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 What is the role of public opinion in trade politics? Previous research either assumes, 
without having solid opinion evidence, that societies are very supportive of free trade, or argues 
that voters have a limited role in trade policy making because they are overshadowed by 
powerful interest groups. In this dissertation, I bridge the gap between the mass behavior and the 
political economy of trade. I argue that we should stop asserting citizens’ preferences and explain 
why some policy makers differ in their responses to citizens’ trade attitudes. Sometimes 
aggregate opinion leans towards free trade; at other times it leans more toward protectionism. 
This is not the result of trade winners and losers changing their minds but of poorly-informed 
bystanders’ assessment of trade. These people, who have no direct stakes in trade, use a neo-
mercantilist shortcut to make sense of openness. Moreover, societies refrain from anti-trade 
sentiment when there is a generous social safety net. Policy makers then decide whether to 
accommodate those views instead of just following their own preferences or business 
lobbying. I argue that policy makers are more willing to be responsive when trade is a 
structurally-determined salient issue and when strong party leaders control campaigns and 
legislative behavior. But the crucial ability to respond to public opinion hinges on the 
administrative dimension of trade politics: responsiveness is greater with more visible policy 
instruments and when the policy-making process is concentrated in a few agencies that facilitate 
policy reform. To test these arguments, I draw on quantitative and qualitative evidence 
from 18 Latin American presidential democracies since 1990, developing a time series index of 
public support for free trade based on the aggregation, processing, and weighting of 
 v 
observational survey data. The hypotheses are confirmed using panel econometric models with 
data on governments’ choices on preferential trade agreements, import tariff rates, and non-tariff 
barriers. I further examine disaggregated opinion and trade policy data and test the causal 
mechanisms with case studies of high (Argentina), moderate (Colombia), and low (Peru) 
responsiveness to public opinion. 
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1.0 Introduction 
A specter haunts customs houses around the world, the specter of protectionism. 
Enthusiasm for free trade is evaporating. The rejection of international trade treaties and low 
import restrictions, previously confined to displaced workers in places like the former 
manufacturing powerhouses of the Mon Valley in Pennsylvania and Sunderland in North East 
England, has filtered into mainstream party platforms. It has been embraced by housewives, school 
teachers, and others with no direct stakes in trade (Colantone and Stanig 2019; Hays, Lim, and 
Spoon 2019; Norris and Inglehart 2019). On the eve of the 2017 G20 Summit in Hamburg, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
issued a joint statement that would have been unimaginable twenty years ago, begging policy 
makers in the most advanced economies not to adopt trade restrictions (IMF, WB, and WTO 2017). 
Since then, the United States and China, the largest world economies, have launched a ferocious 
trade war fought with new high import tariff rates. The European Parliament, for its part, has 
refused to ratify the free trade agreement with the South American Common Market (Mercosur) 
citing concerns with how Brazil manages fires in the Amazon. 
For scholars of developing countries, this should not be entirely surprising. For some time, 
citizens across Latin America have protested and mobilized against the free trade agenda. 
Protectionist sentiment has translated into policy on some occasions. In 1997, Argentine voters’ 
support for free trade was falling (Latinobarometer 1997). The government of Carlos Menem, who 
earlier in the decade had reversed course from his Peronist Party’s strategy of closed borders to 
embrace neoliberal reforms, reacted by requesting the Mercosur’s partners to increase the common 
external tariff while initiating a wave of anti-dumping investigations against Europe, China, and 
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Brazil. By 2001, the Argentine National Trade Commission had approved 80 percent of anti-
dumping requests made since 1998 (World Trade Organization 2007a). However, this sort of 
strong linkage between voters’ views and trade policy does not always materialize. Around the 
same time, polls showed that Peruvians were pessimistic about the benefits of free trade 
(Latinobarometer 1996). The government of Alberto Fujimori, who had pushed the country into 
competitive authoritarianism, did not change tracks with its open borders policy. When Peru 
successfully transitioned to democracy, a similar pattern repeated. By 2004, public support for free 
trade, and especially international treaties, had descended below 45 percent, with rising numbers 
of undecided respondents (CIMA 2004; Latinobarometer 2004). President Alejandro Toledo 
ignored that sentiment and moved forward with the negotiations to conclude a free trade agreement 
with the United States. Four years later, President Alan García proceed with a similar deal with 
China, a deal that was not popular among Peruvians (LAPOP 2008) and that ultimately harmed 
import-competing producers as well as exporting firms in third markets (Mercado, Pierola, and 
Sanchez-Navarro 2019). 
What is the role of public opinion in trade politics? This dissertation proposes a new 
approach to democratic representation and the role of voters in policy making affecting 
international trade integration. Bringing macro politics back into the eminently micro-level 
political economy of trade, I argue that public opinion matters for trade politics in democratic 
regimes. Sometimes aggregate opinion leans towards free trade, other times it leans more toward 
protectionism, and this has policy consequences in democratic regimes. I argue that policy makers 
respond to public opinion by choosing policies that ease restrictions on trade when free trade is 
more popular and by choosing policies that increase restrictions when free trade is less popular. 
This is policy responsiveness, the type of dynamic representation that occurs in democratic 
3 
regimes when policy makers change public policies in the direction of shifts in the aggregate level 
of public (instead of elite or group-specific) support for that public policy (Stimson, Mackuen, and 
Erikson 1995; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002).1 Under the right conditions, trade policy 
will move in the direction of aggregate social views in the same way as is known to happen in 
other public policy areas, such as fiscal policy (Soroka and Wlezien 2010), crime (Canes-Wrone 
and Shotts 2004), individual rights (Lax and Phillips 2009), international migration (Butler, 
Naurin, and Ohberg 2017; Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2017), and defense (Tomz, Weeks, and 
Yarhi-Milo 2020). 
I do not ignore international commitments or specific societal groups. Governments face 
competing demands and constraints when choosing between trade policy outputs and thus the 
political economy of trade has emphasized what specific societal groups want and do. Special 
interest groups lobby policy makers to obtain selective benefits from the regulation of international 
commerce (Alt and Gilligan 1994; Rodrik 1995). Import-competing producers demand protection 
against foreign competition. Exporting firms seek state subsidies to reduce their production costs 
and international reciprocal deals to sell more abroad. Labor unions want to protect jobs and wages 
against layoffs from offshoring and outsourcing and the rising premium for high-skilled 
individuals (Owen 2015). Moreover, national governments face the pressures of globalization. 
There are bilateral, regional, and multilateral international rules on goods, services, investment, 
standards, and government procurement, and dispute settling mechanisms that transfer state 
sovereignty (J. Goldstein 2017). Financial markets can react negatively by moving capital away 
from countries where they see anti-business government behavior (Campello 2015).  
1 Public opinion (I also refer to it as aggregate opinion, aggregate sentiment, and public sentiment) is understood as 
the average opinion of citizens in a given time and place and is different from group-specific opinion (e.g. the 
unemployed; high income voters) and elite opinion (e.g. government officials; media commentators). 
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Rather, I wish to address the elephant of electoral nationwide politics: democratic 
representation requires representatives to be generally in line with what voters want and adjust 
policy if it has lagged too much or drifted too far away from the position of the citizenry. Failing 
to do is expected to bring electoral punishment (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Stokes 
2001; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; Achen and Bartels 2016). Despite competing 
demands from interest groups and the pressures from globalization, lawmakers and political 
appointees depend on votes to survive and those votes may be based on evaluations about policy 
outputs. This should be the case even with economic policies that are the result of multi-causal 
processes, may be complex to analyze, and create varying welfare consequences (Sattler, Freeman, 
and Brandt 2008). 
My theory predicts that there will be trade policy responsiveness when public officials are 
willing and able to follow public opinion, even when it may go against international rules and 
deep-pocketed domestic interests. The economic structure and democratic institutions shape 
willingness to be responsive. First, policy makers pay more attention and react favorably to voters’ 
attitudes when trade is more salient. This occurs when trade figures preeminently in the lives of 
many people. When trade affects just a few people, governments are less predisposed to follow 
aggregate sentiment. Second, responsiveness increases in democracies with strong party leaders 
who have an electoral necessity to appeal to the broader electorate. For example, in presidential 
systems with direct elections, the chief executive has incentives to respond to the median voter. 
Legislators may also have incentives to appeal to the national electorate, but that depends on the 
electoral rules that dictate how candidates are nominated, campaign, and get elected.  
The ability to respond to public opinion depends on the visibility of public policies and the 
institutional setup of the policy-making process. First, I recognize that in contemporary trade 
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politics, the bulk of the job is in hands of non-elected policy makers in the public administration. 
Responsiveness is greater when the policy-making process is concentrated. Concentration reduces 
the coordination issues that arise when several agencies intervene, and it shields the process from 
the recurrent access of special interest groups, removing obstacles that can delay changes to the 
policy status quo. Moreover, I build on the theory of optimal obfuscation (Magee, Block, and 
Young 1989; Kono 2006) and argue that trade policy responsiveness is greater when the trade 
policy instrument involved is more visible for society. When national government leaders make 
public negotiations to reach an international trade treaty, such as Colombia’s Free Trade 
Agreement with the United States, the media covers the episode widely and the public increases 
its attention about the consequences of free trade for themselves and the country. National 
governments have to tread carefully, because going against public opinion can cost them dearly, 
at polls at home as well as reputationally on the world stage. By contrast, responsiveness is lower 
when it concerns more opaque trade policy instruments that are less visible for society, such as 
non-tariff barriers like sanitary restrictions that stop containers with vegetables at the border and 
anti-dumping measures against Vietnamese-made T-shirts. 
This introductory chapter serves four purposes. In the first section I show why 
understanding the true role of voters in trade politics is relevant for the study of globalization and 
democratic representation. The second section introduces the cases of this study: Latin American 
democracies. I explain why it is important to focus on these developing countries and show 
significant variation in trade flows and trade policy outputs across the region. Third, I present my 
conditional theory of trade policy responsiveness. I identify how political institutions and the 
economic structure shape politicians’ willingness to follow voters’ attitudes and how the setup of 
the public administration conditions the ability to respond to aggregate sentiment. This section 
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also rejects the notion that public sentiment on trade should be taken as given and instead offers 
an argument about how the different dimensions of trade globalization and the varying contours 
of the welfare state stimulate popular support for free trade. The fourth section presents the outline 
and empirical strategy, including a unique empirical contribution of this study: a new time series 
index of public support for free trade. 
1.1 The Puzzle 
How do voters participate in their democratic societies’ management of trade integration 
into the global economy? To answer that question, we first need to know what the masses think of 
trade. Existing studies examine the variation and sources of fixed individual trade preferences 
within a society, but they do not allow us to understand whether and why free trade is popular in 
the aggregate. Since the publication of Scheve and Slaughter’s seminal article “What determines 
individual trade-policy preferences?” in 2001, there has been a boom in works in political science 
investigating trade preferences using survey data.2 Scholars have exploited the surge in high-
quality polls that ask people about their views on trade around the world. Those studies argue that 
material self-interest determines individuals’ support for or against free trade very much in the 
same way that the pocketbook affects economic voting at the individual level. As I discuss in 
Chapter Two, the exact source of the economic interest changes according to the theory of 
international trade that scholars rely on: factor endowments, specific economic sectors, consumers’ 
income, the routine intensity of occupations, firms’ productivity levels, and skill endowments (for 
 
2 The article has 885 citations in Google scholar as of September 2020. 
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reviews, see McLaren (2016), Oatley (2017), Owen and Walter (2017), and Naoi (2020)). Studies 
also reveal that individuals process information differently and their attitudes are shaped by school 
socialization, cultural and ideological dispositions, and the weight they give to the wellbeing of 
others (for reviews, see Guisinger (2017) and Naoi (2020). Given all we know about individual 
trade preferences, the “so what” question that emerges is: Does public opinion affect trade policy?  
Existing scholarship on trade politics either assumes that the electorate should matter and 
gets what it wants or instead argues that voters’ preferences have a very limited role in trade policy 
making. The first view claims that the masses of citizens should be represented in policy because 
that is what democratic representation should be about. Neoclassical economists expect workers 
and consumers to benefit from more job opportunities, higher incomes, and cheaper and more 
varied goods generated by the aggregate productivity and welfare gains of trade (Melitz and Trefler 
2012; Goldberg and Pavcnik 2016; Feenstra 2018). Political scientists argue that, if so many voters 
are expected to benefit from trade, first they should like it, and second, their democratic 
representatives should remove trade barriers to please the electorate (Milner and Kubota 2005; 
Kono 2008; Milner and Mukherjee 2009). This position fails to move from the normative world 
to the reality of citizens’ changing (and sometimes apparently incoherent) beliefs and attitudes on 
trade and the multiple public policies that simultaneously regulate cross-border commerce. Such a 
view neglects citizens’ frequent distrust of free trade, the fact that popular support for free trade is 
fragile, or as Blinder puts it, “a mile wide but an inch deep” (Blinder 2019, 121). Some scholars 
tried to remedy this by using snapshots of public opinion (Baker 2009; Kono 2008). But mass 
opinion on trade is not static. Aggregate sentiment is not stable pro free trade. When we recognize 
that, the popular backlash against globalization that took hold of some rich countries since the 
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2008 global financial crisis (Colantone and Stanig 2019; Hays, Lim, and Spoon 2019) is less 
surprising. 
The second common view argues that voters do not know and do not care much about trade 
(Guisinger 2009; 2017), and even if they do, public opinion is too diffuse and cannot compete with 
the powerful organization and money chests of business lobbies with vested interests in trade 
policy outputs (Bearce and Velasco-Guachalla 2020; Betz 2020). Import-competing firms and the 
business associations that represent them offer politicians financial contributions in return for 
policies that raise the domestic price of the good they produce (Grossman and Helpman 1994; 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000). Exporting firms and the clubs that represent them also offer 
contributions, but seeking to lower restrictions at home so as to obtain greater market access for 
their products abroad in reciprocal trade relations (I. S. Kim and Osgood 2019). The firms that 
solve their collective action problems enjoy more resources, time, and knowledge to lobby 
effectively for the policies they want (Olson 1965). In this view, there is little space for disoriented 
and unorganized masses to matter. Undisputedly, political economists are right in examining how 
interest groups with factor-, sector-, or even occupation-specific interests lobby the state to obtain 
policy benefits. However, as I discuss in Chapter Three, that view disregards the fact that policy 
makers who care about their political careers need to respond to voters’ collective opinion, not just 
rhetorically in public statements, but also in public policy. If exporting firms have the information, 
organization, and material means to lobby for economic rents from trade policy, why do we see in 
some instances that governments do not give them what they want? 
In the past, others have proposed that voters matter in trade politics, but they have not 
examined whether changes in observed public opinion on trade translate into changes in trade 
policy. In a classic critique of the dominant paradigms of political economy, Verdier argued that 
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“leaving voters out of the study of democracy is like leaving soldiers out of the study of war” 
(Verdier 1994, xvii). Verdier’s proposed solution was to focus on how voters decide who makes 
trade policy decisions and how those decisions are made depending on how concerned and divided 
voters are about trade relative to other public policy issues. 3 If trade is an issue of great importance 
in society, politicians should seek to represent voters’ preferences on trade; but if trade is of little 
importance to voters, business owners should wield more influence (Verdier 1994, 10).  
Verdier (1994) also challenged the thesis that state officials are autonomous from society 
and that they merely implement economic doctrine. Certainly, public officials can have their own 
ideas about what is good for the country and how to reach it (J. Goldstein 1988). Moreover, 
legislators and executives may follow party doctrines with different trade policy prescriptions. For 
instance, there is evidence from Europe that programmatic parties follow opposing trade policy 
recommendations in their electoral manifestos based on the factor endowment (e.g. labor, capital) 
of their main constituency  (Milner and Judkins 2004; Camyar 2012). But that does not mean that 
when voters elect a leftist party, trade policy is going to become more protectionist. Anecdotal 
evidence from the Socialists in Chile, Ollanta Humala in Peru, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
in México tell us otherwise. It looks like there is something else going on between voters and 
politicians beyond pure economic doctrine or pure leaders’ ideas. The point is whether public 
officials respond to public opinion between elections. 
3 Verdier (1994) did not examine public opinion on trade; he instead used secondary sources to assert what a majority 
of voters wanted at different moments in France, Great Britain, and the United States in the nineteenth century and 
the first half of the twentieth century.  
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Understanding the proper role of voters in trade politics is especially important in our 
globalized world. International institutions reduce the transaction costs of cooperation between 
states, providing information, resolving disputes, and promoting intertemporal commitments 
(Keohane 1984). The international trade institutions of the postwar era, epitomized in the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and a series of multilateral trade rounds, fostered inter-
state cooperation, first between rich nations, and then with the rest of the world (J. L. Goldstein, 
Rivers, and Tomz 2007; J. Goldstein 2017). In addition, cooperation at the regional and bilateral 
level has thrived with the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (Mansfield and Milner 
2012). The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after the Uruguay Round 
further advanced the adjudication of international trade disputes (J. Goldstein 2017). Despite the 
deepening of globalization, national governments retain substantial room to maneuver in policies 
that affect the cross-border integration of goods, services, and factors of production (Garrett 1998; 
Rudra 2008; Hays 2009; Hellwig 2014; Campello 2015). For one thing, treaties include important 
exceptions, such as escape clauses that provide flexibility in the face of an adverse context 
(Rosendorff 2005). For example, WTO rules on temporary trade remedies allow governments to 
impose extra import tariffs on products that have an unusual low international price or that have 
been created with state subsidies. Likewise, WTO tariff ceilings can leave large policy space for 
national public officials to tweak tariff schedules without triggering an inter-state dispute. 
1.2 Trade and Trade Policy in Latin America 
This study examines the role of public opinion in trade politics in Latin America since 1990 
to date. I measure public opinion on trade and estimate how changes in that aggregate sentiment 
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affect what national governments actually do on trade policy (rather than what they say) in 18 
democracies across the region.4 Latin America constitutes an interesting laboratory for several 
reasons. First, all countries in this region are capital scarce economies with low, moderate, and 
upper-moderate levels of income per capita that classify as developing and emerging economies 
in the eyes of the rest of the world. There is variation in terms of relative development between 
these developing and emerging economies, but overall, they constitute a hierarchical variety of 
capitalism, with diversified business groups, foreign investment, low skills, and segmented labor 
markets (Schneider 2013). That allow us to address the implications of international trade theories 
where capital is the scarce factor, a situation very different from that in the United States analyzed 
by most academic studies. For years, there has been a call for more research on the political 
economy of international trade policy outside the United States (Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 
2010). And it is equally valuable to study the mass politics of trade in different contexts, especially 
given the unusual large size of the US economy, the extraordinarily low and stable inflation rate, 
and the relative low level of trade flows as a share of the country’s total output (Guisinger 2017; 
Bearce and Velasco-Guachalla 2020). 
Second, Latin American societies share culture and institutions that facilitate the study of 
policy responsiveness while holding constant important confounders of democratic representation. 
For example, these countries have experienced a common colonial history and the influence of 
Iberian heritage and continental legal traditions. Moreover, for most of the past thirty years, 
countries have experienced democratic regimes with an extended franchise, relatively free and fair 
 
4 The countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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elections, and protection of civil liberties (Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán 2013). More importantly, 
the countries in this geographically delimited world zone have adopted majoritarian presidential 
systems (i.e., chiefs of government are elected by the people and are not responsible to the 
legislature) and proportional electoral systems for the legislature, a combination that is different 
from the United States (majoritarian legislative system and indirect presidential election) and 
Europe (parliamentarism). The presidency is endowed with strong constitutional powers, but 
legislatures remain important, especially when the president’s party does not have a majority of 
seats in Congress (Schneider 2013; Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020). 
Importantly, Latin American countries exhibit wide variation in trade policy choices that 
allows us to estimate the sources of those changes. The trade liberalization reforms of the early 
1990s are widely documented. In a context of economic crisis, with heavy debt burdens, fiscal 
deficits, and ramping inflation, one government after the other adopted measures to liberalize trade 
and financial transactions, shrink the size of the state, and deregulate most aspects of economic 
life.5 Advised by multilateral financial institutions and technocrats, governments abandoned the 
postwar-era import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy and followed comprehensive trade 
liberalization.6 It included unilaterally decreasing import tariff rates, cutting subsidies to domestic 
firms, eliminating import quotas, revoking restrictions to export, and reducing items subject to 
duties and pre-import licenses (Edwards 1995; Rodrik 1994; Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019). 
Also, the old idea of regional integration evolved into trade liberalization projects like Mercosur. 
 
5 One important exception examined later in the dissertation is Colombia, which did not experience an economic crisis 
but liberalized trade in 1990. 
6 In exchange for new loans, troubled states had to agree to conditions in the form of performance criteria, prior actions, 
and structural benchmarks (Wei and Zhiwei 2010; Kaplan 2013; Campello 2015). 
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An extreme version came to be associated with the free trade agenda promoted by the United 
States, including a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (Samford 2010; Tussie 
2011). Countries locked in the changes by joining the WTO, binding tariff rates, and accepting 
changes to national regulations to comply with a long list of trade disciplines (Tussie 2011). The 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) claims that liberalization was “particularly ground-
breaking because trade had historically been the object of heavy criticism and skepticism from the 
region’s most influential economists and politicians” (Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019, 1).  
What is less known is how trade policy evolved in the region in later years after the initial 
“rush to free trade.” There has been little convergence on free trade and the participation in global 
value chains has been very uneven (Bown et al. 2017; Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019). Trade 
flows can be captured as in Figure 1.1 with the De Facto Trade Globalization Index created by the 
KOF Swiss Institute. Higher values of the index (displayed in black) represent greater trade 
openness.7 National trade flows depend on global trade flows, international commodity prices, 
technology development, and the exchange rate, besides national trade policies. Central American 
countries grew significantly in trade openness since 1995. Chile and Mexico exhibited moderate 
growth in openness. The two giants of the Southern Cone (Argentina and Brazil) have remained 
laggards in trade openness, but so did Colombia and Peru, two countries that took significant legal 
and regulatory steps to liberalize trade.  
 
 
7 The index consists of a weighted estimate of the all imports and exports of goods as a share of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), the sum of all trade in services transactions as a share of GDP, and an indicator of trade partner 
diversity based on the (inverted) average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman trading market concentration index for exports 
and imports of goods. 
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Figure 1.1: Catch-All Indicators of Trade Flows and Trade Policy 
 
Note: Black line is the De Facto Trade Globalization Index of the KOF Institute. Red line is the De Jure (Policy) Trade 
Globalization Index of the KOF Institute. Grey dots are scores in the Trade Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation. 
Higher values of each of these indices indicate more free trade. 
 
Most countries in the region are dependent on a few commodities and export destinations 
in a context of high economic volatility. In the late 1990s, the Asian, Russian, and Turkish financial 
crises posed major challenges for emerging economies as national currencies and international 
reserves stocks deteriorated. Furthermore, the global rise of China as a leading exporter of labor-
intensive and increasingly more capital-intensive manufactured goods and an avid buyer of raw 
materials has fully impacted the economic opportunities and challenges that Latin American 
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countries faced in recent years.  In the 2000s, export-led growth in China and its accession to the 
WTO created a commodity boom that increased demand of raw materials such as oil, copper, 
soyabeans, fishmeal, and meat. Chinese demand continues to date, but the rate of growth has 
declined significantly since 2014. 
There is large variation in trade policy outputs, too. Latin American countries did not 
converge around free trade policy, as is increasingly being recognized (Bown and Crowley 2016; 
Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019). The red curve and the grey dots in Figure 1.1 help to visualize 
this fact. The first marker corresponds to the de jure index of trade globalization by the KOF 
Institute.8 The second marker corresponds to the Trade Freedom index of the Heritage 
Foundation.9 Both indicators suggest that countries have frequently chosen protectionist policies. 
However, catch-all measures like these hide the variability of instruments and decisions 
that governments adopt in the field of international commerce, especially given the differentials in 
complexity and visibility across policy tools. We can learn more from disaggregating trade policies 
and studying them independently. In Figure 1.2 we see that in 2010, several but not all countries 
had an average Most Favored Nation (i.e., nondiscriminatory among trading partners) import tariff 
rate significantly lower than they had in the early 1990s, such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru. Some 
states also decreased the number of price, quantity, and quality Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). 
However, there are countries that reduced their import tariffs but increased the use of NTBs, such 
as Mexico. Furthermore, average import tariff rates remained unchanged for almost two decades, 
 
8 The index gauges information on the unweighted mean of import tariff rates, the prevalence of NTBs and compliance 
costs, the share of revenue from taxes on international trade, and the number of free trade agreements. 
9 The index uses the average and the upper and lower bounds of import tariff rates with a penalty for the use of NTBs. 
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such as in Argentina, Bolivia, and Colombia, and even some had higher average rates in 2010 than 
they did in 1992 (Ecuador and Uruguay). By 2018, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador had 
average tariff rates higher than they did in 1992 (Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019, 183).  
 
Figure 1.2: Import Tariff Rates: General Level and Deviation 
 
Source: Author’s own estimation using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Betz (2017). 
Note: MFN tariff rates are calculated at the Harmonized System’s 4-digit level. Standard deviations of tariff rates are 
net of industry-specific effects (e.g., controlling for the fact that agricultural products and electronics are generally 




Finally, countries have also differed in how they make use of the most important innovation 
in the trade policy toolbox of recent years: the PTA. Table 1.1 presents information on the number 
of PTAs signed by each Latin American country as well as their main extra-regional partners. We 
can see that some countries (e.g., Chile, Peru) reached a high stock of treaties in line with their low 
MFN tariffs, although frequently resort to NTBs. Other countries seem to have a relative high 
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number of PTAs by regional standards, like the Mercosur countries, but that masks the fact that 
many of those deals are with regional partners. Instead, other countries that have a low total of 
agreements, cover almost all of their trade flows under preferential rules, including with the United 
States and the European Union. Notably, only three countries have established a PTA with China. 
These are Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru, whose governments have clearly embraced trade policy 
liberalization regardless of the ruling party and, as I will show in the case of Peru, public opinion. 
 
Table 1.1: Preferential Trade Agreements, 1990-2017 






Argentina 15 Mercosur    
Bolivia 3 Comunidad Andina    
Brazil 15 Mercosur    
Chile 30  Yes Yes Yes 
Colombia 20 Comunidad Andina Yes Yes  
Costa Rica 13  Yes Yes Yes 
Dominican Rep. 4  Yes Yes  
Ecuador 5 Comunidad Andina    
El Salvador 8  Yes Yes  
Guatemala 11  Yes Yes  
Honduras 10  Yes Yes  
Mexico 19  Yes Yes  
Nicaragua 7  Yes Yes  
Panama 13  Yes Yes  
Paraguay 15 Mercosur    
Peru 22 Comunidad Andina Yes Yes Yes 
Uruguay 15 Mercosur    
Venezuela 8 Mercosur    
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Organization of American States (2020). 
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1.3 The Argument 
Voters matter for trade politics. The issue before us is not why Peru has so many free trade 
agreements and applies low import tariff rates while Argentina grants so much protection to its 
import-competing producers. Instead, I am interested in explaining why policy makers in some 
countries are better than their counterparts elsewhere at accommodating public opinion when they 
make trade policy choices. The core argument is that public sentiment can be reflected in the 
orientation of trade policy outputs. When many voters support free trade, policy makers should 
remove trade restrictions. When many voters worry or disapprove of free trade, policy makers 
should establish trade restrictions. However, that does not mean that trade policy outputs are 
congruent or perfectly proportionate with mass preferences. Governments face competing 
demands from firms, business associations, workers unions, foreign states, and international 
organizations. Policy makers may also hold personal ideas and party doctrines on how best to 
manage international trade integration. And there is a status-quo bias in policy making, from 
governments’ revenue constraints and the prevalence of budgetary incrementalism to limited space 
on the political agenda (Caughey and Warshaw 2018).  
Acknowledging the limits to perfect responsiveness, I develop a conditional theory of trade 
policy responsiveness. My theory predicts that there will be trade policy responsiveness when 
public officials are willing and able to follow public opinion. A diagram of the theory is shown in 
Figure 1.2 below. The thick arrow represents the causal relationship from public opinion to trade 
policy. The small arrows above represent the economic and political factors that shape willingness 
to respond. The small arrows below represent the public policy dimensions that affect ability to 
respond. I explain each factor below. 
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Figure 1.3: The Conditional Theory of Trade Policy Responsiveness 
 
Government officials need political incentives to accommodate public opinion for dynamic 
representation to occur. Politicians do not want to be replaced by rivals if they do not respond to 
shifts in voters’ demands between elections (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, 
Mackuen, and Stimson 2002). What are the sources of that willingness to respond? The incentives 
that democratic rulers face to adjust policy in response to public opinion differ across countries 
and over time (Powlick and Katz 1998; Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020). First, policy 
responsiveness should be greater on highly salient issues that draw attention from the media and 
voters and pose a direct threat of electoral punishment (Schattschneider 1960; Page and Shapiro 
1983). I argue that commercial policy choices will move in accordance with public opinion when 
the structure of the economy is such that many voters experience the effects of trade flows and 
increase their knowledge about the alternatives to manage trade integration.10 Experimental survey 
evidence confirms that individuals perceive trade to be more salient when their own stakes from 
commercial flows are high (T. W. Taylor 2015). When many people have high stakes in trade, it 
 
10 Verdier (1994) hinted at this factor but did not separate salience from public opinion. 
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should be more prominent in the public debate, not only during electoral campaigns but also in 
between elections. When few members of society directly experience international trade, public 
opinion should have a lesser impact. 
Second, I argue that trade policy responsiveness is higher where political institutions give 
public officials more incentives to appeal to the broader electorate. Political institutions determine 
which actors get to participate in the decision, how they are appointed or elected, and how their 
interactions translate into policy outputs. Political scientists have found that countries with 
particular electoral rules are associated with different types of trade policy outputs (Rogowski 
1987; McGillivray 1997; Nielson 2003; Hankla 2009; Kono 2009; Rickard 2010; Mukherjee 
2016). I bridge the gap between this supply side of trade politics and what society demands 
examining how the presence of political institutions moderate the dynamic relationship between 
public sentiment and governments’ trade decisions. For example, in presidential systems with 
direct elections, the chief executive has incentives to follow public opinion. But presidential 
systems organize the membership, functions, and powers of legislatures differently. The electoral 
system to elect legislators creates incentives for the latter to appeal to the broad electorate and thus 
follow public opinion. Electoral institutions that give more control over platform, strategy, and 
legislative behavior to party leaders, instead of to individual candidates and legislators, motivate 
those party leaders to change trade policy in the direction of changes in aggregate societal opinion. 
The theory’s original contribution is to focus not only on willingness, but also on the ability 
of governments to respond to public opinion. I argue that trade policy responsiveness is greater 
when the setup of the administrative policy-making process within the executive branch is more 
concentrated. The executive branch has a prominent role in trade policy making but there are 
multiple ways to organize the public administration that implements trade policy. The 
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concentration vs. fragmentation of the policy-making process refers to the number of institutional 
veto players within the executive branch whose agreement is necessary to change the policy status 
quo (Tsebelis 2002; Ehrlich 2007). Those veto players are the different cabinet-level and sub-
cabinet-level state agencies that participate in trade policy making. The prevalence of many actors 
jeopardizes coordination and generates opportunities for lobbying by special interest groups. As a 
result, changes to the status quo are blocked or delayed. Therefore, when the trade policy-making 
process is concentrated, the result is that high public support for free trade leads to more free trade 
policy changes and low public support for free trade leads to more trade restrictions.  
Finally, I build on the theory of optimal obfuscation (Magee, Block, and Young 1989; 
Kono 2006) and argue that trade policy responsiveness is greater when the trade policy instrument 
involved is more visible for society. The effects of some trade policies on welfare are easy to 
explain to voters, but there are others whose effects are more complex (Magee, Block, and Young 
1989; Verdier 1994; Kono 2006). Election-motivated policy makers “seek the most informational 
bang for their buck, which means attacking policies whose costs can be explained quickly, easily, 
and cheaply” (Kono 2006, 370). Tariffs are taxes, whose effects are straightforward: a 30 percent 
import tariff rate raises the price of an imported good subject to the duty by 30 percent. By contrast, 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) encompass price, quantity, and quality control measures. How these 
measures work is highly complex. Customs procedures to clear imports do not make headlines in 
the evening news or in the campaign trail. Moreover, governments now resort to preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) to lock in commitments to maintain trade restrictions low between partners. 
While these treaties have increasingly included more chapters on different types of disciplines, 
PTAs as a package remain a very visible trade policy that capture people’s minds and frequently 
trigger strong pro- and anti-deal attitudes. This theory thus allows for the fact that policy makers 
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make decisions on separate trade policies in multiple and opposite directions. In sum, trade policy 
responsiveness will be greatest with the most visible trade policies, such as PTAs, and lowest with 
the least visible trade policies, such as NTBs.  
Before concluding this section, I address the immediate question that emerges from the 
claim that public opinion shapes trade policy: Where does public opinion on trade come from? 
First, I argue that aggregate mass opinion hinges on what ordinary people with no direct stakes on 
trade, whom I call the bystanders, believe about trade. The literature predicts which individuals 
like free trade because they directly win from it and which dislike trade because they directly 
oppose it. That is insufficient to understand why aggregate opinion moves without changes in 
structural factors that lead winners and losers to support or oppose free trade. Rather, the popularity 
of free trade depends on bystanders. To assess trade, they follow a neo-mercantilist reasoning 
which builds from the fact that trade openness has two components: imports and exports. Selling 
more exports abroad is portrayed by the media and the elite as a good thing because it creates jobs 
and signals national strength. By contrast, the neo-mercantilist view thinks that buying many 
imported goods from abroad is a bad thing because it threatens jobs, is unfair and unsafe, and 
makes the nation look weak. A boost of exports increases aggregate support for free trade, and 
import shocks decrease aggregate support for free trade.  
My second argument is that not all surges in imports and sustained high levels of imports 
will trigger a protectionist backlash. Proponents of the embedded liberalism compact argue that 
government-provided social protection can compensate the losers from trade integration. I add that 
social protection can dissuade bystanders from joining the anti-free trade coalition. Therefore, 
countries with a more generous welfare net should maintain relatively stable public opinion on 
trade in the face of an import shock. 
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1.4 The Empirical Strategy 
1.4.1 Measuring Public Opinion on Trade 
If the survival of free trade rests on the strength of popular support for it, we must ask, how 
popular is free trade? The study of the dynamic relationship between public opinion and trade 
policy thus requires a prior step: to identify (instead of assuming) what public opinion on trade 
looks like over time. This simple question has escaped a clear answer in multi-country studies 
given that polls provide different pieces of evidence based on place, time, question wording, and 
answer options. We need data on as many survey items as possible that can be interpreted as 
stemming from an underlying public support for free trade. To address this issue, I created an 
original time series index of public support for free trade for the 18 Latin American countries from 
circa 1990 to 2017. The index was created based on the identification, collection, cleaning, and 
aggregation of existing observational data of thousands of responses to 25 survey questions on 
trade asked in Spanish, English, and/or Portuguese repeatedly over time (Chapter Two presents 
the detailed procedure). The public opinion data were combined using factor analysis, weighting 
each question’s ratio of change by the degree to which it correlates with the quantity of interest, 
into a single opinion series by modeling their common variance. The index, estimated following 
the dyad ratios method (Stimson 1991; 2018), constitutes the most reliable instrument to date to 
assess the popularity of free trade across a large number of economies for three decades.11 The 
 
11 Public opinion on a public policy issue like trade is a measure of absolute preference for that policy issue (Caughey 
and Warshaw 2018), not an indicator of preference for change in respect to the level of policy currently being provided 
by government (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002). 
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results discussed in Chapter Two show that free trade is less popular, and that sentiment is more 
unstable, than previously thought.  
1.4.2 Estimating Responsiveness: Quantitative Evidence 
I use econometric models to study responsiveness to public opinion on panel data for 18 
Latin American democracies in the 1995-2017 period. The index of public support for free trade 
is the major independent variable. I measure the moderators that affect willingness and ability to 
respond to voters with the following: the share of employment in tradable sectors, the personal 
vote index, and the number of agencies that participate in trade decisions. The first and the last 
indicators are novel for the study of trade policy. To test the hypothesis on the visibility of trade 
policy, I use three dependent variables: the number of signed preferential trade agreements (most 
visible), the mean non-discriminatory import tariff rate, and the number of non-tariff import 
barriers initiated (least visible). I use a variety of panel econometric models (random effects, fixed 
effects, autodistributive lagged, and error correction models and provide visual support to 
understand each result. The statistical evidence suggests that governments sign more PTAs and 
lower tariff rates when average support for free trade is higher. By contrast, there is no evidence 
that high popular support for free trade directly leads to a decrease in non-tariff barriers. Moreover, 
the results indicate that electoral systems where party leaders have more control and the 
concentration of policy making in a few public agencies increase the responsiveness to shifts in 
aggregate sentiment on trade. 
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1.4.3 Case Studies: Qualitative Evidence 
Cross-country studies cannot verify whether the causal mechanisms are present or whether 
they operate as expected. I am interested not only in whether one variable affects another, but also 
how such a causal relationship arises (Imai et al. 2011). Therefore, the research design is 
complemented with three country case studies: Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. The case studies 
are more than a mere illustration. They serve to verify the mechanism that is truly operating and 
show how it produces the outcome (Fearon and Laitin 2008; Goertz 2017). The case studies are 
based on my fieldwork conducted in 2018, 2019, and 2020, in Buenos Aires, Lima, and Bogotá, 
respectively. I interviewed former and current legislators and senior public officials in charge of 
trade policy making, from Ministers of Finance and of Foreign Relations, to Secretaries and 
Deputy Ministers of Trade, to international trade negotiators and other expert officials. I asked 
them about their jobs and their views on the influence of voters, electoral pressures, and special 
interest groups, as well as their views on inter-branch and inter-agency relations. I also interviewed 
executive leaders of national business associations12 and local public opinion analysts, economic 
historians, and other scholars.  
Case selection is based on the method of difference: one case (Argentina) has high 
responsiveness, another has low responsiveness (Peru), and a third one has intermediate 
responsiveness (Colombia). The cases share important traits, none of which explains the difference 
in the frequency and degree in which public officials follow voters’ revealed attitudes on trade. 
 
12 The Unión Industrial Argentina, the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia, the Confederación 
Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas and the Cámara de Comercio de Lima in Peru. 
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The three are emerging economies in South America,13 scarce domestic capital, large informal 
sectors, trade integration based in comparative advantage in the primary sector, and high 
dependence on international commodity prices.14 Institutionally, the three countries have 
presidential systems and allow presidential and legislative reelection.15 Colombia has been a stable 
competitive regime for many decades. Argentina recurrently experienced regime change, with 
breakdowns of democracy by means of military coups, but it has been a democracy since 1983. 
Peru transitioned from military dictatorship to democracy in 1980 but it suffered from democratic 
erosion with a self-coup in 1992. Full democratization was achieved again in 2001.16  
As the positive responsiveness case, Argentina has high trade salience (a large labor force 
in import-competing industries in large metropolitan districts), strong party leaders, and 
concentrated policy making in a few political appointees. Colombia and Peru each misses one or 
more of these attributes. In Peru, few workers are employed in the mines and non-traditional 
agricultural lands. And few workers are employed in import-competing manufacturing industries. 
Moreover, the whole political system is unstable and political parties have very weak linkages with 
citizens. In Colombia, the electoral system rewards individual candidates over parties in legislative 
elections and the trade policy-making process is very fragmented. 
 
13 Argentina remains the richest in income per capita terms adjusted for purchasing power (US$ 22,000), followed by 
Colombia (US$ 14,700) and Peru (US$ 12,900). 
14 Top exports are soybeans, wheat, and livestock in Argentina; oil, gold, and coffee in Colombia; and gold, copper, 
and fishmeal in Peru. 
15 It was banned in Peru in 2018. 




The dissertation continues in Chapter Two with the introduction of the index of public 
support for free trade. I describe the available evidence of how societies collectively lean towards 
free trade over time and then present a theory to explain changes in that aggregate opinion. The 
chapter contains the statistical analysis to estimate how export, imports, and social protection shape 
public support for free trade, controlling for other factors that could affect shifts in opinion, such 
as economic growth, inflation, and unemployment. I use a variety of panel econometric models: 
random effects, fixed effects, autodistributive lagged, and error correction models. First, I find that 
higher exports significantly increase popular support for free trade. Second, higher imports in 
general depress public support. Third, opinion became more protectionist in societies more 
exposed to the import shock from China. While Latin American economies have been able to boost 
their exports of foodstuff, oil, and minerals to the Asian giant, they have also seen an exponential 
growth of cheap manufactured imports (Bown et al. 2017; Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019). 
Finally, I show that higher government transfers of cash to the unemployed, the poor, the elderly, 
i.e. the vulnerable elements of society, contribute to solidify popular approval of trade integration. 
Increases in import volumes increase support for unrestricted commerce at higher levels of public 
spending in social protection per capita.  
Chapter Three presents the conditional theory of trade policy responsiveness, including 
hypotheses for how responsiveness is affected by the economic salience of trade, the electoral 
institutions and incentives of national policy makers, the concentration of the trade policy-making 
process, and the visibility of the policy instrument involved. Chapter Three also presents the 
statistical analysis linking changes in the index of public support for free trade to trade policy 
outputs. The results confirm i) that direct responsiveness is greater with PTAs, moderate with tariff 
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rates, and nonexistent with NTBs, ii) that conditional responsiveness is diminished in democracies 
where individual candidates have more leeway than party leaders, iii) that having many 
institutional veto players weakens the link between aggregate opinion and trade policy, and iv) 
weak evidence that responsiveness to public opinion depends on having more workers employed 
in tradable sectors. This chapter also discusses differences in support for free trade between groups 
of voters. 
Chapter Four consists of a case study of Argentina from 1990 to 2017, based on my 
fieldwork conducted in 2018. The case study describes major trade policy changes encompassing 
eight presidential administrations (Carlos Menem I, Carlos Menem II, Fernando de la Rua, Néstor 
Kirchner, Cristina Kirchner I, Cristina Kirchner II, and the first part of Mauricio Macri) and 
reviews survey data from different sources on Argentine voters’ attitudes toward trade over time 
(used as input for the index presented in Chapter Two). This chapter then explains how the 
economic structure, the electoral system, and the organization and working of the public 
administration foster and enable a high level of trade policy responsiveness.  
Chapter Five is a case study of Colombia from 1990 to 2018, describing major trade policy 
changes across seven presidential administrations (César Gaviria, Ernesto Samper, Andrés 
Pastrana, Álvaro Uribe I, Álvaro Uribe II, Juan Manuel Santos I, and Juan Manuel Santos II). The 
chapter also includes detailed information from different surveys on public opinion on trade for 
the different subperiods. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the economic structure, the 
political system, and the organization and working of the public administration. Using interviewed 
elite responses during fieldwork, I identify two major sources of low trade policy responsiveness: 
a highly fragmented policy-making process with many veto-wielding technocrats participating in 
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trade policy decisions and the presence of electoral rules that promote individual candidates over 
parties in legislative elections.  
Chapter 6 is a case study of Peru between 1990 and 2018. The chapter provides information 
on the evolution of public opinion on trade and trade policy changes during the first years of 
Fujimori’s government, the subsequent fall into competitive authoritarianism for the rest of the 
decade, and the four presidential administrations in the contemporary period since democratization 
in 2001. With the insights from interviews conducted in my fieldwork in 2019, the chapter 
examines why responsiveness has been so hard in this country, showing how trade policy 
(especially PTAs and tariff rates) has moved to more liberalization, closer to the preferences of 
technocrats and large exporting firms, despite public sentiment unenthusiastic for free trade. 
Finally, Chapter Seven presents a conclusion that summarizes the major contributions of 
the study, addresses theoretically the issue of elites shaping public opinion, and proposes 
extensions from this research. 
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2.0 When Do Societies Support Free Trade? 
If public opinion matters in trade politics, we must first address two questions. How 
popular is free trade in society? And when do societies support free trade? Existing studies examine 
individual survey responses and make predictions about which persons have preferences for or 
against free trade, assuming these remain constant over time. People who lose from international 
competition have a self-interest in protection while those who win prefer free trade (J. B. Jensen, 
Quinn, and Weymouth 2017; J. Frieden 2019; Margalit 2019). However, we do not know much 
about the aggregate (in contrast to the individual) level of support for unrestricted commerce over 
time. 
To remedy this gap, this chapter directs attention to people who do not hold a pocketbook 
interest in trade openness. Many people are not directly exposed to trade and only have intuitions 
and imperfect knowledge of how commerce affects their lives, those of their families, 
communities, and nations (Ardanaz, Murillo, and Pinto 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; 2013; 
Guisinger 2017). These ordinary “bystanders” rely on a neo-mercantilist shortcut according to 
which selling more exports abroad appears as a better outcome than buying more imported goods 
from foreigners. For the masses, high exporting performance reflects a strong economic standing 
and increases national pride (Guisinger 2017; Bearce and Moya 2020; Silver, Schumacher, and 
Mordecair 2020). On the contrary, high import volumes, while a possible source of lower 
consumer prices (Baker 2009; cf. Betz and Pond 2019), trigger threats of higher unemployment 
and feelings of unfairness, all amplified by negative press coverage (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; 
Guisinger 2017; Colantone and Stanig 2019; Bearce and Moya 2020). This could be especially the 
case with the surge in Chinese imports, that dislocate important local sources of living across 
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Western states (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013). Given that bystanders are sensitive to these 
images, a boost of exports should increase aggregate support for free trade while import shocks 
should generate a more protectionist aggregate sentiment.  
However, high import flows should not necessarily lead to a protectionist backlash. The 
second argument developed in this chapter is that import penetration should not depress public 
support for free trade when there is a generous safety net in place. For many decades, scholars and 
practitioners claimed that governments could fend off criticism of free trade if they provided 
generous social protection to contain the losers of globalization. According to this formula, known 
as embedded liberalism, governments committed to free trade are willing to increase government 
spending in active and passive labor markets to cushion the transition of workers from industries 
impacted by import penetration to other sectors (Ruggie 1982; Rodrik 1998; Hays 2009).  
The notion of embedded liberalism, however, was developed with regard to wealthy, open 
economies such as those in Western Europe. The concept does not travel easily to countries that 
developed generous social protection regimes under closed economies (Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo 2001; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011). In several developing 
countries, governments increased public spending on welfare benefits to support domestic 
consumers of goods produced by firms directly benefited from very high trade policy barriers 
(Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011). That arrangement disappeared with the transition of closed 
economies to globalization. Since the 1980s, the removal of controls to capital flows and trade 
barriers has reduced spending on social protection, although not in health and education (Kaufman 
and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Rudra 2008). The extent to which social 
protection can stop the protectionist backlash and substitute for trade protection remains a matter 
of empirical test. 
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Public support for free trade cannot be taken for granted, and yet it has been almost 
impossible to test these ideas. The inattention to temporal variation and the focus on variables that 
predict individual preferences obfuscate the efforts to measure and explain voters’ opinion on trade 
(Oatley 2017; Naoi 2020). In this chapter, I present a new index of public support for free trade 
for each of 18 Latin American countries that relies on a massive volume of observational survey 
data. I collected all available mass survey data from questions in nationally representative polls 
about evaluations of and attitudes toward international trade in general as well as trade policies, 
with questions made at least more than once between 1990 and 2017. I computed the percentage 
of people who gave answers supportive of the removal of trade restrictions for each of the 25 
unique survey items about trade asked two or more times at any time in the indicated period, 
amounting to a total of 536 aggregate survey marginals. I then used the scaling dyad ratios method 
(Stimson 1991; 2018) to control for survey and time effects in the unbalanced panels to create the 
new continuous index of (latent) popular support for free trade for 444 country-year observations. 
I document important trends in aggregate opinion on trade across countries and over time. 
In the full panel, “only” 54 percent of the public favors trade openness, with a standard deviation 
of almost 10 percentage points. The evidence shows that there are societies with stable, low 
enthusiasm for commercial freedom (e.g. Argentina) and others with stable, high levels of support 
(e.g. Chile). There are countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela that experience a high level of 
instability in their macro opinion on trade. But in every case, there is movement. Since 1996, when 
all countries in the sample have at least one observation, the average change reflected in the index 
is of more than a quarter of a percentage point in a given country-year. Some societies seem to 
move together in the same direction at certain points in time, as was the case during and 
immediately after the global financial crisis of the past decade. Other nations experience their own 
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ebbs and flows. Interestingly, there is no homogenous trend in all countries. While at the end of 
the series the average regional public approval of free trade is seven points higher than it was 
twenty years before, there is no clear evidence of convergence in support for unrestricted 
integration. 
2.1 Previous Research on the Mass Politics of Trade 
The overwhelming focus of existing research on the mass politics of trade is not on the 
level and stability of public support for free trade but on the sources of relatively fixed individual 
trade preferences. Observational studies using individual responses to polls find support for the 
thesis that material self-interest determines individuals’ support for or against free trade in line 
with models of economic voting according to which the pocketbook determines individual 
electoral behavior. The exact source of the economic interest changes according to the theory of 
international trade that scholars rely on. Tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson model 
of factor endowments show that higher personal income and higher level of education increases 
support for free trade in rich countries because individuals who “own” the abundant factor increase 
their income with unrestricted trade (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005). By 
contrast, studies that assume low capital mobility confirm the expectations of the Ricardo-Viner 
model: individuals in import-competing industries oppose trade liberalization and individuals in 
exporting industries support openness (Hiscox 2001; Hays 2009). A major factor we cannot omit 
is that workers will not necessarily receive the same benefits that accrue to their employers that 
lobby; intra-sector solidarity between employers and employees works better when institutions 
force the former to share profits with the latter (Dean 2016). Other explorations in egoistic 
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preferences emphasize skill endowments in imperfect labor markets (Walter 2017) and the routine 
intensity of occupations (Owen and Johnston 2017).  
Survey experiments embedded in opinion polls, moreover, reveal that factors other than 
personal economic hardship explain individual trade preferences. Recent research underscores the 
importance of how individuals receive and process information (Ardanaz, Murillo, and Pinto 2013; 
Guisinger 2017; Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019), their school socialization (Hainmueller and 
Hiscox 2006), union membership (S. E. Kim and Margalit 2017), cultural and ideological 
dispositions (Margalit 2012; N. M. Jensen and Shin 2014; Rathbun 2016), and the weight people 
give to the wellbeing of neighbors, co-ethnics, and co-nationals (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; 2013; 
Guisinger 2017). Recent literature reviews report a very prolific and yet inconclusive landscape of 
explanations for individual trade preferences (Oatley 2017; Naoi 2020).  
Previous studies are not very useful to explain aggregate support for free trade over time. 
In other words, the literature is ill-suited to predict the rise and fall of the “neoliberal consensus” 
at the mass level at the turn of the century (Seligson 1999; Armijo and Faucher 2002; Baker 2003) 
and the emergence of the “backlash against globalization” that we witness today (Colantone and 
Stanig 2019; J. Frieden 2019; Margalit 2019; Naoi 2020).  
There are several problems. First, these studies explain variation across individuals in a 
society rather than across societies. The estimated effect of one survey respondent’s pocketbook 
on her trade preferences has little external validity to explain the average attitudes of the electorate 
on the same issue.17 To measure and explain public support for free trade over time and across 
 
17 Further, the discussion of validity extends to the types of participants in embedded survey experiments commonly 
used in the US-based literature (e.g., college students, a pre-paid Internet users) (see, Guisinger 2017; Naoi 2020). 
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societies we must consider both the representativeness of the poll to include different groups of 
individuals and the central tendency of answers across respondents. Second, existing studies fail 
to account for the time that passes for the effects of exposure to trade openness to materialize on 
investment decisions, the labor market, and consumption patterns. The skill endowment of the 
labor force as well as the distribution of employment across industries are two central variables 
derived from the standard international trade theories to explain individual preferences. However, 
both factors change rather slowly. As McLaren (2016, 120) puts it, in “two years the material 
interest of voters surely had not changed drastically; mobility costs or skill endowments had not 
undergone a radical overhaul.” So how are we to rely just on, for example, a static indicator of 
skill endowment to explain longitudinal variation in aggregate opinion?  
Third, existing studies of individual trade preferences usually are based in one-time shots, 
i.e. use responses collected at one point in time that aim to retrieve the source of trade preferences 
without consideration of changing political and economic conditions (Naoi 2020). This problem 
is not caused by negligence but data availability. Until recently, single-country and multi-country 
opinion surveys have rarely asked the same questions in different points in time. Thus major 
studies of the mass politics of trade, such as Baker’s (2009) on Latin America, used few survey 
data points from one or two questions from one or two pollsters for a small number of countries 
covering less than a decade and with high sparsity of annual coverage (and typically dropping the 
“do not know” response category). Perhaps these reasons explain why models based on factor and 
skill endowments that predict high support for liberal trade in the developing world cannot explain 
episodes of reduction in support in such economies (Rodríguez Chatruc et al. 2019). This issue 
may be better addressed with insights from the comparative and American literatures on mass 
political behavior that link changes in public opinion to public policies (Wlezien 1995; Soroka and 
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Wlezien 2010) and the national economy (Stevenson 2001; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; 
Wlezien and Soroka 2019). Such studies, however, have their own shortcomings as they might 
exacerbate endogeneity in any causal claim between trade policy and public opinion on trade as 
well as fail to capture the varying effects of the national economy on aggregate attitudes toward 
trade.18 
Finally, the majority of studies rely on opinion polls from developed economies with stable, 
high levels of trade openness (Margalit 2019; Naoi 2020). There is scant evidence on whether 
existing theories derived from affluent and open economies help us understand trade opinion in 
the developing world. For example, in Tunisia, a recently democratized Muslim country with high 
trade flows, survey respondents follow their economic self-interest rather than socio-cultural 
identities when evaluating trade (Jamal and Milner 2019). But across Latin American countries, 
both skills, economic beliefs, and ideology are found to explain individual trade preferences 
(Magaloni and Romero 2008; Rodríguez Chatruc et al. 2019). The sources of economic self-
interest may work differently across levels of development, too. In previously closed developing 
economies that adopt trade liberalization, citizens could evaluate trade less for its impact on 
employment and more for what it delivers in terms of cheaper, higher quality, and varied consumer 
goods (Baker 2003; 2009). However, there is no systematic evidence that consumers’ “obsession 
with prices” (Baker 2009, 15) is reflected in trade policy outputs; in fact, imported consumer 
 
18 For instance, economic growth may boost support for openness among people who can buy imported goods but can 
depress it among individuals facing foreign competition necessary to satisfy the increased demand for goods (see, 
Owen and Quinn (2016) and Mansfield, Mutz, and Brackbill (2019)). 
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products are levied at higher duty rates than other products (Betz and Pond 2019; Bearce and Moya 
2020). 
Ultimately, the national context comes to the forefront in another important way. The 
conventional wisdom according to which the losers of trade mute their opposition when they 
receive state compensation is based on the empirical regularities of the rich world in the postwar 
era (Ruggie 1982; Rodrik 1998; Hays 2009). The open economies with generous safety nets of the 
affluent West are very different from those found in the Global South (Rodrik 1998; Rudra 2008; 
Rudra and Tobin 2017). Globalization is thought to put downward pressures on welfare regimes 
in fiscally scarce and financially dependent economies so that there are fewer resources with which 
to compensate the losers of cross-border competition (Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Rudra 2008). 
However, while the empirical link from trade openness to public spending on social protection has 
been thoroughly studied across the developing world (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Rudra 
2008; Nooruddin and Rudra 2014; Rudra and Tobin 2017), there is still no evidence that 
government compensation helps to sustain public support for free trade in such countries. Absent 
such test our general understanding of the mass politics of trade will remain obscure. 
2.2 Explaining Public Support for Free Trade 
This chapter presents a new theory of public support and opposition to international trade. 
The first leg of the argument starts with the fact that public support for free trade is not constant 
over time. To make sense of changes in aggregate trade sentiment, I focus on the real and perceived 
effects of the two components of trade openness: imports and exports. While each trade component 
affects the interests and preferences of people who win from more integration and those who lose 
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from more competition, there are many people who have no direct stake on trade, whom I call 
bystanders. The relatively stable pocketbook interests of winners and losers from international 
trade alone cannot explain why aggregate opinion changes. By contrast, bystanders have feeble 
opinions on trade, so they sometimes join the free trade camp and other times they join the 
protectionist coalition. Bystanders use a neo-mercantilist shortcut, according to which selling more 
exports abroad is relatively better than buying a lot of imported goods from foreigners.  
The second leg of the argument is that huge increases in or sustained high levels of imports 
should not always drive the public away from free trade. Government provision of welfare benefits 
can compensate the negative effects of trade and create broad support for trade. Average opinion 
should be less protectionist when the state compensates people from the risks of globalization. The 
interesting point is that this is less of a conscious pact but the long-term consequence of the 
intimate link between social protection and trade protection in previously closed developing 
countries. The theory thus addresses the changing role of the state in the economy in developing 
countries. 
2.2.1 Imports, Exports, and Public Opinion 
Aggregate trade sentiment is more than the number of people who win from trade (and thus 
support free trade) minus the people who lose from it (and thus oppose it). A naïve account of 
aggregate opinion on trade would claim that societies with many members who win from 
international trade should exhibit higher levels of support for free trade than societies with many 
members who lose from it. This plausible explanation correctly assumes that trade generates not 
only national welfare gains from aggregate productivity and access to goods (Melitz and Trefler 
2012; Goldberg and Pavcnik 2016; Feenstra 2018) but within-country welfare disparities, too. If 
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commerce merely enlarged total output and allowed for cheaper goods to satisfy households needs, 
openness should be always popular everywhere. Trade generates welfare disparities, creating 
winners and losers who support and oppose free trade, respectively (J. B. Jensen, Quinn, and 
Weymouth 2017; J. Frieden 2019; Margalit 2019). Those who have a direct benefit or disadvantage 
from trade have a rational self-interest for or against it. Different international trade theories from 
economics identify the likely winners and losers, but the larger point is that the winners, e.g. 
abundant factor owners or individuals employed in firms that export, have a (stable) self-interest 
in free trade and support it. The losers, e.g. scarce factor owners or those exposed to high import 
penetration, offshoring, and outsourcing, have a self-interest in protection so they will express 
opposition (Owen and Quinn 2016).  
Aggregate trade sentiment is also comprised by those who have no clear stake on trade. I 
argue that what moves aggregate opinion on trade is the combination of the relatively stable 
positions for and against commerce from the direct winners and losers, plus the fluctuating mood 
of the citizens in between them, whom I call bystanders. Bystanders do not derive their income 
from tradable sectors or occupations and their closest experience with trade is as consumers of 
tradable consumer goods.19  
Bystanders are crucial to understand changes in overall public support for free trade 
because they have feeble, changing attitudes on trade, whereas trade winners and trade losers have 
relatively stable opinions. The available survey data provides preliminary support for this 
assertion. Consider Mexican voters, for example. Every two years, the Mexican private university 
 
19 Bystanders may be producers of non-tradable goods (or services) for domestic individuals who work in tradable 
sectors. 
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CIDE conducts a high-quality survey of citizens’ attitudes on trade and other foreign policy issues. 
This survey includes a question on the industry in which respondents are employed allowing to 
get at the attitudes of different segments of society affected unevenly by trade and eventually test 
the Ricardo-Viner theory of specific factors. In Figure 2.1, we see that respondents who are 
employed in tradable sectors, such as agriculture, have very similar opinions about the effects of 
free trade on the national economy over three survey waves. By contrast, the percentage of 
respondents who work in services, retail, and other non-tradable sectors who agree with the 
statement that free trade is good for the country varies significantly over time.20 
Figure 2.1: Stability of Support for Free Trade by Economic Sector 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on survey data for Mexico from CIDE’s Las Américas y el Mundo project, 
various years. 
 
20 The results of support for free trade by sector of employment are replicated in other countries where the same Las 
Américas y el Mundo survey project was fielded, such as Brazil, Colombia, and Perú, but there are just two waves 
available in each of those countries. 
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Why do bystanders change their attitudes toward trade? Bystanders rely on economic 
narratives based on sociotropic concerns, stereotypes, and elite cues rather than micro-signals (e.g. 
trade-affected wage levels) to evaluate how trade openness affects their lives and those of whom 
they care about. The connection from trade openness to mass attitudes does not require that “all 
voters possess a sophisticated understanding of the distributional implications of trade” (J. B. 
Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2017, 428). Research shows that voters follow sociotropic concerns 
about the benefits to others into their evaluations of government performance and public policies 
(Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Healy and Malhotra 2013). Some 
observational and experimental evidence in the United States confirms that the perceived benefits 
of trade to the nation, the community, and the ethnic group are as, or more, important than personal 
interests in shaping trade preferences (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; 2013; Guisinger 2017). There is 
mounting evidence that trade competition has real negative impacts on local labor markets, putting 
downward pressure on wages and leading to layoffs in districts with manufacturing industries 
(Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013). Those local changes have produced important changes in 
residents’ perceptions about the advantages and disadvantages of globalization, even in residents 
who did not work in import-competing firms (Silver, Schumacher, and Mordecair 2020). 
Bystanders follow economic narratives. Only very few people know and care where their 
coffee mugs, kitchen tables, canned peas, or the paper for their books were made. Those who know 
are typically those with a direct stake on producing that stuff. But bystanders do not know the 
origins of their appliances, auto-parts, and sport shoes. People not directly affected by trade “hold 
diffuse prior beliefs over trade policy, and hence are more likely to update their opinion on trade’s 
desirability when exposed to frames that emphasize its effects on prices and employment” 
(Ardanaz, Murillo, and Pinto 2013, 413). Bystanders learn the benefits and costs from open 
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commerce indirectly, from family, colleagues, or opinion leaders, whether journalists, interest 
groups spokespersons, or public officials. The content of the messages about trade varies across 
family members, news channels, and working spaces.  
In a world of imperfect information and competing elite messages, rationally ignorant 
bystanders find it appealing to use a neo-mercantilist shortcut according to which selling more 
exports abroad is relatively better than buying a lot of imported goods from foreigners. The neo-
mercantilist shortcut derives from the fact that trade involves two flows: imports of goods (and 
similarly, the outsourcing of services) and exports of goods (and the inflow of foreign services). 
Most scholars consider trade flows combined when examining trade preferences, but much more 
can be gained by disaggregating the flows into imports and exports (Hays 2009; Kleinberg and 
Fordham 2010).21 The picture that emerges is one of trade having mixed effects on attitudes. 
Recent studies show that higher imports lead to higher aggregate support for a greater role of the 
government in the economy (Owen and Quinn 2016) as well as to fewer votes for the incumbent 
party in national elections (J. B. Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2017), with exactly the reverse 
effects for increases in exports. Even if we assume that the distribution of the labor force across 
economic sectors remains stable, changes in exports and imports at the aggregate level may alter 
average public sentiment on trade because of bystanders with feeble opinions.  
The neo-mercantilist shortcut is simple and effective. It defies mainstream economic theory 
that predicts aggregate gains from trade but is simple enough to attract many people as evidenced 
 
21 Each of these trade flows changes over time due to exogenous factors, such as shifts in global demand, commodity 
prices, and the policies of foreign governments, as well as public policies implemented by the home government, from 
policing crime to spending in public infrastructure to commercial regulations. 
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by its re-emergence in elite discourse and in mass polls in recent years (Blinder 2019). It is rooted 
in ordinary people’s economic ignorance (Rho and Tomz 2017) and their need for security and 
certainty (Johnston 2013). According to the neo-mercantilist view, robust export volumes are a 
positive outcome in itself. High exports signal greater competitiveness. Politicians across the aisle 
boast about them (Guisinger 2017; Bearce and Moya 2020). Exports are seen as a proxy for good 
economic performance, represent opportunities for new jobs, and become a source of advantage 
in world markets (Lee and Osgood 2019; Silver, Schumacher, and Mordecair 2020). Ask a 
Peruvian about the display of Pisco and quinoa products in a grocery store abroad, and you will 
get an emotional response about the high quality of their food and beverages. Argentines you meet 
in a bar or take a taxi bring proud stories about being the world’s grain mill (granero del mundo) 
and selling tubular steel (los tubos de Techint) to the yanquis (Argentine for gringo).  
Certainly, someone could make the reservation that higher exports may be 
counterproductive for society when they increase the domestic price of households’ food basket. 
In the postwar era, for instance, Argentine exports were wage goods, “the very foods and fibers 
which constitute 80% of the family budgets of wage-earning Argentines” (Merkx 1969, 107). 
However, since the 1980s the profile of exporting goods has changed dramatically there and in 
other parts of the region, with the rise of exports of soybeans (that feed livestock, not humans), 
petroleum, gold, cut flowers, or organic asparagus that weight lightly in household consumption 
in the economies of origin (Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019).22 While Argentines and Brazilians 
still boast about their beefs, the premium cuts that are exported to New York, Paris, and Dubai are 
not the same that are consumed domestically, except for the small fraction of wealthy people. 
 
22 In the statistical analysis below, I control for changes in domestic consumer prices. 
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Imported goods, by contrast, are seen as threats to employment, specific industries, and the 
general economy. This is terrifying not only for those who directly lose from import competition 
but also for people who are not directly affected by such changes. There is mounting micro-level 
evidence that people form preferences about trade in terms of employment, not prices (Rodríguez 
Chatruc et al. 2019; Bearce and Moya 2020). The latest survey evidence across Latin American 
countries from the Latinobarometer project shows that individuals think about trade more in terms 
of employment and wages rather than product prices. In 2018, 58 percent of Latin American 
respondents believed that trade produced higher employment, while only 33 percent believed it 
produced lower prices. The results are very similar for previous years in which the question was 
asked. The general pattern from the pooled data replicates in individual countries, from societies 
that tend to be skeptic of free trade, such as Argentina (more jobs: 44 percent; lower prices: 24 
percent), to societies where trade is highly popular, such as Guatemala (more jobs: 53 percent; 
lower prices: 33 percent) and Panama (more jobs: 60 percent; lower prices: 21 percent). Chile is 
the only of the 18 countries were the Latinobarometer survey was conducted that had a larger 
number of respondents saying that trade produces lower prices compared to those who said it 
created more jobs. Moreover, statistical analyses of the micro-level Latinobarometer data report 
that beliefs about the impact of trade on job opportunities are the single largest predictor of 
individual preferences on trade, an effect estimated with higher confidence and larger magnitude 
than other predictors like skills, household income, or age (Rodríguez Chatruc et al. 2019).23  
 
23 I do not provide a theory of why individuals downplay the benefits of cheaper foreign-made goods. An interesting 
inquiry for future work is to test whether real wages allow to purchase foreign imports and access a greater variety of 
consumption goods. 
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One reason why bystanders accept the narrative that imports are bad is that the media and 
politicians disproportionally focus on the negative effects of trade, usually on employment 
opportunities, wage levels, and labor conditions (Guisinger 2017; Facchini, Frattini, and 
Signorotto 2020). Exposure to media creates policy and political awareness among voters (Pérez-
Liñán 2002). The negative coverage on trade is even larger when the press is less free from 
government interference (S. E. Kim 2018) or when social networks amplify those messages, often 
transforming the content and the framing in disinformation campaigns. Elites communicate the 
downsides of import competition more loudly, more clearly, and more frequently than the benefits 
(Guisinger 2017, 174). The adverse coverage leads to sociotropic evaluations of trade in which 
imports generate anxiety about the national economy and damage the national pride (Mayda and 
Rodrik 2005; Colantone and Stanig 2019; Hays, Lim, and Spoon 2019). Here again, the survey 
data from recent Latinobarometer polls show that negative frames that emphasize the threat of job 
losses from increased trade integration substantially reduce the probability of supporting free trade 
and of believing that trade increases job opportunities (Rodríguez Chatruc et al. 2019). In the same 
polls, positive frames that emphasize the potential for lower prices fail to significantly alter the 
probability of supporting free trade and only marginally affect the probability of expressing a belief 
that trade produces lower product prices. 
Third, foreign imports could be negatively interpreted through notions of fairness, as if 
foreigners were taking more of their “fair share” of benefits from commercial exchange through 
“unfair” behaviors (Ehrlich 2018; Brutger and Rathbun 2019). Relatedly, imports can also produce 
nostalgia about some “golden past” in which domestic economic agents were previously protected 
from the vagaries of globalization (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Recent evidence from focus group 
studies report that participants in who disapprove of globalization express feelings of alienation 
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and loss, denouncing that globalization breaks down the national community and changes what it 
means to be part of the nation-state (Hays, Lim, and Spoon 2019). Moreover, trade is explicitly 
framed by those participants as a zero-sum game in which what matters is one’s own country 
benefiting at the expense of other states (Silver, Schumacher, and Mordecair 2020). Finally, rising 
imports can trigger consumer safety concerns according to which foreign products are substandard 
in quality and dangerous to our families (Betz and Pond 2019).24  
The takeaway is that, while material winners prefer freer trade and losers oppose it, the 
level of public support at the national level hinges on how bystanders value trade. Bystanders have 
feeble opinions on trade, so they sometimes join the free trade camp and other times they join the 
protectionist coalition. The effects (real or imagined) of each type of trade flow on individual and 
community wellbeing widely understood create focal points for bystanders to assess commerce. 
Bystanders value trade openness positively when the country exports a lot and negatively when 
the country experiences an import shock. Put differently, bystanders enter the free trade coalition 
when export performance is good and exit it when imports grow significantly. Protectionist 
sentiment emerges when the losers from trade succeed in mobilizing and dominating the public 
agenda to stop economic integration (J. Frieden 2019). Activists, such as labor union leaders and 
business lobbies, frame and distribute negative messages on trade (Guisinger 2017; Colantone and 
Stanig 2019). Amplified by the traditional media and increasingly digital social media, negative 
messages resonate to bystanders (Guisinger 2017; J. Frieden 2019; Facchini, Frattini, and 
Signorotto 2020). If bystanders feel compelled by such images and become (albeit temporarily) 
 
24 Moreover, the stable low levels of inflation in most countries around the world make it harder for individuals to link 
foreign trade to low product prices (Bearce and Moya 2020). 
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closer to the protectionist cause, aggregate public support for free trade will likely decrease. 
Accordingly, Hypothesis 2.1 is that public support for free trade should be higher in the face of 
high exports and lower in the face of high imports. Empirically, we should see that increasing 
exports boost public support for free trade while high import penetration depresses it.  
2.2.2 Social Protection and Public Opinion 
High imports lead to declining support for free trade but these declines can be mitigated by 
social protection. Scholars and public officials find government-provided compensation to be an 
effective means to resist public opposition to openness. In the second half of the twentieth century, 
an implicit arrangement emerged in advanced capitalist societies in which governments provided 
a safety net in exchange for acquiesce with the internationalization of their economies (Ruggie 
1982; Rodrik 1998). This compromise became known as the embedded liberalism compact: 
welfare state policies aimed to “cushion citizens from the vagaries of the international economy in 
return for public support for openness” (Hays 2009, 11). Even if the level of imports is very high 
or there are important import surges, compensation in the form of welfare benefits softens 
opposition to trade among losers who evaluate it in terms of material self-interest and, I add, 
dissuades bystanders from joining the protectionist coalition. 
The literature provides empirical support for its micro-level logic in advanced economies. 
Survey respondents employed in industries which stand to lose from foreign competition increase 
their preferences for welfare spending (Walter 2010; Owen and Quinn 2016). Observational and 
experimental evidence shows that individuals likely to lose from globalization but who are 
compensated with public safety nets are less likely to favor protectionist policies (Hays, Ehrlich, 
and Peinhardt 2005; Margalit 2011; Ehrlich and Hearn 2014; Ha, Lee, and Amri 2014). 
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Compensation usually includes active labor market policies that increase people’s chances of 
finding new jobs (e.g. training) as well as passive labor policies that provide support to those 
already unemployed (e.g. insurance). There is also district-level evidence that trade-specific social 
protection, such as the US Trade Adjustment Assistance program, can act as a substitute to trade 
policy barriers. Districts that heavily rely on trade adjustment assistance are less likely to have 
firms that request anti-dumping measures, controlling for exposure to import competition (S. E. 
Kim and Pelc 2020). In sum, popular support for free trade should not decrease if governments 
provide social security to cushion the displacement from international competition. 
However, there are two important reasons to question whether embedded liberalism works 
in other contexts. First, in the twentieth century several governments in developing countries 
purportedly developed and enlarged welfare regimes under very closed economies (Segura-
Ubiergo 2007; Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011). This is particularly the case of Latin American welfare 
regimes. The origins of the welfare state there traces back to the interwar era. It was a top-down 
project in which governments “introduced social legislation as a mechanism to control increasingly 
mobilized labor movements and urban middle classes” (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 260). The creation 
of welfare benefits aimed at making key social groups loyal to the state authority. The early social 
security regimes in places like Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay had some elements of prewar 
European-style corporatism, such as labor relations governed by collective contracts negotiated by 
unions, but not others such as cooperative (instead of adversarial) business-union relations (Hays 
2009), which led to the failure of coordinated economy-wide wage restraint (Segura-Ubiergo 
2007). 
Importantly, the early provision of social protection in Latin America was not to 
compensate social groups from international trade competition. On the contrary, the governments 
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that closed their countries’ economies from trade to pursuit import-substitution industrialization 
(ISI) policies (which included trade barriers) were the same that increased public spending in a net 
of social protection tools, such as contributary insurance benefits for workers, families, and the 
retired. The goal was to subsidize domestic consumers of final goods produced by the domestic 
firms directly benefited by high commercial policy barriers (Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011, 132). 
This contradicts the foundations of the embedded liberalism compact, developed for open 
economies. There is no clear empirical evidence on how that unique social protection, trade 
protection pair affected public opinion on trade. What we know is that the arrangement disappeared 
with the transition from a closed economy to integration into world markets with the swiftly 
adoption of liberalization (Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Rudra 2008).  
This leads us to the second challenge: whether the welfare systems developed under ISI 
serve as compensation to support trade in the contemporary era of globalization. With deeper 
integration, market forces push governments to cut wages and reduce taxes in a race to the bottom 
to attract mobile capital (Adsera and Boix 2002; Rudra 2008). Globalization creates pressures for 
governments to “cater to domestic and international capital interests by cutting wages and benefits 
… nations that harbor public policies that raise production costs or inhibit sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals risk lower profit margins and capital flight” (Rudra 2008, 2). Developing countries 
appear especially vulnerable to these downward pressures on the provision of social security 
because their states are fiscally as well as financially constrained (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
2001; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Rudra 2008; Campello 2015; Bastiaens and Rudra 2018). Developing 
countries are threatened by the greater race to the bottom among countries with similar factor 
endowments in a world in which China “is defining the new bottom” (Rudra 2008, 3). Analyzing 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, Baker (2009, 261) notes that the gains from consumption should 
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be very high for the people of Latin America to embrace globalization “in lieu of significant 
compensation from their limited welfare states.” It will not be surprising if the lack of safety nets 
generates vocal opposition to openness (K. M. Roberts 2008; Kay and Evans 2018).  
Overall, social protection should cushion the costs of free trade and redistribute its benefits 
for losers and bystanders, discouraging the public’s preference for trade protection. The negative 
campaign from the losers’ camp should be less effective when the welfare benefits are relatively 
generous. Bystanders could think more about consumption and less about the other-regarding 
effects of commerce. However, if globalization affects both public opinion and social spending, 
results will be biased against finding a cushioning effect. Fortunately, the empirical evidence 
suggests that social spending is not just exogenously imposed by global investors and multilateral 
financial institutions, but rather chosen by national governments (Bergh, Mirkina, and Nilsson 
2020). Even though the improved terms of trade fueled by the demand of raw materials by China 
in the early 2000s resulted in greater government revenue collection, there was no convergence in 
welfare policy and outcomes across Latin America (Garay 2016; Holland and Schneider 2017). 
Several governments established income cash transfer programs aimed at the poor and informal 
workers, but differences in benefit coverage and fiscal effort remained large (Kurtz and Brooks 
2008; Garay 2016). Moreover, active and passive labor market policies are still small and ill-
funded across the region (Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019). Governments in poor countries have 
followed their counterparts in rich nations in failing to provide adequate compensation to the losers 
of globalization (J. Frieden 2019). In sum, Hypothesis 2.2 argues that public support for free trade 
should increase when governments compensate for imports with greater social protection. 
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2.3 An Index of Public Support for Free Trade 
This chapter presents an original time series index of public support for free trade for 18 
Latin American countries in the 1990-2017 period. Public opinion on a policy is a latent dimension 
that we cannot directly observe. Nonetheless, it can be constructed from observable answers to 
survey items. Until now, scholars of the mass politics of trade have studied data from one survey 
at a time. But not one survey datum is enough. We need data on as many survey items as possible 
that can be interpreted as stemming from an underlying public support for free trade.  
I collected aggregate survey data from 25 survey questions related to trade by screening all 
available polls in Spanish, English, and/or Portuguese that used a nationally representative sample 
of the adult population, contained at least one item (question) related to trade since 1990, and 
where asked more than once.25 Selection was determined by two decisions. First, I reviewed the 
digital repositories of all multi-country survey projects which cover at least one Latin American 
country, obtaining results from, among others, the Latinobarometer, the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP), Gallup International, Pew Global Attitudes, and the Americas and the 
World Series from the Centro de Investigación y Docencias Económicas. Second, I reviewed all 
country-specific polls conducted by private firms, academic institutions, and government agencies 
in any Latin American country ever included in the digital repositories of the Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research and the Polling the Nations databases. In some cases, the organization 
that requested, funded, and published the poll hired local firms to create the sampling and conduct 
 
25 In a few cases in which the national adult population was unavailable, I selected polls based on samples from large 
urban adult populations. 
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the fieldwork. For instance, the United States Information Agency, a Cold War-era government 
agency in charge of monitoring anti-American sentiment around the world, hired the Instituto 
Brasileiro de Opinão Pública e Estatística Ltda. (IBOPE) in Brazil while choosing Consultoría 
Interdisciplinaria en Desarrollo S.A. (CID) in Central American countries; such items were 
classified as belonging to the major institution (e.g., the USIA). The result is that the selected 
surveys are part of large cross-national research projects that are not susceptible of manipulation 
in the questions they ask by incumbent governments or opposition parties.26 
The second step was to collect and code the survey marginals from each trade-related 
question asked in the polls. The marginals are “the descriptive result of individual surveys, the 
percentage choosing the various possible responses to survey items” (Stimson 1991, 37). That 
involved grouping over people who gave the same answer to a specific question.27 An important 
challenge was that polls did not always use the same words to elicit an opinion on trade, either due 
to idiosyncratic factors or the pollster trying to get at different dimensions of a concept of interest. 
I followed the scholarly wisdom about trade and trade policy to carefully identify all items related 
to attitudes toward international trade, excluding overlaps with other economic outcomes or 
policies. Therefore, I did not include survey items such as opinion on regulation of foreign 
investment or evaluations of regional integration initiatives when it was not clear it referred to 
trade integration. Items were selected if they were intended to generate answers on agreement to 
 
26 The surveys collected from the Office of the President of Mexico (see, Appendix A Table 1) are for the late 1980s 
and early 1990s and thus do not cover the period on which I conduct the statistical analysis. 
27 Some of the oldest polls were not digitalized, requiring hand-coding from printed and scanned tabulations and 
annotated questionnaires. 
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the issue.28 To standardize answers, I collapsed them into three categories: “Agree with free trade,” 
“Disagree with free trade,” and “Do Not Know (or Neither).” For example, the Latinobarometer 
question on the expected benefits of regional trading blocs had five answer categories: “My 
country will benefit a lot,” “My country will benefit somewhat,” “My country will only benefit 
little,” “My country will not benefit at all,” and “Do Not Know.” In my classification, the first two 
options were grouped as “Agree with free trade,” the third and four options were coded as 
“Disagree with free trade,” and the last option was assigned to “Do Not Know (or Neither).” 
Similarly, for items using numerical scales such as 1-7 Likert scales (with the highest value being 
highest agreement), I grouped values 5 through 7 as “Agree with free trade,” values 1-3 as 
“Disagree with free trade,” and the middle point as “Do Not Know.” 
The resulting measure of aggregate public support for free trade, obtained from each survey 
question, is captured by Equation 2.1 below: 




The index takes into account how many people give “Do Not Know” responses to trade 
questions. Failing to do so would inflate and bias the level of aggregate support for free trade. 
Scholars who investigate individual trade preferences based on observational survey data tend to 
drop the “Do Not Know” responses when they construct their dependent variables (Mayda and 
Rodrik 2005; Owen and Johnston 2017). To study aggregate opinion on public policies, however, 
 
28 Also, items on “the most important problem facing the nation” that had “trade” as an answer option were not 
included because no meaningful group of respondents selected “trade” alone as their most important problem. Instead, 
respondents selected the “state of the economy,” “the cost of living,” and “unemployment” as their main economic 
concerns. 
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we must consider all responses. Not everyone is able to express an opinion on specific policy 
issues. Comparing those who express support for an issue to those who express opposition to that 
issue leaves behind several people who do not have enough information and are unable to make 
up their minds about the issue. That would lead to potentially misleading conclusions about the 
level of support for an issue such as international trade (Kleinberg and Fordham 2018).  
For instance, in 1996 the Latinobarometer project conducted an opinion study using a 
sample of 1200 respondents in Argentina, including the question “Do you agree that your country 
can buy goods and services from any other country and that any other country can sell goods and 
services?” with five response categories, one of which was “Do Not Know.” If we merely consider 
the 733 respondents who selected the “Very much agree” and “Somewhat agree” as a share of the 
924 respondents who gave an either positive or negative, the estimated level of public support for 
that year would be 79.3 percent, a remarkably high figure. If, by contrast, we consider the positive 
responses over all responses collected, which includes both the 733 positive responses, the 191 
negative responses, and the 276 “Do Not Know” responses, we see that the level of aggregate 
support is realistically lower at 61 percent. In this study, I consistently take into account the “Do 
Not Know” responses in the denominator of the index. (Figure 2 in Appendix A provides a visual 
comparison of the responses in support of free trade and the Do Not Know responses collected 
from the answers listed in Table 2 in the Appendix). Finally, this is not exclusively a concern in 
developing countries; there is observational and experimental survey evidence from the United 
States that confirms that many US voters frequently choose “do not know” responses on trade-
related questions (Kleinberg and Fordham 2018).  
Overall, I collected 536 survey marginals from 25 survey items asked at least twice over 
the years, measuring the percentage of respondents who agree with, or express support for, free 
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trade. Those percentages encapsulate the opinions of thousands of Latin Americans surveyed in 
the 18 countries. In the Appendix A, I list the sources (Table 1) and the full wording of each survey 
question included in the dataset (Table 2). 
How do we go from survey marginals from questions fielded with time gaps to a continuous 
cross-country, time-series indicator of mass trade opinion? Naïve approaches that take a simple or 
even a moving average of the observed percentages from the raw surveys are problematic due to 
high sensitivity to data availability in any given year (Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020, 48). 
Moreover, question wording and the answer menus vary across polls and countries and within 
them over time. Therefore, I turn to the research in American political behavior, which has studied 
macro partisanship, public opinion on specific policies, and presidential approval over time. I rely 
on the “dyad ratios” method (Stimson 1991; 2018), increasingly applied in comparative settings 
(Carlin et al. 2018). This method uses the information on changes over time within series of 
repeated questions of same wording and answer options to estimate changes in the latent public 
opinion. Focusing on survey items that appear in more than one period, the algorithm computes 
the relative changes in the percent of respondents who answer in the same way within such panel. 
If a question is asked in a survey in years t+i and t+j, the method calculates the ratio of the 
proportion of respondents who agree to the question administered in year t+i to the proportion of 
the agree responses in year t+j. Given that we do not have a full set of cases for each survey 
question to estimate their mean and compare across them, we can exploit the fact that ratios have 
a known expected value of 1. The approach applies both backward and forward recursion, which 
uses the final point of the time series (and the beginning, conversely) to estimate values for each 
item and time point. This methodological strategy then combines numerous disparate opinion 
series using factor analysis, weighting each item’s ratio of change by the degree to which it 
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correlates with the quantity of interest, into a single, unidimensional opinion series by modeling 
their common variance while controlling for tendencies specific to each data source. The algorithm 
then smooths the estimates over time using an exponential function, which yields a complete time 
series between the first and the last dates for which there are observable data.29  
I applied the dyad ratios method to my dataset of raw survey marginals using a program in 
R, obtaining standardized estimates of (latent) popular support for free trade for each country-year 
since the first survey item appears in each country series.30 Opinion data for most countries became 
available around 1995/1996, after the Uruguay Multilateral Round of trade negotiations was 
finalized and the World Trade Organization was formally established. Six countries (Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela) have data going back to 1990 that allow for 
estimation of support for free trade in the context of unilateral trade liberalization. Table 3 in the 
Appendix A summarizes how many observations were used to calculate the level of support for 
free trade in each country, together with a measure of how much of that outcome is accounted for 
with the original data. To validate the new indicator, Figure 1 in the Appendix A plots the 
relationship between observed survey marginals and the estimated index.  
 
29 The smoothing minimizes high “zig-zag” fluctuations. The smoothing model is 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝑥𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑥𝑡−1, where y 
is the smoothed version of the indicator x. The algorithm privileges an estimation “based upon the prior knowledge 
that nature is smoother than empirical estimates of it,” that are determined with sampling error (Stimson 2018, 206). 
30 The resulting coverage varies between 22 and 28 country-year observations. 
 57 
2.3.1 Cross-Country and Longitudinal Variation in Public Opinion 
Figure 2.2 plots the time series index of public support for free trade for each of 18 Latin 
American countries in the period 1990-2017.31 There are a few common patterns. In the second 
half of the 1990s, public support for free trade was on average around 50 percent, a lower value 
than in later periods. The first half of the decade exhibited somewhat higher levels of support for 
free trade but bear in mind that less than half of the sample had data for that early period. Aggregate 
support for free trade went up during the economic bonanza of the first half of the 2000s. That was 
a period in which Latin American economies increased commercial ties with Asia, especially 
China, and enjoyed improvements in terms of trade. Eventually, optimism with open commerce 
came to a stop during the global financial crisis of 2008, which led to capital flight to safety, 
financial instability, lower investment, and an immediate albeit temporary collapse in world trade 
flows. Public sentiment quickly became more pro free trade in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession, reaching even higher levels of support for openness. A new downturn appeared by the 
end of the series, correlated with sluggish economic growth in many parts of the continent and 
lower demand for exports of raw materials to China. 
 
31 In Appendix A Figure 2, I compare the index of public support for free trade to the estimate of percentage of 
respondents who gave “Do Not Know” responses in a given country-year based on raw Do Not Know marginals from 
the same survey items used to create the index of support (I used the dyad ratios methods described above to fill in 
temporal gaps). 
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Figure 2.2: Public Support for Free Trade, 18 Latin American Countries 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. Higher values represent more pro free trade aggregate sentiment. 
 
Turning to the cross-sectional variation, we can see that Argentina stands on the low end 
of popular agreement with openness. The country average of latent popular support in this middle-
income is the lowest in the region at 42 percent for the full time series. Other countries with low 
means are Bolivia (48.2%), El Salvador (50.1%), and Paraguay (50.7%). By contrast, Chile stands 
out with the highest level of support for liberalized trade in Latin America (70.6%). Chile is 
followed by Brazil (58.8%), Peru (57.6%), Colombia (57.2%), Nicaragua (57.1%), the Dominican 
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Republic (56.8%), Costa Rica (56.4%), and Mexico (56.3%). In the middle, we find Uruguay 
(51.2%), Panama (51.4%), Ecuador (51.7%) and Venezuela (53.9%). If we restrict the comparison 
to the years with the best data coverage (2004-2017), the overall picture remains, but with some 
interesting nuances. In this shorter period, the two largest economies in the region changed course: 
Brazil stood out with a higher level of support at 62.6 percent and Mexico came closer to the low-
end at 52 percent. Other countries experienced higher figures than in the past, especially Peru 
(60.3%). Overall, these figures caution against overly optimistic accounts about how popular free 
trade is (e.g., Baker 2009). Those conclusions were based on cross-sectional evidence using few 
survey data points from limited sources with high sparsity of temporal coverage for a small number 
of countries (and typically dropping the “do not know” response category).  
It is clear from the time series that public opinion on trade is not constant. Interestingly, 
there are some countries where opinion moves little and others in which opinion experiences large 
differences. The longest ranges between the minimum and maximum values of within-country 
support for free commerce correspond to Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Some countries 
experienced their largest drops in average opinion in the late 1990s, such as Brazil and Peru. Other 
countries experienced their largest drops in average opinion around the 2008 financial crisis, such 
as Chile, Costa Rica, and Panama, although each of these countries quickly recovered and 
surpassed their pre-crisis levels of support. Importantly, though, we should notice that public 
support for free trade is always moving and we will not find any two consecutive years in which 
mass attitudes remain unchanged. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates how some societies are more sticky in their judgments of international 
trade and others are found at different places depending on the year. For instance, Chile is the 
highest ranked country in each of the three mini-plots of Figure in terms of its estimated value of 
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macro agreement with trade. Conversely, Argentina and Guatemala, are always found at the 
bottom, between the 15-17 and the 17-18 positions, respectively. In other chapters, I discuss the 
evolution of public opinion as well as trade policy responsiveness in three case studies. Two of 
those countries, Colombia and Peru, exhibit interesting changes in macro trade opinion. In fact, 
Figure 2 shows that while latent support in Colombia was stable at the top fifth place in the region 
in 1997 and 2007, it fell to the 15th position in 2017. Peru, by contrast, was in the middle of the 
series in both 1997 and 2017 while experienced high support in 2007 when it reached the second 
largest value in the region. 
 
Figure 2.3: Rankings of Public Support for Free Trade in Three Periods 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. Higher values represent more pro free trade aggregate sentiment. 
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2.4 Econometric Analysis 
2.4.1 Research Design 
2.4.1.1 Methods 
I use panel econometric methods to study the determinants of public support for free trade 
with pooled country-year data for 18 Latin American countries in the 1995-2017 period. Panel 
data, or long time-series, cross-section (TSCS) data, allow us to study differences between units 
as well as within units, producing useful generalizations of causal processes across both time and 
space. Using Ordinary Least Squares regression would violate the assumptions of independence 
and no-autocorrelation.32 Panel econometric methods let us deal with the problem of how to 
control, in an observational study, for factors that cannot be observed and may cause spurious 
correlations.  
I use three major approaches to estimate the effects of exports, imports, and social 
protection on public opinion on trade. First, I use random effects linear regression in which the 
error term decomposes in two parts that arise from independent random processes; assuming they 
are normally distributed, we can estimate their variance.33 To account for nonindependence, 
standard errors are clustered by country. However, behind random effects rests the heroic 
 
32 Unmeasured factors that affect the observation over time are merged into the error term and will likely be related to 
one another at different periods. Unit effects induce problems in the error term because they may be related to the 
observed independent variables. 
33 The random effects model is more efficient than the fixed effects model because it incorporates only one additional 
parameter to the estimation - the variance of Ui (σu) - instead of the N-1 new parameters required in the latter. 
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assumption that the error components are unrelated to the observed independent variables (Bell 
and Jones 2015). Therefore, I also estimate fixed effects linear regressions to rule out time-
invariant omitted variable bias. To account for nonindependence, standard errors are clustered by 
country. I report the fixed effects empirical model for Hypothesis 2.1 in Equation 2.2: 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 +𝜓𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  
I report the empirical model for Hypothesis 2.2 in Equation 2.3: 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  
In addition, serial correlation is a serious issue with panel data, so I also estimate dynamic 
models that incorporate the one-period lagged value of the dependent variable (Hays 2009) and 
calculate panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) with a first order autoregression parameter (N. 
Beck and Katz 1995).34  
Finally, given the nature of the dependent variable and the structure of the data with 
significant cross-country and some temporal variation, I estimate error correction models, flexible 
time series models that may be applied to both integrated and stationary data (De Boef and Keele 
2008). For each independent variable there are two parameter estimates, β1 for the differenced 
variable and β2 for the lagged level of the variable. The β1 parameter provides an estimate of the 
initial change in the dependent variable produced in the short term, i.e., the effect occurs wholly 
at a specific point in time. The model reports the rate at which the outcome returns to equilibrium 
after changes in the independent variables, controlling for the outcome’s past behavior. The β2 and 
 
34 Using a dynamic model with fixed effects may not provide the most consistent and efficient estimates with panel 
data (Nickell 1981). This is less of a problem when T is relatively large to N as in this sample (Angrist and Pischke 
2009). 
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the α1 parameters provide information to estimate the error correction component of the model, 
i.e., the long-term impact of the independent variable that is distributed in each period over a time 
span. The total long-term impact of a change in the independent variable on the outcome is 
computed by dividing β2 by α1 (De Boef and Keele 2008). 
I report the empirical model for Hypothesis 2.1 in Equation 2.4: 
∆𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖 +
 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4∆𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽6∆𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  
The empirical model for Hypothesis 2.2 is found in Equation 2.5: 
∆𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +
 𝛽
6
∆𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽10∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  
2.4.1.2 Independent and Control Variables 
First, I use the value of imports of goods as a share of GDP and the value of exports of 
goods as a share of GDP as two separate independent variables because using a measure of total 
trade flows misses the richness of the contrasting effects that imports and exports have on people’s 
welfare and attitudes (Owen and Quinn 2016; J. B. Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2017). I use 
data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). Second, I include Social 
Protection, which is measured with an indicator of total government spending in social protection 
policies in per capita terms. These expenditures include unemployment insurance, income transfers 
such as conditional cash transfers, and public pensions from the central government, decentralized 
agencies, and social security funds. Official figures are provided by the national governments to 
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the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, expressed in 
local currency, and are then converted to constant prices in US dollars of 2010 per capita (CEPAL 
2020). 
To control for other factors identified in the literature to affect trade attitudes, I incorporate 
economic performance and economic structure variables. The state of the national economy can 
affect public support for international economic integration. Poor growth and recessions may make 
people more anxious about processes they cannot control and thus oppose free trade (Mansfield, 
Mutz, and Brackbill 2019). However, in contexts of poor economic performance, open trade 
policies may be seen less based on their intrinsic merits and more as a source of collective 
insurance in which foreign partners can provide support to the country (Sattler and Urpelainen 
2012). I measure growth with the year-to-year percent change of GDP with data from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). Further, public opinion on trade may be shaped by 
the behavior of the exchange rate. Changes in purchasing power and the effects of the currency on 
trade flows may explain shifts in mass attitudes. I thus include an indicator of real exchange rate 
appreciation of the national currency in relation to the US dollar (World Bank 2020). I also account 
for inflation (with the consumer price index) and the national unemployment rate, measured as the 
number of people who are jobless and have attempted to find employment and those among the 
economically active population who are seeking work for the first time, using data from CEPAL 
(2020). 
I control for economic development and the accumulation of capital with the log of GDP 
per person, based on the purchasing power parity (PPP version) of the GDP expressed in constant 
2010 US dollars, with data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). Finally, 
the degree of labor mobility is estimated with the absolute two-year change in the sum of the shares 
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of the workforce employed across 14 economic sectors over the total employed population, as 
classified by the ILO using the criteria established by the United Nations Statistics Division. 
2.4.2 Results  
The statistical results provide support for the hypothesis that bystanders’ neo-mercantilist 
shortcut determines the average collective sentiment on free trade. Table 2.1, Model 1 presents the 
results from the random effects regressions. A point increase in the value of exports generates an 
increase in 0.33 percentage points in public support for free trade, significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level. The coefficient for the value of imports is not statistically significant. Model 2 
presents the results of the fixed effects regression. The estimated coefficients and standard errors 
are almost identical to those in the previous model. Higher exports increase aggregate support for 
free trade. An increase in one standard deviation in exports (from 30 to 43 percent of GDP) 
produces an instant upward movement in support for free trade of 5 percentage points, all else 
equal. Recall that the average level of support for the entire region is 54 percent. Model 3 includes 
the lagged dependent variable. The coefficient for exports remains positive and significant. Finally, 
the error correction models (columns 4 and 5) improve the estimation of the relationship between 
the two components of trade flows and public opinion. We see that the results for lagged export 
values remain positive and significant while the coefficient for export values differenced are 
positive and highly significant. Moreover, the estimation with error correction models reveals a 
negative and significant short-term effect of import value on public support. This suggests that an 
increase in the share of imports over GDP generates lower support for free trade. 
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Table 2.1: Exports, Imports, and Public Support for Free Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Random Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Error Correction Error Correction 
Imports t-1 -0.138 -0.140 -0.081 -0.074 -0.154* 
 (0.129) (0.161) (0.064) (0.046) (0.091) 
Imports Δ    -0.170** -0.180* 
    (0.085) (0.099) 
Exports t-1 0.331*** 0.347** 0.175** 0.114*** 0.316*** 
 (0.113) (0.138) (0.070) (0.044) (0.099) 
Exports Δ    0.314*** 0.366*** 
    (0.099) (0.111) 
Social Protection t-1 11.529** 15.011** 11.259*** 2.111 12.787*** 
 (4.952) (6.266) (2.767) (1.648) (3.321) 
Social Protection Δ    -6.959 0.877 
    (5.171) (5.966) 
Unemployment t-1 0.038 0.183 0.219** -0.059 0.303** 
 (0.378) (0.414) (0.094) (0.057) (0.124) 
Unemployment Δ    0.124 0.247 
    (0.173) (0.191) 
Inflation t-1 -0.061 -0.062 -0.043 -0.110*** -0.129** 
 (0.069) (0.062) (0.048) (0.030) (0.061) 
Inflation Δ    -0.164*** -0.156** 
    (0.048) (0.061) 
GDP growth t-1 -0.013 -0.003 -0.030 0.032 -0.041 
 (0.101) (0.103) (0.106) (0.187) (0.227) 
GDP growth Δ    -0.046 -0.075 
    (0.173) (0.188) 
Exchange rate t-1 -0.018** -0.012 -0.019** -0.007*** 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.003) (0.012) 
Exchange rate Δ    0.015*** 0.019** 
    (0.006) (0.008) 
GDP per capita t-1 1.854 2.047 7.632** 0.522 9.182** 
 (3.346) (4.211) (3.266) (0.838) (3.905) 
GDP per capita Δ    -6.624 -6.452 
    (17.530) (18.197) 
Labor mobility t-1 -0.053 -0.024 -0.103 -0.230** -0.174 
 (0.178) (0.182) (0.084) (0.097) (0.131) 
Labor mobility Δ    -0.155 -0.117 
    (0.101) (0.111) 
Public Support t-1   0.562*** -0.283*** -0.413*** 
   (0.044) (0.034) (0.048) 
Time trend   -0.377* -0.079 -0.528** 
   (0.196) (0.103) (0.211) 
Constant 27.947     
 (30.659)     
Observations 327 327 325 309 309 
R2 0.154 0.116 0.863 0.230 0.307 
rho 0.405     
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable in Models 1 to 3 is index of public support for free 
trade (see Chapter Two). Dependent variable in Models 4 and 5 is change in index of public support for free trade. A 
positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable generates an increase in public support. 
Variables with Δ indicate one-year change. Model 1 is Random Effects regression with robust clustered standard 
errors. Model 2 is Fixed Effects regression with robust clustered standard errors. Model 3 is AR(1) Prais-Winsten 
Fixed Effects regression with panel corrected standard errors. Model 4 is Error Correction Model with panel corrected 
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standard errors. Model 5 is Error Correction Model with Fixed Effects and panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Panel analysis further allows us to estimate long term relationships after the short-term 
impact on the outcome that is provided with the regression coefficients. I plot in Figure 2.4 the 
long term separate effects of increases in the values of exports and imports on public support for 
free trade using the simulation method of Williams and Whitten (2012) in which the outcome is 
predicted over a number of time intervals in a user-determined scenario. The left panel shows the 
predicted attitudes toward free trade when the volume of imports is one standard deviation above 
the sample mean (red diamonds) and when imports are one standard deviation below its average 
(blue circles), holding constant all covariates. The plot indicates that the effect of the level of 
imports on opinion is statistically significant after four periods, after which high imports depress 
public support for free trade for almost ten percentage points compared to low import flows in two 
hypothetical societies that are the same in all other regards. Conversely, the right panel in Figure 
2.4 shows how high exports increase aggregate pro-free trade sentiment. The red diamonds 
represent the predicted attitudes when the value of exports as a share of GDP is one standard 
deviation above the mean. The blue circles represent attitudes when exports are one standard 
deviation below. The difference in attitudes is immediate and significant, with high exports leading 
to higher public agreement with free trade. 
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Figure 2.4: Long Term Simulated Effects of Trade Openness on Public Opinion 
 
Note: Left panel: Forecasting the effects of low imports (blue) and high imports (red) on public opinion on trade. 
Right panel: Forecasting the effects of low exports (blue) and high exports (red) on public opinion on trade. Produced 
using estimates from Model 1, Table 2.1 and the simulation method of Williams and Whitten (2012). Vertical bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
In the Appendix A to Chapter Two, I show that the relationship is robust to alternative 
measurements of trade flows. In Appendix A Table 4, I provide evidence that using the three-year 
average of export values (instead of the one-year lag or the one-year change) does not affect the 
positive and significant effect on public support for free trade. Models 1, 2, and 3 all corroborate 
that better export performance shifts aggregate sentiment toward pro-free trade views. The 
estimated coefficients for the three-year average of import values, however, is not statistically 
significant in those models. In Table 5, I report findings from several panel specifications using 
the absolute value of imports and exports in billion dollars instead of as a share of GDP. The 
estimate for absolute exports is positive and significant and the estimates for absolute imports is 
negative and significant, holding all other control variables constant. Finally, in Table 6 I use an 
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indicator of trade balance (exports-imports) as a share of GDP. The estimates for trade balance are 
not statistically different from zero in the fixed effects regression but they are significant and in 
the expected positive direction in the error correction model (column 3). There is evidence of both 
a short-term and a long-term impact of trade flows surplus (i.e., more exports than imports) on 
public support for free trade. Aggregate sentiment supports free trade when the total balance is 
favorable to exports compared to imports.  
The next major finding is that the welfare state shapes collective perceptions on trade. In 
all models in Tables 2.1, Appendix A 4, Appendix A 5, and Appendix A  6, the coefficient for the 
level of public spending on social protection per capita is positive, large, and statistically 
significant. This indicates that there is a direct effect of the welfare state on public sentiment, 
controlling for trade flows and economic controls. Greater public spending on social protection 
increases the popularity of unrestricted commerce. Using the estimates from the fixed effects 
regression in Table 2.1, we can calculate that a one standard deviation in the level of social 
protection spending (from 300 to 600 dollars per capita) is associated with an increase of 4.5 
percentage points in public support for free trade, all else equal. In the error correction models, by 
contrast, the differenced amount of spending on social protection is not statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 2.2 predicts that the negative impact of imports on aggregate opinion could be 
reverted if there is a more generous welfare net to contain those left behind by international 
competition. To test this proposition, I present evidence in Table 2.2 of the interaction between the 
level (and differenced) of spending on social protection and import values as a share of GDP. The 
results from the interactive models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 2.2 provide support for Hypothesis 2.2. The 
positive coefficients, which oscillate between 0.41 and 0.67, indicate that the effect of imports on 
public support for free trade is positive at higher levels of public spending in social protection, all 
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else equal. The relationship emerges in the short-term as can be seen by the statistical significance 
in all three models. 
 
Table 2.2: Social Protection, Trade Exposure, and Public Support for Free Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fixed Effects Error Correction Error Correction 
Imports t-1 -0.119* -0.103** -0.185** 
 (0.061) (0.051) (0.089) 
Imports Δ  -0.158** -0.175* 
  (0.080) (0.102) 
Social Protection t-1 4.440 -3.186 4.209 
 (3.517) (2.506) (4.359) 
Imports*Social Protection t-1 0.554** 0.405*** 0.674*** 
 (0.221) (0.135) (0.254) 
Social Protection Δ  -6.915 0.024 
  (5.146) (5.685) 
Imports*Social Protection Δ  0.433 2.599 
  (2.047) (2.352) 
Exports t-1 0.183*** 0.104** 0.327*** 
 (0.069) (0.045) (0.097) 
Exports Δ  0.303*** 0.361*** 
  (0.102) (0.115) 
Unemployment t-1 0.212** -0.024 0.320** 
 (0.089) (0.054) (0.130) 
Unemployment Δ  0.164 0.262 
  (0.184) (0.191) 
Inflation t-1 -0.047 -0.095*** -0.108* 
 (0.049) (0.033) (0.062) 
Inflation Δ  -0.146*** -0.131** 
  (0.048) (0.062) 
GDP growth t-1 -0.055 0.049 -0.067 
 (0.107) (0.186) (0.235) 
GDP growth Δ  -0.015 -0.071 
  (0.173) (0.195) 
Exchange rate t-1 -0.019* -0.008*** 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.012) 
Exchange rate Δ  0.015** 0.019** 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
GDP per capita t-1 4.671 -0.869 5.601 
 (3.162) (1.034) (3.608) 
GDP per capita Δ  -9.459 -7.426 
  (18.583) (19.258) 
Labor mobility t-1 -0.122 -0.260*** -0.205 
 (0.085) (0.092) (0.134) 
Labor mobility Δ  -0.163* -0.133 
  (0.097) (0.111) 
Time trend -0.271 -0.018 -0.400* 
 (0.192) (0.114) (0.209) 
Public Support t-1 0.564*** -0.298*** -0.409*** 
 (0.045) (0.035) (0.049) 
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Observations 325 309 309 
R2 0.860 0.241 0.314 
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable in Model 1 is index of public support for free trade 
(see Chapter Two). Dependent variable in Models 2 and 3 is change in index of public support for free trade. A positive 
coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable generates an increase in public support. Variables 
with Δ indicate one-year change. Model 1 is AR(1) Prais-Winsten Fixed Effects regression with panel corrected 
standard errors. Model 2 is Error Correction Model with panel corrected standard errors. Model 3 is Error Correction 
Model with Fixed Effects and panel corrected standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
To get a better idea of how this works, Figure 2.5 plots the average marginal effects of 
imports as a share of GDP on the index of public support for free trade conditional on the level of 
public welfare. The positive slope indicates that the marginal effect is positive as government 
spending on welfare benefits goes up. The plot also estimates the average marginal effects for three 
segments of the distribution of spending on social protection using the method by Hainmueller, 
Mummolo, and Xu (2019). 
Figure 2.5: The Effect of Trade on Opinion Conditional on Compensation 
 
Note: The black line represents conditional marginal effects of the level of imports (as a share of GDP) on the index 
of public support for free trade conditional on spending on social protection per capita. Dashed gray lines represent 
95% confidence intervals. Effects computed using the method of Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2019) based on 
Model 1, Table 2.2. The vertical bars in gray at the bottom indicate the distribution of the moderator variable. L, M, 





Figure 2.6: Long Term Simulation of Opinion Conditional on Compensation 
 
Note: Left panel: Forecasting the effects of low imports (blue) and high imports (red) on public opinion on trade when 
the central government spends US$100 in social protection. Right panel: Forecasting the effects of low imports (blue) 
and high imports (red) on public opinion on trade when the central government spends US$500 in social protection. 
Produced using estimates from Model 1, Table 2.2 and the simulation method of Williams and Whitten (2012). 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Next, in Figure 2.6 I simulate the long-term effect of the conditional relationship of imports 
and welfare benefits on public opinion. The left panel shows the effect of import volumes on public 
opinion when the government spends little in social protection whereas the right panel shows the 
effect of import volumes when the government spends a lot in social protection. The red diamonds 
represent predicted values of aggregate trade attitudes when imports are one standard deviation 
above their mean. The blue circles represent attitudes when imports are one standard deviation 
below their mean. In both images, high import penetration is associated with lower support for free 
trade and low imports generate greater support. The important point, nonetheless, is that public 
spending in social protection counterbalances the negative effect of imports. For example, public 
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support for free trade in a country where imports are 48 percent of GDP and the government 
transfers $100 per capita in social protection (that is similar to Paraguay in 2008-2010 or El 
Salvador in 2011-2014) is predicted to be between 32 and 37 percentage points, holding all else 
equal, including exports.. Public support for free trade in a country with the same level of import 
penetration as a share of GDP but where the government spends $500 per capita in social protection 
would be between 48 and 52 percentage points. The closest to a real case would be Costa Rica 
since 2010. 
How robust are these findings? First, Appendix A Table 4 reports results that the interaction 
is positive and significant when using the three-year average of imports.35 Second, the results are 
robust to temporal breaks. Both trade openness and public spending in welfare have undergone 
changes since the early rush to open up the economies of Latin America due to global trends in 
trade flows, commodity prices, and the business cycle. I thus check for temporal breaks, estimating 
the interaction between imports and spending in social protection for different subperiods between 
1995 and 2017. The results are shown in Appendix A Table 7, where I add years sequentially. In 
the earlier period, the interactive effect between imports and social protection on public opinion 
on trade was not statistically significant. That may provide support for the skeptics that argued that 
globalization was eroding the welfare net in ways that challenged any possible compensation to 
the losers from international competition (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Segura-Ubiergo 
2007). However, bear in mind that very little can be generalized from the small N in the models 
for the early years. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction appears 
 
35 I do not report interactions between social protection and trade balance because the latter is an aggregate measure 
that masks the fact that social protection compensates for imports, not for net flows. 
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from 2008 onwards, suggesting that the moderating effect of social protection on the relationship 
between imports and public opinion starts to show up in the subperiod with greatest economic 
prosperity in the region.36  
2.4.2.1 The China Shock in Latin America   
How does the economic rise of China shape public opinion on trade? Recent research 
postulates that trade with China has disrupted public support for free trade in rich countries (Autor, 
Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Colantone and Stanig 2019; J. Frieden 2019; Hays, Lim, and Spoon 
2019). Massive imports of manufactured goods in the past twenty years, triggered by 
industrialization and productivity growth in China, constitute an exogenous shock for recipient 
economies, with deleterious consequences for firms that were not able to adapt to the competition, 
prompting large job layoffs and wage reductions. The negative shock has been harder in districts 
with heavy presence of manufacturing plants (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013). The governments 
of rich countries have not improved the provision of social protection to displaced workers. 
Scholars conclude that such failure explains a significant part of the protectionist backlash across 
rich countries in the West (Colantone and Stanig 2019; Frieden 2019; Hays, Lim, and Spoon 2019).  
Is there a “China shock” in Latin America? The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
recently said that “the China shock shattered the region’s hopes of being competitive on labor-
intensive manufacturing, a specialization that could have sparked an East Asian style boom to the 
job market” (Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019, 105). If this is so, what are the consequences in 
terms of mass attitudes on trade? To provide even a tentative answer, one should first consider that 
 
36 I further report the estimates of each country fixed effect in Appendix A Table 8. 
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there are not one but several China trade shocks (Donno and Rudra 2019). With its exponential 
growth in productivity and the ascension to the WTO in 2001, China exhibited a remarkable 
exporting performance of manufactures and a huge appetite for energy, metals, and foodstuff. 
These trends generate both negative and positive distributional effects within China’s trading 
partners (Feenstra and Sasahara 2018).  
Across Latin America, the losers have been low-productivity firms in labor-intensive 
industries disrupted by cheap manufactured imports from China. In addition, there are some high-
productivity firms in labor-intensive sectors that lose from China’s rise, such as the maquilas in 
Central America and Mexico, displaced by Chinese exports to important third markets (e.g. the 
United States). There are several winners, too. Landowners and agricultural producers benefited 
from demand for soybeans, coffee, and meat. Multinational corporations benefited with exports of 
oil and mining. Also, participation in global value chains has led some Latin American dynamic 
firms to export inputs to China that are then re-imported as final products. Finally, bystanders may 
benefit from greater access to cheaper consumption goods, from clothing to smartphones. 
In Table 2.3 I provide the first test of a Chinese import shock in mass attitudes in Latin 
America. Instead of using total imports values and total export values, I now incorporate the 
volume of imported goods from China in terms of millions of dollars using data from the United 
Nations COMTRADE International Trade Statistics Database. I report the results in six columns, 
one for each type of panel model as in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The first three models test the direct 
effect of Chinese imports on public opinion. The other models test the conditional effect of Chinese 
imports on the spending on social protection. Except for the first (random effects) model, I obtain 
negative and statistically significant coefficients for Chinese imports. This suggests that the more 
the competition from China, the lower the level of aggregate agreement with free trade. Further, 
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the random effects (Model 4) and error correction model (Model 6) report a statistically significant 
positive coefficient. This indicates that the effect of Chinese imports on public opinion is positive 
when there is more provision of social protection. Unfortunately, there are not enough consistent, 
time series export data from each Latin American country to China to directly measure the effect 
of exports to China on public support for free trade. 
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 Table 2.3: The China Shock and Public Opinion in Latin America 













Chinese Imports t-1 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Chinese Imports Δ   0.000   0.000*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Social Protection t-1 7.437 10.946*** 12.194*** 2.895 10.264** 9.909** 
 (5.304) (3.673) (3.767) (5.476) (4.286) (4.183) 
Social Protection Δ   0.333   -0.084 
   (5.440)   (5.569) 
Chinese Imports*Social Protectiont-1    0.001*** 0.000 0.001** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Chinese Imports*Social ProtectionΔ      -0.008* 
      (0.005) 
Unemployment t-1 0.077 0.281*** 0.447*** 0.113 0.283*** 0.453*** 
 (0.331) (0.100) (0.118) (0.333) (0.102) (0.117) 
Unemployment Δ   0.364**   0.370** 
   (0.159)   (0.165) 
Inflation t-1 -0.003 -0.005 -0.040 -0.007 -0.005 -0.035 
 (0.056) (0.041) (0.049) (0.058) (0.041) (0.047) 
Inflation Δ   -0.074   -0.069 
   (0.045)   (0.044) 
GDP growth t-1 0.053 0.019 -0.005 0.062 0.019 0.024 
 (0.097) (0.107) (0.188) (0.099) (0.108) (0.191) 
GDP growth Δ   -0.115   -0.083 
   (0.155)   (0.159) 
Exchange rate t-1 -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.014 -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.013 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) 
Exchange rate Δ   0.009   0.010 
   (0.007)   (0.007) 
GDP per capita t-1 5.187 5.328 3.749 6.112* 5.358 3.845 
 (3.448) (3.756) (4.001) (3.466) (3.736) (3.979) 
GDP per capita Δ   -1.788   -4.264 
   (15.706)   (16.270) 
Labor mobility t-1 -0.016 -0.120 -0.196* -0.067 -0.126 -0.224** 
 (0.172) (0.085) (0.100) (0.174) (0.084) (0.102) 
Labor mobility Δ   -0.036   -0.055 
   (0.093)   (0.094) 
Public Support t-1  0.564*** -0.439***  0.562*** -0.444*** 
  (0.048) (0.049)  (0.048) (0.049) 
Time trend  -0.170 -0.112  -0.166 -0.094 
  (0.216) (0.229)  (0.217) (0.232) 
Observations 319 317 300 319 317 300 
R2 0.088 0.888 0.305 0.081 0.890 0.307 
rho .377   .410   
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable in Models 1, 2, 4 and 5 is index of public support for 
free trade (see Chapter Two). Dependent variable in Models 3 and 6 is change in index of public support for free trade. 
A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable generates an increase in public support. 
Variables with Δ indicate one-year change. Models 1 and 4 are Random Effects regressions with robust clustered 
standard errors. Models 2 and 5 are AR(1) Prais-Winsten Fixed Effects regressions with panel corrected standard 
errors. Models 3 and 6 are Error Correction regressions with Fixed Effects and panel corrected standard errors. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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2.5 Conclusion 
How popular is free trade? What explains mass attitudes on international commerce across 
countries and over time? This chapter brings some answers based on new evidence. Until now, 
existing research was interested in testing economic theories of trade to predict trade policy 
preferences between individuals. Those studies were based on snapshots (analyzing answers to 
one survey at a time) from rich countries. That is unsatisfying because we want to understand 
patterns of public opinion on trade, which is at a higher level of aggregation than revealed 
individual preferences. Politicians care about the masses, not the individual. Therefore, I created a 
new index of support for free trade that can measure public opinion over time, creating comparable 
time series across 18 countries in Latin America. The index feeds from dozens of thousands of 
individual answers to survey questions related to trade. Special attention to aggregation and time 
series makes this index a good tool to approach the latent popularity of open commerce across 
societies and within them in the long period from the early 1990s to date. 
I advanced two arguments to explain public support for free trade. First, the general 
popularity of unrestricted trade is determined not just by the pocketbook preferences of winners 
and losers from international competition but from what ordinary people with no direct stake on 
trade believe. This latter group of people, the bystanders, have little knowledge about the material 
consequences of trade except for their experiences as consumers and what they read and watch in 
the media and the public debate. To evaluate trade, bystanders follow a neo-mercantilist reasoning: 
Selling more exports abroad is positive for themselves, their acquaintances, and even the nation, 
while buying a lot of imported goods appears as a jobs killer, unfair business. The results of the 
statistical analysis for the panel of 18 Latin American countries show that high exports increase 
public support for free trade, even controlling for growth, inflation, and the exchange rate. 
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Moreover, I show that importing more goods from China, the quintessential source of labor-
intensive manufactures, is associated with lower support for unrestricted trade in Latin America.  
Second, I argued that social protection compensates for the negative effect of imports on 
aggregate trade sentiment. The evidence from Latin America highlights an odd alliance between 
“neoliberalism” and the welfare state in recent decades. Except for Costa Rica, social protection 
in Latin America was not a consequence of trade openness. Countries that were open to trade for 
much of the twentieth century failed to construct welfare systems because commerce did not lead 
to industrial concentration and strong unionization and any social demands fall on deaf ears in the 
absence of democracy (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 263). Social security, by contrast, was developed by 
those governments that pursued ISI. This is not the typical embedded liberalism which predicts 
compensation in the context of open economies.  
The larger point is that regardless of where and how welfare regimes emerged in Latin 
America, they play a compensatory function once in place and when the liberalization of trade 
takes place. There are countries that were closed and had social protection in place when they 
opened to trade in the 1990s (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Uruguay). There are other countries that were 
closed and opened their economies but did not make an effort to increase social protection (e.g., 
Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, Peru).37 A sharp increase in imports is less likely to reduce public 
support for free trade in the first group while the same shock should increase protectionist 
sentiment in the second group. The data supports this prediction, even accounting for the 
downward pressures on welfare that come about with globalization (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 
 
37 Others, like El Salvador and Panama, were opened from before and yet failed to develop a welfare regime over 
time. 
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2001; Rudra 2008). Whatever is left of those welfare systems after ISI ended, serves a 
compensatory role that keeps public opinion on trade from deviating too much. 
All this begs the question of whether, and under what conditions, public opinion change 
affects trade policy outcomes. That is the issue I turn to in Chapter 3. 
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3.0 Trade Policy Responsiveness: A Theory and A Test 
Voters’ voices, however loose and noisy, matter when policy makers make international 
trade policy decisions. This study argues that governments respond to public opinion by choosing 
policies that ease restrictions on trade when free trade is more popular and by choosing policies 
that increase restrictions when free trade is less popular. In theory, democratic representation 
ensures a close connection between citizens’ demands and their representatives’ policy decisions 
(Dahl 1971). Public opinion is reflected in public policies because voters vote out one partisan 
team and replace it with another that is closer to its preferences (Achen and Bartels 2016) and 
when policy makers rationally anticipate the negative electoral returns of ignoring public opinion 
and adjust policy between elections (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, Mackuen, 
and Stimson 2002). I am especially interested in the second type of policy responsiveness, treating 
elected officials as delegates who try to behave in line with voters’ opinion during their time in 
public office (Mansbridge 2003; Butler and Nickerson 2011). The comparative behavior literature 
provides evidence that governments frequently respond to shifts in public opinion by adjusting 
public policies, from crime laws to spending on public schools (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; 
Soroka and Wlezien 2005; Brooks and Manza 2006; Kang and Powell 2010; A. Roberts and Kim 
2011; Soroka and Wlezien 2015; Caughey and Warshaw 2018). 
However, trade politics presents hurdles for responding to public opinion. The masses face 
information, collective action, and resource constraints to shape trade policy. Researchers studying 
the United States have shown that American citizens are ill informed about international trade, 
have incoherent preferences about it, and do not consider this issue when casting their vote (Bearce 
and Velasco-Guachalla 2020; Guisinger 2009). Moreover, public opinion is the aggregation of the 
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attitudes of individual voters scattered across society. In contrast to special interest groups that 
defend the interest of one firm, sector, or social class and that have to overcome collective action 
problems between members within their group, the general public is dispersed, and its members 
do not have the same narrow interest. Lastly, voters do not have the deep pockets of special interest 
groups such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Sociedad Rural Argentina, or the Federação 
das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Brazil). It is unsurprising then that scholars have dismissed 
voters’ “preferences as of little importance” in shaping trade policy (Guisinger 2017, 5). The view 
that emerges in studies of the political economy of trade is that of a battlefield in which special 
interest groups compete to win influence over policy makers (Goodhart 2015; Guisinger 2017; 
McLaren 2016; Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019). 
Policy makers are not pure ideologues or mere business delegates, they try to follow 
popular mandates, even when they make decisions on international trade policy, because 
responding to voters is the democratic compromise that ensures their political survival. My 
conditional theory of trade policy responsiveness states that, under the appropriate conditions, 
policy makers respond to public opinion on trade, and trade policy choices reflect that aggregate 
sentiment. The first hurdle to clear to find responsiveness is to stop assuming what voters want 
with regards to trade and let them speak for themselves. This is what I do in Chapter Two, 
measuring aggregate opinion on trade over time. The second set of obstacles deal with the 
economic, institutional, and administrative constraints that shape policy makers’ willingness and 
ability to respond to voters when making trade policy choices. This chapter identifies four factors 
that motivate and enable trade policy responsiveness.  
First, responsiveness should be affected by the pocketbook salience of trade, which 
depends on the economic structure of society. Trade policy responsiveness should be higher in 
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places where trade is a salient issue. Salience increases the incentives to make policy responsive 
to society (Verdier 1994). Trade is salient when the stakes from trade flows are high for many 
voters (T. W. Taylor 2015). When voters are exposed to trade, they have more to lose or win from 
changes to the status quo, are better informed about trade, care more about decisions around it, and 
may have important resources to organize and mobilize around it. This can be measured by the 
share of the labor force employed in tradable sectors and occupations (Hays 2009). Trade policy 
responsiveness should increase when many voters obtain their income from tradable industries or 
occupations, whether exporting, import-competing, or integrated in international value chains. 
When salience is low, by contrast, voter preferences have a more limited role on trade policy 
making and public officials are more likely to be influenced by organized producers. 
Second, responsiveness depends on the type of policy makers who make decisions on trade. 
Democracies are not all alike. Not all institutional configurations are equally adept at delivering 
representation (Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020, 4). One dimension is whether policy makers care 
for the broader electorate or for smaller groups of voters. Some democracies have strong party 
leaders who cater to the broader electorate to secure the reputation of their political brands while 
other democracies grant individual candidates and lawmakers greater leeway to build narrow 
coalitions as they see fit. Electoral institutions determine how the preferences of different groups 
are aggregated and weighed in the policy-making process; thus, they affect which interests elected 
officials cater to. Electoral systems that give party leaders control over candidate nominations, 
such as proportional representation formulas with closed lists, increase legislative discipline and 
appeals to broad constituencies (Grossman and Helpman 2005; Naoi 2015; Wagner and Plouffe 
2019). Such rules should increase policy responsiveness in accordance with the changing 
aggregate trade sentiment. By contrast, electoral rules that create incentives to cultivate a personal 
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vote generate representatives who evade voters’ monitoring and are freer to collude with special 
interests (Ames 1995; Carey and Shugart 1995). 
Third, responsiveness depends on how many institutional players participate in the policy-
making process. Trade policy responsiveness should be lower when there is a greater 
fragmentation of the trade administration. While legislatures intervene to ratify international trade 
agreements and sometimes to alter tariff rates, executives decide on most commercial policy 
choices such as licenses, quotas, and international negotiations. The organization of the cabinet 
and the bureaucracy that aide the executive, the rules that regulate agencies that implement 
policies, and the way they make decisions play a strong role in trade policy making. Institutional 
veto players can restrict political leaders’ room to adjust trade policy (Mansfield, Milner, and 
Rosendorff 2002; Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2007; Henisz and Mansfield 2006). The 
participation of many actors with different constituencies, rules, and procedures makes changes to 
the status quo harder to pass (Tsebelis 2002). Further, administrative fragmentation creates routine 
and multiple access points for special interests to lobby and impact trade policy (Ehrlich 2007). 
Finally, responsiveness depends on the visibility of the type of policy instrument involved. 
Commercial policies that are more visible should exhibit a higher degree of responsiveness to 
public opinion. The visibility depends on the complexity on the policy instruments, which 
determines how easy is for voters to learn about them. The complexity inherent to certain policy 
instruments generates opportunities for policy makers to shirk when it is hard to explain the 
consequences for voters’ welfare. Thus public officials often resort to optimal obfuscation (Magee, 
Block, and Young 1989; Kono 2006), using hard to detect and understand non-tariff barriers to 
grant protection to special interest groups. On the contrary, less complex trade policy instruments, 
such as tariffs and international treaties on trade, are more visible for voters. Responsiveness 
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should be greater in those cases when not adjusting policy to public opinion may result in being 
kicked out of office. 
This chapter tests the conditional theory of trade policy responsiveness using the new index 
of public support for free trade developed in Chapter Two and data for different trade policies in 
18 Latin American democracies. The statistical analyses rely on pooled time-series, cross-sectional 
models that estimate responsiveness using changes in various trade policies that regulate imports 
and preferential access to the domestic market (rather than on export promotion): preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs), the average level of import tariff rates and non-tariff import barriers (NTBs). 
3.1 Social Demands for Trade Policy: Incomplete Answers 
If mass public opinion matters for trade policy, we should observe that politicians adopt 
pro-trade policies when public sentiment is, on average, pro-trade, and protectionist policies when 
sentiment tilts toward protectionism. That is the generalization we can draw from the seminal 
political economy model of Mayer (1984), who argued that, if policy decisions are made by 
majority rule, the policy chosen should be closer to the ideal preference of the median voter. 
Nonetheless, the literature has failed to provide a real test of that linkage. Just two published 
articles that use the same data from 1996 offer evidence that voters’ aggregate attitudes toward 
international trade are correlated with the average level of import tariff rates in a small pool of 
advanced and transition countries (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Kono 2008). A Pearson correlation 
coefficient based on a few hundred answers to one question on the World Values Survey and to 
another in the International Social Survey Program hardly constitutes the solid evidence that we 
need to claim that governments adjust trade policy to public sentiment.  
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One problem that arises is that scholars often assume voters’ trade policy preferences 
disregarding actual public opinion on trade. Some authors infer support for free trade based on the 
state of the macroeconomy, e.g. in one important work a low rate of unemployment represents 
broader support for free trade (Chaudoin 2014). Most scholars use international trade theories to 
predict individual trade policy preferences. We discussed these models in Chapter Two. Their 
predictions have not been matched with conclusive evidence (Oatley 2017; Naoi 2020). To 
examine whether there is responsiveness, scholars cannot continue to assume preferences. We 
must scale up from one-time individual answers to aggregate and dynamic measures of trade 
sentiment. 
A second reason why public opinion is not expected to matter is that studies of individual 
trade policy preferences conclude that voters are too disinformed and inattentive about trade. This 
view is influenced by studies from the United States where voters have not usually mentioned 
international commerce as an important issue and have been poorly informed about how their 
legislators vote on trade bills (Guisinger 2009; Guisinger and Saunders 2017). After decades of 
progress in public opinion research, the interwar era isolationist voices appear vindicated in 
Guisinger’s findings: the average citizen “lives in a world which he cannot see, does not 
understand, and is unable to direct” (Lippmann 1925, 14). However, there are reasons to believe 
this is limited to Americans, who live in an unusually large domestic market closer to the image 
of a closed economy typical of economic models, and who have experienced stubbornly low levels 
of inflation, making it harder for them to see what is really driving product prices down (Bearce 
and Moya 2020).38 
 
38 This is important because governments in smaller economies use trade policy to stabilize domestic prices. 
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Scholars have also claimed that voters are too dispersed and disorganized to make coherent 
and consequential trade policy demands. The theory of collective action tells us that narrow and 
concentrated interests groups with fewer members are better able to overcome free-rider problems 
and to organize effectively to pressure the government (Olson 1965). By contrast, public opinion 
does not constitute such narrow and concentrated interests groups. It is diffused across society 
(Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019). Scholars thus paint interest groups as the true change makers 
in trade policy (Bearce and Velasco-Guachalla 2020; Betz 2020). Interest groups, of course, do 
not all obtain want they want. As Schattschneider stated, “selectivity is the basis of pressure 
politics… a few can exert great influence because they are organized and because they are alert 
and have access to information, know what they want, and have power” (1963, 287). Firms and 
business associations offer politicians campaign or lobby gifts in return for trade measures that 
raise the domestic price of the good they produce (Grossman and Helpman 1994). Bear in mind, 
though, that special interest groups can benefit either from rents on their outputs or from no 
restrictions on their inputs (Verdier 1994, 11). This means that some groups pressure to lift 
restrictions on inputs and products that provide them with a special benefit, thus advocating for 
trade liberalization (I. S. Kim and Osgood 2019). 
This last point is crucial in today’s globalized economy. The international institutions of 
the postwar era, epitomized in the GATT and the WTO, fostered inter-state trade cooperation (J. 
L. Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007; J. Goldstein 2017). In addition, cooperation at the regional 
and bilateral level has thrived with the proliferation of PTAs (Mansfield and Milner 2012). 
Individual firms that lobby for more free trade have exploited the reciprocal nature of international 
rules to advance their interests. The newest theories of international trade propose that firms 
located in the same industry differ markedly in the extent to which they export, import, or invest 
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abroad (Melitz and Trefler 2012). The most recent empirical evidence shows that a few, very large, 
and highly productive firms account for almost all trade in any given industry and that those firms 
are the strongest advocates for free trade, systematically taking free trade positions in public and 
lobbying governments to reduce restrictions (I. S. Kim and Osgood 2019). 
Lastly, policy makers may hold their own views on how to best manage the integration of 
their country’s economy to the global economy and thus trade policy may reflect their ideas. The 
assumption, which is correct, is that trade policy decisions are made by public officials, not by 
citizen referendum (Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019), notwithstanding the interesting exception 
of the 2007 plebiscite on the US-Central American Free Trade Agreement in which Costa Rican 
citizens casted a direct vote on trade (see, Hicks, Milner, and Tingley 2014). Even in that case, it 
was the national government that negotiated and signed the agreement, and then political parties 
campaigned for and against it. The argument is that policy makers bring their own ideas about 
policy issues. Public officials usually develop ideas about trade policy (J. Goldstein 1988). 
Doctrines about trade have been prominent in the foundation of nations and their modern paths of 
economic and foreign policy (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004; Irwin 2017; Helleiner and 
Rosales 2017).  
In democracies, the election of policy-driven politicians may give rise to a different version 
of responsiveness than the one advanced in this study. According to Achen and Bartels (2016), 
voters elect candidates of one partisan type over another, so public policy may change in the 
direction of public sentiment after an election because of this partisan selection. This has been 
usually tested with cross-sectional roll-call data, but it fails to pass the test of temporal variation 
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(Caughey and Warshaw 2018).39 Policy makers may want to respond to voters, but they are also 
bound to respond to their parties (Butler, Naurin, and Ohberg 2017). Milner and Judkins (2004) 
report that right-wing parties consistently take more free trade stances in their electoral platforms 
than leftist forces, at least in postwar Europe. The same seems to be true in terms of trade-related 
bills and the partisan composition of the US Congress: Democrats are on average less supportive 
than Republicans of bills that lower barriers to imported goods (Destler 1992), especially when 
they involve labor abundant countries (Conconi et al. 2020). However, US legislators sometimes 
vote on trade-related bills against their party to save their political careers, taking anti-free trade 
stances when they come from districts more exposed to import shocks (Feigenbaum and Hall 2015) 
and to offshoring of activities (Owen 2017). 
Do partisan ideas determine what trade policies officials adopt elsewhere? Major economic 
liberalization reforms in the early 1990s were pushed by technocrats and politicians who embraced 
neoliberal ideas (see, inter alia, Nelson 1990; Edwards 1995; Weyland 2006). It is not clear, 
however, that the rise of leaders ideologically opposed to market reforms translates into 
commercial policy changes (Baker and Greene 2011). For example, the elections of Ollanta 
Humala in Peru and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in México, two candidates that vehemently 
campaigned against free trade, had not produced a change of course to protectionism once elected/ 
Conversely, center-right governments have increased tariff rates and imposed new non-tariff 
barriers when they deemed necessary, as in Argentina in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
39 Caughey and Warshaw (2018) argue that partisan selection is minor not because party control has no policy effects, 
but because mass preferences explain little of the variation in party fortunes. 
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Undoubtedly, trade policy is shaped by special interests and incumbents’ ideas, within the 
constraints of a highly institutionalized international trade regime. Groups that have the resources, 
time, and knowledge to be informed about policy alternatives will surely try to move trade policy 
closer to their preferences. However, large numbers of people can offset the lack of information 
or intensity. As Bailey (2001, 48) argues, “an intense, informed group with 200 people will not 
necessarily have more influence than a less intense, uninformed group of 10,000 people.” 
Moreover, rival political actors can activate and provide information to society if an incumbent 
fails to respond to them because they are captured by special interest groups or just because they 
believe their desired course of action is better. The main point is that governments face multiple 
sets of demands. 40 There are times when what the opinion polls report are not the same as what 
the most powerful domestic producers lobby public officials to do. Catering to mass sentiment 
should be really worth it for policy makers to choose paths that contradict financial pressure (Betz 
2020). The most proper question is then, under what conditions should we expect trade policy to 
change to better reflect public opinion. 
3.2 A Conditional Theory of Trade Policy Responsiveness 
Under the appropriate conditions, policy makers respond to public opinion by choosing 
policies that ease restrictions on trade when free trade is more popular and by choosing policies 
 
40 Government officials may need to adjust trade policy in reference to other policies such as taxation and the exchange 
rate (Rodrik 1995; Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2013; Bastiaens and Rudra 2018). This is controlled for in the statistical 
analysis. 
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that increase restrictions when free trade is less popular. This is policy responsiveness by 
adaptation, the dynamic component of democratic representation by which changes in mass 
preferences lead to changes in public policy (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, 
Mackuen, and Stimson 2002). This is not the same as congruence, when citizens and politicians 
are (statically) proximate in space in terms of policy preferences. Responsiveness is dynamic, it is 
movement from the ebb and flow of public opinion to changes in public policies (Canes-Wrone 
2015; Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020). Responsiveness does not mean that the change in policy 
output is fully proportionate to the size of the change in mass preferences. Nor does it mean that it 
is the optimal policy-wise outcome for society; just that it is preferable, from a democratic 
representation standpoint, to be responsive to the masses than the alternative of responding to 
special interest groups, or to no one at all (Dahl 1971). John Stuart Mill said that disagreement 
between public opinion and government decisions undermines the legitimacy of the latter because 
citizens do not know if their representatives are following their own judgments, are indebted to 
special interests, or just lack wisdom (Stokes 2001, 179). 
Democratic theory since James Madison posits that citizens are capable “not only of 
recognizing good qualities in candidates but also of knowing at the end of the term whether a given 
representative merits reelection” (Stokes 2001, 165). Policy makers who have drifted too much 
from public opinion should be punished when election comes (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 
1995). To avoid that electoral punishment, representatives rationally anticipate and adjust policy 
to voter preferences in between elections. This is possible because politicians monitor public 
sentiment on different public issues (Powlick 1991). Legislators and their staffers come in direct 
contact with constituents and learn the street’s mood from them. Executives frequently 
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commission polls to research firms and some have created specialized units within the public 
administration that serve as centralized collection and analysis points on citizens’ opinion.41 
The conditional theory of trade policy responsiveness identifies a series of conditions that 
enable trade policy to represent public opinion despite the barriers to full convergence as discussed 
above. The incentives that democratic rulers face to adjust policy in response to public opinion 
differ across countries and over time (Powlick and Katz 1998; Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020). I 
argue that, when it comes to trade policy, the willingness to respond comes from the incentives 
offered by electoral institutions and the economic structure while the ability to respond comes from 
the visibility of the policy instrument and the concentration of the trade policy-making process. 
The hypotheses are displayed in Table 3.1. 
  
 
41 Some are formal, separate units within government such as Argentina’s Citizens’ Opinion Special Unit within the 
President’s Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros or Germany’s Federal Press Office (Bundespresseamt). The United 
States even has an Office of Opinion Research at the Department of State to follow public opinion in other countries. 
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Table 3.1: Trade Policy Responsiveness: Hypotheses, Mechanisms, and Implications 
 Moderator Mechanism Operationalization 
Observable implication 
Higher public support for free trade should… 
H3.1 Salience Economic relevance. 
Labor force in tradable 
sectors. 











change and facilitates 
lobbying. 
Number of trade 
agencies involved. 
decrease restrictions with fewer agencies. 
H3.4 Visibility 
Complexity of policy 
instrument. 
Instrument involved 
(tariffs, NTBs, PTAs). 
decrease restrictions as visibility increases. 
 
3.2.1 Salience  
The public has its greatest impact on highly salient issues (Lax and Phillips 2009; Caughey 
and Warshaw 2018). Field experiments show that representatives have more incentives to respond 
to public opinion when they receive information about what voters think and want (Butler and 
Nickerson 2011). The salience of an issue increases information on public opinion on that issue. 
Situations with high information about what policy makers do and the outcomes of their policy 
choices pose a threat of electoral punishment for officials who are unresponsive to voters. For less 
salient policies, by contrast, it is easier for officeholders to shirk voter preferences undetected and 
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less likely that voters will care even if shirking is detected (Lax and Phillips 2009). If that happens, 
narrow, well-organized interests may dominate the policy-making process.  
We could argue that trade policy responsiveness is shaped by the extent to which society 
is materially affected by trade. Hypothesis 3.1 states that trade policy responsiveness should be 
greater when trade is more salient. I focus on the pocketbook or material salience of trade in the 
national economy. Verdier (1994) argues that voters shape trade politics when trade is salient, 
which he identifies as a situation when many voters care and are divided about the issue. However, 
that makes it difficult to distinguish public opinion on trade from the salience of trade. Other 
scholars argue that trade deficits and the deep international trade agreements increase the salience 
of trade so that policy makers pay more attention to it (McKibben and Taylor 2020). However, 
using trade outcomes or trade policy outputs as an indicator of the salience of trade is not suitable 
when trade policy is the dependent variable. 
Politicians should change trade policy in accordance with popular preferences on trade 
when many voters obtain their income in a tradable economic sector. The distribution of the labor 
force across the economic structure shapes politicians’ incentives to respond. There is 
experimental evidence that trade policies become salient when individuals expect the trade policy 
to have significant effects on their welfare (T. W. Taylor 2015). Therefore, when people work in 
tradable sectors, they are knowledgeable of the distributional implications of the status quo and 
alternative policies for their own livelihood and those around them. Some sectors produce goods 
and services that are intended to be sold in another country.42  
 
42 The tradable sector can comprise either primary, secondary, or tertiary activities, depending on where lies the 
economy’s relative comparative advantage and its latent advantage (Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 2010). 
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The effects of trade on wages and job opportunities may be large enough for voters to not 
ignore them and also to be more vocal in demanding what they think is best for them. Voters 
employed in import-competing sectors should be wary of free trade and prefer to curtail imports, 
as they assign greater value to their job security than to cheaper prices in the grocery store. Voters 
employed in exporting sectors should support free trade because it increases the return to their 
sector and thus increases their wages, with which they can buy more and better goods. People who 
benefit from fewer restrictions to export should not just support unrestricted exports; they should 
also support the removal of import protection.43 Voters employed in sectors that import inputs 
should also be supportive of fewer restrictions. When many people have stakes in trade, it should 
be more prominent in the public debate, not only during electoral campaigns but also in between 
elections. Rational anticipation about the effects of changing a policy that many voters care about 
should compel governments to pay attention to these voters’ opinion and respond accordingly. In 
contrast, workers employed in sectors that produce nontradable goods or services, such as nurses, 
government employees, and Main Street store clerks, do not derive their livelihood from trade. 
They may hold an opinion on trade, probably as consumers or followers of a partisan doctrine, but 
the incentive for politicians to respond to the opinion of these individuals is going to be small. 
Finally, voters employed in tradable sectors and occupations may be better disposed to 
obtain the resources that facilitate the organization and mobilization of their demands. Workers 
can use collective action tools derived from labor unionization and participation in political parties. 
 
43 Hays (2009, 41) report survey evidence from ten rich OECD countries that individuals who work in industries with 
a positive balance of exports are more likely to oppose government limits on imports. 
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First, labor unions fight for workers’ rights and they also provide information, systematically 
shaping workers’ preferences (Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi 2014). Labor unions may have a 
significant amount of power, either because membership is compulsory, or because workers select 
into those unions because they see the benefits of joining (Iversen 2005; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). 
Second, political entrepreneurs have incentives to represent and provide information to voters 
whose income is clearly linked to integration into world markets. In Latin America, the pattern of 
trade protection of the early postwar era was the result of coalitions of unions and political parties 
(Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011). 
3.2.1.1 Measuring Salience with Country Panel Data 
Measuring material salience is not without hurdles, especially when we need to aggregate 
information at a high level such as the country level. At best we are dealing with an average level 
of a factor that proxies for salience. One way to proceed would be to consider the level of trade 
openness in the economy, i.e. the total value of imports and exports with reference to the country’s 
total output. The United States, for instance, is usually portrayed not as an open economy but one 
with huge domestic market and a low coefficient of trade flows as a share of GDP, which may lead 
many Americans to think locally and feel alien to the global economy (Guisinger 2017; Bearce 
and Moya 2020). In Latin America, Argentina and Brazil have had stubbornly low levels of trade 
openness, often below 25 percent of GDP. By contrast, the trade openness coefficients are much 
higher in small, open economies such as Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay, in which total trade is 
larger than 100 percent of GDP. However, such an indicator does not tell us anything about how 
people experience trade openness. Perhaps there is an open economy in which very few people 
derive their income from the tradable sector. Moreover, there is a key methodological problem: 
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trade openness is affected by trade policy choices, with more protectionist policies more likely 
leading to a more closed economy.44 
To avoid these problems, I follow Hays (2009) and measure the pocketbook salience of 
trade with an indicator of the size of the labor force employed in tradable sectors as a share of total 
employment in the economy. I obtain country-year data on the employment shares of each of 14 
economic sectors from the International Labor Organization (ILO) about. The ILO uses an 
abbreviated version of the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISIC), Revision 4, by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
The classification of sectors is as follows: Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; Mining and 
Quarrying; Manufacturing; Utilities; Construction; Retail and Wholesale commerce; 
Transportation and Storage; Accommodation and food services (Hospitality); Financial services 
and Insurance; Business administration and support service; Public Administration; Human health 
and Social work; Education; and Other services.45 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 report the distribution of the 




44 Trade policy is not the only determinant of trade openness, especially when using as an indicator the value of trade 
flows by GDP, as changes in the national macroeconomy affect the size of total output and international commodity 
prices affect the value of imports and exports. 
45 The measurement is not flawless. It is based on official statistics provided by national governments, which follow 
different sampling methods to estimate the distribution of the labor force. This may be problematic. Argentina tracks 
the labor force with a periodic household survey that only surveys urban metropolitan areas, leaving out the 
countryside (thus, employment in agriculture is severely undercounted).  
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Figure 3.1: Share of Employment by Economic Sector, 1995 
 
 





Trade salience is measured with the share of the labor force employed in the Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, and Manufacturing sectors. Of course, not all firms 
or productive units (some are family farms) in each of these three ISIC economic sectors trade 
with the rest of the world. But this is the best available cross-national data for these countries on a 
structurally-determined factor that shapes people’s exposure to trade. Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing (includes cattle ranching as well) may be fully for export, such as soybeans in Argentina, 
logging in Brazil or fishmeal in Peru; for domestic consumption but facing import competition, 
such as dairy products pretty much everywhere; or for domestic consumption with no foreign 
competition, may be due to natural barriers, such as potatoes in Bolivia. Mining and Quarrying 
includes metal mining and energy production, such as oil and gas; these are all very tradable 
commodities. Manufacturing firms could export, produce final products that compete with 
imported goods, or use foreign inputs in cross-border value chains. There are also few and small 
manufacturing firms that produce goods that are not traded and do not rely on foreign inputs.  
This way of measuring material salience should reduce spurious correlation with public 
support for free trade. Mass opinion on trade is affected by import flows. These economic shocks 
can affect the structure of the labor force in the long term. If imports of manufacturing goods lead 
uncompetitive domestic producers out of the market, jobs in the manufacturing sector will likely 
shrink. If the import shock is localized in manufacturing but not in other sectors, the relative share 
of employment in manufacturing will decrease. Yet, the consequences of trade integration may be 
felt in other sectors as well, so the structure of the workforce may change little. Also, the evidence 
shows that in most cases import surges come at the same time that export booms, given the increase 
in purchasing power and domestic demand brought about by good exporting performance 
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(Mesquita Moreira and Stein 2019). Greater volumes of imports may also represent the rise of 
intra-industry trade, so competitive firms that engage in both types of flows may need not reduce 
payrolls. Finally, the coverage period for the econometric analysis begins in 1995, several years 
after the big restructuring of the Latin American economies. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw 
large reductions of workers in the manufacturing sector developed under ISI, not necessarily due 
to international trade but to macroeconomic turbulences and cuts in state subsidies following the 
debt and inflation crises.46 
3.2.2 How Party Leaders and Electoral Rules Shape Responsiveness 
The second factor that increases policy makers’ willingness to respond to public opinion is 
the presence of strong party leaders who appeal to the broader electorate. Electoral systems 
regulate who can run for public office, how votes are counted, who is declared a winner, and how 
seats are allocated in collective bodies. Voters delegate policy choices to political representatives, 
but “how well their policy preferences get represented and whether they manage to throw the 
rascals out hinge on the rules for election” (Persson and Tabellini 2003, 6). Democracies exhibit a 
large variety of electoral systems both for the legislature and for the executive (Bormann and 
Golder 2013). Electoral rules affect citizens - public official congruence because they shape the 
composition of legislatures and governments. Electoral rules also have an effect on responsiveness 
 
46 In 1995, all 18 economies in the sample had more than 40 percent of the workforce employed in manufacturing, 
mining, and agriculture, forestry, and fishing. In the last year of the panel (2017), ten countries still had more than 40 
percent employed in those sectors, and only four had twenty percent or less. 
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because they create incentives for public officials to follow public opinion and behave in ways that 
guarantee their political survival (Golder and Ferland 2018; Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020).  
Until now, scholars have relied on electoral institutions to predict specific trade policies 
based on the effects that rules have on politicians’ linkages to interest groups. Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) argue that proportional representation (PR) lead to “general welfare” policies (they identify 
free trade as such) while majoritarian systems lead to targeted benefits. Rogowski (1987) argues 
that majoritarian systems promote the influence of special interest groups in the legislature and 
thus predicts higher levels of protection there in contrast to PR systems. In winner-takes-all 
systems legislators favor the interests of their district-specific constituencies, giving 
disproportionate weight to producers’ lobbies in their districts when choosing trade policies 
(Grossman and Helpman 2005). There is cross-country evidence that PR formulas are associated 
with less restrictive trade policies (Evans 2009; Rickard 2010).47  
Studies of the effects of electoral formulas on trade policies build on the debate over the 
different visions of democracy. The proportional vision is said to facilitate the continuous response 
to changes in citizens’ preferences between elections. By contrast, the majoritarian vision of 
democracy is said to compel politicians to implement the policies on which they campaigned, 
being responsive only when a new election takes place (Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000). 
Proportional systems ensure government representation of the citizenry’s most preferred policy 
position, measured with the position of the median citizen, which minimizes the sum of absolute 
 
47 Rogowski later argued that majoritarian rules promote free trade because they lead politicians to cater to consumers 
vis-à-vis districts-specific producers groups because a loss of votes translates into more seats lost (Rogowski and 
Kayser 2002). Unsurprisingly, the evidence is “somewhat maddeningly inconclusive” (Oatley 2017, 706) 
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distances (Golder and Ferland 2018). Proportional democracies tend to elect at least one party that 
represents the position of the median voter given that voters in such systems are free to behave 
sincerely and vote for their desired electoral choice.  
How do electoral rules affect trade policy responsiveness? I argue that trade policy 
responsiveness is higher when policy makers have motives to care for the broader electorate. The 
idea is not that party leaders lead legislators to vote for free trade as a “general welfare” policy, as 
much of the literature does (Grossman and Helpman 2005; Hatfield and Hauk 2014; Wagner and 
Plouffe 2019). Rather, strong party leaders matter because they focus on the broader electorate 
rather on narrow constituencies to win elections and play a key role in controlling intraparty 
discipline to deliver what voters want. Strong party leaders, as those found from Spain to 
Argentina, care about the party’s overall reputation and cultivating overall support for their party 
brand. These politicians block the emergence of factions within legislative parties. Strong party 
leaders use partisan and institutional tools such as legislative committee positions, personnel 
appointments, and control over parties’ campaign funds to secure that members of the same party 
vote in unity as one bloc in the national legislature (Calvo 2014; Morgenstern 2004; Naoi 2015). 
Pushed by leaders, voting together as a bloc reduces the odds of forming alliances across parties 
while making legislators of one party collectively identifiable to voters as being responsible for 
policy decisions. Strong party leaders work hard to increase this identifiability, making it possible 
for voters to tell which group of politicians controls policy decisions and hence hold them 
accountable for poor government performance (Morgenstern 2004). For these reasons, I argue that 
in systems with strong party leaders, public officials in the executive and the legislature are better 
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suited to react to the shifts in public opinion and they can claim credit for better accommodating 
aggregate sentiment.48  
This type of policy maker emerges in polities where electoral institutions promote strong 
party leaders. Some electoral rules privilege party leaders over candidates. Rules that discourage 
a personal vote tilt the power balance to party leaders vis-à-vis individual politicians. By contrast, 
institutions that create incentives to cultivate a personal reputation encourage individual legislators 
to seek out opportunities to personally claim credit for policies that benefit only their districts 
(Ames 1995; Carey and Shugart 1995). The combination of PR formulas with large district 
magnitude and closed and blocked candidate lists motivate parties to maximize the votes necessary 
to win elections by catering to diffuse groups, effectively competing for votes in large areas of the 
country to maximize the number of legislative seats (Rickard 2018, 41). 
 Accordingly, Hypothesis 3.2 states that trade policy should follow public opinion when 
there are strong party leaders. 
3.2.2.1 Electoral Systems in Latin America 
Despite having presidential systems, Latin American countries vary in how they elect 
legislators. Table 3.2 presents information for some key factors that determine how members of 
the lower house of Congress, or the single house in unicameral legislative bodies, have been 
elected since the third wave of democratization. The first variable of interest is the electoral rule 
family. I use data and definitions from Bormann and Golder (2013). In the proportional 
 
48 This does not prevent party leaders to follow their own ideas or party doctrines when making policy. The point is 
that party leadership positions in democratic regimes rely on securing the survival of the party through effective vote 
maximization. 
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representation (PR) family, parties present lists of candidates to be selected in districts with more 
than one seat to allocate, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the votes. 
In contemporary Latin America, there are no countries where legislators are merely elected in first 
past the post systems requiring a simple plurality in districts with just one seat available. There 
are, however, several cases of mixed systems that combine properties from the majoritarian family 
with PR. An independent mixed electoral system, such as the mixed parallel system, is one in 
which the majoritarian and proportional components of the electoral system are implemented 
independently of one another, typically requiring the use of majoritarian and PR formulas in two 
separate electoral tiers (superposition system). A dependent mixed electoral system, called Mixed 
Member Proportional system, is one in which the application of PR is dependent on the distribution 
of seats or votes produced by the majoritarian formula. This system compensates for any 
disproportionality produced by the majoritarian formula at the constituency level. In most 
dependent mixed systems, individuals have two votes: they cast their first vote for a representative 
at the constituency level and their second vote for a party list in a higher electoral tier. 
The second variable is the Personal Vote Index, which measures the degree of institutional 
incentives to cultivate a personal vote which foster intraparty competition and weaken party 
leaders. Carey and Shugart (1995) defined four variables affecting the degree to which electoral 
rules motivate cultivation of a personal vote: ballot control (when parties control the ballot, 
candidates have greater incentives to follow party orders and pursue its platform), vote pooling 
(the extent to which votes are shared among the candidate’s co-partisans), types of votes (whether 
citizens are allowed to cast votes for parties or for candidates), and district magnitude. Combining 
these factors one can rank electoral systems based on personal-vote cultivation incentives. I use 
updated data on the Personal Vote Index available from Connell (2019). 
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Finally, Table 3.2 reports the average district magnitude and the electoral formula. The 
former is the number of legislators that can be elected in any one district, considering all the 
districts in the country. The latter helps to understand variation within electoral system families. I 
rely on the classification and data of Bormann and Golder (2013). Countries with Mixed Member 
Proportional systems (Bolivia, Venezuela) use the Single Member District Plurality formula in 
their first electoral tier, which is effectively a winner-takes-all rule because individuals cast a single 
vote for one candidate and the candidate with the most votes is elected even if this is not a majority. 
Mexico also uses the SMDP formula although its overall system is classified as Mixed Parallel. 
Other Mixed Parallel systems use alternative formulas, such as the Block Vote (individuals have 
as many votes as there are seats in a district to be filled, using as many or as few of their votes as 
they wish) for some years in Ecuador and the Hare quota in Panama. Pure PR systems use formulas 
with quotas or divisors to allocate seats.  











Argentina 1995-2017 PR 1 D'Hondt 5.35 















District Plurality 1 
Brazil 1995-2017 PR 7 
Hare quota (highest 
average remainders) 19 
Chile 1995-2015 PR 5 D'Hondt 2 
Colombia 1995-2001 PR 12 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 4.88 
Colombia 2002-2013 PR 12 D'Hondt 4.88 
Colombia 2014-2017 PR 12 D'Hondt 5.03 
Costa Rica 1995-2017 PR 1 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 8.14 
Dominican Rep. 1996-1997 PR 1 D'Hondt 4 
Dominican Rep. 1998-2001 PR 1 D'Hondt 5 
Dominican Rep. 2002-2005 PR 3 D'Hondt 4.69 
Dominican Rep. 2006-2009 PR 3 D'Hondt 5.56 
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Dominican Rep. 2010-2015 PR 3 D'Hondt 5.72 
Dominican Rep. 2016-2017 PR 3 D'Hondt 5.93 
Ecuador 1995 PR 1 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 3.1 
Ecuador 1996-1997 PR 1 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 3.33 
Ecuador 1998-2001 Mixed Parallel 1 Block Vote 4.76 
Ecuador 2002-2006 PR 3 D'Hondt 4.5 
El Salvador 1995-2017 PR 1 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 4.57 
Guatemala 1996-1998 PR 1 D'Hondt 2.78 
Guatemala 1999-2002 PR 1 D'Hondt 3.96 
Guatemala 2003-2017 PR 1 D'Hondt 5.77 
Honduras 1995-1996 PR 1 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 7.11 
Honduras 1997-2000 PR 1 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 7.39 
Honduras 2001-2016 PR 1 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 7.11 
Mexico 2000-2017 Mixed Parallel 6 
Single Member 
District Plurality 1 
Nicaragua 1995 PR 1 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 10 
Nicaragua 1996-2000 PR 1 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 4.37 
Nicaragua 2001-2017 PR 1 
Hare quota (highest 
average remainders) 4.12 
Panama 1995-1998 Mixed Parallel 6 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 1.8 
Panama 1999-2003 Mixed Parallel 6 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 1.77 
Panama 2004-2008 Mixed Parallel 6 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 1.8 
Panama 2009-2017 Mixed Parallel 6 
Hare quota (largest 
remainders) 1.77 
Paraguay 1995-2017 PR 1 D'Hondt 4.44 
Peru 2001-2010 PR 5 D'Hondt 4.8 
Peru 2011-2017 PR 5 D'Hondt 5.2 



















3.2.3 How the Policy-Making Process Affects Responsiveness 
The ability to respond to public opinion depends on the setup of the policy-making process. 
The structure of policy making creates different incentives for politicians to respond to voters’ and 
special interests’ demands. Some scholars focus on the attributes and relative power of government 
branches. In the United States, for example, the legislature was usually seen as a body unable to 
resist the rent-seeking pressures of special interest groups in legislators’ electoral districts (Destler 
1992).49 During the Great Depression the legislative branch began delegation of reciprocal trade 
policy authority to the executive, thought to care more for aggregate welfare and support trade 
openness (Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997). Presidents endowed with more delegated 
powers are thought to be better able to insulate themselves from special interest pressures and 
focus on the broad electorate when making policy choices (Nielson 2003; Samford 2010). 
However, Hiscox (1999) points to the fact that delegation is in itself an endogenous institution: 
which political party controls government explains both the decision to delegate trade authority as 
well as the content of trade policy. This idea about constitutional limits to delegate and how they 
may affect trade policy choices has not been tested elsewhere. 
The number of veto players is another key component of the policy-making process. Veto 
players are actors whose agreement is necessary to change the policy status quo (Tsebelis 2002). 
On the one hand, extra constraints on the executive could lead governments to make credible 
commitments to trade liberalization (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). On the other hand, 
 
49 Not all presidential systems are alike, however. Some legislatures have strong committees and can question the 
executive, even impeach her, while others are not vested with such powers (Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020). 
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the presence of more veto players fragments authority and makes it harder to change the status quo 
(Henisz and Mansfield 2006), particularly to ratify international agreements (Mansfield, Milner, 
and Pevehouse 2007). However, the issue with these approaches is that they are insufficient to 
predict trade policy responsiveness when the legislature does not intervene, such as with non-tariff 
barriers that are decided by the executive and bureaucratic agencies. Merely counting parties and 
gatekeepers in Congress is then ill suited to understand the most frequent use of commercial 
regulations.  
Institutional veto players within the policy-making process shape which demands are 
represented when governments manage integration into the world economy. The institutional 
design of the public administration deals with the organizational structure of the cabinet and 
bureaucratic agencies, the distribution of functions, coordination mechanisms, and decision rules 
(Jordana and Ramió 2002). Presidents rely on cabinet secretaries to help them get their agenda 
through Congress and to implement a wide range of policies (Amorim Neto 2006; Camerlo and 
Martínez-Gallardo 2017). Laws, statutes, and executive rules mandate that different parts of the 
public administration should intervene to formulate and implement policy. Fragmentation 
disperses the formulation and implementation of policy among different government agencies.50 
Contrary to the political decision to delegate trade authority from Congress to the executive branch, 
the decision to change the structure of the cabinet and the distribution of responsibilities across 
agencies is not one that can be taken lightly and arbitrarily. There are important transaction costs 
 
50 This is not the same as the constraints on the executive usually discussed in reference to the horizontal distribution 
of power across branches of government. A president whose party does not hold a majority of legislative seats may 
nonetheless lead a concentrated administration in which few agencies intervene. 
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involved in changing the rules of how the public administration works and, furthermore, executive 
leaders must consider the political costs of doing do in terms of the power the president gives and 
takes to representatives from political parties and party factions, including the ruling party. While 
presidents often make at least one change in how they distribute administrative positions and 
functions, especially at the beginnings of their tenures, these are not very frequent. The evidence 
from the new index described below shows that no such changes are found in one country for a 
minimum of three to four years. 
How do institutional veto players affect responsiveness? Hypothesis 3.4 argues that trade 
policy responsiveness should be greater when the policy-making process is not highly fragmented, 
i.e. when few executive departments and agencies intervene. Fragmentation should decrease 
responsiveness for two reasons. First, a system with several veto players makes changes to the 
policy status quo harder to pass (Tsebelis 2002). Commercial policy should be harder to change 
when many agencies participate because coordination among them is less likely (Jordana and 
Ramió 2002). Each agency has its constituency and mandate, or what the heads of those agencies 
think are those constituencies and mandates. Second, the participation of many veto players in 
policy making generally creates more opportunities for lobbying by special interest groups 
(Ehrlich 2007). The size and structure of the bureaucracy affects the possibility of rent-seeking 
behavior by public officials and private agents (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). This is especially the 
case in the context of pro-market reforms in countries with low state capacity and little political 
institutionalization (Brown, Earle, and Gehlbach 2009). Trade policy could be unresponsive to 
mass sentiment when producers have easy access to many public officials. Concentrated policy-
making processes, with their greater clarity of responsibility and lower coordination efforts, should 
offer reelection-seeking politicians the means to better cater to voters, reducing information 
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asymmetries with bureaucrats and reducing the latter’s opportunities to shirk from the public 
mandate. Finally, it is worth recalling that this does not predict that fragmentation will necessarily 
obtain trade protection, just that it will be harder to adjust policy to the wishes of the public if it 
disagrees with those of producers. In sum, Hypothesis 3.3 is that trade policy should follow public 
opinion when the policy-making process is less fragmented. 
3.2.3.1 Trade Policy Making Fragmentation in Latin America 
The fragmentation of the policy-making process is here measured with a new index of the 
number of cabinet-level departments and bureaucratic agencies involved in trade policy-making 
in a given country-year. The only existing collection of cross-national data on the design of the 
trade administration for countries in Latin America covers a few years in the late 1990s (Jordana 
and Ramió 2002). To fill in this vacuum, I collected all available information on trade legislation 
and organizational structure for each of the 18 countries in my sample using the WTO’s Trade 
Policy Reports. These reports are written by the organization’s Secretariat in Geneva after the 
country field missions conducted every four to seven years. I verified and complemented these 
data by consulting the online Official Gazettes (or Registers) as well as published information in 
government websites. The index counts the sum of every national cabinet-level department and 
bureaucratic agency that participates in the regulation of international trade and has some degree 
of decision-making capacity. The measurement incorporates no information on rates and types of 
ministerial recruitment and turnover. However important the latter may be to understanding 
coalitions under presidentialism (Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo 
2017), these factors do not add more information about the level of fragmentation. Nonetheless, in 
the next two chapters I present other pieces of evidence about who and why is appointed at 
different agencies crucial to trade policy making in the case studies. 
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The original research yields that the cabinet departments, usually called ministries, that 
more often intervene are those of Foreign Affairs (equivalent to the US Department of State), 
Finance (equivalent to the US Department of the Treasury), and Economic Development (no clear 
comparison in the US government but shares some responsibilities with the Department of 
Commerce). Ministries of Agriculture and of Industry with responsibility over trade policy also 
abound. On the contrary, not many countries have a separate ministry of Trade. Only Costa Rica 
and Peru have had a Trade Ministry for at least ten years at any time since 1990. Importantly, 
cabinet ministers in Latin America are directly responsible to the president, who has unchecked 
authority to name and dismiss these public officials (Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo 2017, 11).51 
Below the cabinet level, the most common agency involved is the Customs authority. The index 
also counts as a separate agency any government organization with specific jurisdiction over 
temporary trade barriers compliant with the GATT/WTO. These agencies, some of which emulate 
the US International Trade Commission, have boards of directors appointed by the president, the 
legislature, or both.52 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that none of the agencies examined are part of 
what has been labeled the “institutional presidency,” the cluster of technical, administrative, and 
advisory organizations created by presidents as part of the executive branch but independent from 
the cabinet (Inacio and Llanos 2016). In this regard, there is no equivalent to the Office of the US 
Trade Representative embedded within the White House. The resulting indicator ranges from two 
 
51 There are few exceptions. In Uruguay, the cabinet requires legislative approval. 
52 Given the focus on restrictions to free trade, the index does not include agencies solely in charge of export promotion 
campaigns and the organization of business fairs. Nonetheless, incorporating this type of agency does not change 
results because every country has one. It is a constant that does not affect variation across countries or over time. 
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(e.g. Panama 1995) to 11 (e.g. Colombia since the early 2000s), with a median of six. Figure 3.3 
report the total count of agencies involved in trade policy making for 1995 and for 2017.  
 
Figure 3.3: The Fragmentation of the Trade Policy Administration 
 
Note: Authors’ own elaboration. Horizontal axis is number of trade agencies in the executive branch in 1997. Vertical 
axis is number of trade agencies in the executive branch in 2017. Countries in red are those in which the major trade 
agency has been a Ministry of Trade (rather than having Trade as a subunit within other cabinet agencies) for at least 
10 years. 
3.2.4 Visibility 
Finally, I argue that the ability to respond to voters depends on the visibility of the policy 
instrument involved. Hypothesis 3.4 posits that trade policy responsiveness should be greatest 
with the most visible trade policies and lowest with the least visible trade policies. There are 
several instruments at disposal because cross-border commerce can be regulated in more than one 
way. For instance, policy makers can resort to unilateral trade policies, such as changing the rate 
of nondiscriminatory import tariffs, the content of sanitary restrictions, and the amount of state 
subsidies to domestic producers. Policy makers can also use bilateral measures, such as preferential 
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tariffs included in international treaties or voluntary export restrictions, and multilateral trade 
policies, such as anti-dumping measures regulated by the GATT/WTO (Naoi 2009). An important 
point is that differences in the complexity of trade policy instruments lead to differences in their 
visibility. According to the theory of optimal obfuscation, the effects of some trade policies on 
welfare are easy to explain to voters, but there are others whose effects are more complex (Magee, 
Block, and Young 1989; Verdier 1994; Kono 2006). Election-motivated officials “seek the most 
informational bang for their buck, which means attacking policies whose costs can be explained 
quickly, easily, and cheaply” (Kono 2006, 370). The negative effects of import quotas are “less 
detectable by rational ignorant voters than are those of tariffs, and the negative effects of tariffs 
are less detectable than are those of subsidies” (Verdier 1994, 8). 
Changes in the general level of import tariff rates have been common in history. Their 
effects on welfare are not hard to grasp. Tariffs are taxes. The rate at which an imported product 
is taxed raises the price that citizens have to pay for it by the same rate of the duty. Producers that 
use imported inputs do not want to see their production costs increase. Those people easily 
understand that a tariff raises the price they have to pay. More importantly, citizens as consumers 
can understand the welfare costs of tariffs because they make consumption goods more expensive. 
The literature on the political economy of neoliberal reforms that included trade liberalization in 
Latin America in the early 1990s (cited in Chapter One) has largely focused on this type of trade 
policy instrument. By contrast, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) encompass a wide range of price, 
quantity, and quality control measures. How these measures work is highly complex. These control 
measures use advanced formulas and a lot of red tape hidden behind forms. Labeling requirements, 
phytosanitary restrictions, and customs procedures to clear imports do not make headlines in the 
evening news or in the campaign trail. Most bystanders have not ever heard of their existence. 
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Even for small and medium sized firms, it is hard to get full information on these government 
regulations. That facilitates that the largest firms and well-organized and well-funded business 
associations that lobby policy makers obtain favorable treatment from NTBs, while most of society 
will remain in the dark about it. 
Governments increasingly resort to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to lock in 
commitments to maintain trade restrictions low between partners. PTAs are very visible, because 
they are international treaties that cede sovereignty and have important welfare consequences 
behind the border. The media profusely covers the signature and ratification of PTAs. Special 
interest groups for and against these agreements mobilize and make public statements in the media 
and in the streets. In Latin America, three major trade agreements, the South American Common 
Market (Mercosur), the North American Free Trade Agreement between Mexico, Canada, and the 
United States (NAFTA) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAAs), increased everybody’s 
attention and made waves of coverage and ink. Politicians could not remain silent about their 
stance on these PTAs. The launch of the Mercosur is fully discussed in Chapter Four. The signature 
of the Mercosur by President Carlos Menem of Argentina and the signature of the NAFTA by 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico became associated with the victory of trade 
liberalization over the extinct ISI model. Moreover, the structure and content of the NAFTA 
became the template for trade policy makers in all other countries in Latin America to negotiate 
similar deals among themselves and with extra-regional partners (Illescas 2019; Torres 2020). The 
birth and death of the FTAAs, a deal proposed by the US government that would have created a 
duty-free area among all countries in the hemisphere except for Cuba, was a wedge issue that pitted 
many politicians, business leaders, and workers against each other within countries as well as one 
that generated fractures between governments within the region (Estevadeordal et al. 2004).  
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While PTAs have increasingly included more chapters on different types of trade 
disciplines, increasingly the regulatory complexity of their context, these agreements are signed 
by national executives and ratified by national legislatures as a whole package (Díaz Clarke 2019; 
Matthews 2019; Urrego 2020). The media thus portrays them as packages that increase trade 
liberalization and the national economy’s exposure to the global economy, triggering strong 
favorable and unfavorable attitudes. Trade policy responsiveness should be higher when it involves 
PTAs and lower when it involves NTBs. 
 
3.3 Time Series, Cross Sectional Analysis 
3.3.1 Research Design 
3.3.1.1 Dependent Variables 
I test the conditional theory of trade policy responsiveness with panel data using the sample 
of 18 democracies in Latin America for the period 1995-2017.53 Economists are usually interested 
in trade outcomes, such as the value of cross-border flows, or firm behavior, such as the decision 
to export. Political economists, by contrast, are interested in trade policy choices, i.e. the outputs 
of the policy-making process. There are two broad policy types that affect trade: those that are 
applied at the border and those that are applied behind the border. The first group is that of trade 
 
53 This choice reduces the temporal coverage of Ecuador to 1997-2006, Peru to 2001-2017, and Venezuela to 1995-
2005. 
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policy strictly speaking, and includes tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers, such as price-based 
temporary trade barriers, quantitative restrictions, quality controls, and licensing. The second type 
comprises foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations as well as state subsidies, taxes, and 
regulation of business competition (for a full review see, Bown and Crowley 2016). Regulations 
of trade in services are usually addressed by this second type of policy. I focus on the first category. 
Trade policy operates with different degrees of visibility, which affects policy 
responsiveness to voters. There are trade policy dimensions that lend themselves to great exposure 
to the public while others are too opaque and complex, creating opportunities for optimal 
obfuscation. We should thus avoid the traditional use of indices that conflate these dimensions. 
Comparative researchers have addressed the difficulty of using comparable data on trade policy 
outputs by using composite measures of the degree of trade policy openness, such as those of the 
conservative Heritage Foundation or the Cato Institute in the United States, which blend some 
information on tariff levels together with non-tariff restrictions. Others have relied on experts’ 
evaluations of the general orientation of trade policy, such as the index of economic policy reform 
of the IDB (Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020). Instead, I recognize that governments have 
incentives to deviate from the public sentiment and can use a mix of policy instruments to get 
different results. I thus focus on separate policy choices regarding merchandise trade.  
The clearest evidence of responsiveness should be found with decisions on the most visible 
type of trade policy instrument: preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The dependent variable is 
the net cumulative stock of PTAs for each country. PTAs include bilateral and multilateral free 
trade agreements, customs unions, partial scope agreements, and unilateral systems of preferences. 
These treaties establish preferential import tariff schedules as well as standards. Starting with the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, PTAs have become 
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increasingly more complex in content. A PTA today typically includes detailed provisions on rules 
of origin, FDI promotion and FDI flows regulation, double taxation and other tax issues, labor 
standards, environmental standards, access to government procurement, and dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The focus is on PTAs signed by all partners rather than the date of entry in force or 
the date of domestic ratification by each country because I want to capture the intent of the 
executive in liberalizing trade. The signing of PTAs has become highly visible. And the signing 
of a PTA is the culmination of a long process of international negotiations, sometimes taking 
several years. As with major foreign economic policy cooperation arrangements, negotiations take 
place not only between sovereign governments but also within countries between the executive 
and several domestic actors including legislators, interest groups, and voters (Putnam 1988). Data 
for this variable are from the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements database. 
Next, I consider a classic trade policy that is one step less frequently present in the public’s 
minds but still is very important and jumps into the agenda when special interest groups and policy 
makers discuss how to deal with trade deficits: import tariffs. I analyze the average of all ad-
valorem Most Favored Nation (MFN) applied import tariff rates, with rates measured as 
percentages. Governments collect price-based duties at the border for each product that crosses it, 
at different rates. The MFN tariff complies with the principle of nondiscrimination among 
members in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). This type of duty is applied at 
the same rate against goods imports from all other GATT members. Data are collected from 
government sources by the WTO and United Nations offices such as UNCTAD, made available 
through the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Statistics database portal (WITS). Given that 
countries cap part or all of their tariffs at some legal binding commitment reported to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) that is usually higher than the MFN tariff they effectively apply, some 
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countries “exploit this flexibility to make high frequency changes within years” (Bown and 
Crowley 2016, 18) and may not be captured in the annual data. I use the simple average rather than 
weighted indexes that incorporate the level of imports because I wish to separate trade flows from 
trade policies. I do not use collected import duty revenue either, because it is affected by 
international economic factors and domestic constraints such as the level of state capacity and 
corruption.  
Finally, I consider non-tariff barriers (NTB) to trade, the least visible type of trade policy 
and the one for which responsiveness should be the hardest to find. The third dependent variable 
is the number of NTB measures communicated to WTO members. After the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Multilateral Round and the establishment of the WTO, governments have increased their 
reliance on these NTB measures to regulate cross-border commerce in goods. NTBs include trade 
defense measures, namely, antidumping measures, countervailing duties, and safeguards, which 
have a temporary life span that are allowed and regulated by the WTO. These barriers can be used 
to remedy unfair trade practices abroad as well as to concede protection to special interest groups 
that may be affected by the reduction of tariff rates (Bown and Crowley 2016). Other NTBs include 
import quotas, export subsidies, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, all of which are subject 
to monitoring through notification under GATT-WTO agreements. Data are from the WTO’s 
Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal. We cannot include data on other NTBs that are not 
communicated to the WTO, such as export quotas and export licenses. 
3.3.1.2 Independent and Control Variables 
The main independent variable is the original index of public support for free trade 
developed in Chapter Two. The index measures the percentage of people who agree with pro-free 
trade statements in nationally representative opinion surveys in a given country-year. Chapter Two 
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provides a full description of the data sources and estimation method to address the problem of 
unbalanced gaps as well as a detailed discussion of the observed patterns in public support for free 
trade in Latin America in the 1990-2017 period.  
In the previous section of this chapter, I presented the three moderating factors that 
facilitate the public opinion-trade policy link and how they are measured for this analysis. Further, 
I account for several alternative explanations. Changes in commercial policy can be impacted by 
trade flows. I include the value of total merchandise exports as a share of GDP and the value of 
total merchandise imports as a share of GDP. Trade policy decision could also reflect changes in 
macroeconomic conditions as governments try to adjust trade policy to public finance needs or to 
accommodate demands by domestic producers affected by those economic flows (Rodrik 1994; 
Edwards 1995). The business cycle is controlled for with year-to-year change in GDP with data 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). Even without a recession, domestic 
producers are deeply affected by the exchange rate (Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2013). I 
incorporate a measure of appreciation of the real exchange rate from the World Bank (2020). 
Moreover, globalization flows could decrease the degree of economic policy responsiveness if 
governments feel more constrained by global capital markets (Ezrow and Hellwig 2014), which 
could be especially gruesome in developing countries with high dependence in global capital 
cycles. I control for capital account openness using the Chinn and Ito (2006) index of restrictions 
on cross-border financial transactions surveyed by the International Monetary Fund. Finally, I 
account for policy makers’ preferences with a dichotomous indicator of their left-right orientation. 
I use a modified version of the 2019 version of the Database of Political Institutions (T. Beck et 
al. 2001) complemented with national country sources to classify the ideological leaning of the 
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elected president. Finally, I account for differences in economic development with the log of GDP 
per capita with data from the World Development Indicators. 
3.3.1.3 Methods 
This study is designed to see if movements in trade sentiment are followed by decisions in 
trade policy in the same direction. In the past, responsiveness was captured with the slope for a 
static measure of opinion in a cross-sectional analysis (Achen 1978), simply revealing the 
covariation between citizens’ preferences and governmental outputs at a given time. To increase 
confidence in the causal relationship between mass sentiment and policy, we should exploit 
temporal variation, too (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Caughey and Warshaw 2018). Panel data allow 
us to make inferences across both time and space. Panel econometric methods let us deal with the 
problem of how to control for factors that cannot be observed and may be correlated with the 
variable of interest, such as geography, that conflates the effects of the demand side of trade politics 
(Rudra and Tobin 2017). In the simplest form, a positive coefficient means that an increase in 
public support for free trade generates a more freer commercial policy, provided that the dependent 
variable is measured in a way that higher values represent fewer restrictions to free exchange.  
I rely on different panel econometric models based on the nature of each dependent 
variable. To analyze count data on signed PTAs and imposed NTBs, I rely on event count models. 
Applying OLS with discrete and bounded data would yield wrong predictions and suffer from 
heteroskedasticity as the variance of the count increases with the mean (Ward and Ahlquist 2018). 
Assuming that events occur independently and with a constant number of events in any particular 
observational window, we can model such occurrence with nonlinear models such as the Poisson 
regression. However, it is likely that the variance of the residuals is larger than the mean (Ward 
and Ahlquist 2018, 197), especially when there are an excess of zeros in the data (as with NTBs) 
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or if events are positively correlated (as with PTAs). To correct for overdispersion, I estimate a 
negative binomial regression, which uses a more flexible distribution to derive the log-likelihood. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by country to account for interdependence among 
observations. Figure 3.4 display hanging rootograms that plot expected versus actual counts for 
PTAs and NTBs using the two event count models. The wave-like pattern and underpredictions of 
zeros are evidence of overdispersion. Further, I also estimate fixed effects negative binomial 
regression to deal with the omitted variable bias. To simplify the interpretation of complex 
nonlinear regression estimates, I also provide as benchmark a linear probability model.  
 
Figure 3.4: Rootograms to Detect Overdispersion in Count Data 
 
 
Note: Plots on the left are based on Poisson regressions. Plots on the right are based on Negative Binomial regressions. 
The curve represents the square root of the expected frequency of the outcomes using public support for free trade and 
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three moderator variables discussed above, while the vertical bars are from the expected frequency to the observed 
frequency. 
 
To analyze responsiveness when the instrument is the average import tariff rate, I estimate 
linear regressions. I first use random effects linear regression with standard errors clustered by 
country, useful to explore the between-unit variation and see the effect of time-invariant variables, 
as in Betz's (2017) study of trade policy. However, behind random effects rests the heroic 
assumption that the error components are unrelated to the observed independent variables (Bell 
and Jones 2015). Therefore, I also estimate fixed effects linear regressions to rule out time-
invariant omitted variable bias both with and without the one-period lagged value of the dependent 
variable and a temporal trend, standard practice in international and comparative political economy 
(Hays 2009); in the latter case with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) with a first order 
autoregression parameter (N. Beck and Katz 1995).54 Given that Hypothesis 3.4 is unconditional 
while Hypotheses 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are interactive in nature, I follow two general empirical models. 
Here I report Equations 3.1 without the autodistributive component for the case of Hypothesis 3.4: 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 +𝜑𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  
In Equation 3.2, the model tests Hypothesis 3.1 and incorporates the interaction between public 
opinion on trade and the salience of trade: 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝐵3𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 +𝜑𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  
 
54 Using a dynamic model with fixed effects may not provide the most consistent and efficient estimates with panel 
data (Nickell 1981). This is less of a problem when T is relatively large to N as in this sample (Angrist and Pischke 
2009). 
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Finally, I also estimate error correction models as in Chapter Two, estimating β1 for the 
differenced independent variable (which provides an estimate of the initial change in the dependent 
variable produced in the short term) and β2 for the lagged level of the independent variable, which 
allows to calculate the long-term impact of the independent variable that is distributed in each 
period over a time span (De Boef and Keele 2008). I report the empirical model for Hypothesis 
3.1 in Equation 3.3: 
∆𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6∆𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  
3.3.2 Results 
Table 3.3 reports the results for preferential trade agreements regressed on public support 
for free trade. The major finding is that high public support for free trade leads to governments 
signing more PTAs, suggesting that policy makers are responsive to public opinion on trade. 
Models 1, 3, and 5 show the results for the unconditional relationship between public opinion and 
PTAs. The coefficient estimates are all positive and statistically significant. Recall that in negative 
binomial regressions, the coefficients retrieve the change in the log λ (the average number of events 
in the so-called exposure interval) for a change in the independent variable. The coefficient of 
0.015 means that a unit increase in public support for free trade (e.g. from 50 to 51 percent) 
generates a cumulative count of PTAs about 1 time more frequently. The standard deviation of 
public support is 9.8 percentage points, so the effect could be substantial. The relationship can be 
visualized with a simple scatterplot as that in the top-left plot of Figure 3.5 below. This is a major 
finding, as PTAs have become the ultimate policy tool to liberalize trade and lock in the change. 
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Having more PTAs represents a strong choice by the government to lower barriers with more 
trading partners.  
 
Table 3.3: Public Opinion and Prefential Trade Agreements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










Public Support t-1 0.128** 0.219* 0.012*** 0.013 0.004 0.023 
 (0.058) (0.106) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) (0.015) 
Personal Vote t-1  -1.591*  -0.271***  -0.274*** 
  (0.869)  (0.067)  (0.057) 
Public Support*Personal Vote t-1  0.025  0.005***  0.003*** 
  (0.012)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Trade Agencies t-1  1.668  0.314***  0.302*** 
  (1.625)  (0.110)  (0.071) 
Public Support*Trade Agencies t-1  -0.024  -0.005***  -0.006*** 
  (0.020)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Tradable Labor Force t-1  0.490*  0.015  -0.011 
  (0.260)  (0.014)  (0.023) 
Public Support*  -0.002  0.004***  0.000 
       Tradable Labor Force t-1  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Exports t-1 0.026 0.041 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.007 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Imports t-1 -0.031 -0.038 -0.010 -0.011 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
GDP per capita t-1 7.589*** 14.701*** 0.592*** 1.371*** 0.336 0.493 
 (1.382) (2.031) (0.153) (0.245) (0.481) (0.433) 
GDP growth t-1 -0.033 -0.103 0.003 -0.004 0.009* 0.008* 
 (0.100) (0.078) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
Financial Openness t-1 0.730 0.456 0.048 -0.061 0.211 0.249 
 (1.933) (1.534) (0.171) (0.181) (0.173) (0.162) 
Exchange rate t-1 -0.006** -0.010*** -0.001** -0.001** 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Left government t-1 -0.648 -0.074 -0.208* -0.056 0.068 0.066 
 (0.979) (0.808) (0.116) (0.094) (0.061) (0.045) 
Time trend   0.067*** 0.050*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 










ln(α)   -3.456*** -16.660 -17.515*** -18.065*** 
Observations 361 361 361 361 361 361 
AIC   1774.461 1675.616 1479.574 1460.294 
BIC   1817.390 1741.099 1518.817 1530.777 
R2 0.535 0.717     
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable is cumulative stock of signed Preferential Trade 
Agreements. A positive coefficient indicates greater odds of a higher stock of Agreements (i.e., more free trade). 
Models 1 and 2 are linear probability models with robust clustered standard errors. Models 3 and 4 are negative 
binomial regressions with robust clustered standard errors. Models 5 and 6 are negative binomial Fixed Effects 
regressions with robust clustered standard errors. AIC is Akaike information criterion. BIC is Bayesian information 
criterion. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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To understand the relationship between public opinion and PTAs conditional on the 
different factors that shape willingness and ability to be responsive, I report the coefficient 
estimates and provide plots to visualize the interactions. The coefficient for the interaction of 
public opinion and trade agencies is statistically significant in both negative binomial regressions 
from Models 4 and 6 in Table 3.3. The direction of the interactive coefficient, as expected by the 
theory, providing evidence in support of Hypothesis 3.3: trade policy responsiveness is greater 
when the policy-making process is more concentrated (i.e., it has fewer trade agencies involved). 
The negative slope from the interaction means that pro free trade changes in public opinion lead 
to fewer PTAs as trade agencies increase. The top-right plot in Figure 3.5 helps to make this finding 
more clear: when there are few participating trade agencies, an increase in public support for free 
trade generates a higher number of signed PTAs, but this becomes increasingly negative as the 
number of trade agencies increases. 
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Figure 3.5: Estimated Effects of Public Opinion on Preferential Trade Agreements 
 
Note (clock-wise): Top-left scatterplot of bivariate direct (unconditional) relationship (with fitted regression line in 
blue) between public support for free trade and cumulative number of PTAs. Top-right plot is the conditional marginal 
effects of public support for free trade on number of PTAs conditional on number of trade agencies with 95% 
confidence intervals. Bottom-right plot is the conditional marginal effects of public support on number of PTAs 
conditional on labor force in tradable sectors with 95% confidence intervals. Bottom-left plot is the conditional 
marginal effects of public support on PTAs conditional on personal vote index (higher values, more candidate-centric) 
with 95% confidence intervals, All conditional marginal effects estimated from linear regression models with clustered 
robust standard errors as in Column 2, Table 3.3 (with one interactive term at a time). 
 
Second, the interactive coefficient for public opinion on trade and the personal vote index 
is statistically significant across Models 4 and 6, but it is not in the expected direction by the theory. 
The coefficient is positive, suggesting that higher public support for free trade leads to an increase 
in the count of PTAs at higher values of the personal vote index, i.e. when electoral rules for the 
legislature promote individuals candidates. A look at the actual data suggests that Colombia 
comports with this result. A pro-free trade electorate in the last years of the Andrés Pastrana 
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administration and the first years of Alvaro Uribe’s tenure preceded the rise in PTAs in the coming 
years. When I remove this case, the relationship is not statistically significant. Moreover, the 
interaction is not significant when the marginal effect of opinion on PTAs is estimated for each 
value along the index of personal vote. This is seen with the large confidence intervals in the 
bottom-left plot in Figure 3.5.  
Third, there is very weak evidence that the effect of higher public support for free trade on 
the rate of PTA adoption depends on values of our proxy for material salience, labor force in 
tradable sectors. The interactive coefficient in the negative binomial regression (Model 4) is 
positive and statistically significant, but it is not indistinguishable from zero when adding fixed 
effects (Model 6). Moreover, the sign and significance of the interactive term reverses when one 
removes the other interactive terms (i.e., with the moderators trade agencies and personal vote 
index) from the model, as illustrated by the negative and insignificant conditional marginal effects 
of bottom-right plot in Figure 3.5. 
Next, I consider whether there is responsiveness with import tariff rates. Table 3.4 reports 
random effects, fixed effects, and error correction results for the average level of non-
discriminatory import tariff rates regressed on public support for free trade. There is confirmatory 
evidence of an unconditional, direct effect of the level of public support on changes in the tariff 
rate from the error correction model in column 3. The coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. This means that higher levels of support for free 
trade generate decreases in the average tariff rate. However, the unconditional relationship is not 
robust to other specifications like the random (Model 1) or fixed effects autodistributive lagged 
(Model 2) regressions. 
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There is evidence in support for the conditional Hypothesis 3.2. The positive and 
statistically significant interactive coefficient for Personal Vote across Models 4 and 5 suggests 
that a higher level of public support for free trade is associated with less free trade outputs (higher 
tariff rates) under electoral systems with higher incentives to cultivate a personal vote, the opposite 
of party-centric systems. That interaction coefficient is not significant in the error correction 
model. As we can see in the bottom-left plot in Figure 3.6, it is clear that candidate-centric electoral 
systems are not responsive but the evidence is not very supportive (see red marker in plot) for the 
idea that party-centric are more responsive to public opinion when making decisions on import 
tariffs, or at least the average level across all types of product categories as examined here. 
The fragmentation of the trade policy-making process makes it more difficult to respond 
to voters. Hypothesis 3.3 is supported with the results from the error correction model in column 
6 of Table 3.4. The coefficient for the interaction between changes in public support for free trade 
and the differenced value of trade agencies is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level. This means that an increase in public support for free trade generates an increase 
in import tariff rates (i.e. less free trade output) as the differenced count of participating agencies 
goes up. More veto players break the expected connection between public opinion and trade policy 
choice. The result is best depicted in the top-right plot in Figure 3.6. The positive slope represents 
the marginal effects of opinion on the average tariff rates as the count of trade agencies increases. 
Having three executive agencies in charge of making decisions on trade policy significantly 
produce lower import tariff rates if the public feels more pro free trade compared to a similar 
situation but with a state where eight agencies intervene. Finally, there is no evidence that the size 
of the labor force employed in tradable sectors moderates the relationship between aggregate 
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opinion and average import tariffs. The interactive coefficient is indistinguishable from zero in 
both Models 4, 5, and 6 and there is no supporting visual evidence in Figure 3.6, either. 
 
Table 3.4: Public Opinion and Import Tariff Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Random Effects Fixed Effects Error 
Correction 
Random Effects Fixed Effects Error 
Correction 
Public Support t-1 0.008 0.005 -0.010** -0.061 0.003 -0.020 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.004) (0.087) (0.003) (0.024) 
Public SupportΔ   -0.001   -0.006 
   (0.008)   (0.008) 
Personal Vote t-1    -0.350 -0.127 0.022 
    (0.384) (0.129) (0.106) 
Public Support*Personal Votet-1    0.014* 0.004** -0.000 
    (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) 
Personal VoteΔ      0.070 
      (0.163) 
Public Support*Personal VoteΔ       0.041 
      (0.045) 
Trade Agencies t-1    0.091 0.160 0.043 
    (0.588) (0.149) (0.181) 
Public Support*     -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 
           Trade Agencies t-1    (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trade AgenciesΔ      0.385** 
      (0.179) 
Public Support*      0.063** 
           Trade AgenciesΔ      (0.029) 
Tradable Labor Force t-1    -0.053 0.003 -0.010 
    (0.106) (0.033) (0.023) 
Public Support*    0.001 0.001 0.001 
          Tradable Labor Force t-1    (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Tradable Labor ForceΔ      0.044 
      (0.036) 
Public Support*      -0.001 
          Tradable Labor ForceΔ      (0.007) 
Exports t-1 -0.290 -0.016* -0.008 -0.048 -0.019 -0.013 
 (0.032) (0.009) (0.005) (0.032) (0.010) (0.006) 
ExportsΔ   -0.028   -0.033* 
   (0.018)   (0.019) 
Imports t-1 -0.012 0.024*** 0.001 0.005 0.022*** 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.005) (0.019) (0.007) (0.006) 
ImportsΔ   0.057***   0.054*** 
   (0.014)   (0.015) 
GDP per capita t-1 -3.071*** -.0169 0.399*** -2.770* 0.506 0.724*** 
 (1.008) (0.532) (0.110) (1.464) (0.568) (0.276) 
GDP per capitaΔ   -2.145   -0.477 
   (3.594)   (3.511) 
GDP growth t-1 -0.020 -0.036*** -0.010 -0.019 -0.040*** -0.038 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.041) (0.020) (0.012) (0.044) 
GDP growthΔ   0.012   -0.004 
   (0.038)   (0.036) 
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Financial Openness t-1 -2.078*** -0.673*** -0.757*** -1.968*** -0.725*** -0.844** 
 (0.632) (0.246) (0.268) (0.503) (0.255) (0.385) 
Financial OpennessΔ   -0.527   -0.626 
   (0.620)   (0.734) 
Exchange rate t-1 0.005** 0.001 -0.000 0.004** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Exchange rateΔ   -0.001   -0.000 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Left government t-1 0.357 0.134* 0.227* 0.292 0.149 0.286** 
 (0.377) (0.105) (0.130) (0.366) (0.103) (0.137) 
Left governmentΔ   -0.458**   -0.551** 
   (0.200)   (0.220) 
Time Trend  -0.052** -0.038**  -0.060* -0.043*** 
  (0.026) (0.016)  (0.031) (0.014) 
MFN Tariff Rate t-1  0.484*** -0.141***  0.471*** -0.148*** 
  (0.059) (0.028)  (0.054) (0.028) 
Constant 39.313***   37.742**   
 (8.465)   (15.291)   
Observations 358 348 336 352 348 336 
R2 0.037 0.952 0.132 0.037 0.953 0.153 
rho .580   .650   
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable in Models 1, 2, 4 and 5 is average level of ad-valorem 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) import tariff rate. Dependent variable in Models 3 and 6 is change in average MFN 
import tariff rate. A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable generates an increase in 
the average level of import tariff rates (i.e., less free trade). Variables with Δ indicate one-year change. Models 1 and 
4 are Random Effects regressions with robust clustered standard errors. Models 2 and 5 are AR(1) Prais-Winsten 
Fixed Effects regressions with panel corrected standard errors. Models 3 and 6 are Error Correction regressions with 




Figure 3.6: Estimated Effects of Public Opinion on Average Tariff Rates 
 
Note (clock-wise): Top-left scatterplot of bivariate direct (unconditional) relationship (with fitted regression line in 
blue) between public support for free trade and average Most Favored Nation import tariff rate. Top-right plot is the 
conditional marginal effects of public support for free trade on average Most Favored Nation import tariff rate 
conditional on number of trade agencies with 95% confidence intervals. Bottom-right plot is the conditional marginal 
effects of public support on average tariff rate conditional on labor force in tradable sectors with 95% confidence 
intervals. Bottom-left plot is the conditional marginal effects of public support on average tariff rate conditional on 
personal vote index (higher values, more candidate-centric) with 95% confidence intervals. All marginal effects 








Table 3.5: Public Opinion and Non-Tariff Barriers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Public Supportt-1 0.968* -0.335 0.038*** -0.059 0.027*** -0.029 
 (0.343) (1.338) (0.011) (0.046) (0.008) (0.048) 
Personal Vote t-1  -10.412  -0.515**  0.086 
  (6.143)  (0.259)  (0.225) 
Public Support*Personal Vote t-1  0.220  0.010*  0.000 
  (0.130)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
Trade Agencies t-1  -5.247  0.002  -0.478 
  (8.840)  (0.232)  (0.298) 
Public Support*Trade Agencies t-1  0.070  -0.001  0.010* 
  (0.100)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Tradable Labor Force t-1  0.438  -0.108***  0.007 
  (1.651)  (0.040)  (0.078) 
Public Support*  0.001  0.002**  -0.000 
           Tradable Labor Force t-1  (0.030)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Exports t-1 -0.584 0.549 -0.035** -0.039** -0.041* -0.042 
 (0.355) (0.363) (0.015) (0.013) (0.024) (0.030) 
Imports t-1 -0.151 -0.119 0.004 0.013 0.035** 0.035* 
 (0.243) (0.25) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) 
GDP per capita t-1 17.415*** 23.105** 0.919*** 0.628 -0.666 -0.580 
 (4.790) (12.461) (0.319) (0.781) (0.908) (1.024) 
GDP growth t-1 -0.677 -0.768* -0.018 -0.015 -0.002 0.005 
 (0.500) (0.430) (0.015) (0.027) (0.020) (0.017) 
Exchange rate t-1 -0.011 -0.019 -0.001 -0.000 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Financial Openness t-1 -9.308 -9.312 -0.099 -0.025 1.260** 1.115* 
 (13.328) (14.594) (0.491) (0.589) (0.486) (0.594) 
Left government t-1 6.256 9.954 0.019 0.051 -0.001 -0.011 
 (9.478) (10.183) (0.229) (0.240) (0.111) (0.116) 
Time trend   0.004 0.017 0.058 0.051 
   (0.019) (0.029) (0.044) (0.060) 
Constant -155.283*** -153.916 4.906 -33.776   
 (46.365) (124.401) (32.483) (53.737)   
ln(α)   0.263* 0.167 -0.348 -0.362 
Observations 358 358 358 358 358 358 
AIC   2881.615 2846.120 2689.276 2687.369 
BIC   2924.763 2912.495 2728.519 2741.852 
R2 0.331 0.392     
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable is count of Non-Tariff Barriers reported by the 
government to the WTO, including price, quantity, and quality import control measures. A positive coefficient 
indicates greater odds of a higher number of barriers (i.e., less free trade). Models 1 and 2 are linear probability models 
with robust clustered standard errors. Models 3 and 4 are negative binomial regressions with robust clustered standard 
errors. Models 5 and 5 are negative binomial Fixed Effects regressions with robust clustered standard errors. AIC is 





Figure 3.7: Estimated Effects of Public Opinion on Non-Tariff Import Barriers 
 
Note (clock-wise): Top-left scatterplot of bivariate direct (unconditional) relationship (with fitted regression line in 
blue) between public support for free trade and number of reported non-tariff price, quantity, and quality control 
barriers (NTBs). Top-right plot is the conditional marginal effects of public support for free trade on number of NTBs 
conditional on number of trade agencies with 95% confidence intervals. Bottom-right plot is the conditional marginal 
effects of public support on number of NTBs conditional on labor force in tradable sectors with 95% confidence 
intervals. Bottom-left plot is the conditional marginal effects of public support on NTBs conditional on personal vote 
index (higher values, more candidate-centric) with 95% confidence intervals. All conditional marginal effects 
estimated from linear regressions with clustered robust standard errors as in Column 2, Table 3.5, with one interactive 
term at a time. 
 
Governments resort to optimal obfuscation to evade being responsive to voters. This is the 
conclusion from the positive direct (unconditional) effect of aggregate sentiment on the initiation 
of non-tariff barriers. In Table 3.5, both the linear (Model 1) and negative binomial (Models 2 and 
3) regressions yield that higher support for free trade is followed by more NTBs, which increase 
trade protection to domestic producers. Hypothesis 3.4 predicts that responsiveness should be the 
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least likely when governments use NTBs because these are opaque and complex policy 
instruments, difficult to see, to communicate, and to understand. Now, the positive and statistically 
significant coefficients found for public opinion in Table 3.5 take the prediction one step further: 
governments not only fail to reduce NTBs when aggregate sentiment is more pro free trade, but 
they increase those import restrictions under open friendly opinion.  
To avoid alienating an electorate that embraces globalization, policymakers may be using 
less visible restrictions to free trade to provide protection to domestic producers that demand it. 
We do not have observable data on actual non-tariff demands from domestic businesses across 
countries and over time to fully validate this account. But NTBs are, in general, little known to the 
average citizen. Phytosanitary restrictions and safeguard remedies, for example, are less likely to 
make headlines and trickle into the public debate about trade, except for those with vested interests. 
So, the positive coefficient for the independent effect of public support may mean that 
policymakers can make one trade policy choice in the direction of the public sentiment, for 
example signing PTAs or lowering the average import tariff rate, while moving NTBs in the 
opposite direction under the radar. This is best illustrated in the case of Chile since 2010, a country 
where the index of public support for free trade is greater than 70 percent, tariff rates are very low, 
the stock of PTAs is the highest, but NTBs are greater than 70 initiated restrictions per year. 
There is some evidence that policy makers are even less responsive to voters when the 
policy making process is fragmented. The interactive coefficient between public opinion and the 
number of trade agencies is positive in the linear model (column 2) but statistically significant only 
at the 90 percent confidence level in the negative binomial regression with fixed effects (column 
6). This relationship is visualized in the top-right plot in Figure 3.7 using estimates from a linear 
model with one interaction at a time, where the marginal effect of higher support for free trade on 
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NTB initiation becomes positive as the number of executive agencies that participate in the process 
increases. 
The electoral system seems to shape responsiveness with NTBs, but the results are not very 
robust. Positive coefficients in Models 2, 4, and 6 (Table 3.5) suggest that there is less 
responsiveness when electoral systems promote individual candidates over strong party leaders, 
but this relationship is noisy, and the best model achieves a 90 percent confidence level. The 
marginal effect of opinion on NTBs is more than three times higher in an upward direction when 
one moves from a system with a score of three in the personal vote index (e.g., Uruguay) to a score 
of 10 (e.g., Bolivia), as seen in the bottom-left plot in Figure 3.7. Finally, there is no clear statistical 
evidence to support Hypothesis 3.1. While the bottom-right plot in Figure 3.7 using a linear 
regression model suggests a negative marginal effect conditional on labor force size, the negative 
binomial regression in column 4 retrieve a positive and significant interactive coefficient.  
3.3.2.1 Robustness Checks 
How sensitive are these results? I summarize here the robustness checks for the estimated 
relationship between public support for free trade and the three trade policy choices under study, 
both the unconditional effects as well as the conditional effects on the moderators from Hypotheses 
3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. Full results are in the Appendix B. 
The direct effect of public opinion on PTAs is robust to estimating and compensating for 
bias in the estimator. Appendix B Table 1 shows that higher public support for free trade lead to a 
higher number of free trade treaties, robust to jackknife resampling, sequentially deleting one 
observation from the dataset, recomputing the estimator, for the entire size for the sample. That 
table also shows that the direct positive effect is robust to incorporating the lagged dependent 
variable to the negative binomial fixed effects regression. Moreover, the last column in Appendix 
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B Table 1 corroborates the unexpected finding of more PTAs in response to high public support 
in candidate-centric systems using an alternative indicator: PR formula. Using this proxy, 
furthermore, does not wash out the conditional effect of opinion based on the number of trade 
agencies. 
The relationship between public support for free trade and PTAs conditional on willingness 
and ability to respond are robust to the inclusion of other control factors. Appendix B Table 2 
shows that the electoral system, the structurally determined degree of trade salience, and the 
fragmentation of the trade policy-making process exert the same effects as in Table 3.3 discussed 
above when accounting for the total number of institutional and partisan veto players in the 
political system beyond the public administration agencies on trade (using the Checks indicator 
from Beck et al. (2001)); the average level of trade flows openness in the region (using the De 
Facto Trade Globalization index from the KOF Institute); and whether the country is member to a 
customs union (Mercosur and Andean Community). Among these new controls, it is worth 
mentioning that the estimated coefficient for customs union is positive and statistically significant, 
a finding that suggests that countries within a customs union are more likely to sign more PTAs, 
all else equal. This result fits with the case of Colombia and Peru, two countries that have signed 
several of their own deals with other countries while both being members of the Andean 
Community. 
Next, in Appendix B Table 3, I present results for sensitivity analysis for average tariff 
rates regressed on public opinion conditional on the three moderators. The results from the fixed 
effects and error correction models with jackknifed standard errors (Models 1 and 2) are that higher 
public support for free trade increases the average tariff rate (i.e., a more protectionist output) when 
legislators are elected in candidate-centric systems. Furthermore, the statistically significant 
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negative interactive coefficient in Model 3 in Table 3 demonstrate that in countries with PR 
formula, higher support for free trade is associated with a lower average tariff rate, a more clear 
evidence of Hypothesis 3.2. The results from the regressions with jackknife resampling also ratify 
the finding from Table 3.4 that the relationship between public opinion and tariff rates is not 
conditional on the share of employment in tradable sectors. 
In Appendix B Table 4, I show that the relationship between public support for free trade 
and PTAs conditional on the personal vote index is robust to the inclusion of three additional 
control factors: checks on executive power; regional trade flows; and customs unions. The result 
for the last one is not statistically significant, surprisingly reporting that Latin American countries 
that belong to the two regional customs union do not exhibit different levels of non-discriminatory 
tariff rates (other factors such as financial openness, economic growth, and the ideology of the 
ruling government seem to be important drivers). 
In Appendix B Table 5, I first show that using jackknifed standard errors does not alter the 
finding that higher support for free trade produces a higher number of NTBs (see, Models 1, 2, 
and 3). Then I report a non-significant estimated coefficient in Model 4 for PR formula, suggesting 
that responsiveness with NTBs is shaped by the rules about how individual candidates compete in 
elections (shown in Table 3.5) but not by whether the formula is fully proportional or not. And 
lastly, in Appendix B Table 6 I report results from negative binomial regressions that include the 
three additional control variables already discussed for the two other trade policy instruments. In 
this regard, the coefficient of the dummy for membership to customs union is negative and highly 
significant, indicating that Latin American countries that participate in Mercosur and the Andean 
Community use fewer NTBs, all else equal. 
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Finally, in this robustness section I explore the possibility that the fragmentation of the 
trade policy-making process is not really pre-treatment and that in fact it is a mediating (instead of 
moderating) factor enabling trade policy responsiveness. Presidents may manipulate the structure 
of their governments’ cabinets and of the agencies within the executive branch, shrinking or 
expanding the number of agencies that have to intervene in the policy-making process, to facilitate 
a public policy reform (Amorim Neto 2006; Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo 2017). That would 
be similar to the calculus, described by Hiscox (1999), that American politicians followed to 
delegate trade power from Congress to the Executive Branch once they knew the partisan 
preferences of each actor. However, there are important transaction costs involved in changing the 
rules of how the public administration works and, furthermore, executive leaders must consider 
the political costs of doing so in terms of the power the president gives and takes to representatives 
from political parties and party factions.  
To examine these ideas, I use the approach to causal mediation analysis proposed by Imai 
et al. (2011), who decompose the average treatment effect (ATE) into an average causal mediated 
effect (ACME) and an average direct effect (ADE). The ATE is the total effect of the treatment 
(in this case, public opinion on trade) on the outcome of interest. The ACME is the portion of the 
treatment’s effect that operates through the mediator variable. The ADE is the expected difference 
in the outcome under treatment and control when the mediator value is held constant, so this 
includes both un-mediated relationships and un-specified mediated links. In Table 7 in the 
Appendix B, I report the results of the mediation analysis in three groups of models, one for each 
trade policy instrument (PTAs, average tariff rates, and NTBs). The insignificant coefficients for 
trade agencies in the second stage equations and the very low coefficients for the ACME below 
Table 7 indicate that concentration is not a mediator between public support for free trade and 
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trade policy outputs. The interpretation is that if fragmentation matters, it is because it moderates 
the relationship between citizens’ views on trade and commercial policy decisions. 
3.4 Discussion 
The central contribution of this study is explaining why governments choose trade policies 
in the direction of aggregate sentiment. That behavior is not universal; policy makers do not always 
respond to public opinion. But when policy makers respond in policy outputs to public opinion, 
whom are they really responding to? To the whole electorate or to the positions of certain groups 
of voters? In recent years, an important literature in American politics argues that responsiveness 
is unequal, with certain voter groups having disparate influence over public policy. Drawing on 
survey data on US voter preferences, Gilens (2005) and Bartels (2008) argue that high income and 
wealthy people have different views on most issues than those held by less affluent people and that 
these rich people’s views are better represented in public policy, especially in economic policy 
such as taxation. This results from wealthy voters being congruent with US politicians, who are 
typically very wealthy even before becoming representatives, and from wealthy voters 
participating more in politics, especially making donations.  
This line of research has been challenged on methodological and empirical grounds (for a 
review, see (Canes-Wrone 2015; Erikson 2015)) but it poses an interesting question to studying 
representation in other democracies.55 Americans are right to be obsessed with economic 
 
55 There may also be racial and ethnic disparities in representation, with minority voters’ views consistently 
unrepresented in policy making. This is a major concern in the comparative study of consensus and majoritarian 
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inequality breeding unequal representation. But their political system is not universal. The 
bipartisan divide and the winner-take-all rules to elect representatives and the Electoral College 
increase the role of big donors in electoral campaigns and create dependability between politicians 
and the corporations responsible for putting them in office. But that need not be the case in other 
democracies with more political parties and more proportional rules to elect legislators (and direct 
elections in presidential systems). Recent studies of Western OECD democracies show that fiscal 
policies largely reflect the preferences and interests of the middle class, despite the rise of 
economic inequality (Elkjaer and Iversen 2020). 
In cross-country studies of developing democracies, it is difficult to obtain comparable 
time series data on public opinion on trade by income, demographic, or occupation-based groups 
of voters. This may seem strange for scholars of advanced democracies, but this is the result of the 
few surveys that include questions about international trade and do so more than once, which 
severely restricts the primary materials to estimate longitudinal public opinion on trade. Further, 
most surveys used to create the index of public support for free trade in the 18 Latin American 
countries (developed in Chapter Two) do not offer the possibility to identify respondents’ income, 
wealth, ethnicity, or occupation. Moreover, those that do, do not use the same scale, so it is hard 
to group opinion on trade with comparable thresholds. This poses a challenge to studying dynamic 
policy responsiveness by groups of voters across countries. 
 
democracies (Lijphart 2012). These ethnic or racial disparities can be exacerbated when the majority of voters identify 
as black or brown while most government officials are white. Bueno and Dunning (2017) study the deficit of 
descriptive representation in Brazil, but they do not explore differences in policy preferences and policy outputs. 
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However, we can exploit the available cross-sectional opinion data for two or three non-
consecutive years in the 2000s from one major survey research project, the LAPOP’s 
AmericasBarometer, which includes questions on support for free trade agreements as well as 
information on respondents’ household income. Figure 3.8 plots the index of public support for 
free trade from Chapter Two and the support for free trade agreements based on household income 
quintiles from the LAPOP survey studies. Group-level support for this type of PTAs is computed 
as the sum of answers that selected values 5 through 7 in the LAPOP Likert scale. Each circle in 
Figure 3.8 represents the level of support for each income quintile. The top income quintile is 
shown in black and lower income quintiles are shown in lighter shades of gray.  
The main takeaway is that, in most countries, voters do not hold very disparate views on 
the desirability of free trade agreements based on their income. In Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, differences are 
very small and there is plenty of overlap about whether free trade agreements are good for the 
country’s development. Divergence in opinion on trade by income only appears in Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Panama, Peru, and Paraguay. Respondents from high income households have 
consistently more pro free trade positions than the lower income groups. Even there, differences 
are not very large, usually below 10 percentage points among the two most extreme positions. The 
largest differences are in Ecuador and Peru. There are no obvious factors that explain the cross-
country differences in within-case opinion divergence, and this merits a separate study. I caution 
the reader about generalizations based on two or three data points from one survey instrument. 
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Figure 3.8: Public Opinion and Opinion by Income Group 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of (aggregate) public support for free trade and percent of 
respondents who support free trade agreements by household income quintiles from LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer. 
Shades of gray go from darker to lighter as income decreases. Countries with no gray markers have no available data 
on opinion on trade from LAPOP. 
 
Public opinion on trade does not vary much across voters’ income, but where it does, who 
is trade policy representing? The richest, the poorest, or those in the middle? To answer this 
question, we need higher-frequency and more disaggregated data which we do not have. But we 
can do an exploratory, non-causal analysis, plotting opinion on trade by income group against the 
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three trade policy outputs studied in this chapter. Figure 3.9 provides such a visualization using 
trade policy and public opinion data from Peru, the Latin America country with the highest 
differences in voters’ preferences. 
 
Figure 3.9: Income Group Opinion on Trade and Trade Policies in Peru 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on data from Peru on public opinion on trade from LAPOP for three non-
consecutive years. Shades of gray go from darker to lighter as household income decreases. Vertical gray columns are 
number of new antidumping and safeguard measures initiated. Blue line is the cumulative stock of preferential trade 
agreements signed. Red dashed line is average level of MFN import tariff rate. Horizontal axis: years. Left vertical 
axis: percent of public support for free trade. Right vertical axis: quantity of PTAs and new NTBs in a given year (and 
percentage scale of tariff rate). Green arrows indicate responsiveness to the richest group of voters: higher public 
support for free trade among voters in top quintile leads to lower restrictions on international trade. 
 
The trade preferences of Peruvian voters in the top income quintile remained almost 
unchanged in their support for free trade agreements from 2008 to 2010, with short a distance with 
the second top income quintile, but 20 percentage points of distance in preferences with the poorest 
quintile. By 2012, respondents in the richest quintile had increased support for free trade 
agreements to a record high of 75 percent. All other income groups were at lower levels of support. 
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There were more than 40 percentage points of distance between the top and the quintile. The 
superficial evidence suggests that the Peruvian government followed the opinion of the top one 
percent by decreasing the average level of the non-discriminatory import tariff rate, reducing the 
number of antidumping and safeguards measures, and increasing the stock of signed PTAs. In 
Chapter Six, I present a case study of Peruvian trade politics from 1990 to 2017. My analysis 
shows that this political systems is a case of low responsiveness to the median voter and offer an 
economic and institutional explanation for this poor result in terms of democratic representation. 
The larger point, however, remains that in most cases, the opinion of the richest, the poor, and 
those in the middle on free trade are not very different. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In our globalized world, who do governments respond to when making policy decisions to 
regulate commercial integration? Existing studies in the political economy of trade have 
emphasized domestic producers who overcome their collective action problems and lobby public 
officials. To a lesser degree, the ideas of policy makers also enter into the equation, with some 
party doctrines linked to specific trade policy agendas. Ordinary citizens, by contrast, are left out 
of the picture because they are poorly informed and poorly organized. If democracy requires 
policies to reflect the preferences of voters, trade policy seems to fail the test.  
If we look carefully, not at what we imagine voters should prefer but what they actually 
say about trade, there are instances of trade policy responsiveness. This chapter presented 
quantitative evidence of government officials adjusting trade policy outputs in the direction of 
public support for free trade. Responsiveness on trade exists, but it is not perfect nor homogeneous. 
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I offered a conditional theory of trade policy responsiveness to explain that variation. To recall, 
the argument is that there are economic and institutional incentives that increase policy makers’ 
willingness to effectively respond to aggregate sentiment on trade while there are policy and 
administration elements that affect the ability of policy makers to accommodate that opinion when 
regulating international commerce.  
Table 3.6 provides a summary list of the hypotheses, theoretical expectations, overall 
results, and evidence from the econometric analysis with panel data for Latin American 
democracies since 1995.  
 
Table 3.6: Expectations and Results by Hypothesis 
Hypothesis Expectations Results Evidence 
1 (Salience) Greater responsiveness with 
larger labor force in tradable 
sectors. 
Weak. • No evidence of responsiveness under greater salience 
with PTAs. 
• No evidence of responsiveness under greater salience 
with Tariffs. 
• Weak evidence of responsiveness under greater 




when politicians care for 
broader electorate. 
Weak. • Evidence of more responsiveness under candidate-
centric institutions with PTAs. 
• Evidence of less responsiveness under candidate-
centric institutions with Tariffs. 
• Evidence of less responsiveness under candidate-
centric institutions with NTBs. 
3 (Policy 
Making) 
Greater responsiveness with 
more concentrated policy-
making process. 
Yes. • Strong evidence of greater responsiveness under fewer 
trade agencies with PTAs. 
• Strong evidence of greater responsiveness under fewer 
trade agencies with Tariffs. 
• Strong evidence of greater responsiveness under fewer 
trade agencies with NTBs. 
4 (Visibility) Greater responsiveness with 
more visible instruments. 
Yes. 
 
• Strong direct responsiveness with PTAs. 
• Moderate direct responsiveness with Tariffs. 
• Reverse responsiveness with NTBs. 
 
The most apparent result is that the visibility of trade policy instruments affects the ability 
of governments to respond to public opinion. There is strong evidence of direct (unconditional) 
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responsiveness to public opinion with the most visible of trade instruments: the international 
preferential trade agreement. Governments consistently sign more PTAs when public support is 
higher. There is moderate evidence of direct (unconditional) responsiveness to aggregate opinion 
with the second most visible trade instrument: the average level of import tariff rates irrespective 
of trading partner. The results from models that include the differenced and lagged values of public 
opinion show that higher opinion leads to lower average tariff rates. Lastly, there is reverse 
responsiveness to voters when dealing with non-tariff barriers. When voters are collectively more 
favorable to free trade, the estimations indicate that non-tariff barriers go up, which represent a 
less free trade policy, even controlling for trade flows, the business cycle, and changes in the 
exchange rate. Governments follow a smokescreen strategy, relying on complex control measures 
that grant selective protection to domestic producers. Since these are low visibility, policy makers 
go unpunished by voters. 
Second, I found strong evidence for the administrative concentration hypothesis. Trade 
policy responds to public opinion when the policy-making process is more concentrated, i.e., in 
which fewer state agencies participate. The evidence is consistently supportive for this hypothesis 
across the three policy instruments: PTAs, average tariff rates, and NTBs. 
Third, I argued that responsiveness should be greater when politicians care for the broader 
electorate instead of some specific group of voters. The former is more likely to happen in 
proportional systems with party control of nominations. I found evidence of more responsiveness 
to public opinion under candidate-centric institutions with PTAs; evidence of less responsiveness 
under candidate-centric institutions with import tariff rates; and high evidence of less 
responsiveness under candidate-centric institutions with NTBs. I classify this collection of results 
as weak because the result for PTAs and electoral systems contradicts the theory while the results 
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for the other two policies indicate what happens in candidate-centric systems, but not necessarily 
that the opposite always occurs in party-centric systems.  
Finally, pocketbook salience does not seem to shape responsiveness. There are no optimal 
ways to measure salience as a pre-treatment condition, i.e. without confounding salience with 
public opinion. I suggested using the share of the labor force employed in sectors with a heavy 
presence of firms that engage or are exposed to trade, either because they export, import inputs, or 
compete with imports. Using such an indicator, I found no clear evidence that higher public support 
for free trade is followed by fewer trade restrictions when more workers are employed in 
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. This is a matter that must be further explored with other 
indicators and research designs. 
Finally, important questions remain. One issue is about the endogeneity of aggregate 
sentiment on trade. A naïve approach would discard this concern and just take public opinion as if 
exogenous. This is unsatisfactory. Therefore, in Chapter Two I developed and tested an argument 
about the neo-mercantilist reasoning that ordinary citizens use to evaluate trade and the existence 
of a welfare net to prevent a protectionist mass backlash. Yet, that does not fully resolve the 
possibility that policy makers may consciously influence aggregate sentiment to artificially build 
support to their desired choices. In the case studies presented in Chapters Four, Five, and Six I 
report qualitative evidence based on my fieldwork that increases our confidence in the 
relationships. I return to the topic of elite framing and priming in the Conclusion (Chapter Seven). 
The other major question that emerges is how the theorized relations, observed at a distance in 
statistical models with pooled panel data, actually work in the field. This is a question of 
mechanisms. Among other things, it deals with what policy makers themselves perceive about the 
public opinion- public policy link and the consequences for deviating from what voters express. 
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The next three chapters directly address these issues drawing on three detailed qualitative case 
studies: one (Argentina) where trade policy is very responsive to voters, another (Colombia) 
responsiveness is moderate, and the final case (Peru), where low material salience among the 
public and a chaotic political system benefit large exporting firms against an electorate that has 
been less informed and less welcoming of free trade than we would suppose from just observing 
trade policy outputs.  
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4.0 Argentina: Party Leadership, Salience, and High Responsiveness 
How does trade policy responsiveness actually work? To better understand it, I analyze the 
mechanisms implied in the theory developed in Chapter Three with case studies. The first focus is 
on Argentina, a country where governments have been responsive to public opinion on trade in the 
past thirty years. This chapter serves two purposes: it presents detailed evidence of responsiveness 
to voters’ sentiment during the 1989-2017 period and it explains why governments have been 
willing and able to be responsive in the realm of trade policy. The first goal is achieved with three 
original pieces of evidence: documenting changes in public opinion on trade based on real survey 
evidence (the inputs of the index of public support for free trade developed in Chapter Two), 
documenting changes in trade policy based on the analysis of legislation, official statistics, and 
specialized literature, and finally, providing evidence from interviews with public officials who 
reflected on the role of voters and public opinion on decisions on trade policy based on their 
experiences.56 The second purpose of this chapter is reached by offering evidence that the 
economic structure makes trade a salient issue and the electoral system generates strong party 
leaders with incentives to appeal to the broader electorate. Further, the Argentine state makes it 
easier to change policy because the policy-making process is concentrated in a few political hands. 
 
56 I conducted IRB-approved structured interviews during fieldwork in Buenos Aires in October-November 2018. 
Materials and references from the elite interviews are cited in the text. In addition, I acknowledge this research is 
influenced by personal, unstructured dialogues with lawmakers and staffers when I was a staff member for 
Congressman Esteban Bullrich in the Budget and Appropriations Committee of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies 
(2008-2011). 
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Mass support for free trade in Argentina is, on average, the region’s lowest. Even though 
society’s collective support for free trade never reached high levels seen elsewhere, it has moved 
quite a bit over time. A majority of voters embraced neoliberal market reforms and supported trade 
liberalization during the first Carlos Menem government (1989-1995). Optimism about open 
commerce was fostered by the rejection of previous economic policies that came to be associated 
with the hyperinflation crisis of the late 1980s. Public support was also stimulated by the new job 
opportunities from deeper trade integration with Brazil and the increased access to cheaper and 
more varied goods from abroad, such as apparel, electronics, and cars, after decades of restricted 
consumer choice. Public support for free trade began a sustained fall since 1996 that continued 
throughout Menem’s second tenure (1996-1999) and the Fernando de la Rua administration (1999-
2001), due to the combination of an import surge that deeply affected the low productivity, labor 
intensive manufacturing firms in the country’s largest metropolitan areas, and poor export 
performance in the context of an overvalued exchange rate and low international commodity 
prices. Citizens became profoundly disappointed with all things “free” and “liberal” after the 2001-
2002 economic crash and the traumatic end of the fixed exchange rate regime. It took years of 
economic growth led by pro-cyclical government stimulus under Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and 
the impressive growth of commodity exports for aggregate sentiment to be less protectionist. 
Finally, Argentines became relatively more welcoming of free trade during the two presidencies 
of Cristina Kirchner (2007-2011, 2011-2015), although that sentiment was shallow and below 





Table 4.1: Major Trade Policy Changes in Argentina by Sub-Period 
Sub-Period President Trade Policy Changes 
1989-1991 Menem 
Unilateral reduction of tariff rates. 
Unilateral reduction of quantity-control NTBs. 
1992-1996 Menem Locking in liberalization with Mercosur and WTO. 
1997-1999 Menem 
Increase of tariff rates. 
Increase of price-control NTBs. 
No new PTAs. 
1999-2001 De la Rua 
Increase in quantity- and price-control NTBs. 
No new PTAs. 
2002-2003 Duhalde 
Increase in quantity, quality, and price-control NTBs. 
New export taxes. 
No new PTAs. 
2004-2007 Néstor Kirchner 
Increase in quantity, quality, and price-control NTBs. 
Increase in PTAs. 
2008-2011 Cristina Kirchner 
Increase in export taxes. 
No new PTAs. 
2011-2015 Cristina Kirchner 
Increase in quantity, quality, and price-control NTBs. 
No new PTAs. 
2016-2018 Macri 
Unilateral reduction of quantity-control NTBs. 
Reduction of export tariff rates. 
New PTAs. 
Note: Sub-periods are author’s choice and do not necessarily match presidential tenures. Text in blue represents 
changes in trade policy towards more free trade. Text in red represents changes in trade policy towards less free trade. 
Selection and sources for this table are discussed throughout this chapter. 
 
The chapter tracks the frequent commercial policy changes that took place in Argentina 
throughout the 1989-2017 period. To guide the reader, I provide a summary of these changes in 
trade policy in Table 4.1. The gradual liberalization of import restrictions of 1989-1990 was 
followed by more radical changes in the direction of free trade up to the reelection of Carlos 
Menem in 1995. Those policy adjustments included a simplified tariff structure, the removal of 
nearly all non-tariff barriers, the accession to the WTO, and the creation of a free trade area with 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (the Mercosur). Since 1996, the rush to free trade has stagnated. 
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No new preferential trade agreements were signed until the mid-2000s. Temporary price-control 
import restrictions abounded in the 1998-2001 years. From 2002 onwards, several temporary 
restrictions became permanent. After a brief period of seeking trade treaties with extra-regional 
partners under Néstor Kirchner, new forms of protectionism, many alien to the WTO rules, were 
established under his successor. Further, a clear anti-export bias emerged under these two Peronist 
presidents: the country’s leading commodities were heavily taxed to increase government revenue. 
The Mauricio Macri government inaugurated in later 2015 reversed some of the restrictions to 
imports and exports. 
Importantly, several trade policy changes reviewed in this chapter were done in the same 
direction of shifts in aggregate support for free trade. The relationship between opinion and policy 
are documented in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, which plot the temporal evolution of the estimated 
index of latent public support for free trade among Argentine citizens together with the evolution 
of three major policy instruments. Figure 4.1 shows that no PTAs were signed between the sharp 
fall in popular support for free trade in 1996 and the partial but temporary recoveries in public 
support in 2002 and 2005-2006. Figure 4.2 shows how average tariff rates have increased since 
1996. When aggregate sentiment became slightly less protectionist in the mid-2000s, tariff rates 
decreased but never went back to their low levels of 1991. In 2007, a new depression in trade 
preferences was followed by an increase in mean tariff rates. The fact that public opinion on trade 
is little supportive of less restrictions by the end of the period helps understand why Argentina has 
one of the region’s highest tariff rates. Finally, Figure 4.3 presents evidence of how the changes in 
people’s minds in the mid-1990s led to the “wake up call” that authorities got “to adjust the 
avalanche of cheap imports,” as the former chair of the National Foreign Trade Commission 
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(CNCE) told me in an interview (Bertoni 2018).57 The state agency began approving many 
domestic firms’ requests for price-control import measures, such as anti-dumping. 
 
Figure 4.1: Public Opinion and Preferential Trade Agreements in Argentina 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of public support for free trade (see Chapter Two) and the number 
of new preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed by the Argentine government, based on data from the Organization 
of American States. The height of the vertical grey lines indicates the cumulative number of new PTAs signed in a 




57 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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Figure 4.2: Public Opinion and Import Tariff Rates in Argentina 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of public support for free trade (see Chapter Two) and the 
Argentine average ad valorem Most Favored Nation import tariff rate with data from the World Bank. Higher tariff 
rates represent less free trade. 
 
Figure 4.3: Public Opinion and Non Tariff Barriers in Argentina 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of latent public support for free trade (developed in Chapter Two) 
and the number of price-, quantity-, and quality-control non-tariff import barriers (NTBs) established by the Argentine 
government in a given year, with data from the World Trade Organization. More NTBs represent less free trade. 
 
 
Why do governments respond to aggregate trade sentiment? The chapter analyzes how 
Argentina policy makers have incentives to care about what the median voter thinks and how the 
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policy-making process allows officials to accommodate those views. First, trade is very salient in 
Argentina because many workers are employed in tradable sectors, especially in import-competing 
industries given the relatively large development of manufacturing in the country under the ISI 
model in previous decades. Trade is an issue that is present in the public discourse. Politicians, 
especially those in the opposition, often talk about trade in the media, in rallies, and in Congress. 
The powerful sector-wide and peak labor unions also have this topic on their policy agenda. 
Second, the constitutional and electoral rules in Argentina produce strong party leaders with 
incentives to pay attention and respond to voters’ opinion during and in between elections. The 
political survival of presidents, legislators, ministers, and other national top appointed officials 
depends on how far they depart from the national median voter. When policy makers openly fail 
to respond to voters, the threat of electoral punishment is real. As discussed below, Argentine 
voters were more likely to punish the ruling party at the polls in the 2009 midterm legislative 
elections for not changing tracks and responding to public opinion on a highly visible trade issue.  
Finally, the administrative policy-making process in Argentina is relatively concentrated 
in a few political hands. The Ministry of Finance has controlled trade policy, while in recent years 
that responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Industry. The CNCE and the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry have secondary roles in trade policy formulation. No other institutional players intervene. 
The result of the combination of these factors is that Argentine policy makers give a great weight 
to ordinary voters in their calculations, and they are able to adjust trade policy accordingly. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 provides a historical 
background of trade and trade policies prior to 1989. Section 4.2 describes the trade liberalization 
of the first Menem administration and the available opinion survey evidence for that period. 
Section 4.3. analyzes the protectionist sentiment and the protectionist trade policies of the 1997-
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2001 period. Section 4.4 discusses public opinion and trade policy under the Kirchners’ 
administrations. Section 4.5 offers an explanation for high trade policy responsiveness in 
Argentina, with a description of the political system and the strength of party leaders who care 
about the broader electorate, an analysis of employment by sector and media coverage of trade, 
and a review of the institutional actors that participate in the trade policy-making process. 
4.1 Background 
The “rise and fall” of Argentina is deeply interlinked with international trade and the 
coalitions, institutions, and policies that sustained or hindered it (Merkx 1969; Díaz Alejandro 
1970; Brambilla, Galiani, and Porto 2018; Gerchunoff and Llach 2010; Spruk 2019; A. M. Taylor 
2018). Argentina was among the ten richest countries in the world in the eve of World War I. The 
economic bonanza was driven by an export boom of cereals and meat that rested on four pillars: 
abundant fertile land, a small population, the expansion of the railways system, and the control of 
political power by the landowner elite. At the peak of the boom, international trade constituted 
close to 60% of GDP (A. M. Taylor 2018, 4). Even though the authorities explicitly promoted 
agricultural exports and the import of manufactures from its strategic partner, Great Britain, import 
tariff rates were high compared to other world regions, mainly because it was an important and 
easily collectible source of state revenue (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004). A first bump on the 
road came with the Great War, when world trade temporally collapsed, revealing signals of 
problems ahead. Differences among the elites led to the opening of the political system and 
democracy was achieved earlier than in most countries in the world at the time (Mainwaring and 
Perez-Liñán 2013). The big shock came with the Great Depression of 1930. Not only trade 
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relations came under severe stress, but political development was interrupted, too, as the armed 
forces overthrew the democratic government and installed the first of many military regimes to 
come (Merkx 1969; O’Donnell 1978) 
The external shock led to the reversal of the pattern of open trade and the adoption of the 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) model. In the 1940s, governments redirected investment 
toward the substitution of imported consumption goods. When the war ended, the new economic 
conditions created by the provisional policies created their own political equilibrium: urban 
workers migrated from the countryside and from Europe demanded social and political rights 
(Gerchunoff and Llach 2010; Galiani and Somaini 2018). Juan D. Perón, who served as labor 
ministry of the outgoing military regime and was elected president in early 1946, fostered the 
incorporation of the masses into the political system. Perón encouraged unionization at the same 
time that he initiated generous social welfare policies and pushed for higher wages in a top-down 
corporatist strategy to control civil society (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). The welfare state was launched 
with the increased trade revenue based on highly beneficial terms of trade (G. Sánchez 2018).58 
Social protection for workers was developed together with trade protection for domestic 
producers (Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011). Peronism dramatically expanded state intervention in the 
foreign commerce. The state raised tariff rates for imports and exports and established import 
licenses and export restrictions. The authorities also implemented capital and currency controls, 
nationalized foreign-own companies, and subsidized the capital stock and operations of domestic-
own manufacturing firms (Gerchunoff and Llach 2010; Galiani and Somaini 2018). 
 
58 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 24, 2018. 
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The ISI model was used to redistribute income from the rural sector to urban workers and 
industrialists (Merkx 1969; Díaz Alejandro 1970; O’Donnell 1978). Even when Peronism became 
outlawed by the military, the ISI policies of later administrations gave the state the most important 
role in managing the economy (De Pablo 2012). In 1970, for example, the Onganía dictatorship 
gave labor unions control of health insurance through the “obras sociales” to be financed by a 
mandatory payroll contribution (Etchemendy 2011, 180). The ISI contributed to the growth of 
capital-intensive industries, such as steel and domestic appliances. Firms developed an important 
lobbying capacity, which would prove fundamental to the reproduction of the policies that 
benefited them (G. Sánchez 2018).59 But favoring industry over agriculture in a country with a 
fundamental comparative advantage in agriculture comes at a large cost (Brambilla, Galiani, and 
Porto 2018, 1). The anti-export bias of ISI blocked productivity growth in agriculture, the sector 
which generates the inflow of hard currency, and failed to promote an efficient industrialization 
(Galiani and Somaini 2018). The favored firms could not live without state subsidies. The latter, 
in turn, became burdensome on public finances. The combination of subsidies and the arms race 
of military rulers was financed by external government debt and monetary emission (Gerchunoff 
and Llach 2010). In the long term, ISI led to boom-and-bust business cycles and an unstable 
political equilibrium with the armed forces as the ultimate referee (O’Donnell 1978). By the mid-
1970s, inflation spiraled out of control, triggering widespread protest amid a context of armed 
insurgency and increased state repression (Gerchunoff and Llach 2010; Mainwaring and Perez-
Liñán 2013). 
 
59 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 24, 2018. 
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The first attempt to liberalize trade policy occurred under the last military dictatorship. The 
Junta Militar was not homogenous in its policy preferences and it delegated economic policy 
making, including trade policy, to Economy Minister José Martínez de Hoz, a landowner and steel 
industry executive. The major trade policy change begun in November 1976, when the maximum 
import tariff rate was capped at 100 percent and export taxes for agricultural goods were 
eliminated. That led to an increase in exports in the next two years (Gerchunoff and Llach 2010, 
370). The second step of the reform came in December 1979, with the establishment of a schedule 
of tariff rate reductions. However, the military kept almost all import quotas in place and created 
an industrial promotion regime to fight unemployment in politically “sensitive” districts, 
establishing subsidies and tax exemptions that blocked productivity gains. While Congress was 
closed, parties banned, and unions intervened, the industrial promotion regime was captured by 
domestic firms and factions of the armed forces (Mamone 2018). 
The overall effect of the military’s “apertura” was sharp because it was accompanied by a 
tight monetary policy, the liberalization of the capital account, and the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. The whole approach ended badly, with a massive trade imbalance of 4.8 billion 
dollars, a budget deficit of 10 percentage points over GDP, the loss of manufacturing plants and 
jobs, and a banking crisis (Gerchunoff and Llach 2010, 373). In 1981, General Videla and Minister 
Martínez de Hoz were forced to step down and were replaced by more nationalistic rulers.  
After the 1982 South Atlantic War, Argentina began a transition to democracy. President 
Raúl Alfonsín was successful in consolidating democracy but failed to stabilize prices and public 
finances. As his economic team recognized, Alfonsín’s approach to economic policy was similar 
to that experienced in the 1960s: “pure will” and “technical expertise subjected to political 
priorities” (Mazzorín 2005). Trade policy was delegated to the Secretary of Trade, in charge of 
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“administering” prices for consumer products in collusion with business owners (Gerchunoff and 
Llach 2010, 413). By 1986, the average tariff rate for imported goods was 32 percent, with nearly 
prohibitive tariff rates for automobiles and computers, plus there was a temporary surcharge of 15 
percent during the Austral price stabilization plan and export duty rates were determined at 25 
percent. The Alfonsín administration ended badly, as the debt and fiscal crises gave way to full-
scale hyperinflation, eroding real wages, assets, and savings. Amid street riots and food looting in 
urban districts (Echegaray and Elordi 2001), Alfonsín negotiated with Congress an early departure 
from government in mid-1989. 
4.2 Deep Free Trade Reforms and Support, 1989-1996 
4.2.1 Trade Policy Liberalization under Menem-Cavallo 
The second attempt to liberalize trade was very different from the first. It was conducted 
by the government of Carlos Menem, the second president after democratization. Trade policy 
liberalization was pursued both with unilateral internal changes and active negotiations abroad. 
The reform had short-term economic benefits for the national economy, boosting both export and 
import growth and some productivity gains. The reform had lasting institutional effects due to the 
creation of a regional free trade block in the Southern Cone, membership to the World Trade 
Organization, the establishment of a technical agency to manage trade remedies, and the delegation 
of foreign trade promotion and international economic negotiations to the diplomatic corps. The 
reform became increasingly under stress due to macroeconomic problems in the late 1990s and the 
voter-elite consensus on open markets came to an end in 2001 never to recover fully again. 
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This process of trade liberalization was implemented by an unlikely actor: a Peronist 
administration, a party which in the past was the main standard bearer of the ISI model. Carlos 
Menem was the former governor of the small and poor province of La Rioja, and he had been 
imprisoned by the last military regime. Menem was elected president on May 1989 on a traditional 
populist platform, whose manifesto said very little about specific policies but its rhetoric resembled 
that of early Peronism (Stokes 2001). Some observers have suggested that Menem’s decisions 
once in office were equivalent to a “Nixon going to China” shift (Cukierman and Tommasi 1998). 
As with the previous liberalization attempt, Menem’s shift occurred in the context of an economic 
crisis, with the country besieged by hyperinflation. In addition, the economy was debilitated by 
the default of the external debt and a massive budget deficit rooted in dysfunctional public utilities 
and state-own enterprises from hotels to steel mills to airlines companies.  
As a president, Menem fully embraced market reforms, including trade liberalization. After 
winning the Peronist party’s nomination, Menem recruited Domingo Cavallo, a Harvard-educated 
economist and Peronist congressman, as his advisor. As Cavallo told me in an interview, Menem 
“knew that times were significantly changing in global history (he was sworn in in July 1989 and 
the Berlin Wall fell in November)” and Cavallo “sensed an opportunity to implement important 
reforms quickly” (Cavallo 2020).60 Cavallo “educated” the incoming president on economic topics 
and the necessity of implementing radical reforms (Cavallo and De Pablo 2001). However, 
Menem’s first appointees to the Ministry of Economy were delegates from one of the most 
powerful business groups, Bunge & Born, whose mandate was to pursue a traditionally corporatist 
approach to tame inflation through pacts with business associations and unions. In the meantime, 
 
60 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 14, 2020. 
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Cavallo was appointed Minister of Foreign Relations,61 and from that position he took charge of 
all foreign economic policies as well as he kept working on an overall stabilization and reform 
package to be implemented if designated Economy Minister.  
4.2.1.1 Unilateral Trade Policy Changes 
Trade policy liberalization started with unilateral changes in 1989 and 1990. The first 
Ministers of Economy under Menem, Néstor Rapanelli and Antonio Erman González, pursued a 
gradual reduction of tariff rates and the simplification of the tariff structure.62 The changes in trade 
policy were implemented together with a massive devaluation of 170% of the Argentine Austral. 
Import licenses remained in place and the government resorted to the old recipe of “administering” 
consumer goods prices with private firms (Echegaray and Elordi 2001). The measures 
implemented in the first year and a half of Menem’s presidency did not produce major changes in 
trade flows, which continued to have a positive balance given the currency devaluation and the 
loss of purchasing power of households.  
In early 1991, Menem appointed Cavallo as Minister of Economy. The economic team 
believed that they had to “change the rules of the game,” in terms of shifting economic institutions 
toward a market system, and expected that in doing so they would face firms’ opposition (C. 
Sánchez 2005). Cavallo immediately announced the creation of the Convertibility Plan, its core 
 
61 In Argentina, as in many other Latin American countries, the Ministry of Foreign Relations is known as the 
Cancillería.  
62 Miguel Roig was Menem’s first Minister of Economy, appointed July 9, 1989, but died six days later. Rapanelli 
was Minister from July 18, 1989 to December 18, 1989, and González was Minister from December 19, 1989 to 
February 4, 1991. 
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being a fixed exchange rate regime. The Central Bank controlled the money supply by buying and 
selling US dollars at the fixed rate, while the monetary base could not exceed the Central Bank’s 
international reserves. (Gerchunoff and Llach 2010). As with most other countries in the region at 
the time, the reform package covered taxation, monetary policy, financial policy, investment and 
private property, and economic deregulation across the board (Edwards 1995; Kaplan 2013).63 
Cavallo believes that he had a “popular mandate to liberalize the economy, including trade” 
and that he acted accordingly (Cavallo 2020).64 He eliminated the import licenses as well as the 
National Grains Board and the National Meat Board, state-run trading agencies created by previous 
Peronist administrations.65 Further, the Economy Minister accelerated unilateral tariff rate 
reductions and simplified the structure of protection, which came to be distributed in three broad 
groups: 0 percent tariff rate for raw materials and capital goods, 11 percent for intermediate goods, 
and 22 percent for manufactured goods. In addition, Argentina adopted the Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) and introduced unified customs valuation in 
early 1992. The Menem administration radically shifted from the anti-export bias of the past and 
eliminated all export for agricultural products, except for raw hides. The government also created 
a “mirror” export subsidy scheme in November 1992, in which the state subsidized exporting firms 
 
63 The Menem administration actively pursued more than 40 bilateral investment promotion and protection treaties 
with other countries. In the 1991-1997 period, foreign direct investment inflows doubled to $36 billion, mostly going 
to privatized public utilities, and the country became the world’s 14 largest net recipient of FDI (World Trade 
Organization 1998, 17). 
64 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 14, 2020. 
65 The official Buy National program, which protected domestic firms that sought government procurement, was 
eliminated in 1991. 
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in relation to the import duties applied, but it was discontinued one year later (World Trade 
Organization 1998).66  
4.2.1.2 Trade Policy Changes in the International Arena 
Trade policy liberalization under Menem took an even more radical approach with its 
international trade decisions. Regional and multilateral trade agreements operated as lock-in-
devices limiting the scope for policy reversal (Bianculli 2016). In 1990, the Cancillería under 
Minister Cavallo envisioned a free trade agreement with Argentina’s neighbor countries in the 
Southern Cone.67 The plan built on the economic cooperation program created in the late 1980s by 
presidents Raúl Alfonsín and José Sarney of Brazil. Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, and Bolivia were 
also invited to join. The latter two eventually declined to join as full members. The June 1990 talks 
led to the signing of the Asunción Treaty in January 1991, establishing the Mercado Común del 
Sur (Mercosur), a free trade and custom union regional block. The constitutive treaty of Asunción 
was ratified by the Argentine Congress on August 15, 1991. The treaty entered into force in 
December 1991. Importantly, in Argentina the provisions of ratified international agreements 
supersede domestic legislation and additionally, decisions adopted by the Mercosur executive 
 
66 There were still some non-negligible trade restrictions. Since 1993, the Ministry of Economy applied minimum 
specific duties on imports of textiles, clothing and footwear items originated outside of Mercosur. Moreover, the 
government kept different non-tariff barriers, such as technical and sanitary measures, that affected the free movement 
of imports of tobacco, sugar, paper, and pharmaceuticals products(World Trade Organization 1998, 23).  
67 Foreign Relations Minister Cavallo also led the process to restructure the defaulted sovereign debt. He carried out 
talks with US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady and with the Japanese government and negotiated the extended 
facility loan program with the IMF. In 1993, Cavallo concluded the Brady Plan of debt swap as Minister of Economy. 
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bodies do not require domestic legislative approval. With Mercosur, the Menem administration 
broke with the past and signed the first free trade agreement in the country’s history (Bouzas and 
Gosis 2014). 
Mercosur liberalized trade building upon a simple framework. The treaty had very few 
chapters on merchandise trade. Its main component was a schedule to eliminate all tariffs between 
partners and reach complete duty-free trade of goods within four years. There were no sections 
about trade in services in its original form. By 1994, trade liberalization of goods between 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay was successfully achieved (Bianculli 2016). The new 
policy effectively covered 95 percent of intra-Mercosur trade, while “sensitive” sectors, namely 
sugar and automobiles, were supposed to be phased by 1998 (World Trade Organization 1998).  
Argentina also developed a common trade policy with its Mercosur partners. The idea 
behind forming a customs union was to increase bargaining power in the WTO, using regional 
tariff rules to implement multilateral compromises and using the WTO seal to accelerate regional 
integration (Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004). The common trade policy was problematic, 
though, as differences erupted between the governments on the specific structure of the common 
external tariff program (Bouzas and Gosis 2014). In 1994, the government of Argentina, pushed 
by Cavallo and Guido Di Tella (his successor in the Cancillería), did not want to go forward with 
the customs unions, wary of the more protectionist stance of the Brazilian government displayed 
in its trade negotiations with Chile, Bolivia, and Perú (Cavallo 2020).68 Menem allowed his 
ministers to enter into direct talks with Brazilian president-elect Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a 
like-minded pro-market reformist, to convince him not to pursue the customs union. Eventually, 
 
68 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 14, 2020. 
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the “political strength of Itamaraty,” as the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations is commonly 
known, won over with the legal argument that “the Asunción Treaty mandated to enforce the 
common trade policy” (Cavallo 2020).69  
The Ouro Preto Protocol signed in December 1994 established the common external tariff 
(CET) program, with tariff rates being modified only if all Mercosur partners consent. The phase-
in of the CET consists of a gradual convergence in rates, which may mean an increase or a decrease 
in rates depending on country characteristics, a common list of exceptions (e.g. capital goods and 
informatics), and unique country exception lists (World Trade Organization 1998). To comply 
with the CET, Argentina had to re-introduce a 12 percent tariff for capital goods, which had been 
lowered to 0 percent in 1991 (Gutiérrez Girault 2018).70 That move “blurred the rationality” behind 
the structure of protection envisioned by the Menem government (Cavallo and De Pablo 2001). 
The CET has been the object of ongoing discussions among Mercosur members as it has been 
observed “more in spirit than the letter” (Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004, 88). To avoid the 
CET, the neighboring countries to Mercosur’s member states decided to enter into talks to sign 
free trade agreements with the block as a whole. The Mercosur-Chile trade agreement came into 
force in October 1996, followed by the Mercosur-Bolivia trade agreement in March 1997. More 
than 90% of trade between the six countries became duty free in a few years. 
The other major international trade policy development of the period was the participation 
of Argentina in the negotiations to create the WTO. The country was a member of the GATT since 
1967. During the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), Argentina joined other agricultural countries in 
 
69 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 14, 2020. 
70 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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the Cairns Group to advocate for the elimination of export subsidies to agricultural products and 
the lift of import restrictions on the import of such products by Europe and the United States.71 
The Menem administration played two games with regards trade with the United States. The first 
game was the public opposition to US trade policies, especially the US Export Enhancement 
Program, in the Cairns Groups. The second game was the bilateral economic cooperation with the 
George H. W. Bush administration. Menem signed the 4+1 Accord between Mercosur and the US 
in June 1991, which created a Consulting Committee on Trade and Investment to foster economic 
ties between the Southern block and the first world economy and then compromised the 
elimination of Argentina’s export subsidies programs in exchange for favorable US treatment of 
countervailing duties (Corigliano 2003). 
In the multilateral forum, Argentina used international commitments to lock in trade 
liberalization at home but still bounded most import tariffs at ceiling levels substantially higher 
than the applied rates (World Trade Organization 1998). The Argentine Foreign Relations 
delegation signed the Marrakesh Agreement, which was ratified by Congress on December 15, 
1994. Argentina became a full founding member of the WTO in January 1995.72 From the first 
Ministerial Meeting of the WTO held in Singapore in December 1996, Argentina has called for 
the full liberalization of agriculture and the elimination of agricultural subsidies in rich countries 
(World Trade Organization 1998, 23). 
 
71 Other countries in the Cairns Group were Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. 
72 Also in 1995, the European Union withdrew the preferential status to half of Argentina’s exports of aluminum, hides 
and leathers, and chemicals due to achieving graduation (due to income per capita growth). 
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4.2.2 Public Support for Liberalization 
The market reform package was very popular in the early period and this popularity was 
exploited by pro-reform public officials to overcome interest groups pressures (Tussie, Casaburi, 
and Quiliconi 2004, 94). With the 1989 hyperinflation crisis, Argentine people adopted a “crisis 
mindset,” according to which the public felt that extreme measures had to be taken even if that 
required painful sacrifices to “pulverize the crisis” (Echegaray and Elordi 2001, 192). Optimism 
about the future and public support for the president’s job taming the economic crisis were very 
high in the first six months of Menem’s tenure as reflected in the Sofres-IBOPE and SOCMER 
polls (Echegaray and Elordi 2001, 195). One of the reasons that have been advanced by scholars 
for that early support for adjustment in the middle of the crisis is the aversion of impoverished 
citizens to further loses based on prospect theory (Weyland 1998). By 1991, the support for the 
economic reforms was rooted on the early price stabilization success of the Convertibility Plan 
(Mora y Araujo 2011). The decrease in the inflation rate consistently increased approval of Menem 
as president and increased support for Cavallo’s economic plan, helping to secure victory for the 
incumbent Peronist party in the October 1991 legislative elections (Echegaray and Elordi 2001, 
204).  
Public opinion on trade was generally favorable to liberalization in the early to mid-1990s, 
although it was lower than overall support for the economic stabilization plan. In 1993, one survey 
asked Argentine respondents about their evaluation of the removal of import restrictions. 40 
percent agreed that unrestricted imports were positive for their country, 32 percent disagreed and 
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29 percent were indifferent or did not know (Romer & Asoc. 1993).73 The same pollster asked a 
similar question one year later, in the midst of the Mexican peso crisis, but included a different 
wording: whether respondents agreed that the removal of import restrictions was positive for 
consumers to benefit from lower prices or that removal of import restrictions was negative because 
it could lead to a rise in unemployment. That time, only 26 percent agreed with unrestricted imports 
(Romer & Asoc. 1994). In that same poll, however, Argentines were asked about their opinion of 
free trade agreements. Of those who gave an answer (67 percent of all surveyed), 53 percent 
indicated their support for deepening Mercosur, 21 percent said they would like Argentina to join 
NAFTA, and 26 percent said they opposed all free trade agreements (Romer & Asoc. 1994). In 
April 1995, 56 percent of valid responses expressed their opposition to increasing export duties, 
one of the short-term measures imposed by the Menem administration in the aftermath of the 
Tequila crisis. From mid-1995 to mid-1997, public support for free trade became was consistently 
high, as reported by the Latinobarometer project. For example, in June 1995, 68 percent agreed 
that free trade blocks such as Mercosur were positive for the country (Latinobarometer 1995), and 
one year later, 61 percent believed that increasing trade with other countries was positive for the 
national economy (Latinobarometer 1996). 
The overall balance of the trade policy liberalization was positive until 1996. In the very 
short term, with the new exchange rate regime and the streamlining of the tariff structure, between 
1990-1991 imports jumped from 7 billion to 12 billion dollars while exports contracted from 17 to 
15 billion dollars (Gerchunoff and Llach 2010). Exports of fuel, agricultural, and manufacturing 
 
73 There are no public records of opinion surveys with questions on trade using nationally representative samples for 
the 1989-1992 years. 
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(especially, cars and chemicals) grew exponentially, boosted by an increase in the productivity 
rate. The ratio of total trade to GDP increased from 20 percent in 1991 to 32 percent in 1996. 
Between 1992 and 1996, Argentine exports to Latin America grew from 31 to 48 percent of the 
total exports (exports to Mercosur increased from 19 to 33 percent). The trade balance, negative 
since 1991, became positive by 1995. While the volume of total trade quadrupled over the 1990s, 
composition changed marginally, especially for imports, concentrated in capital goods and 
intermediary inputs from the United States, Europe, and Japan (Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 
2004, 79).  
Importantly, the increase in exports and the deeper trade integration with Brazil were 
fundamental to moderating the negative shock brought by financial contagion during the Tequila 
crisis (Gerchunoff and Llach 2010). Originated in a run on the Mexican peso, the 1994 crisis 
triggered a domino effect in Latin America. Argentina, with its over reliance on capital flows since 
the establishment of the Convertibility Plan, could not avoid a temporary contraction of investment 
and domestic demand (World Trade Organization 1998, 3). Unemployment rose briefly, but the 
worse labor and welfare effects were about to come with the sustained appreciation of the exchange 
rate in later years. Such an external shock could have been a good moment to replace the fixed 
exchange rate regime without too much loss of reputation. However, the government’s incentives 
no to change it were high, as they “had been raising the stakes of the game … Ending Convertibility 
would probably have signaled that the economy was weak and that the stabilization game was 
over” (Galiani, Heymann, and Tommasi 2003, 130). In 1995, Menem was reelected, being the first 
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such reelection thanks to the new rules of the 1994 Constitutional Reform. As the protagonists of 
the reform believe, the reelection “was a plebiscite on the liberalization program” (Cavallo 2020).74 
Domestic businesses were less supportive of free trade. Businesses that lost with 
international competition and could not increase productivity lobbied to block the reforms, or 
obtain selective protection and compensation mechanisms (Etchemendy 2011). Protectionist 
lobbying efforts had weak success in this early period, as the economic crisis created a sense of 
urgency and delegation to the pro-market reform executive. The literature agrees that a major 
economic crisis was a necessary condition to implement radical market reforms (Edwards 1995; 
Cukierman and Tommasi 1998; Weyland 1998; Samford 2010; Stokes 2001; Kaplan 2013). 
Menem’s former Trade Secretary agrees with this view: “the hyperinflation crisis relaxed most 
obstacles to structural change in the economy” (C. Sánchez 2005). However, he said, “there was 
no true conviction about the benefits of a deregulated economy among businessmen.” According 
to the Trade Secretary, there were “two types of businessmen, those who [he] did not ever meet 
because they were efficient and requested nothing from the Ministry, and those who [he] saw every 
day, whose livelihood depended on subsidies, favors, and multiple exchange rates, and who had 
special information and connections with policy makers” (C. Sánchez 2005).  
In fact, Argentine business was highly divided over trade policy. As predicted by 
mainstream political economy (Alt and Gilligan 1994; Rodrik 1995; I. S. Kim and Osgood 2019), 
the positions that Argentine firms and business associations took on the Menem-Cavallo trade 
liberalization depended on whether they produced tradable goods, engaged in exporting or 
importing, and their degree of concentration of production and location in the production chain 
 
74 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 14, 2020. 
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(Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004; Bianculli 2016). While farmers and landowners favored 
the elimination of the anti-export bias of past ISI policies and opposed the fixed exchange rate 
regime, splits were more salient in the manufacturing sector. For example, big carmakers were 
pitted against local auto-parts producers, and the textile, clothing, and footwear industries were 
divided between manufacturers using domestic inputs, importers of finished goods, and 
manufacturers using imported inputs (Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004, 93). Also, a few 
industries were highly concentrated, such as steel and aluminum, conferring business owners 
greater access to policy makers. Manufacturing firms that had better access to financing, especially 
those of foreign capital, welcomed liberalization. Others did not, and when they could not increase 
their productivity to compete with foreign imports, businessmen sold their assets and factories (C. 
Sánchez 2005).  
Industrialists’ trade policy disagreements were reflected in the incoherent stance of the 
national manufacturing peak association, the Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA), in the Mercosur 
and WTO negotiations (Bianculli 2016). Firms that bore the costs of liberalization were less 
successful in lobbying for protection than scholars expected (Geddes 1995, 196). However, there 
was still room for some firms to obtain what they wanted. In 1995, the Argentine government 
deviated from the Mercosur’s common external tariff on a third of all manufacturing tariff lines 
and such exemptions were associated with firms with political clout in the provinces they operated 
(Pezzola 2017). Once the Mercosur members began join negotiations with extra-regional 
countries, a few sectoral associations within the UIA, such as food processing, steel, and 
chemicals, displayed a stronger lobbying effort to obtain more market access abroad or more 
import protection at home (Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004; Bianculli 2016). The overall 
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orientation of trade policy under Menem-Cavallo, however, remained clearly pro-liberalization, 
not least because voters liked it. 
4.3 Liberalization, Interrupted (1997-2001) 
4.3.1 Losing Faith in Free Trade 
Trade policy liberalization came increasingly under attack as the success of the price 
stabilization program generated problems elsewhere. The victorious fight against chronic high 
inflation rested on the fixed exchange rate regime. The Convertibility Plan made inflation fall from 
over 1,300 percent in 1990 to 25 percent in 1992 to 0.1 percent in 1996, the lowest rate recorded 
in six decades (World Trade Organization 1998, 6). As Cavallo’s team recognized, the popularity 
of the Convertibility Plan made it a “magical trick” to address all sorts of problems, forgetting that 
it was just one macroeconomic tool with only one narrow goal (C. Sánchez 2005). The government 
and the private sector, both asset holders and ordinary individuals, “acted as if the evolution of the 
economy and the fiscal situation, in particular, need not cause big concerns” (Galiani, Heymann, 
and Tommasi 2003, 110). However, the Argentine economy remained threatened by the high 
volatility of international capital flows. The country was first hit with the 1994 Mexican crisis and 
then hit harder with the 1997 South East Asian crisis and the 1998 Russian crisis (Campello 2015). 
In the meantime, currency appreciation accelerated. That was especially the case once Brazil 
devaluated its currency. Under the Convertibility Plan, overvaluation had to be compensated with 
a substantial increase in the productivity rate, the same or higher than that of the US economy, 
with which the Argentine currency was pegged (C. Sánchez 2005). That did not happen. The fixed 
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exchange regime left little room to maneuver. Fiscal deficits became burdensome, too. Despite 
much rhetoric about the retreat of the state from the economy, public finances did not improve as 
recurrent borrowing in hard currency in international credit markets helped to close fiscal books 
(Galiani, Heymann, and Tommasi 2003; Campello 2015).  
In some accounts, Argentine public opinion kept its faith in market reforms at least until 
the 1999 presidential elections. People were generally favorable to the stabilization plan and the 
bonanza enjoyed in the early and mid-1990s under Menem-Cavallo. Even as economic recession 
began, the trade surplus became a deficit, and unemployment rose, Argentines remained 
stubbornly committed to the Convertibility plan and the libre mercado.75 On trade, Baker (2003) 
reports that Argentines were relatively pro-free trade at the end of the twentieth century. For 
instance, he reports a 1998 Wall Street Journal poll in which 66 percent of respondents agreed that 
free trade was good for the country and a 1999 poll from that newspaper in which 56 percent 
thought that Mercosur had been good for the country (Wall Street Journal 1998).  
However, there were signs of growing opposition to unrestricted trade. Instead of attacking 
the core of the problem (i.e., currency overvaluation and fiscal deficit), the masses turned their 
backs on trade liberalization. In December 1997, Latinobarometer reported that only 34 percent 
agreed that more imports were a good thing for the country (Latinobarometer 1997). Economic 
growth became negative in 1997 and the national unemployment rate climbed to 19 percent (from 
6.9 percent in 1992). Real wages stagnated. The recession was intimately linked to that of Brazil, 
 
75 One pro-market official reflected that “Argentine society did not call for us to be efficient, save, and invest in 
growth; they just asked us to keep the Convertibility at any cost” (C. Sánchez 2005). Because many people had 
contracted debts in dollars and because of the harsh memories of hyperinflation, they opposed any hint of change in 
the exchange rate regime (Pérez-Liñán 2007, 177). 
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Argentina’s largest trading partner (Gutiérrez Girault 2018).76 Job losses were especially 
pronounced in manufacturing. These two macroeconomic trends generated a rise in the percentage 
of households under the poverty line (World Trade Organization 1998, 5). 
By early 2000, with economic recession and recently raised taxes in sight, public opinion 
was increasingly weary of free commerce, especially the preferential exchange with the Brazilians. 
As The Economist noticed, “as farmers and manufacturers have bled, so has Argentines' belief in 
open trade and Mercosur” (The Economist 2000a). In December 2000, a poll commissioned by 
the US Information Agency showed that 43 percent expressed that free trade benefited their 
country. But opinion was split in two, as disagreement to that statement was 41.5 percent (Mora y 
Araujo & Asoc. 2000). In April 2001, a Gallup poll reported that 49 percent of Argentine 
respondents opposed the Free Trade Area of the Americas, followed by 24 percent who had no 
clear opinion. In the run-up to the October 2001 midterms, most voters felt pushed away from the 
two main political parties, as they had failed them to provide growth and well-being for four years. 
Unsurprisingly, the largest number of votes were null and blank. In 2002, anything that sounded 
remotely linked to the now doomed Convertibility was perceived as a failure and a disgrace. 
According to a former foreign affairs official in the De la Rua administration, the Argentine society 
“has a pattern of countering crazy with craziness, replacing the full commitment to the market with 
the full embrace of tight controls, as recurrent economic crises erode interpersonal trust and trust 
in public institutions” (Gutiérrez Girault 2018).77 In early 2003, only 26 percent agreed that 
economic globalization was positive for the country (CIMA 2003). In August 2003, three months 
 
76 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
77 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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after the election of Peronist governor Néstor Kirchner as president, only 12 percent expressed 
support for free trade agreements (Latinobarometer 2003).  
Trade liberalization, having been one of the most visible market reforms, was “at the core 
of social discontent” (Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004, 77). A major source of dissatisfaction 
was the absence of a strong, coherent welfare net. The welfare state inherited from the ISI was not 
dismantled but its foundations were weakened. More importantly, the growth in population under 
the poverty line and the rise in income inequality of the late 1990s were not accompanied by an 
aggressive social policy to protect the vulnerable population (Holland and Schneider 2017). From 
1989 to 1994, there were no improvements to social policies. Only during his reelection bid in 
1995 did Menem address the growing social demands with a fragmented policy that emphasized 
targeted benefits with the creation of a Social Assistance Secretariat and several assistance 
programs under different cabinet and sub-cabinet level agencies (Acuña, Kessler, and Repetto 
2002). Programs included school feeding programs and temporary small monetary sums for laid 
off and disabled individuals. Beneficiaries carried the burden of request and enrollment and were 
limited to the formal sector of the economy. The implementation of many of those actions were 
delegated to non-governmental organizations (Acuña, Kessler, and Repetto 2002). There were no 
permanent cash transfers across the board and state pensions for the elderly were subject to 
administrative freezes to deal with unbalanced public finances. Moreover, although the World 
Bank contributed part of the funding since 1997, the social assistance policies had a pro-cyclical 
nature, with lower public spending when total economic output was low. In addition, the 
decentralization reform that transferred responsibilities over public education and health care to 
cash-stripped and low state capacity provincial governments hindered the development of policies 
to increase the competitiveness of the workforce. Financially constrained, the De la Rua 
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government did not increase the size or nature of the social assistance benefits. The inadequacy of 
social benefits was aggravated by the regressive nature of the tax system, where sales taxes on 
food and other consumption goods are levied at higher rates than other taxes. 
 
4.3.2 Last Measures before the Collapse 
Trade policy liberalization lost steam with the deepening of the economic crisis that began 
in 1997. Crucially, public opinion forced a change to trade policy. Menem’s gambit to seek a third 
consecutive presidential tenure led to his party bosses and ministers to act in light of voters’ 
increasing dislike of open commerce. Paraphrasing Ernest Hemingway’s famous line, Argentina’s 
return to protectionism evolved in two ways: “gradually and then suddenly.” Starting timidly in 
1997, trade policy became increasingly more protectionist. For example, Mercosur became a 
contested issue. The temporary obstacles to full within-block free trade became deeply entrenched. 
In mid-1997, the Menem administration, which had by that time replaced Minister Cavallo with 
Roque Fernández, the outgoing Central Bank President and an economist trained at the University 
of Chicago, agreed to start talks with the Brazilians to lower import tariffs on sugar, a commodity 
that both economies produce (more efficiently in Brazil). However, the president’s party in 
Congress, the Partido Justicialista, passed a bill to bar lower tariffs to protect a major source of 
local government revenue and low-skilled employment in the Northwest provinces.78 The 
 
78 One family-run business group dominates the sugar market and is the major private employer in the province of 
Jujuy. It also runs biodiesel, renewable energy, paper, and citrus production. The firm holds leadership positions within 
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president vetoed the bill, but his own party insisted on overriding it (The Economist 1997). 
Eventually, the two presidents convinced their Paraguayan and Uruguayan counterparts to agree 
to an increase in the common external tariff rate by three percentage points for at least two years.79 
Propositions on a common currency and price index coordination were abandoned (Gutiérrez 
Girault 2018).80 
Argentina’s establishment of trade barriers on clothing and footwear imports led it to 
becoming a defendant on two WTO dispute panels initiated by the European Union. Argentina lost 
a WTO dispute initiated by the United States and was asked to eliminate the statistical tax of 3 
percent ad valorem imposed on imports from all sources other than Mercosur. Furthermore, 
Argentina did not fully comply with the Multilateral Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs). The country had no patent regime for pharmaceutical products, 
benefiting the local industry, which produced and imported versions of new drugs developed and 
registered in the industrialized economies (Etchemendy 2011, 64). The Menem administration sent 
a bill to Congress in 1993 to comply with the TRIPs. The proposed legislation generated the 
outspoken opposition of the domestic pharmaceutical firms, which successfully rallied legislators 
 
the peak industry association, the UIA (Nougues 2018) (Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 10, 
2020). 
79 In early 2000, Brazil threatened to sue Argentina before the WTO over import quotas on Brazilian textiles while the 
governor of Buenos Aires, Argentina’s most populous province, blamed the devaluation of the Brazilian currency for 
business closures and ramping unemployment in his district (The Economist 2000b). 
80 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
 179 
and public opinion in an anti-free trade movement that delayed and water-down the legislation 
(Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004, 82).81  
On the domestic realm, trade policy liberalization stagnated. While criticism of the 
Convertibility Plan was public taboo, “disputes became deflected to discrepancies in effective rates 
of protection. Particularly after the recession began to bite sharply after 1998, trade policy came 
to be seen as a tool to mitigate macroeconomic distress” (Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004, 
77). The national peak industry association, the UIA, structured a more anti-free trade position. 
The UIA, however, remained split between two internal factions: the more competitive, large scale, 
export-oriented car, food and beverage manufacturers against the low-productivity, low-
innovation textile, clothing, footwear, and home appliances sectors “that the government calls 
sensitive” (Nougues 2018).82 Given the sharp differences between the factions, a few large 
business groups with diversified investment across the economy play a pivotal role within the 
business association. These latter companies tilt the balance for or against free trade depending not 
on their natural comparative advantage but on the effect of the exchange rate on their production 
costs (Nougues 2018).83 Currency appreciation and low consumer demand due to growing 
unemployment and output contraction led the business groups to demand greater trade protection 
in the late 1990s. 
With the evolution of the Mercosur’s CET, the simplified four-tier import tariff structure 
from the first Menem presidency evolved into an eleven-tier structure by the end of Menem’s 
 
81 The legislation ultimately adopted in 1996 proved insufficient to satisfy the United States, a major trading partner 
and the biggest proponent of the reform. The US removed Argentina from its Generalized System of Preferences. 
82 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 10, 2020. 
83 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 10, 2020. 
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second tenure in office (World Trade Organization 1998).84 By late 1998, Argentina had a higher 
average import tariff rate (13.5%) than in 1992, with a fifth of all imports being dutiable at rates 
above 20 percent. The highest tariff rates were for footwear, cars, and used machinery. In addition, 
some imported items became subject to minimum specific duties and all imports were subjected 
to the value-added tax. Changes in tariffs were used not only to provide protection to domestic 
businesses, but to increase government revenue in the middle of a recession. Tax revenue 
collection from imports doubling from 2% to 4% as a share of total tax collections by 1997 (World 
Trade Organization 1998, 45).  
Moreover, Argentina became one of the world’s leading players in anti-dumping (AD) 
cases, particularly during the years leading up to the December 2001 crisis (World Trade 
Organization 2007a). Figure 4.4 reports the requests and decisions of the Comisión Nacional de 
Comercio Exterior. As one of the CNCE professional bureaucrats at the time (he later became the 
chair of the agency’s board) told me, “the reality ended the naivety of free trade among Argentine 
policy makers” (Bertoni 2018).85 Definitive and provisional AD measures as well as the 
application of safeguard import quotas, targeting steel, chemicals, and electric appliances imports 
from Brazil, China, and the European Union, were more frequent than the Menem and De la Rua 
governments would like to acknowledge. From January 1998 to December 2001, the CNCE 
initiated 85 new anti-dumping cases, 15 of which were against Brazil and 14 against China. Over 
a third of cases involved steel. Most other cases involved intermediate inputs, such as PVC, nylon, 
 
84 The previous tiers were 5, 13, 22 and 35 in percentage points, and the new rate tiers were 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 
16, 18 and 20, plus a temporary 3 percent increase. In terms of economic sectors, agriculture had the lowest rate and 
standard deviation while industry had the highest rate. 
85 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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and polyester, and consumer goods, such as bicycle tires, washing machines, and microwave 
ovens. Breaking with previous patterns, the Argentine authorities granted final anti-dumping 
remedies to 71 of those cases. Moreover, in 1999 the Economy Ministry re-established automatic 
pre-importing licenses for consumer goods after more than a decade without them, with the goal 
of quickly analyzing the option of establishing trade remedies. 
 
Figure 4.4: Anti-Dumping Decisions in Argentina (1995-2015) 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on data from Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterior, Statistical Yearbooks, 
various years. Higher values of anti-dumping remedies applied (in blue) represent more protection. Cases in red are 
government’s decisions to not prosecute or apply anti-dumping remedies.  
 
The relationship between protectionist sentiment and protectionist policy continued under 
President Fernando De la Rua. One of his top economic policy advisors said in an interview that 
his government’s “measures on trade have to be understood as the political consequences of 
citizens’ low trust in foreign partners”  (Gutiérrez Girault 2018).86 The CNCE accelerated the rate 
 
86 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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of approval for domestic firms’ request for anti-dumping relief. In early 2001, as the economic 
recession deepened and the service of the external sovereign debt became more difficult, De la 
Rua appointed Cavallo as his Economy Minister. This time, Cavallo did not conceal that currency 
appreciation had to be addressed and that trade policy would serve as a revenue-generating tool 
(Cavallo and De Pablo 2001). Bypassing Congress, the Ministry issued Resolution No. 8/2001, 
which raised the import tariff rate to 35 percent for a thousand consumer goods and increased tariff 
rates for some other products.87 Cavallo also created the “convergence factor,” a fiscal scheme in 
which dollar receipts from exports were converted into pesos with a more favorable exchange rate 
(based in the Euro) while purchases in dollars of imported goods (even those from Mercosur) were 
discriminated against with a lower rate (Tussie, Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004, 81). Cavallo also 
accused the Brazilian government of upsetting trade by deliberately devaluing their currency and 
betting on the collapse of Argentina’s currency board regime. As one of his lieutenants told me, 
the president was convinced that “the government had to face the crisis, whatever it takes, which 
means recognizing Argentine culture of distrust against foreign actors” (Gutiérrez Girault 2018).88 
De la Rua’s defensive economic measures proved weak and he lost political support. In the 
last quarter of 2001, the economic situation was dire and social unrest was generalized. The defeat 
of the ruling party in the midterm legislative elections generated skepticism not only among 
households and domestic businessmen, but foreign investors as well (Galiani, Heymann, and 
Tommasi 2003; Pérez-Liñán 2007). Capital flight and a run against the banks accelerated the fall 
of the De la Rua government. Besieged by food riots and looting, massive demonstrations, the 
 
87 In 2000, the government re-introduced the domestic preference system to local contractors of public procurement. 
88 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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mobilization of unions and the middle classes, and the lack of support from other political parties, 
the president submitted his resignation on December 21, 2001. Absent a vicepresident, the 
Peronist-controlled Congress selected Governor Adolfo Rodríguez Saa as interim president. In his 
inaugural speech, the new president declared the default of the sovereign debt with private 
creditors. Amidst steady public outrage against the entire political system, Rodríguez Saa resigned 
a week later, to be replaced with former Peronist presidential candidate Eduardo Duhalde. His first 
measure in office was to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime. 
4.4 Full Reversal of Liberalization, 2002-2015  
4.4.1 Economic Recovery and Anti-Export Bias 
Trade led the recovery of the Argentine economy once it hit rock bottom in early 2002. 
The economy was in tatters. Output had contracted by 16 percent in the first quarter and the 
unemployment rate was at 25 percent. The long recession, coupled with business closures, layoffs, 
and the devaluation by 75 percent of the Argentine peso, pushed at least half of the population to 
poverty (Campello 2015). The Duhalde government had abandoned the currency board, forcibly 
converted dollar-denominated assets, savings and debts into pesos, extended the maturity of bank 
deposits, changed public utilities contracts, and extended capital controls to the wiring of 
dividends, interests, and remittances abroad.89 The unorthodox policy mix averted hyperinflation 
 
89 The Economy Minister was Jorge Remes Lenicov (January – April 2002), replaced by Roberto Lavagna (April 2002 
- November 2005), when the department’s name changed to Ministry of Economy and Production. 
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and had an immediate positive outcome on trade flows. The devaluation stimulated the 
development of a high trade surplus. Exports increased from 11.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 27.7 
percent in 2002, whereas imports went from 10.2 percent to 12.8 percent of GDP (Campello 2015, 
173). Exports grew both in volume and in price. International commodity prices began a boom 
like no other in the past decade. Export growth was based in the new high demand from growing 
emerging economies outside of Mercosur, namely China and India, which were avid for soybeans, 
grains, and other foodstuff commodities. By mid-2002, the strong export performance had 
translated into positive GDP growth (World Trade Organization 2007a). The Argentine economy 
came back to its feet as many households, businessmen, and investors slowly regained confidence 
that the worse of the crisis had already happened. 
Despite exports being the fuel of the economic recovery, the Peronist administration 
restored the anti-export bias characteristic of the postwar era (Bouzas and Gosis 2014). Duhalde 
established export duties with the stated goal of increasing revenue for a cash-stripped 
government.90 That was not new in the global history of trade policy, as governments frequently 
resorted to trade taxes to fund the treasury (Irwin 2017; Coatsworth and Williamson 2004). What 
was different was that the Argentine government could do it while other developing democracies 
failed to offset trade revenue losses as both firms and voters refuse to pay other taxes due to weak 
public goods delivery (Bastiaens and Rudra 2018). The export tariff rate was determined at 45 
percent for natural gas, 25 percent for crude petroleum, 20 percent for soybeans, wheat, and maize, 
 
90 In Chapter Three I do not analyze the extent of trade policy responsiveness with export measures because there are 
no available reliable time series data on export restrictions for my panel of 18 countries. This does not mean that 
responsiveness could not happen with regards to that type of trade policy. Either way, the narrative in this section is 
to provide a background for the import control measures discussed below. 
 185 
15 percent for beef, and 5 percent for all other exports. The new duties were introduced by 
Ministerial resolution as temporary measures, but with no set end date. Furthermore, the rate for 
export drawback on all goods was reduced by half (Resolution 56/2002). In addition, the Economy 
Ministry determined official export prices and reference markets for each product. Overall, export 
duties accounted for nearly 10 per cent of total tax revenue between 2002 and 2005 (World Trade 
Organization 2007a). Importantly, trade revenue in Argentina goes directly into the federal 
treasury and is not shared with subnational governments, such as the income and sales taxes (G. 
Sánchez 2018).91 Finally, the Duhalde administration, together with the Central Bank, established 
a separate foreign exchange market for exporters, who were asked to register, make sales, and 
convert dollars into pesos at a differentiated exchange rate. 
When Néstor Kirchner was elected president in 2003, the export duty rates and the foreign 
exchange restrictions remained in place.92 His government also moved forward with the first 
quantity restrictions on exports of meat in decades. The favorable terms of trade led to sharp 
increases in the domestic price of food, which grew at a faster pace than the general inflation rate. 
By 2006, the positive relationship between trade openness and lower consumption prices of the 
prior decade had reversed. The price of meat in a country that traditionally produces a lot of meat 
and where citizens eat a lot of meat “became a sensitive and salient political issue” (Ardanaz, 
Murillo, and Pinto 2013, 417). Kirchner instructed the Finance and Agriculture departments to 
adopt quantitative export restrictions for bovine livestock and meat cuts (Bouzas and Gosis 
 
91 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 24, 2020. 
92 Néstor Kirchner’s appointees to the Ministry of Economy and Production were Roberto Lavagna (April 2002 – 
November 2005), Felisa Miceli (Nov. 2005 – July 2007), and Miguel Peirano (July – December 2007). 
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2014).93 The decision was welcomed by many poor households but triggered protests from cattle 
ranchers. Unionized meatpacking workers mobilized against the trade policy and later that year, 
the government created an employment assistance program for that industry. 
The 2007 presidential elections were won by Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, 
Néstor Kirchner’s spouse. The Kirchner governments were not homogenous and there were clearly 
distinct ruling styles and approaches to policy making (Kulfas 2016, 13). Still, Cristina Kirchner 
kept and deepened her predecessors’ restrictions on exports (Bouzas and Gosis 2014). First, 
foreign exchange restrictions remained in place during Cristina Kirchner’s first tenure and replaced 
with more stringent capital controls in her second tenure.94 Second, exports such as grain, meat 
and dairy products had to be disclosed in a specific register. Third, exports for consumption were 
subject to a value control system to enforce duty collection. Fourth, the government prohibited 
exports of natural gas and established an export quota for bread-type wheat (World Trade 
Organization 2013). Finally, the government established a floating export duty system in which 
rates adjusted in reaction to international commodity prices. In the short term, the infamous 
Resolution 125/2005 increased export duty rates up to 33 percent for the most profitable 
commodity in the country: soybeans. Whereas in 1990 there were only 5 million hectares of 
soybean crops (out of 18 million total crop land), by 2008 soybean cultivation covered 18 million 
 
93 In 2005, the Kirchner administration also temporarily suspended exports of tailings of copper and aluminum alloys 
to reduce the price of inputs for domestic industries.  
94 Since 2011, funds for any new investment or purchase of shares and real estate must have been liquidated through 
the so-called Single Free Exchange Market controlled by the Central Bank, which was also responsible for authorizing 
wiring profits and remittances abroad. 
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hectares (out of 30 million in total) (Kulfas 2016).95 As the government disclosed to the WTO, the 
duties were to be used to cushion the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on domestic prices and 
to finance public spending in the context of the international financial crisis of 2008 (World Trade 
Organization 2013). The same economic sector that was hugely benefited by the massive currency 
devaluation was about to “be charged the favor in installments through export duties” (Kulfas 
2016, 128). 
Cristina Kirchner’s government believed it was a relatively harmless way to raise revenue. 
(export duties represented 24 percent of government revenue, see Figure 4.5). While Argentina’s 
traditional main exports of beef and wheat were key domestic consumer goods, soybeans are not 
consumed by Argentine households but used to feed livestock abroad. However, the policy 
generated fast and widespread opposition from rural producers, big and small alike. Producers 
started a national production lockout and established roadblocks across the countryside. Cristina 
used anti-agrarian rhetoric and her government was swift in using the security forces to lift the 
roadblocks. Those episodes increased media coverage nationwide (Mangonnet, Murillo, and 
Rubio 2018). Soon, the historically anti-Peronist (but largely disorganized) urban and suburban 
middle classes joined forces with the agricultural sector in a large, loose opposition movement. 
Eventually, the government agreed to secure legislative support for the new export system. But in 
 
95 Soybean production locates in both traditional fertile zones and new areas opened by the expansion of the agrarian 
frontier due to a capital-intensive model relying on mechanization, harvesting subcontracting, and agrochemicals. 
Soybean wealth also boosted the demand for services in towns across the countryside (Mangonnet, Murillo, and Rubio 
2018). 
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a momentous decision amid a split vote in the Senate, Cristina Kirchner’s vice-president voted 
against the bill.96  
The lack of political wisdom to reverse the unpopular export retenciones cost the president 
a significant amount of voter support and the ruling party the midterm legislative elections of 2009. 
Between March and July 2008, nation-wide presidential approval fell from 55 to 15 percent 
(Novaro 2020). In mid-2009, the Peronists lost the majority of the National Chamber of Deputies 
for the first time in decades. All the largest and most densely populated provinces voted against 
the president’s party. Cristina’s intransigency with the export tax produced a rarely seen voter 
movement that cut across traditional party lines (Mangonnet, Murillo, and Rubio 2018; Porto and 
Lodola 2013). The legislative electoral defeat forced key Peronist party bosses in Congress and 
Peronist provincial governors to reevaluate the strategy and renounce the unlikely alliance between 
farmers’ demands and urban dwellers (Ardanaz, Murillo, and Pinto 2013). 
 
 
96 Economy Minister Martín Lousteau (Dec. 2007 – April 2008) was replaced by Carlos Fernández (April 2008- July 
2009), then replaced by Amado Boudou (July 2009 – Dec. 2011). The department was renamed Ministry of Economy 
and Public Finance in mid-2008, as Cristina Kirchner created the Ministry of Industry, where she appointed Debora 
Giorgi, assuming responsibilities over Domestic Commerce and Business (“Comercio Interior”) and Foreign Trade 
(“Comercio Exterior”). In her second tenure as president, Cristina Kirchner appointed Hernán Lorenzino (Dec. 2011- 
Nov. 2013) and Axel Kicillof (Nov. 2013 – Dec. 2015) to head the Economy and Public Finance Ministry and 
confirmed Giorgi as Minister of Industry. 
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Figure 4.5: Trade as a Source of Government Revenue in Argentina 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data from the World Bank Development Indicators. Note: Tax revenue is 
percentage of revenue of the Argentine central government. 
 
4.4.2 Sui Generis Import Protection 
Néstor and Cristina Kirchner adopted anti-import protectionist policies in the face of low 
public support for free trade. A survey from September 2002 reported that 45 percent of Argentine 
voters preferred a closed economy with high state intervention in the economy, followed by a 15 
percent who wanted a closed economy with less state intervention (Mora y Araujo 2011). In May 
2004, one year into Néstor Kirchner’s presidency, only 27 percent of respondents agreed that 
economic globalization had been good for the country and just 19 percent agreed that joining the 
FTAAs would be good for the national economy (CIMA 2004). In the 2004 Latinobarometer poll, 
only 30 percent agreed that free trade treaties were either positive or very positive to increase job 
opportunities (Latinobarometer 2004). In November 2006, 50 percent saw free trade treaties as 
positive or very positive (Latinobarometer 2006). One year later, as the presidential elections to 
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succeed Néstor Kirchner were taking place, just 33 percent of voters saw FTAs as a good thing 
(Latinobarometer 2007).97  
After a traumatic change of course at the turn of the century, aggregate preferences about 
integration to the world economy and the role of the state in the economy between 2002 and 2011, 
did not deviate much from a pattern of backlash against market reforms (Mora y Araujo 2011). 
Mass opinion reflected the sense of threat that the Argentine middle classes perceived from the 
outside world once their economy went burst (Mora y Araujo 2011). As a former trade policy 
maker told me, “the 2001 crisis lives in the minds of Argentine voters with the image that corn 
was imported from France while factories we have known our whole lives were closing. So the 
2003 election was a plebiscite between traumatic free trade versus protectionism, which led to 
everything that happened during under the Kirchners” (Bertoni 2018).98 
Breaking with the regional trend of the 2000s, the Kirchners did not pursue the deepening 
of trade integration through international preferential treaties. As can be seen in Table 4.2, only 
six PTAs were signed and entered into force during the 12 years in which the Kirchners ruled, and 
only three of those were with extra-regional partners, none of which represented an important 





97 In December 2007, 42 percent of respondents agreed that trade was good or very good for their own welfare (PIPA 
2007). 
98 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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Table 4.2: Preferential Trade Agreements Signed by Argentina 
Preferential Trade Agreement 
Date of 
Signature 
President Entry into 
Force 
MERCOSUR 3/26/1991 Menem 11/29/1991 
MERCOSUR - Chile ACE 35 6/1/1996 Menem 10/1/1996 
MERCOSUR - Bolivia ACE 36 12/17/1996 Menem 2/28/1997 
MERCOSUR - Mexico ACE 54 7/2/2002 Duhalde 1/5/2006 
MERCOSUR - Mexico ACE 55* 9/27/2002 Duhalde 1/3/2003 
MERCOSUR - India 1/25/2004 N. Kirchner 6/1/2009 
MERCOSUR - Colombia - Ecuador - Venezuela ACE 59 10/18/2004 N. Kirchner 4/1/2005 
MERCOSUR - Morocco 11/26/2004 N. Kirchner 4/29/2010 
MERCOSUR - Peru ACE 58 11/30/2005 N. Kirchner 12/13/2005 
Argentina - Mexico ACE 6 8/24/2006 N. Kirchner 1/1/2007 
MERCOSUR - Israel 12/18/2007 C. Kirchner 12/23/2009 
MERCOSUR - Turkey 6/30/2008 C. Kirchner Not yet 
MERCOSUR - Southern African Customs Union 12/15/2008 C. Kirchner 4/1/2016 
MERCOSUR - Egypt 8/2/2010 C. Kirchner 9/1/2017 
MERCOSUR - Colombia ACE 72 7/21/2017 Macri Not yet 
Argentina - Chile 11/2/2017 Macri 5/2/2019 
MERCOSUR - European Union 6/28/2019 Macri Not yet 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Organization of American States (2020). 
 
 In an interview, Rafael Bielsa, Nestor Kirchner’s first Foreign Affairs Minister, told me 
that “the president knew that the Argentine people did not tolerate the idea of a free trade 
agreement with the United States, so he ordered [the minister] to use diplomacy to boycott the 
political-level negotiations on the ALCA [the Free Trade Area of the Americas] in the coming 
Summit of the Americas that Argentina was hosting” in 2005 in the city of Mar del Plata (Bielsa 
2020).99 The free trade initiative was launched by George Bush Sr. using the template of the 
NAFTA. There were several non-cabinet-level technical meetings in Washington and other places 
during Bill Clinton’s tenure to identify common grounds for tariff liberalization, standards 
 
99 Personal Zoom Interview, Santiago, Chile, August 11, 2020. 
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harmonization, and rules of origin. By 2003, however, the Western Hemisphere governments were 
already talking of a “FTTAs a la carte,” with few universal rules to allow for more preferences to 
be agreed on a bilateral basis as Chile, Colombia, and Peru were doing (Bianculli 2016). 
Reinvigorating a traditional Anti-American discourse during the Summit and exploiting the 
common position between the Argentine and Brazilian peak industrial associations, the Argentine 
government got  Lula da Silva to back a move to prevent Mexico, Chile, and the Central American 
delegations from including a crucial statement of support for the FTAAs. Moreover, George Bush 
Jr.’s attendance to the Summit was met with an unusual level of popular opposition enabled and 
promoted by the host. The ruling Peronist party helped organized an alternative Peoples’ Summit 
repudiating US foreign policy in the region. The episode was followed by Kirchner’s invitation to 
Chávez for Venezuela becoming a full member of the Mercosur in 2006.100  
The protectionist import policy was deepened with several ad-hoc measures established by 
the executive branch as a reaction to the increase in domestic consumption prices (Kulfas 2016). 
For example, the Néstor Kirchner administration established excise duties on cigarettes, beverages, 
and cars; a new certificate to import bicycles (Resolution 220/2003);101 non-automatic import 
licenses for carpets (Resolution 54/2004) and washing machines (Resolution 444/2004); an import 
quota on imported TV sets from Brazil (Resolution 43/2005); a toy import certificate (Resolution 
485/2005); and a footwear import certificate (Resolution 486/2005). In 2006, the Federal Revenue 
 
100 Venezuela’s accession culminated in 2012 at the same time that Paraguay was temporary suspended due to the 
removal by impeachment of President Fernando Lugo, a political ally of Cristina Kirchner. Later on, Paraguay would 
be restored, and Venezuela would be kicked out of Mercosur for failing to comply with the within-block free trade 
and the CET.  
101 Excise duties were created by Law 24674/2006, but the Ministry of Economy could modify rates. 
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Agency (AFIP) established sanitary import prohibitions for fresh fruit, lettuce, spinach, broccoli, 
among other vegetables, and fertilizers and pesticides (Resolution 2146/2006). That was in 
addition to the Minimum Specific Import Duties of 8 percent to textiles, clothing, footwear, toys, 
computers, and mobile phones from non-Mercosur markets (World Trade Organization 2007a, 
37). 
By the end of the Néstor Kirchner government, price control agreements between the 
national authorities and importers, producers, and grocery stores became widespread (Bouzas and 
Gosis 2014). The stated goal was to restrain price rises in the context of the return of high inflation 
for the first time in more than a decade. The immediate end of the Convertibility Plan did not cause 
a large increase in inflation because consumer demand and sales were low. But by late 2005, the 
expansion of state subsidies to public utilities and to finance consumer borrowing and the 
administrative rise of the minimum wage and of regulated private and public sector wages led to 
weaker budget figures. The Central Bank covered the demand expansion with monetary emission. 
As soon as consumer goods prices started to increase at the grocery store, the government launched 
“agreements,” justified by the annual extension of the Emergency Powers Act first established by 
Law 25561 of January 2002. Moreover, the authorities reactivated an old regulation from the early 
1970s allowing criminal sanctions for people engaged in “raising prices artificially or 
unjustifiably; hoarding raw materials or products, or forming larger-than-necessary stocks; 
unjustifiably denying the sale of goods; or reducing normal production.” As an anti-inflationary 
tool, it did not work well, as they put pressure on supply and caused shortages among several 
consumer products as well as diesel (World Trade Organization 2007a). As a Kirchnerist 
economist acknowledges, “the price policy was perilous and insufficient at the same time” (Kulfas 
2016, 121).  
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Under Cristina Kirchner, the state increased its role in the economy, leading to more trade 
protection. The government’s failure to reach an agreement with a small group of bondholders, 
who owned sovereign bonds defaulted in 2001 and did not accept the terms of the 2005 and 2010 
restructurings, cut the Argentine government and firms from access to international capital 
markets. The increase in public spending in welfare benefits and in subsidies to domestic producers 
and public utilities created a growing budget deficit. With no access to borrowing from abroad, 
the deficit was covered by monetary emission and transfers from the Central Bank and the state-
own banks. Capital flight accelerated in 2011. The authorities reacted by creating a “cepo 
cambiario” by which no individual or firm could buy or sell foreign currency without express 
authorization from the Central Bank and the Revenue Agency. At the same time, worried about 
growing inflation, the Kirchner administration did not want to further depreciate the peso in an 
economy with high pass through to domestic prices (Kulfas 2016). This highly unorthodox policy 
mix had effects on the composition of imports. Gas and petroleum, two commodities that led 
Argentine exports in the 1990s, were two of the top imported goods in the mid-2010s (Center for 
International Development 2020).  
In that context, import restrictions were used to raise government revenue and to 
redistribute income to the core of the Peronist coalition of urban workers and industrialists. Import 
tariffs were not as important as they were in the past but still accounted for between 5 and 7 percent 
of all government revenue. Specific Duties were eliminated but certain ad-valorem tariff lines saw 
increases in duty rates. By 2012, the overall MFN simple average tariff rate was around 11 and 12 
percentage points, with rates ranging from 0 to 35 percent. More than a quarter of tariff lines had 
duty rates above 15 percent. Moreover, the list of tariff exceptions to the Mercosur’s CET was 
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increased from 100 to 300 product lines (Bianchi 2018).102 The structure of protection remained 
the same, offering more protection for the same industries benefited by Duhalde and Néstor 
Kirchner. Higher average tariff rates are applied to non-agricultural goods, especially textiles and 
clothing (average of 25 percent), footwear (25 percent), electronics (11 percent), and cars and 
transportation (18 percent).  
Non-tariff import restrictions were raised significantly. Cristina Kirchner created the 
Ministry of Industry, and the Trade, Industry, and Small- and Medium Enterprise Secretariat 
within it. Former Secretary Eduardo Bianchi justified his office’s increased intervention in trade 
flows in the expectation that world overproduction during the global financial crisis would swarm 
into the Argentine market damaging domestic producers (Bianchi 2018).103 For that reason, the 
authorities “operated at the limit” of what was allowed by the WTO, making aggressive use of pre-
import licenses and temporary trade remedies. The Secretary pressured the board members of the 
CNCE to accept new demands for relief against Chinese products, especially to force China not to 
pursue soybean oil refinement facilities (Bianchi 2018). In that period, Argentina ranked among 
the top five users of anti-dumping measures in the WTO (World Trade Organization 2013).  
The use of non-automatic licensing increased substantially for textiles and clothing (238 
tariff product lines covered by licenses) and machinery and mechanical appliances (126 lines), 
paper (35 lines), footwear (34 lines), and transport equipment (30 lines) (World Trade 
Organization 2013). Moreover, 114 tariff product lines required both automatic and non-automatic 
licenses, simultaneously. The WTO allows countries to use licenses to delay imports up to 60 days 
 
102 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 22, 2018. 
103 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 22, 2018. 
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but the Argentine government repeatedly failed to comply with that limit (The Economist 2011a). 
As Bianchi himself acknowledges, the use of “pre-import licenses increased [his] political clout in 
the government and vis-à-vis firms that produced tradable goods.”104 By 2012, Bianchi was 
succeeded by Guillermo Moreno, a famous and loud Peronist pundit. Moreno replaced the existing 
licenses with a more restrictive pre-registration and pre-approval regime known as the Advance 
Sworn Import Declaration (DJAI). In addition, he required importers to reach a certain level of 
local content in their production (Conconi and Schepel 2017). Moreno emerged as the ultimate 
decisionmaker on what could be traded across the border regardless of origin, sector, and 
specification (Kulfas 2016, 160). Foreign books, tires, and pharmaceutical inputs made the bulk 
of product restrictions at the customs (The Economist 2011a). The Secretariat kept a firm-level 
spreadsheet monitoring every commercial exchange and trading requirement, and it blocked de 
facto the import of intermediate goods (Nougues 2018).105 The decision was not aimed at building 
local supply chains but to tightly control the foreign exchange. In an ultimate effort to avoid selling 
hard currency to acquire imported goods, the Trade Secretary asked producers that wanted to 
import goods but had no factories there to export goods worth at least as much they wanted to 
import (The Economist 2011a; Conconi and Schepel 2017).  
The reality was far from what the Trade Secretary envisioned and most firms that needed 
to import goods had no material capacity, funding, expertise, or manpower to export. As the current 
Minister of Productive Development recognized not long ago, the para-legal scheme created in 
2012 created “luxury car dealers who had to export wine and lemons, and a secondary market 
 
104 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 22, 2018. 
105 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 10, 2020. 
 197 
emerged to exchange exporting quotas with a surcharge of 5 to 13 percent” (Kulfas 2016, 160). 
The import licensing system and the para-legal export-for-import measures were denounced by 
other countries at the WTO. The European Union initiated a dispute in May 2012, followed by a 
separate complaint by Japan, Mexico, and the United States, which also removed the concessional 
status of Argentine exports of fruits and other non-commodity goods in their Generalized System 
of Preferences. The Argentine government replied it was a mere customs procedure and retaliated 
initiating its own complaints against the European Union (biodiesel) and the United States (meat 
and citrus). The dispute panel, which found Argentina to be infringing Article XI of GATT, had a 
tough time examining the policies, unfamiliar to the WTO, due to their vagueness, non-legality, 
and ad-hoc discretion (Conconi and Schepel 2017).106  
Cristina Kirchner did not change course, as she felt that many people supported a tough 
stance on trade. The import restrictions remained in place until the end of her tenure in December 
2015. However, the tight capital controls were highly unpopular (Lupu et al. 2015). Further, many 
Argentines seemed once again favorable to globalization. In May 2014, 68 percent of surveyed 
respondents by the Pew Research Center were favorable or very favorable to economic 
globalization. Interestingly, though, such popular support was shallow. In the same poll, only 39 
percent of people thought that international trade led to lower consumer prices and 59 percent 
 
106 In addition, the Kirchner governments enlarged sector-specific and province-specific industrial promotion regimes 
and re-established Buy National incentives in public procurement legislation to increase protection against 
international competition. The largest regime is one by which the national government grants special tax incentives to 
domestic firms established in the island of Tierra del Fuego that assemble electronics and home appliances with 
components made abroad (World Trade Organization 2013). The regime, however, contributes little to value added 
manufacturing development or local supply chains (Kulfas 2016, 194). 
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thought that it increased wages (Pew Research Center 2014). But the perception of policy makers 
says otherwise. As the former chair of the CNCE under Cristina Kirchner told me, “when 
housewives could not find parts to repair washing machines due to the import restrictions, they 
said enough is enough. Which coincided with the rise of Macri as a viable alternative to Kirchner’s 
candidate in 2015” (Bertoni 2018).107 
Leading a new coalition of right and center parties, Mauricio Macri beat Néstor Kirchner’s 
former vicepresident in a presidential runoff in November 2015. One of his first executive orders 
in early 2016 was to eliminate export duties for soyabeans and suppress the non-automatic import 
licenses regime, the two most unpopular commercial policies of the past decade. Macri’s 
government also made the conclusion of a preferential trade agreement between Mercosur and the 
European Union a top priority, eventually becoming a major public issue after the 2017 midterm 
elections. 
4.5 Why Is Argentina So Responsive? 
The Argentine authorities have proven to be very responsive when it comes to trade policy 
during the contemporary democratic period. That does not mean that public opinion was the only 
driver of trade policy. Ideology was linked to some key trade policy decisions, such as Cavallo’s 
push for a free trade area with Brazil and the unilateral tariff reduction of 1991. Cavallo’s policy 
reform package is usually dubbed as the posterchild of the Washington Consensus (Edwards 1995; 
Kaplan 2013). That is the name of a list of economic policy recommendations that should be 
 
107 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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implemented by developing countries, according to the economists and technocrats working in 
Washington-based international organizations (the World Bank, the IMF, and the IDB) and the US 
Treasury.108 Cavallo embraced the ideas of open markets, but according to him, “there was a Latin 
American Consensus, which others call a Washington Consensus. You are wrong to say that it was 
an imposition by Washington. The Consensus was a menu of economic policy issues that were not 
thought to be uniformly applicable to every country. The reforms that were implemented were 
made by national leaders based on their understanding and experience of the 1980s crisis” (Cavallo 
2020).109 Likewise, a former Secretary of Trade under Cristina Kirchner told me, “As everyone, I 
have an ideology. I am a Peronista clásico. For me, the consumer does not exist. Before the 
consumer, there must be a guy with enough income to consume” (Bianchi 2018).110 
Business lobbying surely contributed to some significant trade policy decisions, especially 
product-level restrictions that affected individual firms. Well-connected large business groups in 
the countryside blocked the liberalization of the sugar market in the mid-1990s. Small producers 
in the clothing and footwear sectors of metropolitan Buenos Aires successfully lobbied for anti-
dumping remedies and restrictive licenses that amounted to import quotas against Chinese-made 
sport shoes and Brazilian fabrics. Medium-sized businesses in the province of Tierra del Fuego 
 
108 However, the fixed exchange rate was not an IMF policy recommendation. It preferred devaluations to address 
short term imbalances (C. Sánchez 2005). 
109 Cavallo also believed that reforms would be effective if Argentina abandoned anti-Americanism so he made his 
first trip as Minister to Washington to meet State Secretary James Baker to learn firsthand what were his priorities 
(Cavallo 2020). 
110 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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created with tax exemptions and no research and development investment avoided competing with 
American iPhones and Korean washing machines.  
And yet, Argentine policy makers exhibited a remarkably adaptation to public opinion. 
When voters expressed discontent with market reforms, neoliberal officials such as Roque 
Fernández in the late 1990s and Domingo Cavallo (in the De la Rua presidency) did not hesitate 
to erect trade barriers that run contrary to their beliefs. Certainly, the decisions these men took in 
the late 1990s were taken in the context of economic malaise (GDP contraction, rising 
unemployment). However, they did not take similar decisions under previous bad economic times 
when public support for economic liberalization was high (e.g. during the Tequila crisis in 1994). 
Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, who themselves had openly defended market reforms and 
liberalization in the 1990s when they ruled in the province of Santa Cruz, perfectly sensed the 
feelings of disgruntled voters after the 2001-2002 crash and adopted an exaggerated anti-free trade 
stance that suit them electorally once in national office.  
Trade policy responsiveness is possible in Argentina for three reasons: trade is salient for 
many people; the political system rewards visible policy changes in reaction to voter sentiment; 
and the concentrated institutional structure privileges political principals over bureaucratic agents. 
4.5.1 Salience 
Trade is very salient in Argentina. First, trade flows have reached significant figures as a 
share of the country’s economic activity both at the beginning and the end of the 20th century. 
Trade was important in the modernization of the Argentine economic structure and the nation-
state-building efforts from 1860 to 1914 (Gerchunoff and Llach 2010; Brambilla, Galiani, and 
Porto 2018; A. M. Taylor 2018). The protectionist and welfare state that evolved from the Great 
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Depression and the rise of the Peronist movement led to a substantive reduction in the coefficient 
of trade openness. Yet, trade remained salient in the postwar era as a political cleavage between 
urban and rural coalitions (Galiani and Somaini 2018; G. Sánchez 2018). After the debt crisis of 
the 1980s, the deepening of globalization in the early 1990s created opportunities for Argentine 
businesses to look outwards and engage in greater inter- and intra- industry trade and global and 
regional value chains. The trade policy changes of the early Menem administration facilitated the 
expansion of both imports and exports. As Figure 4.6 shows, total trade flows have been at least 
20 percent of GDP since 1990. Immediately after the 2001-2001 economic crash and devaluation, 
total trade represented 42 percent of GDP. We have seen earlier in the chapter how important were 
exports of agricultural commodities to the recovery of economic activity, the upturn on society’s 
expectations, and the improvement in public finances. Even when combined merchandise imports 
and exports fall back to 23 percent of GDP at the end of Cristina Kirchner’s second government, 
policy makers and analysts recurrently and vehemently discussed the role of trade in the broader 
approach to Argentina’s macroeconomic stability and international economic integration. Previous 
experiences of trade liberalization in simultaneity with financial integration largely shaped the 
political and technical debate around the role of trade policy in managing Argentina’s integration 
to the world economy (Bouzas and Gosis 2014; López and Pascuini 2018). 
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Figure 4.6: Imports and Exports in Argentina (1960-2018) 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on data from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. 
 
A second reason why trade is salient is that the tradable economic sectors employ many 
people. At the national level, these sectors employ not a majority but a relatively large number of 
workers. Figure 4.7 shows employment across sectors estimated by the ILO since 1991. The red 
line indicates the workers in manufacturing, agriculture and mining, and finance as a share of total 
employment in the country. Manufacturing employment is the highest in import-competing sectors 
such as textiles, clothing, and footwear but also in sectors with high levels of intra-industry trade 
such as cars and appliances. Manufacturing sectors that employ fewer workers but contribute 
substantively to the value added, are exposed to international competition, such as steel production. 
Another manufacturing sector that employs relatively large numbers of workers but has an 
exporting profile, is the food and beverages industry. Agriculture, however, represents a small 
share of the total workforce because the exporting agricultural commodities that the country 
produces are intensive in land (very abundant in Argentina) but not on labor, given the types of 
crops and the development of mechanization. Yet, agriculture indirectly creates numerous jobs in 
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non-agrarian occupations and sectors in the towns its serves throughout the country’s interior 
(Mangonnet, Murillo, and Rubio 2018). Finally, financial services are highly tradable since the lift 
of restrictions for foreign investment in the sector and the privatization of provincial state-own 
banks in the early 1990s. Banks employ many workers in both large and small cities across the 
country. 
 
Figure 4.7: Share of Employment Across Economic Sectors in Argentina 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on data from International Labor Organization. Economic sectors grouped by 
the author.  
 
The importance of trade as a source of employment is clearer when we consider political 
geography. Employment in tradable sectors in Argentina is concentrated in crucial electoral 
districts: the largest and most populated ones. Policy makers are sensitive to the attitudes and 
demands of citizens in those metropolitan areas. Given how votes are tallied in national elections, 
not every district (24 provinces plus the capital city of Buenos Aires) counts the same. More 
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populous provinces carry larger weight in electoral coalitions. Successful presidential candidates 
need to obtain many votes in the province of Buenos Aires, home to 18 million people (39 percent 
of total population), or some combination of the other populous districts, such as Córdoba (8.4 
percent), Santa Fe (7.7 percent), the city of Buenos Aires (6.8 percent), Mendoza (4.3 percent), 
and Tucumán (3.6 percent). Moreover, to pass legislation, governments need the support of many 
of the 70 deputies that the province of Buenos Aires has in Congress. That district has the largest 
absolute number of workers employed in tradable sectors. For instance, textiles, clothing, and 
footwear concentrate in the metropolitan core proximate to the city of Buenos Aires (home to most 
financial employees). It is also a massive employer of farmers and food and beverage industry 
workers, together with other large districts like Santa Fe and Mendoza. Córdoba is the country’s 
carmaker powerhouse, home to thousands of autoworkers in foreign-controlled firms that assemble 
cars with parts made within the Mercosur. This does not mean that all or even a majority of workers 
in districts such as Buenos Aires or Córdoba are employed in industries with a large potential for 
trade. Residents of those districts who are bystanders because they have no clear pocketbook 
interests in trade, are better able to learn about the effects of trade in their communities just because 
there are several firms that export or face import competition close to where they live. 
Caring about voters in districts with several firms with vested interests for or against deeper 
and freer trade is crucial for Argentine policy makers. This is especially so given the low mobility 
of labor across districts (G. Sánchez 2018).111 When an economic sector employs many people, it 
obtains a special status. Trade authorities understand this; their survival in office depends on 
 
111 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 24, 2020. 
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“delivering for voters in big, politically important districts” (Bianchi 2018).112 Business owners 
understand this; thus, they use the number of employees in their payroll as leverage when 
bargaining with the government to move trade policy closer to their private interests (Nougues 
2018).113 In this context, more workers are better, whether one large firms employ many hands, or 
several small firms (employing few workers each) use abundant labor together (G. Sánchez 
2018).114 Workers in “politically sensitive” districts can use collective action tools to protect their 
jobs in ways that escape from standard business lobbying to policy makers. In fact, labor unions 
are very strong in places like Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Santa Fe. Across the country, organized 
labor has long-term histories of political affinity with the Peronist party. Further, organized labor 
knows how to and has the resources to mobilize to defend their members’ rights, an inheritance 
from its strength in the ISI period, which was not terribly curtailed by neoliberalism given the 
limited and negotiated nature of labor reform under Menem (Etchemendy 2011). With the rise of 
labor informality in the early 2000s, union membership has stagnated a bit in recent decades. Yet 
the “power of the streets,” with the frequent demonstrations and roadblocks in urban centers of the 
unemployed and informal worker movements, has appeared as a powerful substitute tool available 
for workers with no formal labor union rights.  
Finally, society is informed about trade because the press produces high amounts of news 
about it. Argentina has one of the largest media markets as well as highest rates of internet 
penetration in Latin America (Mitchelstein and Boczkowski 2020). Since the return to democratic 
 
112 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 22, 2018. 
113 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 10, 2020. 
114 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 24, 2020. 
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rule almost forty years ago, the country has enjoyed high freedom of the press, high freedom of 
speech, and a vibrant press. With the privatization of the wireless and of state-own media 
organizations in the early 1990s, TV broadcasters and radio stations multiplicated across the 
country. In the past twenty years, the market has increased in concentration with fewer media 
conglomerates controlling most the audience, especially in metropolitan areas. The national 
government and political parties do not own or control media outlets.115 Public broadcasting plays 
a very small role at the national level. Coverage of economic and public policy news is very 
widespread and Argentine media consumers receive a lot of information from the state budget to 
consumer inflation to business regulations. These types of news are not reserved for specialized 
business outlets. Radio and TV primetime news and talk shows spread information on economic 
news that would be alien to mainstream media in most other countries.  
News coverage about Argentina’s international trade has been extensive. That has been 
especially the case during the 2008 (defeated) export tariff bill, when the topic was in all major 
newspaper headlines every morning for several weeks (Mangonnet, Murillo, and Rubio 2018). In 
less extraordinary times, trade has also been a major topic in news coverage. Figure 4.8 reports the 
annual number of news articles containing the words imports and exports in the major national 
newspaper La Nación for more than two decades. Three patterns emerge. First, coverage of news 
on exports is very large, with more than 1000 articles a year on this topic since 1997. The trend is 
especially pronounced between 2001 and 2010, coinciding with the major role of exports in 
economic recovery after the crisis. Second, news coverage of imports is less frequent than that of 
 
115 The situation is different in some small, backward provinces where political elites are also the economic elites and 
ruling families control the most important media outlets in town. 
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exports but has still been remarkably high, with at least 2.8 articles a day in this major newspaper 
since 1999. Third, news coverage of trade-related topics remained very high but experienced a 
change in content around the beginning of Cristina Kirchner’s second presidential administration. 
When her government established widespread controls to cross-border exchange of goods, 
services, investment, and currency, news coverage of imports surpassed that of exports. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Annual Frequency of Trade-Related Articles 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on results from the La Nación newspaper’s online search engine for articles 
with headlines including the keywords importación, importaciones, exportación, exportaciones between January 1996 
and January 2018. The results are grouped by year. 
 
4.5.2 Strong Party Leaders 
Argentina has strong party leaders with incentives to cater to aggregate citizen sentiment. 
The main party leaders in Argentina are the president, the legislative party bosses, and provincial 
governors. First, presidents have large constitutional powers to enact public policies closer to their 
ideal points. Presidents have the status of co-legislators, endowed with powers to propose, veto, 
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and amend legislation (Calvo 2014; Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020). Further, they dominate the 
agenda-setting process and get complete attention by the national media. Since 1995, Argentine 
presidents are elected for a tenure of four years in direct elections in which the whole country is 
one district, and the presidential elections are concurrent with elections for one half of the National 
Chamber of Deputies and a third of the Senate. Candidates that obtain more than 45 percent of the 
vote (or 40 percent and more than 10 percentage points of margin with the second candidate) are 
declared winners. If no one reached that threshold, a runoff or ballotage takes place a month later 
between the two candidates with more votes. For these reasons, challenger candidates and 
presidents seeking reelection care about the broader national electorate. Rafael Bielsa, the former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Néstor Kirchner, told me in an interview that his department did not 
proceed with trade talks with other countries, including Mercosur members’ high level meetings, 
unless the president himself approved each step along the way (Bielsa 2020).116 According to a 
Trade Secretary of Cristina Kirchner, senior advisors to the President requested his office to “pay 
attention to the requests made by businessmen whose firms employed many workers in proximity 
to elections” (Bianchi 2018).117 
 Second, there is a select group of legislative party bosses, especially in the Senate (the 
upper chamber) who care about the broader electorate, unlike other types of legislators whose 
careers depend on local power relations in their districts (Kikuchi 2018). Although there is no 
formal seniority system in the Argentine Congress, legislative leaders wield impressive power over 
other legislators, controlling committee membership, committee bill reports, and the small 
 
116 Personal Zoom Interview, Santiago, Chile, August 11, 2020. 
117 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 22, 2018. 
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leadership forum where bills with committee reports are filtered and selected to go to a vote on the 
floor (Calvo 2014). The result is that influence “flows from the top down, and the rank and file 
grants automatic support to the party leadership” (Ames 2001, 205). Finally, governors are party 
bosses in their provinces. They build up territorial political support based on their personal 
influence and control of provincial budgets and federal transfers (Jones and Hwang 2005; 
González and Mamone 2015). These resources allow them to obtain and maintain the support of 
local electorates. Moreover, governors control a significant part of legislative party list 
nominations in Argentina’s closed-list PR electoral system (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). As a 
former Trade Secretary reported in an interview, “governors phone national authorities and send  
delegates to Buenos Aires to make demands for industries and workers in their districts” (Bianchi 
2018).118  
Since 1946, there have been two catch all parties, the Peronists (formally, Partido 
Justicialista) and the century-old Unión Cívica Radical, which fall along the Peronist – 
Antiperonist cleavage, which does not fit typical left-right or conservative-liberal programmatic 
divisions. With the return to democracy in 1983, the two parties remained the largest forces and 
each one ruled for the next two decades. In 2001-2002, the political storm that emerged from the 
economic crisis diminished substantially the Radicales electoral strength in national elections. The 
Peronists split into factions after the crisis and their hold on national power has relied on unstable 
coalitions between governors and legislative bosses. Further, two center-right antiperonist parties, 
Macri’s Propuesta Republicana and Elisa Carrió’s Coalición Cívica, emerged powerful in the 
largest metropolitan areas, especially in Buenos Aires. 
 
118 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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Strong party leaders and few strong parties mean that legislative discipline in the Argentine 
Congress is high and legislators usually follow what their party leaders say. Legislative behavior 
follows one unidimensional cleavage: government versus opposition (Jones, Hwang, and Micozzi 
2009). Legislators sign committee reports and vote for or against bills on the floor based on 
whether they belong to the president’s party or to the opposition. If the president’s party has not 
enough seats to form a single party majority, they form legislative coalitions with small provincial 
parties and independents, and the same government-opposition logic applies (Calvo 2014). There 
is almost no room for parochial behavior. If legislators need something from the treasury or a 
national ministry for their districts, they bargain outside of Congress and do not challenge bills 
initiated by the executive (Calvo 2014; Kikuchi 2018). This is despite the fact that the Constitution 
says that Senators represent “the will of the provinces” while Deputies “represent the nation.” 
Deputies are elected across the 24 subnational districts in full PR systems with D’Hondt formula 
and an average district magnitude of 13.7 (Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020). Small provinces have 
a minimum bound of five deputies. Until 2001, Senators were appointed by indirect election by 
state legislatures. After the electoral reform contained in the 1994 Constitutional reform went into 
effect, members of the upper chamber are elected directly by the citizens in a modified PR system 
with a magnitude of 3.0, with two seats allocated to the party with most votes in a province and 
one seat for the next party in votes (Crisp, Olivella, and Rosas 2020). The electoral reform of 1994 
created incentives for directly elected Senators to be responsive to voters (Micozzi 2013). In spite 
of multi-level ambition (e.g., legislators seeking future positions in local government), Senators 
have become highly visible political figures. Many Senators are former governors, national cabinet 
ministers, and even presidents. For these reasons, bill production in the Senate and, in particular, 
general (as opposed to provincial-targeted) bills, have increased since 2001. 
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There were very few instances, however, in which Congress had an important role in trade 
policy making. The Constitution gives Congress jurisdiction over “tariffs and customs” and 
“economic development” (Article 75, sections 1, 22, 24). Nonetheless, Congress has delegated 
trade policy making to the Executive Branch, or the former has directly assumed the responsibility 
without consent. Renunciation of the constitutional mandate began with the establishment of a new 
Customs Code in 1981 by the last military dictatorship, a time during which Congress was closed. 
After the return to democratic rule, the Legislative Branch explicitly and willingly delegated its 
powers to set import and export tariffs to the Executive Power (Bouzas and Gosis 2014, 90). The 
1994 Constitutional Reform made it easier for the President and the Jefe de Gabinete de 
Ministros119 to pass legislation after been authorized to do so by a law of Congress with simple 
majority. For legal purposes, the Executive Branch has treated trade tariffs as taxes and changed 
tariff rates by executive decree based on laws that authorize delegation to change taxes. For 
instance, in 2001 Minister Cavallo signed more than 90 resolutions changing economic 
regulations, including tariffs, based on a generous interpretation of the delegation of Act 25414. 
In 2002, President Duhalde assumed plenty of budgetary and trade policy powers based on the 
delegation of Act 25561, a piece of legislation that has been subsequently renewed to all presidents 
with special delegatory laws (such as the 25972 Act of 2004 and the 26896 Act of 2013) as well 
as ordinary annual budget acts. Moreover, with the Mercosur’s common external trade policy in 
1994, Argentine legislators have had no say in tariff schedules agreed to at the regional block level 
(G. Sánchez 2018).120  
 
119 Translation is Chief of Staff, but it is more like a Premier in semi-presidential systems like France. 
120 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 24, 2020. 
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The Legislative Power, however, has intervened in the ratification of international 
agreements as mandated by the Constitution. The President’s party in Congress has had usually 
little difficulty in securing ratification of PTAs despite a few raucous speeches against the deals  
on the floor of the legislature (Bertoni 2018; Bianchi 2018; Gutiérrez Girault 2018). The high rate 
of approval of PTAs obeys to the internal working of the Argentine Congress, in which the only 
bills that make it to the floor are those that were pre-cleared by the powerful inter-party pre-floor 
committee (Calvo 2014). Congress has also intervened to restrict the liberalization of tariffs on 
sugar from Mercosur and the protection of the domestic pharmaceutical sector against the TRIPS 
Multilateral Agreement in the late 1990s, and the parliamentary discussion of the contentious 
export tariffs on agricultural commodities in 2008. Those were the only three strange occasions in 
which deputies and senators broke party lines and did not vote together with their party block in 
the typical government vs opposition division. Finally, it is worth referring to the type of concerns 
that legislators make about trade policy, irrespective of party, in opportunity of the legislative 
authorization to the Executive Power to appoint some ambassadorships abroad.121 In the televised 
hearings, senators questions only focus on bilateral trade balances and inquiry the appointees about 
what measures they will take in office to make trade imbalances (more imports than exports) into 
trade surpluses.  
 
121 Presidential appointees that do not belong to the diplomatic corps must obtain authorization from the Senate. 
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4.5.3 Concentrated Policy Making  
Finally, Argentine governments have been able to respond to public opinion because the 
policy-making process is concentrated in a few political actors within the Executive Branch.122 
Such concentration has made it easier to adopt changes to the policy status quo. While there has 
been no cabinet-level Trade Ministry, decisions on trade policy have been made by few politically 
appointed decision makers with little involvement of independent and technocratic civil servants 
(Bouzas and Avogadro 2002; Bouzas and Gosis 2014). Jurisdiction over trade policy can be 
divided in two broad areas: one that deals with the “unilateral” administration of trade with rules 
applied within borders and another that deals with “reciprocal” trade relations involving rules or 
decisions that affect other trading partner countries.  
Historically, the Ministry of Economy (or Finance) proposes and defines the general 
orientation of trade policy. Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the President with no 
intervention of Congress. Secretaries and Under Secretaries are appointed and dismissed by 
Ministers.123 Until the election of Cristina Kirchner, the Finance Ministry was in charge of 
administering non-tariff barriers and customs regulations as well as non-trade policies that have 
effects on trade flows, such as investment regulations, tax exemptions, and state subsidies (Bianchi 
 
122 Concentration should not be confused with administrative centralization. Argentina is a federation and subnational 
governments enjoy substantive levels of administrative, political, and fiscal decentralization. Trade, however, is a 
policy responsibility delegated from provinces to the federal (national) government by Constitutional design since the 
first such political arrangement in 1853. 
123 National cabinet positions are called Ministries. The lower levels, in descending order, are Secretariats, Under 
Secretariats, and National Directorates. 
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2018; Cavallo 2020). Within the Finance Ministry, the Trade Secretariat (Secretaría de Comercio) 
has direct jurisdiction over import and export licenses, quotas, and tariffs. In Spanish, commerce 
is a noun with two meanings: international trade and domestic market regulations (e.g., consumer 
protection, antitrust). In Argentina, the Trade Secretariat usually contains two or more Under 
Secretariats, one for each dimension of commerce: the Under Secretariat for Foreign Trade and 
the Under Secretariat for Comercio Interior, or business regulation (Bouzas and Gosis 2014). In 
2008, Mrs. Kirchner re-assigned the Trade Secretariat to the new Ministry of Industry. For a few 
years, the Trade Secretariat also had responsibility over industrial policy and SMEs promotion 
(World Trade Organization 2013).124 Since 1991, all Finance and Industry Ministers and Trade 
Secretaries have been politicians, scholars, or public figures, but none has been a business owner, 
leader, or representative. 
Relations between the Trade Secretariat and firms and business associations has been 
highly informal. There are no clear legal mechanisms in which firms and associations can 
participate in the formulation and implementation of trade policy, discussing ideas, exchanging 
information, or demanding solutions to their problems (Bouzas and Avogadro 2002; Bouzas and 
Gosis 2014). And yet, the business sector does frequently reach out to the Minister and the 
Secretariat in an ad-hoc fashion (Bouzas and Avogadro 2002). As a major business leader claimed, 
informal “dialogue” on trade between large business representatives and political leaders is 
 
124 During the Néstor Kirchner administration, responsibility over foreign direct investment and trade in energy 
commodities was given to the new Ministry of Federal Planning and Public Investment (World Trade Organization 
2007a). The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Tourism were established in 2009 and 2010, respectively, 
with formal responsibilities in formulating trade policy in agricultural goods and tourism services, but they were 
secondary to the will of the Finance and Industry Ministries (Bianchi 2018). 
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common but seldom produces the results that business wants (Nougues 2018).125 Political 
appointees ultimately make trade policy decisions based on what their political superiors ask them 
to (Bouzas and Gosis 2014; Bianchi 2018). The reason is that the Executive Power tend to give 
greater preeminence to macroeconomic policies that affect the broader electorate, such as price 
stability and total government revenue, rather than particularistic policies (Gerchunoff and Llach 
2010; Bouzas and Gosis 2014; G. Sánchez 2018). 
Reciprocal trade policy, such as international trade negotiations with foreign countries, 
were delegated in 1990 from the Ministry of Economy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has 
remained there until 2016, when Macri transferred them to the Ministry of Industry, accentuating 
concentration. The Cancillería’s Secretariat for International Economic Relations represents the 
Argentina’s official position in bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade talks, agreements, and 
disputes (Bianculli 2016).126 The Argentine diplomatic corps is widely praised for being one of 
the few independent bodies within the national state bureaucracy. As such, diplomatic officers 
pursue an image of partisan independence that make them to remain at arms-length of political 
parties and private interest groups. Business associations have complained about being kept out of 
talks and receiving little information from the Foreign Affairs officials (Nougues 2018).127 Thus, 
 
125 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 10, 2020. 
126 An International Studies Center (CEI) was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide technical 
assistance, such as general equilibrium models to assess the effects of trade liberalization in the economy (Gutiérrez 
Girault 2018) (Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018). Furthermore, the Ministry oversaw 
an export promotion agency, Fundación ExportAr, that provided domestic private firms with foreign market 
information. 
127 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 10, 2020. 
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the Trade Secretary sends delegates to participate in bilateral trade talks with foreign governments, 
in which specific trade policy changes are decided, while the diplomatic corps leads the 
multilateral talks in which general trade norms are discussed (Bianchi 2018).128 Inter-agency 
cooperation and coordination between the Ministries of Economy, of Industry, and of Foreign 
Affairs has been weak and sometimes produced diverging official preferences during talks with 
other countries (Bouzas and Gosis 2014, 77) 
In between the administrative dimension (decided by the Ministry of Economy) and the 
international dimension of trade policy (at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), in 1994 the Argentine 
government created a National Foreign Trade Commission (CNCE) in charge of examining firms’ 
demands against unfair foreign practices. It was an idea of Minister Cavallo, who openly copied 
the model of the US International Trade Commission (Decreto 2191/94). Before that, anti-
dumping petitions were considered in a very ad-hoc fashion by advisors to the Trade Secretary 
with no legislation to rely on (Finger and Nogues 2005). Cavallo’s goal was to provide 
compensation to import-competing Argentine firms amid the radical trade liberalization he was 
leading, because “it was visible to the authorities that many imported goods had prices well below 
those in their countries of origin and there was not yet the WTO we could resort to” (Cavallo 
2020).129 On paper, the CNCE is an independent technical body that replicates the two-track US 
model, in which the Commission investigates injury to industry while the Secretary of Trade 
decides on the existence of the unfair practice and establishes WTO-compliant temporary trade 
remedies, based on the Commission’s technical recommendation (Bouzas and Avogadro 2002). 
 
128 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 22, 2018. 
129 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 14, 2020. 
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The division of duties was aimed at defusing lobbying pressures on political appointees (Tussie, 
Casaburi, and Quiliconi 2004, 85). Furthermore, the Argentine anti-dumping law states that the 
Commission’s opinion is binding only when it finds no injury, but is non-binding when the 
investigation yields damage (Bertoni 2018).130 
The establishment of the CNCE, however, did not eliminate politicians’ intervention on 
trade restrictions. The CNCE board members are appointed by the Ministry of Economy, using 
quotas for members of the ruling and opposition parties (Bouzas and Avogadro 2002). But 
replication of the US logic failed in Argentina, which has a multiparty system and where the 
dominant party, Peronism, is a catch-all, ideological loose movement (Bertoni 2018). Moreover, 
by copying the US model without granting the agency with full financial and legal autonomy, the 
CNCE is trapped in lengthy bureaucratic procedures.131 There are two separate file procedures for 
anti-dumping and safeguards examinations which “make it difficult for domestic firms, especially 
SMEs, to make investigation requests,” and for civil servants to comply with the timeframe 
allowed by the WTO (Bertoni 2018).132 In words of its former head, the CNCE functions “as an 
emergency room, only dealing with ‘sensitive’ firms that recurrently request protection, without 
having the ability to study trade flows in the long term and the general implications of trade policy” 
(Bertoni 2018). In that context, decisions by the board on whether to recommend the existence of 
injury are taken informally in agreement with the Under Secretary for Foreign Trade: that “official 
communicates to the board member their intention to vote in unanimity in line with the goals of 
 
130 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
131 The Commission does not have its own budget or legal counsel and has no power to subpoena complainants and 
witnesses (Bertoni 2018) (Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018.) 
132 Personal Interview, Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 17, 2018. 
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the Trade Secretariat’s leadership” (Bertoni 2018). Unanimous votes at the CNCE board make it 
more likely that the Minister of Economy will decide to impose a temporary trade remedy. That 
does not mean that board members are co-opted or bought by special interests (Tussie, Casaburi, 
and Quiliconi 2004; Finger and Nogues 2005). Lobbying by firms and business associations exists, 
but it is aimed not at the CNCE employees or board members, but at the Minister of Economy and 
the Secretary of Trade (Bianculli 2016; Bertoni 2018). 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I have documented the relationship between public opinion and trade policy 
in Argentina from 1989 to 2017 and shown that governments have been generally responsive to 
voters when making trade policy. Public opinion on trade has been largely affected by export and 
import flows and the difficulty synchronicity issues of opening trade and finance while 
simultaneously using the exchange rate to stabilize prices. Moreover, the welfare net was 
inadequate to avoid a backlash in the late 1990s. Unemployment, poverty and inequality all rose, 
first with the import shock and then by the massive devaluation to address competitivity and liquify 
debts in hard currency. Public officials unmistakably with neoliberal credentials noticed the 
popularity of free trade and reacted by resorting to several non-tariff barriers, increasing the non-
discriminatory import tariff rate, and abandoning negotiations on trade treaties with the United 
States, Europe, and the major economies of the region such as Mexico and Colombia. The 
governments of the 2000s and 2010s used trade protection as social protection as well as a revenue 
generating tool in large part to finance social spending. The problem was that Cristina Kirchner 
did not react to the change in aggregate sentiment and the unlikely urban-rural popular alliance 
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that briefly emerged to oppose the 2008 export taxes. After an electoral defeat, the Peronist 
administration focused on regulating imports, adopting many restrictions, including some 
considered discretional, unfair, and illegal by the WTO and the country’s major partners, such as 
Brazil. However, those measures were just an overreaction to the low levels of popular support for 
free trade. 
Argentina has a combination of institutional and structural factors that make policy makers 
willing and able to respond to voters, factors that are not present everywhere. As we will see in the 
next two chapters, trade is not always as salient and present in the public agenda as it is in 
Argentina. For instance, in Peru (Chapter Six), trade is not a salient issue despite the crucial role 
of mineral exports for national economic activity as very few Peruvians work and are in contact 
with tradable industries. In that context, a pro-free trade consensus has emerged among the 
political and business elites. Moreover, the institutional setup of the policy-making process 
conspires against governments’ ability to respond to public opinion. Colombia (see Chapter Five) 
has a very fragmented process to change trade policy and several technocratic agencies intervene 
in decisions. Furthermore, the electoral system creates incentives for Colombian politicians to 
focus on smaller constituencies rather than in the national electorate. Lastly, the Peruvian political 
system makes it very hard for voters to participate in policy making, especially on economic issues 
such as international trade. In the 1990s, the country suffered from competitive authoritarianism 
and decisions were made by the odd mix of neoliberal populists, technocrats, and business leaders. 
In the 2000s, democratization evolved into a democracy without parties with extreme electoral 
volatility and very shallow party roots in society, breaking the chain of representation. Instead, 
trade politics remains there as the product of ideologues and a few large business interests with 
unified trade interests. 
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5.0 Colombia: Powerful Interests, Technocracy, and Moderate Responsiveness 
This chapter analyzes the relationship between public opinion and international trade 
policy in Colombia between 1990 and 2017. I present survey evidence of popular support for free 
among Colombians and detailed historical evidence of unilateral, reciprocal, and multilateral trade 
policy changes in the period under study. The main takeaway is that trade policy responsiveness 
is moderate. Based on elite interviews in Colombia, I analyze how each of the moderators of the 
conditional theory of responsiveness developed in Chapter Three fare in this case.133 There are 
weaker political incentives for politicians to appeal to the broader citizenry and there are important 
formal obstacles to the ability of governments to modify the trade policy status quo.  
In the past thirty years, public sentiment on commercial integration in Colombia has been 
generally stable towards free trade. From 1994 to 2012, the average level of support for free trade 
has been over 50 percent, with survey evidence of support for free trade in principle as well as for 
particular free trade policies. Free trade sentiment was at its highest between 1999 and 2003 and 
then shortly after the global financial crisis, but in all other periods it has trended below 60 percent, 
suggesting it is not an extremely popular issue. In fact, the review of the existing survey questions 
on trade indicates that about a quarter of all surveyed respondents have constantly failed to express 
support or opposition to trade-related questions. In the last years of the period, average sentiment 
has been less supportive of free trade. Interestingly, the available data suggest that Colombians do 
not differ much in their support or opposition to free trade based on income level.  
 
133 I conducted IRB-approved structured interviews with legislators, executive branch trade policy makers, business 
representatives, and other elite members in Bogotá in February-March 2020. 
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Trade policy seems to be dual. On the one hand, the general level of non-discriminatory 
import tariffs has been decreasing since 1990 and Colombia has signed several international 
treaties that lower barriers to trade with the country’s largest partners including those outside Latin 
America. On the other hand, the structure of tariffs is highly skewed toward protection for national 
agriculture and there has been a proliferation of state subsidies for import-competing producers 
and farmers as well as an extensive use of quality and quantity-control non-tariff import barriers. 
Targeted protection is granted to some manufacturing industries via technical standard 
requirements and temporary trade remedies, too. Table 5.1 provides the major trade policy 
developments in the period under study.  
 
Table 5.1: Major Trade Policy Changes in Colombia by Sub-Period 
Sub-Period President Trade Policy Changes 
1990-1991 Gaviria 
Unilateral reduction of tariff rates. 
Unilateral reduction of quantity-control NTBs. 
1992-1995 Gaviria 
Locking in liberalization with Andean Group, G3 
Agreement and WTO. 
1996-1999 Samper 
Increase of price-control NTBs for agriculture. 
No new PTAs. 
1999-2002 Pastrana 
No new PTAs. 
No changes to tariffs despite economic crisis. 
2003-2007 Uribe 
US Free Trade Agreement. 
New intra-regional PTAs. 
2008-2010 Uribe 
Increase in quantity and quality-control NTBs. 
New extra-regional PTAs. 
2010-2018 Santos 
Increase in quantity and quality-control NTBs. 
New extra-regional PTAs. 
Note: Sub-periods are author’s choice and do not necessarily match presidential tenures. Text in blue represents 
changes in trade policy towards more free trade. Text in red represents changes in trade policy towards less free trade. 
Selection and sources for this table are discussed throughout this chapter. 
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Both policy dimensions (i.e., general pro-free trade policies and selective protection) have 
been stable over time with few changes. My fieldwork and analysis in Colombia find that if there 
is one word that summarizes this country’s experience, it is stability. Contrary to what we see in 
other parts of the region, Colombians have experienced macroeconomic stability as a result of 
political compromise among the economic elite and the insulation of an extensive technocratic 
state (Robinson 2007). The stability in fiscal and financial arenas is replicated in trade policy. 
Trade policy has not been very responsive to public opinion. Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show 
how public support for free trade has changed over time based on the index developed in Chapter 
Two, plotted against three policy instruments that regulate imports from abroad: PTAs, tariff rates, 
and non-tariff barriers, respectively. The reduction in support for open borders of the mid 2000s 
did not avoid that the government signed several PTAs. Moreover, the depression of pro-free trade 
sentiment between 2008 and 2016 was followed by a reduction of Most Favored Nation import 
tariff rates. 
Figure 5.1: Public Opinion and Preferential Trade Agreements in Colombia 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of public support for free trade (see Chapter Two) and the number 
of new preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed by Colombia, based on data from the Organization of American 
States. The height of the vertical grey lines indicates the cumulative number of new PTAs signed in a given year. 
Empty spaces indicate that no new PTA was signed that year. More PTAs represent more free trade. 
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Figure 5.2: Public Opinion and Import Tariff Rates in Colombia 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of public support for free trade (see Chapter Two) and the 
Colombian average ad valorem Most Favored Nation import tariff rate with data from the World Bank. Higher tariff 
rates represent less free trade. 
 
Figure 5.3: Public Opinion and Non Tariff Barriers in Colombia 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of latent public support for free trade (developed in Chapter Two) 
and the number of price-, quantity-, and quality-control non-tariff import barriers (NTBs) established by the 






Why has responsiveness been moderate to low in this case? Part of the answer is that 
Colombian political institutions are ill suited to provide what voters want. The political system 
creates incentives for legislators and presidents to cater to powerful economic interest groups. As 
the former Deputy Minister of Trade acknowledges, “business associations (gremios económicos) 
and large private domestic corporations (grupos económicos) knock on the Trade Ministry’s doors 
the whole day and obtain everything they want … because politicians are outspokenly pro-free 
market but continuously provide the special measures that businessmen asked them for” (Sarasti 
Montoya 2020). Business associations and individual firms, especially large family-run business 
groups, are well-organized, well-funded, and well-connected (Schneider 2004; Rettberg 2005). 
They exert high pressure on elected officials, political appointees, and top civil servants alike. 
Public policies in Colombia, a long surviving democracy with extreme levels of political violence 
and economic inequality, have a strong private-regarding character which frequently disagree with 
voter preferences (Robinson 2007; Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008; Eslava and Meléndez 
2009). Those regulations undermine productivity growth and economic modernization despite the 
general liberalization ethos installed in the early nineties (Eslava and Meléndez 2009). 
The rules to elect legislators have discouraged the building of strong party brands and have 
made it more politically expedient for candidates and representatives to seek private financing 
catering to special interests (Archer and Shugart 1997; Botero 2007; Pachón and Shugart 2010). 
Even though Colombia is a presidential democracy with direct elections, a weakened President 
after the Constitutional reform of 1991 has incentives to align with the preferences of congressmen 
and senators when considering policy changes, especially given the post-election coalitions that 
take place given the noncurrent nature of the elections. And the frequent use of PTAs has required 
formal ratification in the bicameral Congress, which is much more than a rubber stamp.  
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The other part of the answer is that Colombia has a large technocratic bureaucracy since 
the late 1950s that makes it difficult to change public policies in general, and the same applies to 
trade (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008; Dargent 2011; Eslava and Meléndez 2009). While 
there is a ministry in charge of trade policy, embedded within a department that also regulates 
industrial policy, there are several other cabinet-level ministries that intervene in trade policy 
making. Moreover, there is an extended system of checks and balances within the Executive 
Branch where expert bureaucrats and top appointees have to provide consent to choose between 
policy alternatives. The proliferation of state agencies offers special interest groups with more 
access points to the policy-making process. As the literature highlights, Colombia has a vibrant 
domestic private sector, represented by powerful business associations, and the large business 
grupos (conglomerates) have connections in all parties and across the state apparatus. Yet, a fuller 
picture that emerges from my analysis is that the professional civil service does not automatically 
ally with firms and industry leaders; technocrats have their own knowledge, ideas, and expertise, 
and act accordingly.  
The rest of the chapter is organized in five sections and a final summary. The first section 
offers a historical background on trade and trade policy in the twentieth century in Colombia. The 
second section presents evidence from Colombian opinion polls with questions on trade that were 
used to construct the index developed in Chapter Two. The third section describes the trade 
liberalization of the early 1990s, both in its unilateral and reciprocal/multilateral dimensions as 
well as on the general orientation of the reform and the important pockets of protection that 
survived or grew. The fourth section describes major trade policy changes in the 2000s under the 
right-wing governments of Alvaro Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos, especially the making, signing 
and ratification of PTAs starting with the free trade treaty with the United States. The fifth section 
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explains the patterns of moderate to low responsiveness to public opinion with focus on an 
electoral system that fosters a personal vote and a fragmented, technocratic policy-making process. 
5.1 Background 
Colombia has historically managed its integration into the world economy differently than 
other countries in Latin America. Colombia has not experienced the economic volatility and 
balance of payments crises of other developing countries (Robinson 2007).. For nearly a century, 
the economy enjoyed continued growth, relatively low inflation, sound public finances, and low 
public debt (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008). Under the Conservative Party and Liberal 
Party governments, Colombia has exhibited “unspectacular but steady progress and its economic 
policy on the whole has been subtle and conservative with a judicious addition of heterodox 
measures” (Thorp 1991, 14). Rival regional economic elites fought for control over national 
political power (Bushnell 1993), but the two mainstream political parties did not really differ in 
their preferred economic policies (Robinson 2007). Liberals and Conservatives relied on pork 
barrel to guarantee legislative approval of policy changes. The trend did not change with the 
consolidation of a competitive political regime with an explicit bipartisan arrangement and civilian 
control over the armed forces in the late 1950s. Later in this chapter I show how the political 
system explains the stickiness of its trade policy in the long term and the diminished response to 
public sentiment. 
Governments’ approach to international trade has been relative stable. Colombia was not 
an open economy at the beginning of the 20th century and it did not become more closed after 1930 
(Villar and Esguerra 2007). Trade was hindered by high transportation costs and large distances 
 227 
from productive localities to the coasts. Geography, with its rugged terrain, the challenges of the 
Andean mountain chain, the tropical climate, has been more of a burden than a blessing. 
Traditionally, economy activity has been oriented toward the center instead of its two oceanic 
coasts (Holguín 2020). Public infrastructure has been inadequate, even by regional standards 
(Eslava 2020). In the postwar era, Colombian rulers followed an import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) strategy. The policy included trade protection via high tariff rates for the 
large, non-commodity agricultural sector (meat, dairy, and wheat) and the light manufacturing 
sector. Protectionist policies were the result of a non-diversified export base in an environment of 
low access to international financing (Villar and Esguerra 2007).  
But contrary to other nations in the region, the Colombian version of ISI incorporated the 
active promotion of traditional exports, mainly coffee, and some non-traditional exports (Juárez 
1993; Perfetti, Higuera, and Oviedo 2018). It is worth noting that the main commodity of Colombia 
has not been subject to trade policies and is not examined in this study: illicit drugs, especially 
cocaine.134 Within the legal economy, the performance of coffee exports contributed to the 
business cycle as well as to the internal dynamics of the Colombian society (Posada-Carbó 
2012).135 Coffee production was dispersed across small and medium sized farms, but the selection 
of high-quality coffee and its commercialization abroad was concentrated in a public-private 
management apparatus (Thorp 1991). In 1967, Colombia adopted a crawling peg exchange rate 
regime in place until 1991, creating stability and predictability to domestic producers who wanted 
 
134 In recent decades, illegal gold and emerald mining have also appeared as major exporting sectors. 
135 Trade in coffee experienced three major trends: boom in volume and prices from 1910 to 1940, stagnation from 
World War II to the mid-1970s, and price raises since the late 1970s.  
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to export goods other than coffee.136 The pro-export component of the ISI included generous state 
subsidies, such as the draw-back systems of tariff exceptions and tax credit certificates for non-
traditional exporters (Juárez 1993; Edwards and Steiner 2008). By the mid-1980s, oil replaced 
coffee as the major exporting good, representing more than 40 percent of merchandise exports.  
By the late 1980s, integration to world markets retained its bimodality: concentration of 
exports on one or two commodities and a closed economy that imported few inputs and 
consumption goods and no integration in value chains. Imports accounted to only 15 percent of 
GDP, the same as in 1960. Exports of coffee, the main commodity, had experienced sharp 
decreases in the previous decade due to the fall of international prices (see Figure 5.4). Colombia’s 
commercial regime was highly restrictive, and in that respect not far from its Latin American 
neighbors, with several import tariff categories, an average import tariff rate of 70 percent in 1985 




136 Coffee exhibited a low response to the real exchange rate (Villar and Esguerra 2007). 
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Figure 5.4: Imports and Exports in Colombia (1960-2018) 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on data from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. 
 
5.2 Public Opinion on Trade 
In Colombia, public opinion has been generally favorable to free trade. The index of public 
support for free trade developed in Chapter Two has a mean of 57.4 percent for Colombia, with a 
standard deviation of 7 percentage points over thirty years. The average value is higher, and the 
variance is smaller, than the figures for all Latin American countries. This is replicated with the 
examination of observable data from real polls. For example, in September 1985, the US 
Information Agency commissioned a poll with an item about citizens’ agreement with the idea of 
lifting restrictions to trade: 65 percent approved the statement (USIA 1985). Six months later, that 
same question received a 66.5 percent of agreement (USIA 1986). This trend is sustained over 
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time and has not suffered greatly under sluggish economic growth or changes in other forms of 
public mood such as presidential approval. In 1997, for instance, the Latinobarometer project 
found that 65 percent of surveyed Colombian agreed that increased commercial integration was 
good for their country (Latinobarometer 1997). Two decades later, favorable replies to that same 
question reached 59 percent (Latinobarometer 2016). Similar phrased questions from other 
pollsters got similar answer rates. In early 2009, just months after the trade collapse of the global 
financial crisis, 60 percent of Colombian respondents believed that economic globalization was a 
good thing (CIMA 2009).  
Public sentiment remains generally pro-free trade even when we break it down into 
particular groups of people. Colombians’ support for free trade policies cuts across social classes, 
at least based on the available data. The LAPOP project is one of the few that allow us to examine 
responses about free trade along with information on the income level of respondents. Answers to 
the question on whether free trade agreements are good for the respondent’s country are ranked in 
ascending order of agreement from 1 to 7, inclusive, plus a do not know category. By grouping 
answers into three camps, supportive, opposed, and no opinion (which includes “neither or” 
answers), we can more easily make observations of common patterns for the five self-reported 
income level groups. In 2004, during the international stage of the USFTA negotiations, all five 
income groups had more than 50 percent of respondents giving a 5, 6, o 7 points of agreements 
with free trade agreements. The two extreme tails, the very poor and the very rich, had 52 percent 
of individuals in agreement, while 60 percent of those in the middle groups were on average 60 
percent in favor of those liberalizing agreements (LAPOP 2004). In 2008, during the global 
financial crisis, there were even smaller differences in support for FTAs: the lowest income group 
was 47 percent in agreement, the same value as the median group, and just two percentage points 
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lower than that reported for the highest income group. In 2010, during an impasse in the strategy 
of signing new PTAs between the one with Canada in 2008 and the next one with the Pacific 
Alliance in 2012, LAPOP reported the same distances of two percentage points, just with a higher 
overall value across groups (the lowest score was 56 percent) (LAPOP 2010). 
Questions about support for free trade agreements get relatively similar responses to 
questions about free trade in general. During the Gaviria administration, 65 percent of surveyed 
individuals agreed that the Free Trade Area of the Americas was a good deal for Colombia (USIA 
1993). Years after, under President Samper, a poll from the same organization showed that 78 
percent approved of the US approach of PTAs with the Latin American region (USIA 1996). By 
the end of the Pastrana administration, 61 percent of the public continued to agree that the FTAAs 
was positive for the country’s development (Latinobarometer 2001). Months into Uribe’s first 
government, 65 percent of surveyed Colombians approved of the FTAAs (CIMA 2003). 
According to Gallup, aggregate sentiment for the bilateral trade agreement with the United States 
was likewise very positive during the closing international negotiations (Gallup 2006). It remained 
barely unchanged in early 2008 at the next round of Gallup’s Voice of the People, even after the 
deal was ratified after acrimonious debate in Congress. Moreover, the positive mass attitudes 
toward free trade in Colombia do not change significantly between those who say that it is good 
for job opportunities from those who say it is good due to the greater access to consumer goods 
(Latinobarometer 2006; 2007). 
However, closer examination of available survey data reveals that Colombian voters who 
disapprove of free trade are usually the same number, or less, of those who have no opinion or are 
neither in favor nor against free trade. Massive opposition to free trade is nonexistent in this 
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country.137 There seems to be both little knowledge and little disagreement. For example, while in 
the early 1990s only 18 percent gave a negative opinion of PTAs that increase trade integration in 
the Americas, 17 percent had no opinion (USIA 1993). In the early 2000s, other polls showed 
similar figures: 14 percent of disagreement with the FTAAs while 25 percent expressed no 
definitive views (Latinobarometer 2001; CIMA 2003). In 2004, 24 percent of individuals surveyed 
by the Latin American Public Opinion project had negative views about trade integration via PTAs, 
but 21 percent had no views about the issue (LAPOP 2004). This also emerges from the more 
recent surveys conducted by the Mexican Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas: 
negative and non-opinion recorded answers about economic globalization and trade integration are 
roughly the same across polls in Colombia (CIDE 2008; 2010; 2015).  
These findings provide some support for the claim that Colombian governments are not 
very constrained by voters’ views on trade because trade is not a divisive issue on the public 
agenda. Academics and policy makers interviewed for this study claimed that very few ordinary 
voters voice strong attitudes for or against free trade. There are two small groups of individuals 
with strong views on trade. On the one hand, top state bureaucrats in charge of economic policy 
and business leaders from large corporations respond openly in favor of free trade. On the other 
hand, university student groups, fringe political parties on the left with few legislative seats, and 
human rights activists strongly oppose free trade on the grounds that it is directed by Washington, 
DC. But those groups “are anti-free trade as much as they are Anti-American,” and have not gained 
 
137 There was only one instance (in a September 1994 USIA poll) of negative opinion larger than 40 percent of total 
opinion in the series of observed survey marginals along 30 years. 
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“many followers in a society that leans conservative” (Urrego 2020).138 As the former Vice 
Ministry of Foreign Trade told me, in between those two small groups, “most Colombians do not 
voice sharp views about international commerce. It is not like in Argentina, where everybody 
knows what they can buy from abroad and what the government does about it” (Sarasti Montoya 
2020).139  
5.3 The Apertura of the 1990s 
In 1990, the national government adopted a program of trade policy liberalization. It was 
part of a market reform package, popularly known as the apertura, drafted during that year’s 
electoral campaign by a group of politicians from the incumbent Liberal Party, academic advisors 
(mainly, economists from the Universidad de los Andes, a top private school), and representatives 
from large business groups. The package was approved by the National Council for Economic and 
Social Policy (CONPES) to be implemented in the next five years (Edwards and Steiner 2008, 
128). The authors of the reform criticized the historic low level of openness and the productivity 
sluggishness and sought to move Colombia toward an explicit “outward orientation and export 
growth” strategy through the “gradual and partial” integration to the global economy (Edwards 
2001, 63). The package included reforms in other areas such as foreign direct investment, financial 
(de)regulation, exchange rate policy regime, and the independence of the Central Bank.  
 
138 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 26, 2020. 
139 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 24, 2020. 
 234 
Outgoing president Virgilio Barco implemented the first set of trade policy changes in 
February 1990 with the abolition of quantitative restrictions to imported goods. Quantitative 
restrictions were replaced by tariffs whose rate would be determined via auction by import-
competing producers in confidential bets solicited to the Instituto de Comercio Exterior.140 The 
Barco administration then established by executive decree a new procedure to evaluate anti-
dumping petitions, reduced export subsidies through the tax reimbursement program, and nearly 
eliminated the subsidies to imports of capital goods for exporting firms. In the final days of the 
Barco government, the percentage of products with pre-import licenses shrank to 33 from 60 
percent six months before (Juárez 1993; Edwards 2001; Echavarría and Gamboa 2004). 
Unilateral trade liberalization via import tariff cuts was implemented as soon as the new 
president César Gaviria, Barco’s former Minister of the Interior and campaign advisor to the 
assassinated candidate Luis Carlos Galán, was inaugurated in September 1990. The Ministry of 
Economy, under Professor Rudolf Homes, led the reduction from 14 to nine tariff rate groups, with 
a 50 percent average tariff rate for consumption goods (down from 58 in December 1989), 31 
percent for raw materials and intermediate inputs (down from 38), and 28 percent (down from 37) 
for capital goods. The new tariff schedule came into effect while the Central Bank devalued the 
currency. The short-term effect was that, instead of increasing, imports declined compared to 
exports (Edwards 2001, 48). The behavior of trade flows in the context of the lift of capital account 
restrictions created a large surplus in the balance of payments. Within one year, the Gaviria 
administration further deepened the liberalization with the adoption of a simplified, four-category 
 
140 The government received petitions for only a third of auctioned product lines due to its complexity and lack of 
transparency (Edwards and Steiner 2008). 
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import tariff structure. In September 1991, average tariff rates were less than half of their previous 
levels: consumption goods at 21 percent, raw materials and intermediate inputs at 12 percent, and 
capital goods at 13 percent. Further, import licenses were requested for less than three percent of 
product lines (Edwards 2001). Lastly, the Colombian government embraced foreign direct 
investment in the oil sector, principally from the US (Occidental Petroleum) and the United 
Kingdom (British Petroleum), including removing restrictions to trade in energy commodities 
(Dunning and Wirpsa 2004). 
The trade policy reform included a major regional integration initiative. In 1992, the 
Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs negotiated with its largest trading partner, Venezuela, a 
free trade agreement within the framework of the Andean Group. Originally established in 1969, 
the Group was almost defunct by the late 1980s (Echavarría and Gamboa 2004, 150). The new 
preferential agreement covered most sectors but excluded agriculture and cars. In 1993, the 
neighboring countries, with Ecuador also on board, created a customs union and adopted a 
Common External Tariff (CET). The CET came into force in February 1995 with four main 
categories that replicate the existing tariff system in Colombia, although the common tariff 
excludes the agricultural and automobile sectors. Contrary to the Mercosur, the Andean Group 
established within-block mechanisms to deal with anti-dumping, counter-vailing duties, foreign 
investment, intellectual property, and transportation (Echavarría and Gamboa 2004, 151). The 
Group also legalized the signing of free trade agreements with other countries. In late 1993, 
Colombia signed a partial scope agreement with Chile and in 1994, Colombia signed the G3 trade 
agreement with Mexico and Venezuela, which phased out tariff rates within ten years and 
established equal treatment for foreign investment. Lastly, at the multilateral level, Colombia 
actively participated in the Uruguay Round (it had joined the GATT in 1981). In preparation to 
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the establishment of the WTO, Colombia negotiated some of the highest tariff ceilings (for 
agricultural products, some reaching 270 percent) in the region (Echavarría and Gamboa 2004, 
149). 
There was one crucial difference in the Colombian trade reform compared to other Latin 
American countries: there was no major crisis when the policy change was launched. There was 
no economic recession, bank run, or hyperinflation. The annual rate of growth of GDP since 1985 
had been greater than 3 percent. Inflation was high compared to world standards but low compared 
to the region and it was under control, with an annual average increase in consumer prices lower 
than thirty percent. Compare that to the hyperinflations in Argentina or Peru. Further, the national 
unemployment rate in Colombia was stable around 10 percent since the mid-1980s. In that context 
of macroeconomic stability, the apertura was not welcomed by businesses which traditionally 
enjoyed policy favors from the state (Edwards 2001; Juárez 1993). The coffee producers 
association (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros), representing the most competitive exporting 
sector and the trustee that had administered the National Coffee Fund for over four decades, 
supported the reform (Edwards 2001; Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008). So did the cut flower 
producers (Asociación Colombiana de Productores de Flores), representing non-traditional 
exporting interests, the banks (Asociación Bancaria) and the retail and services association 
(Federación Nacional de Comerciantes). But other powerful interests groups opposed it, including 
the national peak industry association, which includes but is not exclusive of large manufacturing 
(Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia, ANDI) and the rural producers society 
(Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia), founded in 1871 and the strongest pro-agriculture voice 
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in the countryside (Juárez 1993; Schneider 2004).141 Most labor unions, although relatively weak 
in the Colombian private sector, also opposed it. Even the exporting firms alliance (Asociación 
Nacional de Exportadores) opposed the elimination of tax incentives to export. So did a large 
faction of the ruling Liberal Party that backed the Minister of Economic Development, Ernesto 
Samper (Edwards 2001; Edwards and Steiner 2008). However, some of those same groups backed 
other components of the market reform package such as the labor flexibilization reform and the 
privatization of state-own companies.  
Despite the general pro-free trade reform, the opposition of interest groups blocked the 
removal of trade policy protection for some economic sectors, especially the non-commodity 
agriculture, i.e. crops other than coffee. While the state monopoly in the grains import market 
ended, the Gaviria administration expanded subsidies to banana exports, established ad-hoc tariff 
and quantitative restrictions to cotton and textiles, set minimum reference prices for more than 
thirty agricultural products, and suspended imports of dairy and chicken (World Trade 
Organization 2006; Edwards and Steiner 2008). Especially important is the special price band 
system for agricultural imports (SAFP), which has the stated goals of shielding domestic 
agriculture from world price fluctuations and stabilizing farm incomes (Perfetti, Higuera, and 
Oviedo 2018). The system, which can be traced back to the variable levies of the European Union’ 
Common Agriculture Policy set in the 1950s, consists of import tariff rates based on the difference 
between international reference market prices and floor and ceiling prices set by resolution every 
 
141 The Asociación de Cultivadores de Caña de Azúcar (sugar), the Federación Colombiana de Ganaderos (livestock) 
and the Asociación Colombiana Popular de Industriales (light manufacturing and supply chains) also opposed 
indiscriminate liberalization. 
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six months on the basis of historical values (World Trade Organization 2006).142 The SAFP is a 
major source of trade policy protection and rents for rural producers in the countryside, harming 
the processed food industry (Echavarría and Gamboa 2004; Perfetti, Higuera, and Oviedo 2018). 
Furthermore, in 1993, Congress created an “equivalent special tariff discount” mechanism to 
compensate importers of wheat, barley, maize, and sorghum, with the funds being administered 
directly by private firms rather than the state (Torres 2020). In that context, the Gaviria 
administration resorted to the type of social policies promoted by an efficiency response to 
globalization: increased government spending in education instead of compensation to the losers 
from international competition (Levy and Schady 2013; Holland and Schneider 2017). 
The Gaviria trade reforms were not deepened by his successor, Ernesto Samper, 
inaugurated in August 1994, but were not reversed either. Perhaps the most salient trade policy 
change was the extension of the SAFP at the Andean Group level, renamed Comunidad Andina in 
1996. Imports of poultry cuts became subject to prior licensing, too. Moreover, the Colombian 
authorities wanted to deepen trade with the United States by way of joining the NAFTA. The 
George H. W. Bush administration had launched the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) as a 
unilateral system of tariff preferences to discourage illicit drugs production and trafficking in 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. However, as the former chief trade negotiator claims, “the 
Clinton administration rejected the idea of expanding NAFTA and convinced the Colombians to 
sign a bilateral investment treaty and to participate in region-wide technical-level talks to create a 
 
142 If the reference price is below the floor, the CET is applied plus a surcharge. If the reference price is above the 
ceiling, the CET is applied with a discount. If the reference price is the same as or between the ceiling and floor prices, 
only the CET applies (World Trade Organization 2006). 
 239 
free trade block in the entire hemisphere, the FTAAs” (Torres 2020).143 The Samper government’s 
approach to all other foreign economic policy issues was consumed by its diplomatic confrontation 
with the US government due to the increasing involvement of drug cartels in domestic politics.  
Trade policy remained unchanged through economic crisis. After decades of growth, the 
Colombian economy stagnated in 1998 as a consequence of the financial volatility in emerging 
markets across the region and the world. The secular appreciation of the exchange rate since 1992 
and the rise in imports in the middle of the decade contributed to a current account deficit (Villar 
and Esguerra 2007). In addition, the capital inflows that followed the relaxation of controls during 
the apertura were channeled toward a construction and real estate boom fostered by the process 
of urbanization (Perez-Reyna 2017). The private sector was increasingly indebted in foreign 
currency. With the financial contagion and the reversion of global capital flows since the currency 
crises of South East Asia in 1997, Colombian firms, households, and banks became under severe 
stress and private risk levels soared (Perez-Reyna 2017). There were concerns about the budget 
deficit after the increase in public spending in education and health mandated by the 1991 
Constitutional reform (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008). Eventually, the generalized fall of 
expectations depressed the real economy. In 1999, just one year into the administration of 
Conservative Party president Andrés Pastrana, total output in Colombia was -4.2 percent, 
effectively the largest recession that the country faced since the Great Depression.  
Adjustment during the crisis was conducted by the Central Bank, which abandoned the 
monetary approach of the mid-1990s, increased the inter-bank interest rate, and devaluated the 
currency. Pastrana also requested a bailout from the IMF, which asked for a reduction in fiscal 
 
143 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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transfers from the central government to the subnational units (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 
2008). Many indebted firms closed across economic sectors. Unemployment jumped to 20 percent 
and wages were severely deteriorated. In December 2000, the government launched a conditional 
cash transfer program, Familias en Acción, at first of limited reach and small benefits ($17 per 
month), largely financed by the World Bank and the IDB. The crucial point to our story is that the 
government did not resort to increasing tariff rates or imposing quantitative restrictions during the 
crisis (Villar and Esguerra 2007). Figure 5.5 shows that the use of anti-dumping investigations 
accelerated in 1998 and 1999, especially in the steel and chemicals sectors, but it was short of the 
cases of crisis-battered Argentina and Brazil around the same time. The Andean CET remained in 
effect, while agricultural imports were subject to higher tariff rates (World Trade Organization 
2006).144 
Figure 5.5: Anti-Dumping Decisions in Colombia (1994-2018) 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on data from Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, Statistical 
Yearbooks, various years. Higher values of anti-dumping remedies applied (in blue) represent more protection. 
 
144 Congress created a special charge for customs service that would effectively increase the cost to import, but it was 
struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 (World Trade Organization 2006). 
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5.4 The PTA Strategy under Uribe and Santos 
Serious change in trade policy came when the government of Álvaro Uribe embraced a 
strategy of pursuing new generation preferential trade agreements (PTAs), especially with extra-
regional and industrialized partners. The PTAs were devised by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Industry, and Tourism (MINCIT) as a tool to lock in the tariff cuts of the apertura a decade before 
as well as to diversify markets abroad. With the appointment of Jorge Botero, Uribe’s electoral 
campaign manager, as head of the MINCIT, it was clear that the PTAs would have preeminence 
in the government’s program. The idea of establishing a PTA with the United States (the USFTA), 
however, included other considerations, such as ensuring US economic and military aid to support 
the fight against the drug cartels and the left-wing guerrillas FARC and ELN. In addition, the Uribe 
administration wanted to partially privatize the state-own Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos 
(Ecopetrol) and to provide incentives for more foreign investment as well as security protection in 
the energy sector (Dunning and Wirpsa 2004).145 The trade strategy gained momentum once it 
became apparent that US government would not automatically extend the ATPA (Silva 2007; 
Torres 2020). In April 2003, President Uribe announced his willingness to sign a PTA with the 
US. The George W. Bush administration accepted the idea but insisted on negotiating with all 
other countries affected by ATPA because it thought it would be easier to impose American 
objectives (Torres 2020). 
 
145 The policy deepened under President Santos when duty-free concessions were made to the energy sector in March 
2011. 
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Negotiations for the USFTA were hard both at home and abroad. On the one hand, the 
agreement entered the public agenda and there was substantial mobilization around it, an important 
difference with the PTAs subscribed in the past. The main business associations, such as ANDI, 
supported the proposal to begin talks, as they wanted to expand Colombian exports to the United 
States, secure access to US-made intermediate inputs and consumption goods, and guarantee the 
foreign aid after the failed peace negotiations with the guerrilla under Pastrana (Eslava 2020; 
Holguín 2020). By contrast, the Sociedad de Agricultores and the national pharmaceutical 
companies expressed their opposition (López Montaño 2007). Furthermore, student movements, 
leftist politicians, social and human rights activists, and indigenous representatives formed an 
alliance to oppose the trade deal (Urrego 2020). Mobilization against the deal was not directed at 
trade concessions per se but at the close ties with the United States in the context of increased 
militarization of homeland security policy (López Montaño 2007; Rettberg et al. 2014).  
The MINCIT was not alone, though, as “the President himself led the pro-USFTA domestic 
campaign, which included public audiences with local non-government organizations as well as 
ordinary citizens” across the country (Urrego 2020).146 Uribe’s average popularity levels were very 
high, around 60 percent (Carlin et al. 2018). The Attorney General issued a legal opinion that trade 
negotiators could not be sued in complaints about “ceding sovereignty” during the international 
talks. Further, the deputy ministers of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture joined the international 
negotiation team, and congressmen as well as the executive directors of the ANDI and the 
Sociedad de Agricultores were invited to attend pre-official meetings abroad (Torres 2020; Urrego 
2020). The government also courted domestic interest groups by tying the approval of the USFTA 
 
146 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 25, 2020. 
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to the launch of a “Competitiveness Agenda,” consisting of pro-investment regulations in public 
infrastructure (Eslava 2020). The ruling coalition also created a compensation mechanism via 
social protection: the Future Rural Income Act (Ingreso Agro Seguro), which established cash 
transfers to rural producers to be administered by the Sociedad de Agricultores (Silva 2007). The 
rural income transfer soon became engulfed by a corruption scandal in which payments meant for 
small farmers went instead to large landowners (The Economist 2011b), although it continued to 
be delivered. The geographical coverage and the monetary benefits of the Familias en Acción 
program were also strengthened.147  
On the other hand, it was not easy to negotiate together with other Andean countries vis-à-
vis the highly experienced US Trade Representative team. The main issue, of course, was “the 
highly asymmetric economic relationship between Colombia and the United States” (Eslava 
2020).148 As a former negotiator recalls, it was “hard to directly oppose American demands in face 
to face talks, especially when they took place in large and empty ballrooms of grey, dark federal 
buildings in Washington, DC” (Torres 2020).149 Moreover, divergences among the South 
American governments soon ensued. Peru wanted a faster deal and was eager to concede more, 
while Bolivia and Ecuador were absorbed in domestic political turbulence that made them leave 
the negotiating table (Silva 2007). Eventually, negotiations became bilateral and the US extracted 
 
147 The government also launched transfer programs to the elderly population: Programa Subsidio de Apoyo de 
Pensión and Programa de Protección Social al Adulto Mayor. 
148 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 24, 2020. 
149 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. This source also recalls how the American delegation 
organized two field trips to Puerto Rico and Tucson (places that had nothing to do with the bilateral and regional trade 
being discussed) to ease relations with the South American delegations. 
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an important concession: any PTA that Colombia signed in the future could not give more benefits 
to other countries unless Colombia also granted those benefits to the United States. Finally, the 
labor and environmental standards and the intellectual property chapters were closer to what the 
Democratic opposition in the US Congress demanded than to what the Bush and Uribe 
governments wanted. 
Despite all the effort that the Uribe administration put to get the deal, the USFTA would 
not come into force for at least six more years. The USFTA was signed by Uribe and Bush in 
November 2006. In February 2007, Uribe formally requested urgent treatment of the treaty. The 
Committees on Foreign Affairs of both chambers discussed it in 19 meetings, with the participation 
of many of those interest groups and activists that opposed the deal (De la Cadena Ortíz 2008). 
The Colombian Congress ratified the USFTA in June 2007: the House of Representatives voted in 
favor 85-10 (71 congressmen did not vote) and the Senate voted 55-3 (43 senators did not vote). 
Despite the quick ratification in Colombia, the US Congress was not willing to ratify it after the 
Democratic Party won the midterm elections, citing human rights and environmental concerns. In 
the meantime, the constitutional revision of the USFTA was approved by the Constitutional Court 
in 2008. After winning the presidency, Barack Obama could not get his party to move ahead with 
the ratification. It was a humiliating defeat for Uribe and the MINCIT, but they could not confront 
the Americans given the compromise for military aid.  
The first containers with Colombian goods to access the US market under the preferential 
agreement would have to wait until May 2012, after eight months of new bilateral trade talks and 
the approval of a new bill by both Congresses. By that time, bilateral trade flows were weaker, 
with 32 percent of Colombian exports destined to the US and 26 percent of imports coming from 
the US. Rural producers continued to lobby the state for special protection once the USFTA 
 245 
entered into force. The Minister of Agriculture understood that giving special treatment to farmers 
through the Future Rural Income was crucial so that when “the cold shower of the FTA hits them, 
it doesn’t turn into pneumonia” (The Economist 2011b). 
Colombia tried to leave the USFTA fiasco behind by making free trade deals with other 
countries. All PTAs signed by Colombia are listed in Table 5.2. Top government officials 
recognize that the 2008 global financial crisis was “an opportunity to minimize the economic 
dependency from the United States and diversify trading partners” (Holguín 2020).150 In 
November 2008, within days apart, the MINCIT reached agreements with Canada and the 
European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). Both deals 
faced few hurdles in Congress. After his election in 2010, President Juan Manual Santos, former 
Vice-President under Uribe, Minister of Foreign Trade under Gaviria, and Minister of Finance 
under Pastrana, continued and accelerated the free trade agenda of his predecessor. Colombia 
signed and ratified agreements with Venezuela (after the reestablishment of relations broken 
between Uribe and Hugo Chávez), Costa Rica, the Republic of Korea, Mercosur, and the European 
Union.151 The latter, granting immediate duty-free access to 60 percent of goods between 
Colombia and the 27 European partners at the time, was a strategic move vis-à-vis the United 
States, signed just weeks after the USFTA came into force. The ratification process was longer 
than that of the USFTA, but ultimately fewer legislators were absent and more voted in favor (79 
to 18 in the House of Representatives and 75 to 15 in the Senate).  
 
150 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 26, 2020. 
151 Korea represented 1.3 percent of Colombian total merchandise exports and 1.9 percent of its imports while the 
European Union constituted the 14 percent of exports and 16 of imports. 
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Table 5.2: Preferential Trade Agreements Signed by Colombia 
Preferential Trade Agreement Date of Signature President Entry Into Force 
Colombia - Panama 7/9/1993 Gaviria 1/18/1995 
Colombia - Chile ACE 24 12/6/1993 Gaviria 1/1/1994 
Colombia - Mexico - Venezuela ACE 33 6/13/1994 Gaviria 1/1/1995 
Colombia - CARICOM 7/24/1994 Gaviria 1/1/1995 
Andean Community – Sucre Protocol 6/25/1997 Samper 6/25/1997 
Colombia - Cuba ACE 49 9/15/2000 Pastrana 7/1/2001 
Colombia - MERCOSUR ACE 59 10/18/2004 Uribe 4/1/2005 
Colombia - United States 11/22/2006 Uribe 5/15/2012 
Colombia - Chile ACE 24 additional 11/27/2006 Uribe 5/8/2009 
Colombia - El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 8/9/2007 Uribe 11/12/2009 
Colombia - Canada 11/21/2008 Uribe 8/15/2011 
Colombia - European Free Trade Association 11/25/2008 Uribe 7/1/2011 
Colombia - Venezuela 11/28/2011 Santos 10/12/2012 
Alianza del Pacífico 6/6/2012 Santos 7/20/2015 
Colombia - European Union 6/26/2012 Santos 3/1/2013 
Colombia - Korea 2/21/2013 Santos 7/15/2016 
Colombia - Costa Rica 5/22/2013 Santos 8/1/2016 
Colombia - Israel 6/10/2013 Santos Not yet 
Colombia - Panama 9/20/2013 Santos Not yet 
Colombia - MERCOSUR ACE 72 7/21/2017 Santos 12/20/2017 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Organization of American States (2020). 
 
President Santos embraced the idea of constituting the Pacific Alliance as an “association 
of like-minded, free trading countries that would integrate their economies” beyond merchandise 
trade, as the Deputy Minister of Trade told me (Sarasti Montoya 2020).152 By 2011, Colombia and 
the other Andean Community nations had consistently lowered import tariff rates. Non-
agricultural products had a MFN tariff rate of 4.9 percent while the rate for agricultural products 
was 11.5 percent. The average level of applied tariffs was just 6 percent, down from 12 in 2006, 
and very few products are taxed at rates higher than 20 percent (World Trade Organization 2012). 
 
152 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 25, 2020. 
 247 
In that context, the Colombian chief negotiator claims that the Pacific Alliance was a “political 
initiative” that looked proactively to Asia and the Pacific basin, past the traditional approach 
toward Latin American regional integration especially “after the collapse of trade with crisis-torn 
Venezuela” and “the special relationship with the United States” (Torres 2020).153 Signed in 
February 2014, the Pacific Alliance was ratified in November 2015, giving immediate access to 
preferential tariff rates around 0.4 percent to 95 percent of goods within the block.154 The Alliance 
is not an international organization; it has no secretariat, bureaucracy, or office, and the country 
that holds the rotative presidency leads the agenda in a given year. The driving force is the 
diplomatic corps, who see it as a foreign policy tool. Diplomatic officials, instead of MINCIT 
officials, made the major decisions, such as the requirement that new members sign a PTA with 
the Alliance as one entity (Torres 2020). 
Despite the emphasis on free trade agreements, selective protection continues for some 
economic sectors. Most of the measures protect agricultural producers. In 2010, the Santos 
administration established import tariff quotas for maize, rice, soybeans, cotton, and dairy 
products. In 2011, it adopted export quotas of live bovine animals and levy surcharges for mild 
coffee, emeralds, and coal. The Andean SAFP remained in place for more than 150 agricultural 
tariff lines, including tariff rates higher than 100 percent. The average MFN tariff for agricultural 
products rose from 14.5% in 2011 to 15.4% in 2017, with an MFN tariff rate for dairy of 55 percent 
that goes up to 68 percent under the SAFP (World Trade Organization 2018). Manufacturing has 
 
153 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
154 Some voices warn that trade will not increase more within the block because Chile was already very open to all, 
Mexico is focused on North American integration, and Peru is a direct competitor of Colombian exports (Eslava 2020; 
Torres 2020). 
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not been protected as often, although a few restrictive measures have been taken. On the one hand, 
some restrictions were aimed “at keeping consumer inflation down,” such as the exceptions to the 
CET import rates for clothing and footwear, publicly defended as customs measures against under-
invoicing (Sarasti Montoya 2020).155  
On the other hand, the MINCIT has used anti-dumping measures, but not other commercial 
policies, to tackle the increased inflow of cheap manufacturing goods from China since 2010. 
Contrary to other Latin American countries that have welcomed closer economic ties with China, 
Colombian political elites have been relatively wary. A prominent figure of the ruling conservative 
alliance believes that “China has an essentially different political and economic development 
model that is alien to Colombian capitalist and pro-American model” (Holguín 2020).156 Chinese 
imports have put downward pressure against employment in the manufacturing sector, “but have 
not affected the national unemployment rate due to a relatively high mobility to the services sector” 
(Eslava 2020).157 Unemployment, however, have seen an increase in the past years since the 
massive inflow of Venezuelan immigrants. Some migrants, many of whom are low skilled, “find 
temporary harvest jobs in the countryside but many others pour into the largest cities” (Vélez 
2020).158 
Further, non-automatic, pre-import licenses continue to be in effect for up to 180 tariff 
lines, including used cars, used tires, and chemicals (World Trade Organization 2018). Finally, the 
most visible change against the open borders policies of the past has been the public refusal of 
 
155 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 25, 2020. 
156 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
157 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 24, 2020. 
158 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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Ivan Duque to sign new PTAs in the run up to the 2018 presidential elections (Eslava 2020; Sarasti 
Montoya 2020). Once sworn in as president, Duque withdrew the letter of intent to join the Trans 
Pacific Partnership and Congress passed a bill which modified the ratification procedure and the 
judicial review of PTAs (Torres 2020). According to legislators from Duque’s coalition, the 
president is “ideologically in favor of free trade,” but they think that “public infrastructure 
development and the shrinkage of the trade deficit should be the priority in the short term” (Vélez 
2020).159 
5.5 Explaining the Stability of Trade Policy 
Why is trade policy in Colombia so stable? Why do not governments change policy to 
respond to shifts in public opinion? This section explores how the economic structure and the 
political system make policy makers more or less willing to respond, and then how the institutional 
setup and functioning of the policy-making process shapes trade policy choice and outputs. 
5.5.1 Salience 
Trade has remained a low-profile issue even though employment in tradable sectors is 
moderate. Figure 5.6 presents the estimated distribution of the labor force across 14 economic 
sectors calculated by the International Labor Organization, regrouped by the author in five 
categories. Two clear trends emerge. First, over forty percent of the workforce is employed in 
 
159 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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sectors that engage in trade, counting both manufacturing and agriculture and mining. Second, 
there is a secular decrease in jobs in the agriculture and mining category since the late 1990s, albeit 
the two sectors retain more around twenty percent at the end of the series. There are several 
possible explanations for such a decrease (rural to urban migration; job destruction in the economic 
crisis of 1998-2000; the layoff of workers with the privatization of Ecopetrol in the early 2000s; 
the classification of greater value-added stages of internationalized production in food and flowers 
as services instead of primary activities). But employment in the manufacturing sector has 
remained stubbornly stable at 15 percent over time. This is a major development in the context of 
the rise of China as a major source of competition since the early 2000s. The only systematic 
analysis of the effects of the China shock in Colombia using time series firm-level data finds that 
more imports from China have decreases domestic productivity growth and the growth rate of the 
number of exported products while producing no significant changes in the level of employment 
or conditions (e.g. informality) of the Colombian manufacturing sector (Molina 2020). 
Figure 5.6: Share of Employment Across Economic Sectors in Colombia 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on data from International Labor Organization. 
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The news media avoid discussing trade in their major headlines. Information about cross-
border flows or proposed commercial policies is “only newsworthy in the specialized business 
pages; ordinary folks just get a hint of trade in shallow stories about exotic tropical products being 
sold in faraway markets” (Urrego 2020).160 For a narrow window during the 2006 negotiations of 
the USFTA, the MINCIT top officials were portrayed in the national news media (Torres 2020).161 
Overall, however, mainstream political parties and their “aligned opinion leaders in the press have 
minimized opportunities for trade to become an issue on the public agenda” (Urrego 2020).162 As 
a presidential candidate from the current ruling coalition told me, “I do what I think is best for the 
country, not whether voters like or not” (Holguín 2020).163 Even the Green Party whip in Congress 
recognizes that center-left politicians “embrace globalization by default” and that they do not 
campaign on trade integration, even though they may later oppose certain contents of trade policies 
(Sanguino 2020). 
5.5.2 The Political System 
The political system does not generate incentives for policy makers to care about the 
national median voter. From independence to the late twentieth century, the Colombian political 
system has been characterized by a close connection between local economic elites and national 
political elites, a bipartisan system with high intraparty competition, the constant exclusion of other 
 
160 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 26, 2020. 
161 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
162 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 26, 2020. 
163 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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political groups, and a large technocratic bureaucracy. The policy outputs have been profuse 
special favors to economic elites with macroeconomic stability (Eslava and Meléndez 2009; 
Eslava 2020). The political result has been civil violence but democratic stability. For more than a 
century, the system was dominated by local elites from the Liberal and Conservative parties 
(Bushnell 1993). Elections have been frequent since the days of the federal republic in the 1850s, 
albeit with limited suffrage until well into the current unitary state. The expansion of the franchise 
to all males occurred in 1936. While Colombia has seen no populist movement, it surely developed 
a clientelist political system, with a few large firms receiving many rents from the state, and a 
violent dispute over their control (Robinson 2007). For years, the members of the political and the 
economic elites “all spoke to and knew each other” (Thorp 1991, 198). Violence between the 
Liberals and Conservatives was common until the bipartisan power-sharing deal of the Frente 
Nacional to evict military ruler Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1958. That arrangement, originally 
planned to last 12 years, included a two-party government coalition, with quotas for filling in 
cabinet and bureaucratic positions, and the nomination of presidential candidates by consent from 
the two parties (Bushnell 1993).164 Presidents had strong decree powers, exclusive introduction of 
some legislation, quasi-judicial review attributions, and the ability to rule under state of siege 
(Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008, 206).  
Violence and public unrest led to the fall of the bipartisan arrangement and the adoption of 
a new Constitution in the early 1990s. Political violence has been common in Colombia and the 
state has struggled to establish effective control over significant parts of the jungle and mountains. 
 
164 During the formal stage of the Frente until the mid-1970s, strict parity between the Liberals and the Conservatives 
also included Congress, the courts, subnational governorships, and municipalities. 
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In the context of revolutionary insurgencies across Latin America, in Colombia the accumulation 
of economic grievances and the lack of opportunities for political outsiders beyond the bipartisan 
arrangement led to the formation in the 1960s of the Marxist guerrilla Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia. Another insurgent group that emerged was the Movement April 
19th in reference to the alleged fraud by the Frente Nacional that impeded Rojas Pinilla from 
winning the 1970 presidential election.165 The National Front ended officially in 1974. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, drug cartels organized and established coca fields and cocaine factories, 
exploiting the weakness of the territorial reach of the Colombian state (Thorp 1991; Robinson 
2007). Local landowners funded paramilitary militias to provide private security, increasing 
overall violence (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2013). For many decades, aims at addressing 
the civil strife reached stalemate between Congress, which catered to rural interests, and the 
Executive Branch, which was trying to accommodate the increasingly urban median voter (Nielson 
and Shugart 1999).166 Three presidential candidates were slain during the 1989 campaign. In that 
context of carnage, the student movement of the Séptima Papeleta effectively shaped national 
public opinion and pressured the government to call for a Constitutional reform.  
5.5.2.1 Presidents and Legislators 
Since 1971, the President has enjoyed exclusive authority to make most trade policy 
changes. Tariff rates, for instance, can be modified by executive decree (Villar and Esguerra 2007). 
 
165 Other left-wing armed insurgent groups included the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Ejército 
Popular de Liberación (ELN). 
166 Colombian rules gave Congress the sole authority to make constitutional revisions and legislators have 
conspicuously blocked previous reform efforts. 
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Sanctioned in July 1991, the new Constitution reduced presidential proactive and integrative 
powers, restricting the use of executive decrees, and withdrawing the unilateral appointment 
powers of the cabinet and state agencies (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008). It also lowered 
the requirements for legislative override of presidential vetoes. However, Congress and other state 
actors have become increasingly relevant in the trade policy-making process (Cárdenas, Junguito, 
and Pachón 2008; Eslava and Meléndez 2009). Legislators must ratify any international treaty, 
including PTAs. In Colombia, legislators have not been very responsive to the average urban voter 
(Nielson and Shugart 1999; Edwards 2001). The 1991 Constitutional reform did not eliminate the 
candidate-centered electoral system to select representatives. For decades, there was no vote 
pooling across party lists and no limit on the number of lists per party. Despite the historic control 
by just two parties and the fact that the Senate is elected in a single national district, existing rules 
undermined attempts to build strong party organizations focused on national issues (Archer and 
Shugart 1997; Crisp and Ingall 2002; Pachón and Shugart 2010). Colombian parties lacked the 
internal coherence and discipline in the national legislature to effectively make policy. The 
situation did not change with 1991 reform. The Constituent Assembly established nonconcurrent 
elections for Congress and the Presidency while it did not constrain the ability of elected politicians 
to vote on bills as they see fit instead of following party lines. The electoral formula was the Hare 
largest reminders, generating incentives for parties to fragment into factions. The authors of the 
reform also reduced the number of members to each of the congressional houses and established a 
minimum of two congressmen for each subnational district. To end the partisan duopoly, the state 
started funding candidates who run for national office, instead of parties (Botero 2007).167 
 
167 The reform also encouraged the participation of demobilized guerrilla combatants into legal politics.  
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The result was the extreme proliferation of parties in a new multiparty system, with an 
effective number of legislative parties higher than seven and high volatility between elections 
(Botero 2007; Pachón and Hoskin 2011; Posada-Carbó 2011). Post-election coalitions and greater 
participation of legislators in the election of the president have become common after 1991 
(Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008, 208). In 2002, Álvaro Uribe, a candidate with no real 
partisan organization, won the presidential elections and members of Congress belong to at least 
70 different movements among parties and factions (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008, 211). 
In 2003, an electoral reform was passed to reduce inter-party fragmentation and strengthen partisan 
representation with the Congress. The D’Hondt formula was adopted, together with the restriction 
of one party list per district and minimum thresholds of the national vote. However, district 
magnitudes remained the same and party lists could be either open or closed. The institutional 
change decreased the number of parties running in large magnitude districts but increased the level 
of intraparty competition in such territories (Pachón and Shugart 2010). Despite being less 
personalized after 2003, Colombia remains with one of the highest scores in the region in the 
personal vote index envisioned by Carey and Shugart (1995). 
For the past thirty years, the Colombian Congress has repeatedly intervened in the 
ratification of PTAs. As confirmed by both representatives (Sanguino 2020; Vélez 2020) and 
executive trade officials (Torres 2020), the intervention of the legislature does not only take place 
ex post of the signing of the international treaty, but during the negotiations as well. Even though 
negotiations are secret, “groups of select Congressmen and Senators are briefed by the executive 
officials before and after high-level talks with foreign counterparts” (Holguín 2020).168 The 
 
168 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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President and the Minister of Trade, Industry, and Tourism “have informal talks with 
representatives to gauge the likelihood that the PTA would be ratified” (Urrego 2020).169 
Legislators are frequently “approached by leaders of the gremios, the business associations, during 
the negotiating stage” (Torres 2020).170  
Once the treaty is signed by the executives of the two or more trading partners, the process 
of formal ratification begins with discussions at the committee level. Each chamber of Congress 
has only seven Committees as mandated by the Constitution and representatives can only 
participate in one (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 2008, 211). The Comisión Segunda of each 
chamber examines all foreign policy bills, from defense strategy to PTA ratification. The 
committee “is not one of the most appealing” by individual legislators (Vélez 2020), likely because 
of the lack of opportunities for making appropriation amendments (Holguín 2020).171 However, 
“tradition dictates that the President of the Chamber should come from this committee, so high-
profile politicians become members there,” as evidenced by mi interviews with members, among 
others, the opposition whip (Sanguino 2020)172 and a presidential candidate of the incumbent 
coalition (Holguín 2020).173 As one of the interviewed representatives said, PTAs are not discussed 
as mere commercial tools but as part of the international strategic alliances (Holguín 2020). In 
addition, the committee allows to “conduct political control of the executive, and top executive 
 
169 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 26, 2020. 
170 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
171 Personal Interviews, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
172 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 24, 2020. 
173 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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officials are recurrently invited to answer legislators’ questions” about ongoing negotiations as 
well as the implementation of existing deals (Sanguino 2020).174  
Crucially, neither committees or the plenary can make amendments when ratifying PTAs, 
just yes or no votes for the entire bill. This prohibition, together with the increasing tendency for 
legislators to caucus and vote along the government and opposition divide, helps to understand the 
weak role played by district specific economic interests in explaining individual legislators’ vote 
on the most salient of all treaties, the USFTA (De la Cadena Ortíz 2008). In the first episode of 
ratification in 2007 (a second, smoother vote took place in 2012), legislators who may have 
opposed the USFTA because their constituents opposed it, or were more likely to be harmed by 
the liberalization, have decided to be absent rather than take a critical negative vote on the floor. 
By contrast, in November 2005, legislators from wheat-producing districts were able to vote on 
the exclusion of wheat from the Acuerdo de Complementación Económica agreement with the 
Mercosur (opposed by the Uribe administration) while voting in favor of the bill in general (De la 
Cadena Ortíz 2008). 
5.5.3 Technocratic Fragmentation 
The policy-making process is highly fragmented even beyond the separation of powers 
between the President, Congress, and the Constitutional Court. The latter was assigned in 1991 
with the responsibility to conduct ex ante review of statutes, treaties, important bills, and 
presidential emergency decrees before they are implemented (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 
 
174 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 24, 2020. 
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2008, 213). The original Supreme Court retained the judicial functions. Members of the 
Constitutional Court are appointed by Congress based on recommendations by the President and 
the State Council. To change the status quo, the President must align its policy preferences with 
those of the Constitutional Court. During the apertura in the 1990s, top bureaucratic officials in 
the Ministries of Finance and of Trade made adjustments in their internal procedures as well as in 
the content of international economic treaties, from investment treaties to PTAs, to accommodate 
the new state organ and its broad powers (Torres 2020). Each PTA signed by the President and 
ratified by Congress has been also examined by the Constitutional Court, “delaying on average 
one year their entry into force” (Sarasti Montoya 2020).175 
Colombia has a large, strong technocracy composed of institutional veto players within the 
Executive Branch. No major policy decision is made “without the participation of all such players” 
(Torres 2020).176 Every new presidential administration rules under an official programmatic 
document, the National Development Plan, which results from the participation of many of these 
veto players. The Plan is developed by the Administrative Department of National Planning 
(DNP), a quasi-cabinet-level agency established in 1958 as part of the National Front agreements 
by recommendation of the Curry Mission from the World Bank (Cárdenas, Junguito, and Pachón 
2008; Dargent 2011). That technical mission envisioned the DNP as responsible for planning for 
long-term economic development while the Banco de la República would guarantee financial 
stability and the Ministry of Finance would guarantee fiscal stability. The DNP is expected to 
develop and monitor policy goals within the National Development Plan, but it does not have 
 
175 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 25, 2020. 
176 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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legislative initiative or direct responsibilities over budget expenditures as cabinet ministries do 
(Rivera Pérez 2020). In recent decades, the DNP has worked divided into a territorial branch, that 
deals with subnational officials and intergovernmental transfers, and a sectors branch, which 
mirrors the President’s cabinet and intervenes in national public policy formulation and evaluation. 
On international trade, the DNP intervenes in at least three ways: by identifying trade-
related goals to be included in the National Plan; by conducting the technical revision of any trade 
bill that the MINCIT wants to send to Congress; and more consequently, by participating with 
voting power in two key inter-agency committees that make trade policy decisions (Rivera Pérez 
2020).177 The “Triple A” (for its Spanish acronym) Committee on Customs Affairs, Tariffs, and 
Trade makes general and sectoral policy recommendations on tariff and customs barriers. The 
other committee is the Under Directorate for Commercial Practices within the MINCIT, which 
receives firms’ demands on anti-dumping and decides and carries out technical investigations. To 
conduct these tasks, the DNP counts with an entire Under Directorate of Business Productivity and 
Internationalization with 12 full time professional employees, mostly economists and lawyers 
(Rivera Pérez 2020).178 Moreover, prior to the apertura of the 1990s, the DNP was responsible for 
administering foreign direct investment (Torres 2020).179 
In addition to the DNP, there is a National Planning Council, a corporativist state body 
with representatives from business, labor, subnational governments, student movements, native 
peoples, among other groups, which discusses the draft of the National Development Plan (Eslava 
 
177 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 25, 2020. 
178 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 25, 2020. 
179 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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and Meléndez 2009). The Plan is then formally approved by the National Economic and Social 
Policy Council (CONPES), an advisory body within the Presidency of the Republic, where cabinet 
ministers, the CEO of the Coffee Federation, and the president of the Central Bank participate and 
vote (Eslava and Meléndez 2009).180 The last actor, known as the Banco de la República, is the 
monetary, exchange, and credit authority and was granted formal independence from other state 
actors as well as the private sector in the 1991 Constitutional reform. Previously, the directorate 
of the Monetary Board was comprised of representatives of different industry gremios (Cárdenas, 
Junguito, and Pachón 2008). Furthermore, in the past the Central Bank administered the large 
subsidized credit system for exporters (Edwards and Steiner 2008). 
There are other extra-cabinet institutions with formal responsibilities to participate in the 
trade policy-making process, such as the Foreign Trade Supreme Council and the Foreign Affairs 
Advisory Council. The former is an inter-agency coordination forum where the President and 
ministers from all cabinet departments with responsibility over trade policy convene to make long-
term policy changes. It “barely meets,” but when it does and agrees on policy choices, “they must 
be implemented by the Ministries” (Rivera Pérez 2020).181 The latter, by contrast, is an institutional 
space outside of the Executive Branch that meets to provide non-binding advice to the President. 
It is integrated by all former Presidents and Ministers of Foreign Affairs as well as current 
representatives from each chamber of Congress, which makes it “an incredibly high level political 
forum” (Holguín 2020).182 The advisory council has not met in the last couple of years, although 
 
180 The secretariat of the CONPES is exercised by the Deputy Director of the DNP. 
181 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 25, 2020. 
182 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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members of the incumbent coalition claim to “have informal access to the President and the 
cabinet” (Vélez 2020).183 
At the cabinet level, Colombia has had a Ministry of Trade since the early 1990s. The 
Foreign Trade Framework Act of 1991 created the Ministry of Trade, which took the attributions 
of the Instituto de Comercio Exterior, which was formerly in charge of trade remedies (e.g. anti-
dumping measures), as well as jurisdiction on foreign investment and financial services from the 
DNP and the Banco de la República (Edwards 2001). The bill also established the Bank of Foreign 
Trade (Bancoldex) and the Proexport promotion agency (Edwards and Steiner 2008). Still, under 
President Gaviria, the major trade policy changes were decided and implemented by the Ministry 
of Finance and the Central Bank (Torres 2020). Starting with the Samper administration, the 
Ministry of Trade increasingly gained power. Several técnicos such as lawyers and economists 
from the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank were transferred to the new agency. Those 
bureaucrats joined the league of professional civil servants that constitute the cream of Colombia’s 
technocratic democracy (Dargent 2011). Top negotiators were trained by trade officials from Chile 
(Torres 2020; Urrego 2020). However, the leadership of the ministry in the early era was occupied 
by career politicians from the party opposite to the President’s, in a reminiscence of the old 
bipartisan arrangement of the Frente Nacional. In later years, however, trade ministers and their 
deputies have been copartisans or close acquaintances of the President. 
Soon after his inauguration, President Uribe merged the Ministry of Trade with the long-
standing Ministry of Economic Development (not to be confused with the DNP). Trade policy 
within the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism (MINCIT) is administered by the Deputy 
 
183 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
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Ministry of Foreign Trade. As one former Deputy Minister explained to me, trade policy is decided 
and administered by four major units, called Directorates: Economic Integration (on Latin America 
and the Andean Community), International Trade Relations (with extra-regional partners, such as 
the United States and the European Union), Foreign Investment and Trade on Services, and 
Foreign Trade, which includes the Under Directorates for Commercial Practices (e.g. anti-
dumping remedies) and of Operations (e.g. exporters register, importers register), and the Imports 
Committee, which deals with import licenses (Sarasti Montoya 2020).  
Top officials across the Directorates are mostly recruited from leading universities and 
other technical state agencies through informal meritocratic rules (Dargent 2011). Despite the large 
overall budget of the Ministry and the relative high level of qualifications of MINCIT bureaucrats, 
former top MINCIT officials complain that “they do not have strong capacity to collect and analyze 
domestic and international economic and business data to inform most of their policy choices” 
(Sarasti Montoya 2020).184 International trade negotiators respond directly to the Minister of 
MINCIT, which generates intra-agency frictions between the Chief Negotiator and the Deputy 
Minister of Trade (Torres 2020). Moreover, MINCIT negotiators have to coordinate their work 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although diplomatic officials are not formal members of the 
international trade negotiations as with other countries in the region. Lastly, the MINCIT has a 
Deputy Ministry of Industry, which deals with regulations of and subsidies to the manufacturing 
sector. 
Since 2002, the MINCIT leads the trade policy-making process, although with important 
intervention of all the other institutional veto players, such as the DNP. As has been mentioned 
 
184 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 25, 2020. 
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above, the Ministry of Agriculture has an important role in receiving and filtering rural producers’ 
demands and providing compensatory subsidies in the context of trade liberalization. In addition, 
the highly pro-free trade Ministry of Finance and three anti-free trade technical executive agencies 
implement trade policy and fill in many of the gaps about content: the National Customs 
Directorate, the Agricultural Quality Institute, and the Food and Drug Surveillance Agency (Eslava 
2020; Sarasti Montoya 2020; Urrego 2020). Since the ratification of the USFTA, the Ministries of 
Transportation, Labor, and Environment have gained a seat in the decision table on trade matters. 
Former and current officials agree that inter-agency coordination, and even intra-agency 
coordination within the MINCIT, is “suboptimal” (Sarasti Montoya 2020) and is plagued with 
“deadlock” (Rivera Pérez 2020). The gridlock is “less a consequence of ideological differences 
but of the administrative jealousy of bureaucrats with opposite mandates and constituencies” 
(Urrego 2020).185 
5.5.3.1 Institutions and Special Interest Politics 
How does the competent but fragmented Colombian state filter and respond to social 
demands? There is an important debate among scholars as to whether technocrats, especially those 
that we can find in places like Colombia, are agents of private business, politicians, foreign actors, 
or autonomous actors with their own preferences and sway (Centeno 1993; Dargent 2011; Kaplan 
2017; Schneider 2004). Several technocrats have been trained and pursued careers at pro-free trade 
international financial institutions in Washington, DC, especially the World Bank and the IDB. 
However, there are also public officials, especially at the deputy minister or minister levels, that 
 
185 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 26, 2020. 
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come from the private sector. Regardless of their origin, the academic consensus is that in 
Colombia, economic policy making, including foreign commerce, has traditionally included close 
consultations with the business sector. This is confirmed by former top policy makers interviewed 
for this study, some of whom have continued their careers as leaders in business associations 
(Sarasti Montoya 2020; Torres 2020; Urrego 2020).  
This comes as no surprise because Colombia is known to be a case of well organized 
business participation in Latin America (Schneider 2004). Powerful business associations, 
organized at the sector, regional, and peak levels, have represented the private sector vis a vis the 
state. The Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia, for example, was perhaps the strongest 
business association in South America for many decades, having a large, professionalized staff 
and organizing many welfare and training activities. The Federation represented the interests of 
coffee growers while working as a multinational corporation in world coffee trade and a quasi-
public provider of services across the countryside (Juárez 1993; Schneider 2004). As we have 
discussed above, business associations from the ANDI to the Sociedad de Agricultores have taken 
positions in public for or against trade policy changes depending on how they would be materially 
affected by changes in the tariff structure, the licensing regime, the subsidized credit mechanism, 
and other policy tools. In fact, business leaders organized the Consejo Gremial Nacional as a 
national peak association to operate as the sole business representative discussing details of the 
reform with the state during the Gaviria administration (Schneider 2004). Moreover, the business 
sector has traditionally been led by domestic firms, not international business. Participation of 
foreign-based multinational corporations in economic activity has been low in Colombia (Thorp 
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1991), except for the oil sector, where a few foreign private players concentrate extraction, 
refinery, and export.186 
 The important trait is that business associations lobby not only legislators (Eslava 2020) 
but also executive ministers (Sarasti Montoya 2020) and even justices who sit in the Constitutional 
Court (Urrego 2020). Lobby is not a registered legal activity as in the United States. However, 
business associations provide financial contributions during electoral campaigns. More 
importantly, they exert pressure by constantly monitoring and sharing information about 
government plans to change the status quo (Juárez 1993). At the smallest hint that the rules of the 
game are being considered to be changed, such as when public officials had small chats at cocktail 
parties with diplomatic representatives from China, the associations call ministers and even the 
president himself to pressure against any change (Sarasti Montoya 2020).187 If the state agency 
continues with plans to pursue a trade policy change the associations have not requested, the latter 
“resort to the friendly press, which is concentrated under few private hands, to carry out a negative 
campaign against siting officials” (Urrego 2020).188 
Still, the political clout of business associations has weakened since the restructuring of the 
economy since the apertura in the early 1990s and the financial crisis of 1998-2000. Instead of 
business clubs, individual firms regularly engage in the policy-making process. This is especially 
the case with import-competing and exporting firms, a third of which have reported to petition the 
authorities as surveyed by the monthly studies of FEDESARROLLO, the country’s largest private 
 
186 However, the energy sector still has important participation by the partially privatized Ecopetrol. 
187 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 25, 2020. 
188 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 26, 2020. 
 266 
think tank (Eslava and Meléndez 2009). More importantly, Colombia’s integration into the world 
economy has brought more firm concentration in a new style of hierarchical capitalism that, despite 
reinforcing dysfunctional development outcomes such as a dual labor market, has strengthened the 
political clout of the private sector (Schneider 2013). A few, large family-run business groups 
gained strength within the private sector and increased access to government (Eslava and Meléndez 
2009). The groups are constituted by many dozens of incorporated firms, sometimes even more 
than a hundred, across a diversified portfolio in different economic sectors, usually including both 
agriculture, manufacturing, and finance (Schneider 2013). Four family run groups, the Santo 
Domingo, the Ardila Lulle, the Sarmiento and the Sindicato Antioqueño, together own assets 
equivalent to a sixth of the country’s GDP and almost the entire stock value of domestic own firms 
in the national stock exchange (Rettberg 2005). The grupos have “product-level trade policy 
demands” as they engage in intra-industry and intra-firm trade with subsidiaries in Latin America 
(Urrego 2020).189 As the interviewed officials recognize, “it is in the interest of these grupos to 
have a professional, informed staff with expertise and connections with the multiple civil servants 
and politicians that intervene in the policy-making process” (Sarasti Montoya 2020).190 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has shown that there is some correlation between the fairly stable level of 
public support for free trade and the free trade character of new international treaties and the low 
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average level of import tariff protection. But the analysis has shown that there is considerable slack 
and shirking by policy makers. Important sectors of agriculture and industry remain heavily 
protected by tariff and non-tariff barriers. Governments and lawmakers have not been punished 
for these deviations. The review of the available evidence and the interviews with former and 
current policy makers points to the little willingness and the general inability of government 
officials and legislators to follow aggregate opinion. 
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6.0 Peru: Political Chaos, Elite Consensus, and Low Responsiveness 
This chapter studies the relationship between public opinion and trade policy in Peru, a 
case of low responsiveness. Peru radically liberalized trade policy at the beginning of the 1990s in 
the midst of a severe economic crisis, very much like in Argentina. Unlike what we saw in 
Colombia, Peruvian governments made a sharp reversal in the way of integrating their country into 
the world economy. There was a public demand for liberalization in 1990, but popular support for 
free trade evaporated soon after and was feeble through the rest of the decade. Instead of adjusting 
commercial rules in line with public opinion as their counterparts in Argentina, Peruvian policy 
makers consolidated and locked in the liberalization.  
Peru today has one of the least restrictive trade policy regimes in Latin America. 
Governments of different ideological orientations have created a dense web of encompassing free 
trade international agreements that grant unrestricted access to the Peruvian market for all major 
trading partners within and outside the region. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the major trade 
policy changes that are discussed in this chapter. 
From 2003 onwards, Peruvians have been more welcoming of free trade, and the general 
level of support has oscillated between 50 and 60 percent of surveyed respondents. However, the 
analysis of the opinion data reveals that public support is more fragile than apparent at first sight, 
with less than 40 percent of support for PTAs in some years, and that there are significant 
differences in opinion between groups of citizens based on income, with the two richest quintiles 
expressing high support and the other three quintiles revealing much lower levels of support. 
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Table 6.1: Major Trade Policy Changes in Peru by Sub-Period 
Sub-Period President Trade Policy Changes 
1990-1991 Fujimori 
Unilateral reduction of tariff rates. 
Unilateral reduction of quantity-control NTBs. 
1992-1995 Fujimori* 
Accession to WTO. 
No new PTAs. 
1996-1999 Fujimori* 
Accession to Andean Community. 
Unilateral reduction of tariff rates. 
2002-2006 Toledo US Free Trade Agreement. 
2003-2007 García 
Unilateral reduction of tariff rates. 
New intra-regional PTAs. 
New extra-regional PTAs. 
2008-2010 Humala 
New intra-regional PTAs. 
New extra-regional PTAs. 
Increase of price-control NTBs. 
2016-2018 PPK 
New intra-regional PTAs. 
New extra-regional PTAs. 
Note: Sub-periods are author’s choice and do not necessarily match presidential tenures. Text in blue represents 
changes in trade policy towards more free trade. Text in red represents changes in trade policy towards less free trade. 
* denotes non-democratic regime. Selection and sources for this table are discussed throughout this chapter. 
 
Figures 6.1 through 6.3 provide a glimpse of how trade policy outputs behaved in relation 
to aggregate sentiment on trade. In contrast to what happened in the 1990s, changes in non-
discriminatory import tariff rates seem to have followed voters’ revealed attitudes in the 2000s 
(Figure 6.2). But we find the opposite situation in regard to PTAs (the most visible trade policy 
instrument) and NTBs (the least visible instrument). On the one hand, the prolific signing of 
international treaties that increase trade exposure seem to be off pace with the level of support for 
free trade: there are more PTAs than one would predict based on public opinion. On the other 
hand, the use of non-tariff barriers has increased significantly since the 2008 global financial crisis 
and has not gone back to the levels registered in the previous decade, despite generally favorable 
citizen views on trade in recent years. 
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Figure 6.1: Public Opinion and Preferential Trade Agreements in Peru 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of public support for free trade (see Chapter Two) and the number 
of new preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed by Peru, based on data from the Organization of American States. 
The height of the vertical grey lines indicates the cumulative number of new PTAs signed in a given year. Empty 
spaces indicate that no new PTA was signed that year. More PTAs represent more free trade. 
 
Figure 6.2: Public Opinion and Import Tariff Rates in Peru 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of public support for free trade (see Chapter Two) and the Peruvian 
average ad valorem Most Favored Nation import tariff rate with data from the World Bank. Higher tariff rates 
represent less free trade. 
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Figure 6.3: Public Opinion and Non Tariff Barriers in Peru 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on the index of latent public support for free trade (developed in Chapter Two) 
and the number of price-, quantity-, and quality-control non-tariff import barriers (NTBs) established by the Peruvian 
government in a given year, with data from the World Trade Organization. More NTBs represent less free trade. 
 
What is going on in Peru? One part of the answer is that the economic structure of the 
country produces low salience for trade. The exporting sector employs few workers, mostly 
unskilled, and does so in places far away from the urban centers. A few large foreign corporations 
control the extraction and exporting of minerals, Peru’s more profitable commodities for centuries. 
There has been little public discussion about the foreign ownership and destination of metals, 
although the past two decades have seen the rise of localized social protests around the mines for 
environmental and cultural grievances. 
The second major part of the answer is that Peru has a chaotic political system. The citizen-
representative connection is broken. President Alberto Fujimori decided to pursue whatever policy 
he and his allies saw fit after the 1992 self-coup d’état and the dissolution of Congress, 
consolidating a unique authoritarian and neoliberal mix. Democratic representation was curtailed 
by both the rise of technocrats and business interests in government during the 1990s. Fujimori 
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recruited neoliberal technocrats to stabilize and deregulate the economy in the early 1990s, but 
they were relegated later in the decade, when the leaders of the business associations representing 
firms that had won from liberalization came to fill in the main positions. Despite poor export 
performance, damaging trade deficits, and a recession, trade was not a major issue in the public 
agenda of the 1990s because society was consumed around the polarizing figure of Fujimori and 
the corruption scandal that toppled his regime. As President Toledo’s former Secretary of Industry 
told me, “Peru integrated into the world economy under Fujimori. He adopted hard measures, but 
it looks like he was a necessary leader. You love him or you hate him” (Matthews 2019).191 
After the fall of Fujimori, politicians promised to clean the state and be more responsive to 
voters. But politicians increasingly lost connection with voters in a new dysfunctional competitive 
regime without real parties and mesmerized by electoral volatility. Corruption scandals multiplied 
and eroded all trust in government. In the meantime, a small group of technocratic officials 
concentrated all commercial policy decisions in close alliance with the largest exporting firms and 
business associations. 
This chapter continues as follows. First, I give a general historical background of trade in 
Peru. Second, I analyze the major trade changes that occurred under Fujimori in the 1990s. Third, 
I offer evidence that public support for free trade was feeble in that period. Fourth, I review the 
major liberalization of the 2000s under four administrations that kept the same orientation. Fifth, 
I provide survey evidence of the still low public support for free trade in the second period. Finally, 
I discuss each of the institutional and structural factors that jeopardize trade policy responsiveness. 
 
191 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
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6.1 Background 
Since the Spanish conquest, Peru has had a difficult time to manage its integration into the 
world economy. For centuries, the economy has been organized in two radically different sectors, 
with one small but highly profitable segment that extracts and exports minerals in enclaves in the 
mountains while the rest of the economic activity is in non-tradable subsistence agriculture and 
low-skilled services (Contreras 2018; Thorp and Bertram 2013). For some authors, there is a third 
category: the illegal economy, which includes narcotics and contraband and is considered to 
generate more income than the legal exporting sectors (Durand 2007). The dual organization of 
the Peruvian economy emerged during the colonial era, when the demographic crisis among the 
native population produced by European conquest led to a withered internal market, encouraging 
the orientation of the colonial economic system toward mining of precious metals to export to the 
Iberian metropolis (Contreras and Cueto 2018; Contreras 2018). Chronic low state capacity, 
epitomized with the first population census in seven decades taking place only in 1940 and the 
complete absence of the national public administration in the countryside, had negative 
consequences to remediate economic and ethnic inequality (Contreras and Cueto 2018, 324). The 
exporting sector has been the major source of government revenue since the independence wars 
and until the 1960s, the political elites reinforced the dependence in that small dynamic sector with 
economic policies such as an undervalued exchange rate and low corporate taxes. 
In modern history, Peru has suffered from very volatile economic policies, 
mismanagement, and corruption, regardless of political regime type. The armed forces intervened 
in Peruvian politics and directly exercised government first in the First World War and then in the 
1930s. In the 1950s, General Manuel Odría sought to expand the state intervention in the economy 
and attacked the landed elite in line with other military commanders turned into populist leaders 
 274 
in the region, like Juan Perón in Argentina. The sixties saw two brief democratic governments, 
albeit in the context of rapid social changes from the migration to the cities and the demise of the 
economy based on fishmeal exports (Cotler 1978). In the 1970s, the country experienced swings 
from the heterodox nationalism, including an extensive land reform, of General Juan Velasco 
Alvarado (1968-1975) to the orthodox adjustment of General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-
1980), another military despot. In the 1980s, the swings were from the austerity and liberalization 
by democratically elected President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985) to the leftist 
nationalism of his democratic successor, Alan García (1985-1990). By that time, business owners 
and representatives largely distrusted a state they saw as inefficient, ill-prepared, and lacking 
appropriate channels of communication and participation for private interests to have a say in 
policy making (Thorp 1991, 197). 
The instability and failure of economic policy was evident with the import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI). Peru undertook ISI at a relatively late date, in the mid-1960s, as an 
accessory to the top-down agrarian reform envisioned by Velasco (Samford 2010). Landowners 
were offered cash instead of state bonds if they were to invest in manufacturing industries 
(Contreras and Cueto 2018, 370).192 The military regime also directed subsidized credit to build 
and operate automobile, appliances, and small electrical machines factories. A new Chrysler 
factory made the cheap utilitarian trucks that inundated the Sierras. Imported goods, which had 
been unimportant due to the lack of consumer demand, were severely restricted by high tariff rates 
and quotas to protect the nascent industries around Lima. The ISI policy under Velasco had a heavy 
 
192 More than ten million hectares (across 16,300 farms) were expropriated and given to the rural, mostly indigenous 
labor force (Contreras and Cueto 2018, 371). 
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anti-export bias. The government nationalized the mines and farms and controlled the export 
market with the trading corporations MINPECO S.A. (mining) and EPCHAP (fishmeal and 
cotton). The system was managed with inefficiency and produced currency overvaluation, 
exaggerated capital intensity, and little employment generation (Samford 2010, 195).  
Soon after the transition to democratic rule in 1980, center-right President Belaúnde 
launched the first trade liberalization reform, announcing a sharp reduction of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. Interviewed for this study, Richard Webb, the former president of the Central Bank under 
Belaúnde, recalled that the trade reform was part of a series of market actions to curtail inflation 
and seize the hard currency windfall from the 1979 oil shock as new oil deposits were discovered 
in the country (Webb 2019).193 However, the manufacturing sector mobilized against the 
Belaúnde’s effort (Samford 2010). The government, assailed by the Mexican sovereign debt crisis 
and the fall in revenue due to a climate shock, conceded to the industrialists and returned tariff 
rates to their previous levels (Webb 2019). 
 
 
193 Personal Interview, Lima, September 10, 2019. 
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Figure 6.4: Imports and Exports in Peru (1960-2018) 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on data from World Bank’s Development Indicators. 
 
Belaunde’s successor, Alan García from the leftist Aprista Party, took a hard stance against 
foreign creditors, both private and multilateral, and approached the financial clouds announcing 
the nationalization of all banks, leading to massive capital flight. García’s heterodox program 
included price controls, devaluation, demand stimulation, and more than half a dozen exchange 
rate regimes (Stokes 1996). In addition to administering more than fifty different import tariff 
rates, the government banned the import of more than 500 goods, which accounted for a quarter 
of all domestic industrial production (Webb, Camminati, and Thorne 2005). Imports of 
consumption goods briefly soared, fueled by a stronger domestic demand, but exports stagnated. 
Foreign reserves dwindled, the fiscal deficit worsened, inflation soared, and wages suffered their 
largest fall in history (Contreras and Cueto 2018). The Maoist guerrilla movement Shining Path 
that had emerged in the mountains during the Belaúnde era begun executing terror attacks in cities, 
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leading to a spiral of violence.194 The decade ended in chaos and the inability of the state to provide 
the most basic social services (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 267). Peruvians were frustrated, fearful, and 
fatalistic. 
6.2 Radical Liberalization under Fujimori 
In 1990, Peruvians were “willing to accept anything to take the country out of the abyss,” 
as one of the policy makers perceived at the time (Illescas 2019).195 Legislative and presidential 
elections took place during an hyperinflation crisis with annualized four digit figures of consumer 
price increases. In June, Alberto Fujimori, the little-known dean of the National Agrarian 
University, won the run-off presidential election against world-renowned author Mario Vargas 
Llosa. The latter run on a libertarian platform with backing from the conservative parties and the 
urban elites; one of his campaign’s TV ads depicted a state bureaucrat as a monkey urinating on a 
desk (Stokes 1997, 212). Fujimori, by contrast, cultivated the image of a common man and a 
political outsider untainted by the political establishment (K. M. Roberts 1995, 95). He traveled 
the Andean highlands with a poncho on a tractor and ate in public marketplaces in urban 
shantytowns. Fujimori campaigned on the need of a “gradual” but not a “shock” type of economic 
 
194 Formally named the Partido Comunista del Perú por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariátegui, the guerrilla group was 
initiated and led by philosophy professor Abimael Guzmán in the Southern region of Ayacucho. A Truth Commission 
in 2003 found that the guerrilla attacks and the government’s anti-subversion response using the armed forces led to 
70,000 deaths (Contreras and Cueto 2018, 397) 
195 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 9, 2019. 
 278 
adjustment to curb hyperinflation. By the time of the election, a poll by research firm Apoyo S.A. 
showed that 67 percent of low-income respondents in metropolitan Lima preferred a gradual 
approach, while 74 percent of the wealthiest respondents said they wanted a shock. Half of low-
class voters surveyed who did not vote for the Vargas Llosa told pollsters after the election that 
they did not support him because he “represented the interests of the rich” (Stokes 1996, 549). 
Soon after the election, Fujimori developed a remarkable policy shift, embracing swift pro-
market reforms from opening international commerce to liberalizing public utility prices to the 
privatization of state own-enterprises to deregulating private labor contracts (Stokes 1996; 1997). 
Vargas Llosa had lost the election, “but his platform won” (Contreras 2019).196 As the former 
president of the Central Bank put it, Fujimori “had no clear policy ideas, so he was not difficult to 
influence” (Webb 2019).197 The winning candidate had been advised by Adolfo Figueroa, an anti-
austerity economist from the Catholic University of Peru. However, electoral victory led to 
approaches by neoliberal economists Hernando de Soto and Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller, who 
organized a road trip to New York and Tokyo to meet with private bankers, multilateral creditors, 
and top government officials (Stokes 1997, 217). In addition, economists at the Central Bank had 
been “making predictions on Lotus spreadsheets about the reach of a shock liberalizing all 
previously regulated consumer prices,” as one of those technocrats remembers (Illescas 2019).198 
Joining a troupe of politicians campaigning on what Stokes (2001) calls “security-oriented” 
platforms that promised a blend of gradual correction and popular appeals to the masses across 
 
196 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
197 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
198 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 9, 2019. 
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Latin America (e.g., Carlos Menem in Argentina, Carlos Salinas in Mexico, Fernando Collor de 
Melo in Brazil), Fujimori openly embraced economic liberalization in discourse and action. 
Trade policy liberalization was unilateral, fast, and furious. It was part of Finance Minister 
Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller’s plan to lift regulated prices rapidly and indiscriminately (Samford 
2010). On August 8, 1990, in what became known as the “Fuji-shock,” the state eliminated the 
“administered” prices of gas, fresh produce, and other items of household consumption, and 
unified the preexisting multiple exchange rates into a managed floating regime after a sharp 
devaluation. During the next two months, the mean import tariff rate fell from 72 percent to 23.6 
percent. Import tariff categories of dutiable goods dropped from 56 to just three, capped at 15, 25, 
and 50 percent rates, respectively (Webb, Camminati, and Thorne 2005). Import quotas and the 
banned imports list were eliminated as well, and export subsidies and cash transfers from the 
Central Bank to inward-looking textile and agricultural firms were eradicated (Webb, Camminati, 
and Thorne 2005; World Trade Organization 2007b). In early 1991, as Hurtado was replaced by 
another liberal economist, Carlos Boloña, the highest tariff rate was eliminated, a schedule to reach 
a uniform import tariff rate of 15 percent was published, and prior import licenses and the import 
registry were ended. Later that year, Fujimori issued decrees enshrining the “freedom of 
commerce” and the “elimination of monopolistic practices and any restriction on free competition” 
(Webb, Camminati, and Thorne 2005). In addition, the Fujimori administration adopted other 
neoliberal reforms to open the economy. It restructured the outstanding sovereign debt with the 
IMF and foreign private lenders in return for accepting a fiscal austerity plan, launched a 
Committee on Private Investment Promotion to privatize state-owned companies, offered “tax 
stability contracts” to private firms to trade off greenfield investments for no new taxes, and passed 
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legislation on equal treatment for foreign direct investment (Contreras 2018; Contreras and Cueto 
2018).  
The radical liberalization significantly and rapidly affected the business landscape and the 
labor market, but it was not followed by mass protests. In a matter of days after the initial Fuji-
shock, domestic firms that had survived for decades due to tariff protection “had to restructure or 
close” (Illescas 2019).199 Several small and medium enterprises in clothing, textiles, and supplies 
for appliances and machines closed shop. But according to the executive of one of the associations 
of big business, unrestricted capital and labor mobility made industrial reconversion less painful 
due to investment in technology and the low barriers to hiring of low-skilled women in services, 
respectively (Teullet 2019).200 As one of the public officials involved in the previous, failed effort 
reveals, “in light of the earlier opposition to Belaúnde, it is surprising that the industrialists did not 
mobilize to oppose the liberalization of 1990. Fujimori’s free room to reform was unusual in 
Peruvian history” (Webb 2019).201  
However, while there was support among some business associations for the reform and 
the streets were mostly quiet soon after the launch of the reform, small and medium manufacturers 
in the textile and appliances industries that became insolvent by the falling barriers protested and 
found support among the opposition that controlled Congress (Samford 2010). Fujimori’s Cambio 
90 political organization was an electoral vehicle more than a real party. The legislature was 
controlled by opposition forces from García’s Aprista Party and Vargas Llosa’s FREDEMO. On 
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200 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 9, 2019. 
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April 5, 1992, citing resistance among legislators to the economic reforms and his discretionary 
use of executive orders to change laws, Fujimori decided to break the constitutional order and 
carried out an autogolpe that included the dissolution of Congress, the courts, and the subnational 
governments. Pressured by the United States and the European Community, Fujimori called for a 
constitutional reform to be ratified by a citizen referendum.  
The democratic breakdown did not affect the trade liberalization. To the contrary, political 
centralization and Fujimori’s top-down ruling style impeded any reversion of the commercial 
reforms (Illescas 2019; Matthews 2019). The President continued governing by decree even 
though his supporters gained several seats in Congress (Samford 2010). During the Uruguay 
Multilateral Round, the Peruvian government committed to an import tariff ceiling of 30 percent 
and a further reduction of the average tariff rate to 16 percent. The Fujimori administration also 
launched two major institutional changes affecting trade: the creation of the National Customs 
Superintendency (SUNAT) and of the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and 
Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI) as autonomous state agencies tasked with 
administering tariff and non-tariff barriers, respectively (Webb, Camminati, and Thorne 2005). 
The second entity followed a quasi-judicial model to make decisions on temporary trade remedies 
with new legislation (by presidential decree, not legislative bills) compliant with the GATT. 
Furthermore, the Peruvian government decided to withdrew from the Andean Community Free 
Trade Area for “not being open enough,” as the common external tariff system had higher rates 
than those unilaterally set by Peru (Torres 2020).202  
 
202 Personal Interview, Bogotá, Colombia, February 27, 2020. 
 282 
In 1993, the Ministry of Finance under Jorge Camet “developed a roadmap on trade policy” 
that included the accession to the World Trade Organization and the goal of locking in the reforms 
with preferential international agreements (Illescas 2019).203 Led by technocrats trained at the 
Central Bank, the authorities started trade negotiations with the United States, first with the goal 
of joining NAFTA and then with idea of entering the FTAAs (Illescas 2019). However, that goal 
would not be reached for more than a decade. Until 1997, there were no major changes to the 
commercial policy instruments, except for the approval of a free export zones regime. That year, 
Fujimori agreed with his counterparts at the Andean Community to re-join the free trade area and 
adopt the common trade policy. The average import tariff rate fell to 13 percent with a standard 
deviation of just 3 percent, although a temporary surcharge duty of 5 percent was set for meat, 
grains, and dairy products (Webb, Camminati, and Thorne 2005; World Trade Organization 
2007b). By 1999, Peru had signed a trade agreement with Chile, its historically regional adversary, 
and joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. 
 
6.2.1 Feeble Support for Liberalization 
Peruvian citizens exhibited early buyer’s remorse regarding the liberalization. Data on 
public opinion on trade policy is not available before 1994, but there is reliable information on 
urban citizens’ agreement with the total neoliberal reform package in the previous years. The local 
market research firm Apoyo Opinión & Mercado conducted monthly polls on the reform package 
among residents of Lima since September 1990. Approval of the Fuji-shock was moderately high 
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at 59 percent, but approval soon fell below 40 percent for the rest of the first year of the Fujimori 
administration (Stokes 1996, 552). The highest peak in support for the neoliberal plan was just 
after the April 1992 autogolpe, when around 65 percent of respondents expressed their agreement 
with the market reforms. However, that approving mood soon evaporated, and opinion would not 
be favorable for the neoliberal program at least until the campaign for reelection in mid-1995 
(Stokes 1996, 553). Public opinion may have mattered little in the new period of autocratic rule, a 
time during which the President used tanks to threaten opposition legislators and created sui 
generis institutions to reform the constitution. 
Polls based on national representative samples report weak aggregate support for free trade. 
In August 1994, Apoyo Opinión & Mercado conducted a poll sponsored by the US Information 
Agency and found that just 37 percent of respondents supported the idea of lowering restrictions 
to imported goods (USIA 1994). In May 1996, after the reelection of Fujimori, the World Value 
Surveys project showed that support for free trade was very low, at just 20 percent (WVS 1996). 
Around the same time, the Latinobarometer found a similar pattern for aggregate opinion on the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas: only 28 percent of respondents approved of the deal that the 
Fujimori government had begun to negotiate, almost the same figure as the number of respondents 
that chose “do not know” (Latinobarometer 1996). By late 1997, average support for the removal 
of trade barriers in general had climbed to 60 percent, although 18 percent did not express an 
opinion for or against it (Latinobarometer 1997). Two years later, as the country was entering the 
climax of polarization around Fujimori’s attempt for another reelection, the polls showed that only 
51 percent of Peruvians agreed that globalization was good for their country’s development (USIA 
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2000).204 Overall, public sentiment was welcoming of the reforms early on but “then became 
increasingly suspicious, even though there was no widespread popular opposition” (Vidarte 
2019).205  
Aggregate sentiment on free trade was weak because the trade performance was 
unimpressive and there was no compensation to the losers of the new economic system. The early 
supportive attitude to the stabilization and liberalization program of 1990 fits with what scholars 
have said about this case (Stokes 1996; 1997; Weyland 1998). The grim mood generated by 
hyperinflation, electricity cuts, and violent terrorist attacks had prepared Peruvians to embrace a 
radical departure from the status quo (Contreras and Cueto 2018). The economic crisis was 
perceived by many people as the failure of the closed economy (Contreras 2019).206 This view is 
ratified in my interviews with former policy makers of that time (Casas 2019; Illescas 2019; Webb 
2019). Public support for reform was high during the early stabilization stage, which was 
successful in bringing down inflation and coincided with the repression of the armed insurgency. 
The optimism was contagious for a time, like the “taxi driver who drives happily across town 
 
204 Two related economic policy reforms were received differently by Peruvian voters. The liberalization of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), which flew mostly to the financial, mining, and retail sectors, was supported massively (Casas 
2019). However, the privatization of state-own enterprises in the energy and public utilities sectors generated 
opposition, a much larger disagreement than with trade liberalization (Casas 2019; Teullet 2019). Protests erupted in 
the Southern region of the country against the rise in utility fees for water and sanitation, electricity, and gas. 
Eventually, the negative mood reached residents in Lima, who also turned their backs against the proposal of 
privatizing the big state-run oil company, PetroPerú (Casas 2019) (Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 
2019). 
205 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
206 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
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listening to the radio about the fall of the Shining Path’s leader while the suspension compressor 
cracks, the passenger seats shattered” (Contreras 2019).207  
However, public opinion turned its back against reform as the trade liberalization did not 
generate immediate gains in wages and job opportunities. The performance of the exporting sector 
was poor until 1994 even though the economy was growing strongly. In the first three and a half 
years after the unilateral changes to the tariff regime, exports stagnated (Illescas and Jaramillo 
2011). Only when international prices of oil and minerals rose around 1995 did export performance 
improve. The increase in prices was stronger than that of exported volumes (Illescas and Jaramillo 
2011). Also, the success of the price stabilization and the new rules friendly to investment 
generated new opportunities for export growth in non-traditional goods such as textiles and fruits 
(Contreras 2018). And yet the decade of the 1990 is one of sustained deficits in the trade account 
because import flows increased exponentially, as can be seen in Figure 6.1. Imports grew, first, 
because a stable and growing domestic market required consumption of goods insufficiently 
produced locally. A sign of the new times was the opening of the first shopping malls in Lima, 
whose stores were filled with imported goods previously unavailable. As one of the leading 
economic historians puts it: “The malls had an important psychological effect. It was like entering 
a palace for the first time; even if you had no money to buy the goods, you felt like you were in 
and belonged to a better place” (Contreras 2019).208 Interestingly, however, the increased access 
to cheaper and more varied consumer goods did not translate in an overall high level of approval 
of free trade as reflected in the poll data. Second, imports of intermediate and capital goods grew 
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to supply the means to the new FDI in the energy and mining sectors and the reconversion of the 
business activity toward services, construction, and retail (Illescas and Jaramillo 2011). 
The second major cause of weak support for trade liberalization among ordinary voters in 
the 1990s has to do with the lack of state compensation to the losers of the structural changes. The 
preexisting welfare net in Peru was almost nonexistent, except for the pension program for public 
employees and some liberal professions (Contreras and Cueto 2018; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Public 
health and education systems were in shambles and there were no active or passive labor market 
programs. As the economic shock therapy took place, Peruvian citizens “were left with no cushion 
to weather the sudden loss of subsidies for food and gas or invest in skill acquisition” to a transition 
to other occupations or sectors (Trivelli 2019).209 Most workers in the informal economy, which 
by some accounts were 50 percent of the economically active population, have never received 
welfare benefits (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 267). Further, the Fujimori reform package included the 
deregulation of labor contracts and the establishment of a private pension system copied from the 
US and Chilean voluntarily pension market regimes (Mesa-Lago 1997). 
Pressured by the IDB and the World Bank, Fujimori launched the Social Development 
Cooperation Fund, a small scale, means-based social assistance program to provide basic social 
infrastructure projects in poor neighborhoods, with money from those same multilateral 
organizations (Trivelli 2019). After a weak electoral performance among low income voters in the 
1993 constitutional referendum, Fujimori expanded social expenditures and targeted them to low 
income electoral districts (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 269). Crucial to Fujimori’s new “war on poverty” 
was the unexpected $2 billion windfall from a privatization settlement with Spanish investors over 
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the telecommunications service; the sale price was equivalent to more than half of annual export 
earnings (K. M. Roberts 1995, 104). Fujimori’s coordinator for social policy agreed in an interview 
that public spending for low income families increased with school breakfast, community kitchens, 
and rural road improvement programs (Teullet 2019).  
However, there were no changes in the direction of more social protection or investment 
in education and training (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). As the former Minister of Social Development 
to President Humala told me, “the people negatively affected by the trade opening had already 
perished [fritos] before the actual liberalization due to the hyperinflation, and then they carried on 
perished [fritos] in the new economic system” (Trivelli 2019).210 
6.3 Second Generation Liberalization 
Trade liberalization in Peru continued despite the economic slowdown and the political 
crisis of the late 1990s. As we have seen in previous chapters, the emerging economies of Latin 
America were severely affected by the financial crises of South East Asia and Russia. In a context 
of increased financial volatility and relaxed regulations, global investors took their funds out of 
emerging countries in a domino effect that hit countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia 
(Campello 2015). However, despite the free capital mobility in Peru, the country did not suffer 
such a blunt loss in market confidence. The business cycle and public expectations were more 
affected by the increasing political polarization around the figure of President Fujimori and his 
pursuit of a third consecutive presidential mandate, banned by the constitution (Contreras and 
 
210 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 12, 2019. 
 288 
Cueto 2018, 428). The political tensions erupted with a widely televised corruption scandal that 
harmed Fujimori’s personal reputation. Contrary to previous years, when the economic reforms 
that radically changed the Peruvian society, or Fujimori’s 1992 self-coup, did not trigger massive 
protests, the political scandal caught all the public’s attention and led to loud protests against the 
president. In November 2000, during an official visit across Asia and after an opposition leader 
was appointed chair of the legislative assembly, Fujimori presented his resignation and sought 
political asylum in Japan.  
In the 2001 presidential elections, opposition leader, businessman, and Stanford graduate 
Alejandro Toledo won the presidential elections. He had campaigned on an anti-corruption and 
pro-democracy platform while calling for “building the second floor,” or new generation, of pro-
market economic reforms in Peru (Contreras and Cueto 2018, 432). Regardless of party and self-
reported political ideology, Toledo (2001-2006) and all those who succeeded him in democratic 
elections in the past two decades (Alan García [2006-2011], Ollanta Humala [2011-2016], Pedro 
Pablo Kuczynski [PPK, 2016-2018], and Martín Vizcarra [2018 to date]), maintained the pro-free 
trade and pro-business orientation once in power. 
The approach to trade policy in the early 2000s was to lock in the removal of cross-border 
restrictions on goods and to deepen the liberalization of services and FDI by creating binding 
international commitments. Both the incoming public officials and the technocrats at the 
international financial institutions, especially the IDB, believed that despite the sharp changes in 
the tariff structure in the early 1990s, Peru was still a laggard in international trade flows, with a 
low trade opening coefficient and a high export concentration in a few commodities with little 
value added (Díaz Clarke 2019; Pierola 2019; Posada 2019). The selected instrument was the 
preferential trade agreement (PTA), including measures on tariffs, non-tariff barriers, services, 
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FDI, and standards. President Toledo created a Ministry of Trade and Tourism (MINCETUR) and 
charged it with the mission of advancing the PTA agenda. Table 6.2 presents the list of all PTAs 
signed by Peru since 1990. Notice the rise in new agreements since the accords with the Mercosur 
block in late 2005 and the United States in early 2006.  
 
Table 6.2: Preferential Trade Agreements Signed by Peru since 1990 







Andean Community 6/25/1997 Fujimori 6/25/1997 
Peru - Chile ACE 38 6/22/1998 Fujimori 7/1/1998 
Peru - Cuba ACE 50 10/5/2000 Fujimori 3/9/2001 
Peru - MERCOSUR ACE 58 11/30/2005 Toledo 1/2/2006 
Peru - United States 4/14/2006 Toledo 2/1/2009 
Peru - Chile ACE 38 additional 8/22/2006 García 3/1/2009 
Peru - Canada 5/29/2008 García 8/1/2009 
Peru - Singapore 5/29/2008 García 8/1/2009 
Peru - China 4/28/2009 García 3/1/2010 
Peru - EFTA 7/14/2010 García 7/1/2011 
Peru - South Korea 11/14/2010 García 8/1/2011 
Peru - Thailand 11/18/2010 García 12/31/2011 
Peru - Mexico ACE 67 4/11/2011 García 2/1/2012 
Peru - Panama 5/25/2011 García 5/1/2012 
Peru - Costa Rica 5/26/2011 García 6/1/2013 
Peru - Japan 5/31/2011 García 3/1/2012 
Peru - Guatemala 12/6/2011 Humala Not yet 
Peru - Venezuela 1/7/2012 Humala 8/1/2013 
Alianza del Pacífico 6/6/2012 Humala 5/1/2016 
Peru - European Union 6/26/2012 Humala 3/1/2013 
Peru - Honduras 5/29/2015 Humala 1/1/2017 
Peru - Brazil ACE 58 additional 4/29/2016 Humala Not yet 
Peru - Australia 2/12/2018 Kuczynski 2/11/2020 
Trans-Pacific Partnership 3/8/2018 Kuczynski Not yet 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on (Organization of American States 2020). 
 
In the early 2000s, Peruvian trade policy accompanied the good performance of exports 
under highly favorable external conditions and a stable macroeconomic management. Since 2003, 
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a boom in international commodity prices fueled by Chinese demand, such as gold, silver, copper, 
and zinc, generated spectacular total output growth and high government revenue collected from 
income tax. Between 2000 and 2015, Peru experienced a decade of unprecedented economic 
growth. Income per capita grew at 6 percent annually (World Bank 2015), almost three times faster 
than the world average and six times faster than in the previous forty years (Pierola, Fernandes, 
and Farole 2018). The country achieved substantial labor accumulation, supported by a strong 
demographic dividend and impressive labor-force participation (higher than that in Malaysia, 
Chile, and most OECD countries), while capital accumulation was at the level expected for the 
country’s income per capita (World Bank 2015, 6). Savings by the private and public sectors 
helped finance a sharp increase in investment rates without resorting to higher debt.  
In an interview for this study, Juan Carlos Matthews, the first National Director of Foreign 
Trade, reflects on how they approached the “second generation” trade liberalization. The FTA with 
the United States was “a true political and policy landmark. It was a major market for us because 
the US represented a fifth of our imports and exports and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug 
Eradication Act (ATPDEA) was up for renewal. Peru began trade talks as part of the CAN. When 
we saw that the Colombians were not willing to offer several items, we continued with bilateral 
talks with the Americans. The latter were eager to reach a deal with us for geopolitical reasons, 
because the US had no friends in the region beyond México, Chile, and Colombia. At least that is 
what a US Senator told me after the conclusion of a bargaining round” (Matthews 2019).211 This 
is a similar account of what I found in Colombia, where policy makers also pointed at the expiring 
date of the ATPDEA and the split into bilateral talks midway into the negotiations (see Chapter 
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Five). As another trade official, who relocated from the Central Bank to the MINCETUR, told me: 
“The USFTA was a breakthrough that enabled Peru to pursue the aggressive commercial policy 
goals established by Fujimori in the 1993 Constitution by way of PTAs with the rest of the world” 
(Illescas 2019).212 
As opposed to the top-down approach of trade liberalization under Fujimori, the new 
administration displayed a more consensual approach to the new era of commercial opening with 
greater participation of the private business sector. This is the view that emerges from interviewing 
former and current policy makers and business leaders. From the onset of the Toledo 
administration, the mandate given to the officials at the MINCETUR was clear, “follow the 
Chilean model,” as a former senior trade advisor recalls (Díaz Clarke 2019).213 That model implied 
an important international agenda of PTAs with diversification of North and South trading partners 
as well as an aggressive export promotion strategy designed and executed by the state based on 
creating a national brand (Marca Perú) and marketing flagship export products, such as llama 
wool, pisco, quinoa, and wild berries. Those policies required close state-business collaboration. 
The producers that worked with the government were not the big (mostly foreign owned) mining 
and energy companies that were already very internalized, but the new non-traditional agricultural 
businesses that emerged in the coasts (Pierola, Fernandes, and Farole 2018). With the structural 
changes that took place in the 1990s, the light manufacturing auto-parts and home appliances 
sectors disappeared. Those medium-sized business owners that were able to restructure, did so by 
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setting shop in the previously unfertile lands between Lima and the Northwestern frontier 
(Contreras 2018).  
When trade talks with the United States were making progress, many firms had a strong 
interest in exporting and obtaining preferential access to foreign markets (Teullet 2019).214 In 
2002, the MINCETUR had recruited firms and business associations to develop the National 
Strategic Export Plan, enshrining the trade policy goals of the “Chilean model.” The policy makers 
in charge recalled receiving financial aid and technical cooperation from the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation, the German Corporation for International Cooperation, the United 
States Agency for International Development, and the IDB (Díaz Clarke 2019; Matthews 2019). 
The work lasted almost two years of formal consultation and input from the Peruvian private sector 
(Díaz Clarke 2019). During the negotiations with the United States, the MINCETUR built on that 
prior collaboration and asked to have a single input channel from the domestic business sector 
(Posada 2019).215 The latter reacted positively, creating the Business Council on International 
Negotiations, with participation from the associations of big traditional exporters and the smaller 
and newer non-traditional agricultural firms. That initiative accomplished the goal of offsetting 
protectionist voices.  
Government leaders and lawmakers seem to have narrowly responded to public opinion 
when they decided to approve the treaty with the United States. The international signing of the 
agreement, and thus the beginning of the formal domestic approval, took place after the first round 
of the 2006 presidential elections. Senior officials at the MINCETUR and the President’s Office 
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commissioned opinion polls to research firms before the signing of the USFTA, as confirmed by 
some of those private pollsters (Chaparro 2019).216 That confirms that they cared about public 
opinion, or at least were curious to know more about it. In addition, the MINCETUR conducted 
more than 500 small town halls across the country to present the deal to local civil society 
representatives, which “was an opportunity to gauge their opinion” (Matthews 2019).217 There is 
no public access to those commissioned polls, but other surveys around the time portrayed a 
restrained mood. In 2004, when the deal was not news in the national media, only 45 percent of 
respondents supported a free trade agreement, with almost 40 percent being undecided or having 
no opinion (Latinobarometer 2004). In November 2006, during the ratification process in 
Congress, 54 percent expressed agreement with the idea that such a deal would be good for job 
opportunities (with 26 percent having no opinion) (Latinobarometer 2006). Crucially, however, 
the PTA was “not a big issue in the public agenda that average Peruvians cared about. The noise 
and the backstage bargaining were with the business associations,” as a former MINCETUR 
official who worked on the treaty told me  (Díaz Clarke 2019).218 
Political opposition to the USFTA was not widespread but headed by center-left candidate 
Ollanta Humala, who denounced the removal of protection for farmers and the intellectual property 
clause that would increase the price of prescription drugs (Posada 2019; Vidarte 2019). Although 
neither the lame-duck President Toledo nor the Aprista candidate, former President García 
controlled legislative majorities of their own, there were pro-free trade majorities across parties 
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(Borges 2019).219 Disregarding a majority of Peruvians who preferred the issue to be discussed by 
the new legislature (Chaparro 2019; Vidarte 2019), Congress moved forward with ratification in a 
lame-duck session  (The Economist 2006). The USFTA was approved in a 79-14 vote without 
much debate. Even though Peru failed to push back on the agricultural subsidies to American 
farmers, the treaty did not enter into force due to the opposition of the Democratic Party’s takeover 
of the US Congress. When the Bush administration incorporated the labor and environmental 
clauses required by the Democrats, the Peruvian legislature led by President García’s Aprista 
coalition quickly ratified the modified deal. As discussed below, there was no big change in public 
opinion at the time. In late 2007, the President was given delegated powers to implement by decree 
the necessary measures. That was a much more contentious issue. The congressional vote was 54-
38 in favor of delegation, with 28 abstentions. Eventually, García enacted 60 decrees in excess of 
the number allowed by Congress, generating social unrest in the Amazon due to the deregulation 
of communal indigenous lands (Borges 2019). 
After the trade treaty with the United States “put Peru back on the map” (Posada 2019),220 
the García administration negotiated and signed PTAs with other Northern partners (Canada, the 
European Free Trade Association), China, Global South partners (Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, Japan), and Latin America (Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala). The fastest 
negotiations were with China: the content of the treat was agreed to in six rounds, even though it 
 
219 Alan García had experienced an ideological transformation from left to right when out of power (Vidarte 2019). 
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was the one that generated greater opposition from domestic producers of import-competing 
goods. The Peruvian negotiators were able to exclude up to 500 product-level import tariff lines 
in the clothing and textiles categories from the phase in structure and the Chinese quickly accepted 
(Matthews 2019; Posada 2019). The number of signed PTAs was smaller under President Humala, 
but the depth and number of member countries was much larger because Peru entered into a free 
trade area with the European Union and created the Pacific Alliance with Chile, Colombia, and 
Mexico. Humala was sceptical about these deals as an opposition leader, but after entering into the 
presidential run-off, the anti-Fujimorista parties reached an electoral alliance with him. One of the 
major concessions was to move forward with the negotiations in course and to ratify and 
implement those already concluded (Contreras and Cueto 2018; Contreras 2019; Teullet 2019). 
The MINCETUR did not receive many firms’ demands for tariff protection. Instead, firms 
requested the state to provide “insurance guarantees to borrow abroad, acquire technology, and 
establish tax-free zones” (Matthews 2019).221  
Later in the decade, by the time that President Kuczynski was impeached by Congress 
during a corruption scandal linked to a foreign construction and infrastructure firm, 95 percent of 
Peruvian trade was channeled within preferential agreements. Since 2016, as the commodity boom 
unwind, the PTA agenda has lost steam (expect for the signing of the Comprehensive Trans-Pacific 
Partnership) and the focus has turned to the aging public infrastructure and increasing firm 
productivity with intra-border regulations. Peru continues to export less than would be predicted 
by its income per capita level, import flows as a share of GDP are one of the world’s lowest, and 
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participation in global value chains is highly concentrated in forward links to its commodity 
exports (Pierola, Fernandes, and Farole 2018). 
 
6.3.1 Public Support in the New Era 
The average Peruvian exhibited “cautious optimism” about free trade since the fall of 
Fujimori in 2001. As the commodity boom was taking hold in early 2003, surveyed citizens 
expressed high levels of satisfaction with economic globalization (approval level of 64 percent) 
and optimism about the FTAAs (agreement of 62 percent), although 27 percent of respondents did 
not know whether it would be good or not (CIMA 2003). By 2004, however, the level of popular 
support for free trade would decrease and would never be higher than 56 percent at the most for 
the next decade. In addition, the number of people who disapproved of free trade agreements, the 
removal of import restrictions, or trade globalization in general, was usually around 20 and 35 
percent, depending on polls and years.  
The non-opinions of Peruvians remained significant at the same or higher rate than those 
of explicit opposition to free trade. For example, approval of globalization reached 51 percent of 
surveyed individuals in May 2004 (CIMA 2004), while another poll the same month showed that 
agreement that PTAs were beneficial for the country’s economy was only 45 percent, with 40 
percent of respondents who did not know (Latinobarometer 2004). In late 2006, 54 percent of 
respondents said that PTAs were good for job opportunities in Peru, while 66 percent agreed with 
the statement that PTAs would increase the access for respondents to cheaper foreign goods 
(Latinobarometer 2006). Importantly, the small elite opposition to the USFTA that year was geared 
towards the threats to the environment and the access to drugs for low income people, not job loses 
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(Contreras and Cueto 2018, 432; Vidarte 2019). The following year, support for PTAs obtained 
again 52 percent (Latinobarometer 2007).  
In 2008, after the ratification of the second version of the USFTA and when international 
negotiations with Canada and Singapore were about to conclude, the AmericasBarometer reported 
that aggregate support for PTAs was just 39 percent, with 30 percent of rejection, and 27 percent 
of non-opinions (LAPOP 2008). Two years later, the AmericasBarometer reported almost identical 
figures for support of PTAs: 38 percent of approval, 30 of disapproval (LAPOP 2010). In 2012, 
the percentage of surveyed respondents that supported PTAs climbed a little but still did not pass 
the 50 percent barrier and people who said they did not know was 28 percent (LAPOP 2012). 
Contrary to what we found for Colombia, public opinion on trade in Peru seems to vary 
across income levels. Available disaggregated data from the AmericasBarometer for three separate 
waves (LAPOP 2008; 2010; 2012) allows us to see the views on trade from Peruvians with 
different self-reported household income (grouped at the quintile level). People in the two lowest 
income groups express lower support for free trade than the rest of society. The pattern for the 
lowest two income levels is consistent across waves: 29 and 36 percent in 2008, 28 and 20 percent 
in 2010, and 36 and 47 percent in 2012. Further, only the highest income group had 50 percent or 
more of support for free trade in 2008 and 2010 (in 2012, 50 percent or more individuals in the 
three highest income groups were in agreement with free trade, but the highest of all had even 
higher approval ratings, at 73 percent).  
This is not surprising given the negative labor market effects from increased trade 
competition and the weakness of the Peruvian welfare state in a context of income inequality. On 
the first issue, analysis with panel data of firms and customs transactions shows that the inflow of 
manufactured consumption goods from China since 2003 has reduced sales and demand for new 
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workers in small sized firms while the competition with Chinese products in third markets has 
reduced the rate of employment growth in Peruvian exporting firms (Mercado, Pierola, and 
Sanchez-Navarro 2019). On the second issue, social protection remains poorly provided and 
underfinanced despite efforts by the center-left government of Humala to reach more people and 
institutionalize social programs. There was no cabinet level agency for social policy until 2011. 
Increased government revenue in the past decade has allowed the government to launch a 
conditional cash transfer program, with the Brazilian model of Bolsa Família in the policy makers’ 
minds, although the Peruvian welfare state faces strong challenges associated with the historical 
low state capacity and the lack of a pro-social policy constituency to demand social rights, 
especially among the poor indigenous people in the countryside (Trivelli 2019).222 
Interestingly, this is not the view that some business leaders have of the effects of free 
trade. The CEO of the powerful business association Confederación Nacional de Instituciones 
Empresariales Privadas told me that “the winner of the liberalization was the low-income 
consumer. Previously, poor people had to buy used clothing in yard sales. Now, my daughter and 
her nana [babysitter] wear the same Nike shoes” (Teullet 2019).223 
On the other hand, there seems to be little difference in support for PTAs in terms of self-
reported ideological position, except for those in the extreme left that are openly against PTAs 
(LAPOP 2008; 2010; 2012). Support for free trade does not divide people along partisan lines in 
a highly polarized landscape where the main cleavage is between Fujimoristas and anti-
Fujimoristas (Chaparro 2019; Vidarte 2019). Recall that the opposition to Fujimori in the late 
 
222 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 12, 2019. 
223 Personal interview, Lima, Perú, September 9, 2019. 
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1990s was due to his disregard for democracy and corruption, not due to the pro-market reforms 
he implemented (Contreras 2019; Vidarte 2019). Similarly, in the 2000s, while there was 
opposition to free trade from one electorally viable leftist sector, that of Ollanta Humala, he 
embraced trade liberalization once elected president. There pro-free trade discourse is shared by 
the political elite. 
6.4 Limited Responsiveness under an Autocracy and a Democracy without Parties 
Peru is a society with a historic democratic deficit. The twentieth century witnessed several 
military regimes. After the constitutional reform of 1979, the military handed over power, and 
Belaúnde won the presidential elections the next year. Formal democracy seemed consolidated, 
despite poor economic performance and increasing unrest and political violence in the countryside. 
In that context, it is expected that governments are responsive to voters. As we have discussed 
above, there seemed to be a close relationship between a popular demand for change in the 
economic realm and the swift neoliberal reforms implemented by Fujimori soon after inauguration 
in 1990. However, policy responsiveness became more limited after Fujimori suspended the 
Constitution and dissolved Congress in April 1992 to overcome legislative deadlock to his 
economic reforms (Samford 2010). Those actions represented a breakdown of democracy and is 
classified as such by country and foreign experts (Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán 2013). That year, 
Peru’s score in the Polity index of democracy dropped from 7 to -3 and remained below 1 on the 
-10, +10 scale (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). 
The Fujimori regime dodged vertical (electoral) and horizontal (inter-branch) 
accountability. It did so despite calling for elections to select a constitutional assembly (and then 
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other elections to ratify the new constitution) and to elect a new president in 1995, in which 
Fujimori won the reelection (K. M. Roberts 1995; Cameron 2004; Levitsky and Cameron 2003). 
In fact, the political regime under Fujimori meets the criteria of competitive authoritarianism, a 
hybrid regime in which formal democratic institutions remain the primary means of gaining power, 
but in which incumbent rulers abuse power, skewing the field to compromise the opposition’s 
ability to compete (Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Since 1998, with the move by Fujimori to try a 
second reelection even though it was banned by the Constitution, appeals to voters became 
gradually important again (Morgan 2003). However, that did not make the regime more 
democratic. Human rights abuses continued. For example, thousands of rural women were forcibly 
sterilized in an anti-poor campaign carried out by the national health authorities (Contreras and 
Cueto 2018, 448). Overall, the country consistently got a score of 0.1 (the lowest possible) on the 
Varieties of Democracy index of liberal democracy during that decade, indicating the almost 
complete absence of liberal democracy (Lindberg et al. 2014). 
A democratization transition ensued once Fujimori fled the country into exile due to a 
corruption scandal. The country obtained scores of between 0.6 and 0.7 in the index of liberal 
democracy and a 9 in the Polity index of democracy. In the new period, Peru remained a 
presidential regime where the chief executive is elected directly by the people (with a run-off 
system) and enjoys significant legislative powers. This should have brought greater responsiveness 
to the broad electorate. Moreover, democratic Peru has one factor that according to the theory in 
Chapter Three should facilitate responsiveness: the concentration of the policy-making process. 
However, in the first two decades of the twenty first century, Peruvian governments’ embracing 
of trade liberalization is greater than we would expect from the light aggregate support for free 
trade.  
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Why was responsiveness limited in this period? The answer refers to both the political 
system and the economic structure of Peru. Permissive electoral rules in a society with extremely 
low attachment to parties and political institutions have impeded the evolution of a party system 
after the transition to democracy. Presidents and political appointees in the executive branch, on 
the one hand, and legislators, on the other, have loose connections to voters. In addition, trade 
policy responsiveness is affected by the low salience of trade, despite the huge role that exports 
have played in this country’s history and the drastic experience of the first stage of trade policy 
liberalization under Fujimori. Politicians and the media do not talk about trade. This is explained 
by the unique nature of the exporting sector in Peru, which has until recently been an enclave 
economy with a few, large extractive industries spotted in the mountains employing few workers, 
while the rest of the economy is little integrated not only into the global economy but the formal 
sector, subsisting beyond the reach of tax collectors, labor unions, and public goods provision. 
6.4.1 Concentrated Policy Making 
According to the theory developed in Chapter Three, the concentration of the policy-
making process should enhance trade policy responsiveness because election-motivated policy 
makers can have a firm control over the state apparatus to make policy changes when they see fit 
while there are fewer opportunities for external pressures from special interest groups to take hold 
on the echelons of the public administration. If a firm or a business association offers money to 
bureaucrats in charge of designing PTA clauses, levying tariffs, or granting licenses (or hassles 
those officials in public), concentration of the policy-making process should allow the political 
principal (such as the President or the Minister) to monitor such situation and act accordingly. If 
the President or Minister feel they need to respond to aggregate sentiment, and that sentiment is 
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contrary to what the firm or business association demands, they will instruct the public 
administration with the policy path more palatable in electoral terms. Based on these expectations, 
Peru appears as a case of policy-making concentration. The President has more legal powers, and 
greater political legitimacy, than the legislature. More importantly, few bureaucratic agencies 
intervene to formulate and implement all sorts of trade policies in Peru. This has been the case in 
the authoritarian context of the 1990s as well as in the democratic 2000s. 
The first stage of trade liberalization was led and implemented by the Finance Ministry 
(MEF), with support from the Central Bank, which had inherited the system of subsidies for 
exporters and other firms. The description by an interviewed former official is very revealing: 
“The liberalization was top-down. The political decisions were made by the President and the 
Ministers he appointed to open the economy. There was then total delegation of the trade policy 
goals, tools, and outputs to the técnicos. In the first stage, the business sector did not participate in 
the strategy or the administration of commercial policy” (Pierola 2019).224 At the MEF, the driving 
force of the trade liberalization process was Roberto Abusada, an economist graduated from 
Cornell who had served in the same post under President Belaúnde in the failed attempt to cut 
import tariffs and remove non-tariff barriers (Webb 2019). Concentration of decision making was 
strongest between the inauguration in 1990, its immediate stabilization program (the Fuji-shock), 
and the ascension of Jorge Cammet, the leader of the largest business association, CONFIEP, to 
the MEF in 1993. In that earlier period, the President had enlisted Carlos Boloña and a young 
group of lawyers from the Catholic University and economists from the exclusive, private 
University of the Pacífico, a few of whom had done graduate studies in the United States, to 
 
224 Personal Interview, Washington, DC, August, 2019. 
 303 
“transform Peru into a market economy,” as one of them told me (Casas 2019).225 Those appointees 
and advisors constituted a technocratic group “charged with the establishment of the new rules for 
the new economy” (Casas 2019).226  
The President delegated economic policy decisions to the MEF and the Central Bank, 
whose charter was replaced by Fujimori with the sole mandate of price stability, “while keeping 
the power to veto anything he did not like” (Pierola 2019).227 The two agencies became “efficiency 
islands [islas de eficiencia],” a term shared by several former policy makers interviewed (Casas 
2019; Matthews 2019; Webb 2019). Those “islands” were sustained by the international financial 
organizations in Washington, DC. The IDB had an important role in sending technical missions 
and providing access to foreign public officials and US-based scholars (Casas 2019).228 Their role 
was important to temper the international criticism against the democratic backsliding and human 
rights abuses (Dargent 2019). The technocrats, however, consciously and openly “believed in the 
neoliberal agenda; it was no imposition from the business sector or the multilateral creditors. We 
asked the IMF for some of the harshest measures in the loans’ letters of intent, not the other way 
around” (Illescas 2019).229 There was a shared consensus “bordering dogmatism” among the 
younger levels of the economic policy agencies (Pierola 2019).230 
 
225 Boloña was recommended by economist and libertarian celebrity Hernando de Soto (Illescas 2019). 
226 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
227 Personal Interview, Washington, DC, August, 2019. 
228 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
229 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 9, 2019. 
230 Personal Interview, Washington, DC, August, 2019. 
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The scholarship (Arce 2003; Dargent 2011) and the policy makers interviewed (Illescas 
2019; Pierola 2019; Webb 2019) agree in that the Ministries of Industry and International 
Economic Relations and of Agriculture had no real role in the trade liberalization. Those cabinet 
agencies, which had developed relations with domestic producers in previous years, were 
delegated to a secondary role in the set of economic policy goals. Fujimori appointed a different 
type of people to those posts: loyalists with family and ethnic ties to the President, with no policy 
preferences of their own (Arce 2003). That appointment strategy was part of Fujimori’s new 
variety of populism in which he astutely manipulated symbolic themes and articulated a strong 
anti- establishment discourse that, instead of attacking the economic elite as in the old days, blamed 
the country’s problems to political parties, Congress, and the Judiciary (K. M. Roberts 1995, 97). 
That explains the decision not to go ahead with a much-announced reform of the state bureaucracy 
in the late 1990s. The civil service career remained not professionalized, the number of public 
employees increased more than under Alan García, and the autonomy of the tax agency was 
challenged and used to operate a kickback scheme (Arce 2003, 349). 
After the 1992 coup, the influence of the MEF increased, now without a legislative 
oversight (Dargent 2019), and Fujimori governed without a party, relying on the intelligence 
agencies and patronage as substitutes to build political support (K. M. Roberts 1995; Cameron 
2004; Levitsky and Loxton 2013). The government insulated even more the bureaucrats in charge 
of examining firms’ demands for trade remedies by creating the INDECOPI and appointing a free 
trade believer as its chair as well as young economists that were considering working in the Central 
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Bank or abroad (Pierola 2019).231 But the neoliberal technocrats eventually lost the leadership 
positions. Jorge Cammet, a construction and real estate developer and the president of the powerful 
CONFIEP, was appointed head of the MEF in 1993, once the major economic reforms (including 
trade liberalization) were already in place (Arce 2003, 341). Cammet remained in that post until 
1998, the longest tenure of an economy minister in decades. Business-government relations 
became gradually more cooperative and stable in that period (Arce 2003, 339). “Even as a 
technocrat, one does not work in a vacuum. That does not mean we accommodated every demand 
from the private sector, either,” argues a former trade official (Illescas 2019).232 The new intimacy 
between the MEF and the CONFIEP, whose leadership was recruited throughout the decade from 
the national Exporters, Banks, and Fishing associations, and the institutional changes at the Central 
Bank, disabling the subsidies regime, helped the free trade cause, as the CEO of the peak business 
association told me (Teullet 2019).233 
After the fall of Fujimori, the trade policy-making process remained concentrated, albeit 
with a new technocratic body. President Toledo delegated macroeconomic management to his 
Chair of the Cabinet Council, Princeton-graduate and former Wall Street investment banker Pedro 
Pablo Kuczynski. Toledo prioritized trade policy in his government agenda by creating the 
MINCETUR early in his tenure, with full competence over international commercial policy and 
 
231 Andean Community Affairs were conducted by career civil servants in the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
232 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 9, 2019. 
233 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 9, 2019. 
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export promotion.234 The new cabinet-level agency was the initiative of Vice-President Raúl Díaz 
Canseco, who got his nephew Alfredo Ferrero appointed as its first Minister (Dargent 2019).235 
The Ministry of Industry and International Economic Relations was disbanded, with some 
responsibilities going to the MINCETUR and others to a new Ministry of Economic Production. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost all responsibility over foreign economic relations and the 
economic liaisons in the diplomatic missions abroad were replaced by those appointed by the 
Ministry of Trade.  
The Vice-President personally recruited forty young professionals from the private sector 
who would become the top officials in the MINCETUR (Díaz Clarke 2019). A few technocrats 
from the Central Bank were designated at the new trade agency (Illescas 2019). Only employees 
working in the Directorate for Andean Community Affairs from the shutdown Industry ministry 
were retained by the MINCETUR. The cream of the new trade technocracy had little or no 
experience in public administration (Dargent 2019). That had some initial setbacks when forming 
the international negotiating teams for the USFTA, as the Director of Foreign Trade at 
MINCETUR recognized (Matthews 2019).236 
 
234 The INDECOPI remained a separate, quasi-judicial agency for anti-dumping and safeguards. Moreover, the second 
version of the USFTA that included environmental standards forced President García to create a Ministry of 
Environmental Affairs (Casas 2019). 
235 The Vice-President, who had served as Under Secretary of Tourism under Belaúnde, wanted to create a separate 
Ministry of Tourism, but the President and the Chair of the Cabinet Council thought it was too much (Matthews 2019). 
236 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
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From its inception, the MINCETUR served as the state agency to “uphold trade 
liberalization” (Dargent 2019).237 That did not change over time, regardless of the incumbent 
President. The MINCETUR did not changed tracks under García, Humala, PPK, or Vizcarra. It 
followed the same National Strategic Exports Plan and the same PTA agenda set in the Toledo 
years. As one official said, “the low profile of the MINCETUR in public opinion allowed us to 
work without distractions” (Díaz Clarke 2019).238 No distractions meant no interference from 
politicians and other public agencies. For example, several legislators wanted the Ministry to give 
state subsidies to farmers, but the leaders at MINCETUR opposed and blocked that move 
(Matthews 2019). 
6.4.2 An Unstable Political System 
Peru is one of the most extreme cases of party collapse around the world. The Peruvian 
party system collapsed in the late 1980s under the weight of a hyperinflationary crisis and the 
Shining Path insurgency (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016, 413). Party collapse cleared the election of 
Fujimori, who built his own party months before the 1990 election with no members of the 
traditional parties (Cameron 2004). The four parties that dominated Peruvian politics in the 1980s 
– Aprista, Popular Christian Party, Popular Action, and the United Left – declined from 97 percent 
of the vote in 1985 to just 6 percent in 1995 (Kenney 2003). Following Fujimori’s auto-golpe, the 
1993 Constitution abolished the Senate and established an electoral system in which all 120 
legislators were elected from a single national district. Fujimori’s anti-establishment rhetoric was 
 
237 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
238 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 9, 2019. 
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effective. Ambitious politicians abandoned the old parties and declared themselves “independents” 
(K. M. Roberts 1995). Conditions for party brand development based on programmatic 
differentiation were unfavorable: a consensus around neoliberal economic policies and the 
extermination of the Shining Path took hold of elites (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016). None of 
Fujimori’s main rivals in 1995 and 2000 challenged his economic program. After Fujimori’s fall, 
presidential candidates who criticized neoliberal policies continued them once in office (Vidarte 
2019). In addition, labor unions, never very powerful in Peru, were furthered weakened under 
Fujimori, as he bypassed low-income grassroots organizations and deregulated the labor market. 
Ethnic parties in a country with a majority of indigenous population in the countryside did not 
form, either (Cotler 1978; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016). 
Despite democratization in 2001, party system decay continues to date. Post- Fujimori Peru 
is a “democracy without parties” (Levitsky and Cameron 2003). All parties created after 1990 have 
collapsed, failed to achieve national significance, or remained personalistic movements (Levitsky 
and Zavaleta 2016). Politicians have become partisan free agents who create their own tickets or 
negotiate positions on others’ tickets. Most parties are dissolved after each election. Candidates 
for legislative or local office negotiate positions on other politicians’ slates. These harmful patterns 
have continued despite some electoral reforms to reduce the chaotic system. Now legislators are 
not elected in a single constituency but in 25 electoral districts that match the geographic 
boundaries of the subnational regions, which were devolved political decentralization after the fall 
of Fujimori (Tanaka 2006). The electoral rules now require a minimum threshold of 5 percent of 
the vote for entry into Congress, new parties need a higher number of citizen signatures from two 
thirds of the country’s districts, and independent candidacies are banned to run for President or 
Congress (Vergara 2011). The post-2001 score in the Personal Vote Index (see Table 3.2) is 5, a 
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moderately high number, the same that have Chile (with the binomial PR system) and México 
(using the mixed formula), but not as extreme as in Colombia. However, purchasing places on 
legislative lists is not unheard of; it can be as cheap as 20,000 dollars (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016, 
418). Moreover, there has been a wave of provincial and regional “movements” that compete 
exclusively in local elections (Vergara 2011). Politicians developed alternative strategies (e.g., 
party-switching, party substitutes) that enabled them to win elections without parties, weakening 
incentives for party building (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016, 412). 
The consequences of the lax electoral rules and completely non-institutionalized party 
system are a chaotic democracy without parties in which politician-voter linkages are weak and 
ephemeral. This does not contribute to democratic accountability even after the fall of a ruler like 
Fujimori who abused power in office. It is no surprise then that legislators have no incentives to 
intervene more actively in policy making and to follow citizens’ opinion on policy matters 
(Vergara and Watanabe 2016). Presidents have had little incentives to follow the average voter 
because immediate re-election has been banned after democratization. In theory, Presidents can 
run for another term after one has passed, but none have tried it. The balance of this unstable 
political system with no roots in society is one with no party enjoys a majority in Congress, two 
former Presidents (Humala and PPK) are jailed for corruption crimes, one (Toledo) is wanted by 
the courts and exiled in the United States, and the other former president (García) killed himself, 
as the police came to his house to detain him for corruption. 
6.4.3 Low Salience in the Enclave Economy 
If the political system were not enough to put a downward pressure on policy 
responsiveness, Peru’s economic structure does not help, either. Peru has a dual economy. There 
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is one dynamic, high profit, high productivity exporting sector, which relies in a small workforce, 
some of it highly skilled, as in the banks, but largely unskilled in the mining and oil sectors. The 
other is the densely populated, low-productivity, largely informal, non-tradable sector comprised 
of subsistence agriculture and low-skilled services in construction, retail, the food industry, and 
personal services (Contreras and Cueto 2018; Seminario 2015; Thorp 1991).  
The dual organization of the economy emerged during the colonial era, when the 
demographic crisis among the native population produced by European conquest led to a withered 
internal market, encouraging the orientation of the colonial economic system toward mining of 
precious metals (Contreras and Cueto 2018; Contreras 2018). The historical trend did not change 
course in the two hundred years after independence. Peru only exhibited a sequential 
diversification of exporting commodities usually in small enclaves in different parts of the national 
territory, first sugar in the Northern coast (a plantation crop with highly concentrated land 
ownership), then rubber in the Amazon, guano fishmeal in the Pacific inner islands, then oil, and 
nowadays gold and copper (Thorp 1991; Thorp and Bertram 2013). The export destinations have 
changed (first it was Europe, then the United States, followed by some South American nations in 
times of bonanza, and now China), but the pattern of concentration of exporting goods remains 
intact. The Peruvian economy depends on international commodity prices and thus has 
experienced recurrent boom and bust cycles. The expansion of exports (usually in price, not 
volume) has contributed slightly to the general development of the country. 
The salience of trade is low. “Integration into the world economy is very disconnected from 
the daily lives of Peruvians” (Seminario 2019).239 In the past decade, the exports generated by the 
 
239 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 11, 2019. 
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“modern,” or dynamic, economy represented, on average, 25 percent of the country’s GDP. 
Mining commodities like gold and copper, controlled by a small number of big private 
corporations, generate 65 percent of the country’s exports (16 percent of the GDP) (Contreras 
2018; Seminario 2015). By some accounts, more than 70 percent of mining and energy 
corporations are foreign owned since the privatization of public companies in the early 1990s 
(Seminario 2015), returning to the patterns of foreign concentration seen at the turn of the 
nineteenth century and the boom of guano exports (Thorp and Bertram 2013). The dominance of 
Australian, British, Canadian, Swiss, and US corporations is being surpassed by Chinese 
investment. 
 
Figure 6.5: Estimated Employment by Economic Sector in Peru 
 
Note: Author’s own elaboration based on data from International Labor Organization. 
 
Crucially, the exporting sector employs few workers. Official statistics for 2017 show that 
only 9.5 percent work in manufacturing and 25 percent work in the agriculture, mining, and fishing 
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sectors combined (INEI 2020). The rest are jobs in services, including construction, public 
administration, education, and health care. Time series estimates from the ILO based on those 
government statistics (see Figure 6.5) show that the distribution of the labor force has not changed 
a lot in the past thirty years, expect for the reduction in agriculture, fishing and mining group from 
37 percent in 1990 to 29 percent since 2009. However, not every job in manufacturing or 
agriculture, fishing, and mining can be considered to be directly impacted by trade. Several product 
categories in the Peruvian manufacturing sector do not compete with foreign goods (Mercado, 
Pierola, and Sanchez-Navarro 2019). And more clearly, the bulk of jobs in agriculture are not in 
the dynamic sector that ships exotic fruits abroad but in the subsistence sector in the highlands. 
Mining extraction of precious metals has been always an enclave enterprise, with isolated 
male workers in the Andes (copper in Arequipa, Cuzco, and Moquega; silver in Junín, Pasco, and 
Ancash; gold in Cajamarca and Madre de Dios) and the Amazon (gold). Since the 1990s, open-pit 
mining has relied in big scale automatization and few employees are needed to refine and ship the 
metals in the coast. One of the country’s leading economic historians estimates that the metals 
mining sector employs fewer than 100,000 people (Seminario 2019). At the peak of the commodity 
boom in 2012, the government estimated that mining, energy, fishmeal production, finance, and 
non-traditional agribusiness directly employed one million Peruvians (Contreras 2018). That 
represents 8 percent of the economically active population (INEI 2020). Peruvian policy makers, 
business leaders, and international bureaucrats like to boast about the huge rise in the arid lands of 
the Pacific coast of non-traditional agricultural goods of asparagus, quinoa, avocado, paprika, 
mango, and berries since the early 2000s (Pierola 2019).240 Exports of these few products to Europe 
 
240 Personal Interview, Washington, DC, August 2019. 
 313 
and the United States represent up to 70 percent of agricultural exports. However, this is a highly 
specialized industry with little labor demand (and mostly of low-skilled women in the fields): some 
accounts point to just 35,000 direct jobs (Contreras and Cueto 2018, 434).  
The trade authorities estimate that the effect on jobs is stronger because they find that there 
are, on average, seven firms involved in the supply chain of each exporting firm (Matthews 
2019).241 However, those are likely to be poor paid, unstable jobs. The official statistics show that 
two thirds of all jobs in the country are informal. Such workers have no access to social rights such 
as minimum wage, paid vacations, retirement pension, or  health care, and/or their employers are 
not formally registered, and thus less likely to provide any of those benefits (INEI 2020). 
Moreover, just 17 percent of the workforce had college degree in 2017 (it was 13 percent in 2007), 
and only 27 percent of all firms employ ten or more employees (INEI 2020). In addition, Peru 
experienced a strange demographic phenomenon in which the labor force shrank: when the country 
was growing the most between 2005 and 2010, more than 1.3 million Peruvians from low income 
families but with higher education level emigrated abroad, settling in Argentina, Chile, Spain, and 
the United States (Contreras and Cueto 2018, 449). Today, with their remittances in hard currency, 
Peruvians in exile constitute a major source of globalization inflow in the Peruvian economy. 
For the Peruvian masses, trade is not an issue present in their homes, either. There is no 
primetime news discussion about exports prices, trade balances, pre-import licenses, or time to 
clear customs. In the 1990s, the media landscape changed with the decline of the traditional 
newspapers and the rise of tabloids and celebrity programs targeted at the new literate population 
in metropolitan Lima and the few other urban centers, while the countryside remained 
 
241 Personal Interview, Lima, Perú, September 10, 2019. 
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disconnected from national news altogether (Contreras and Cueto 2018, 425). That “prensa 
chicha” covers political scandals and entertainment, not economic and business news, and not even 
policy proposals. Every public official, business representative, scholar, and consultant 
interviewed for this study concurs that trade is just not in the public discussion. Politicians have 
no incentives to bring attention to the issue. That last time it happened was with the ratification of 
the USFTA when Humala was an opposition leader advocating for a blend of economic 
nationalism and indigenous heritage that he abandoned as soon as he was elected.  
Nevertheless, another face of economic globalization is in the public agenda since the early 
2000s: foreign direct investment in the mining sector. The issue is less with the foreign ownership 
of the mines or the export of the commodities than with the environmental and social consequences 
of mineral extraction. The main source of discontent is with access to water (used by corporations 
to extract metals) and blowing off mountain tops in deserted territories that overlap with 
indigenous ancestral lands. Local residents are also dissatisfied with the increase in substance 
abuse and crime surrounding the mines (Contreras and Cueto 2018, 441), many of which 
increasingly employ foreign workers, especially in management positions. The increasingly 
frequent violent clashes with the police and private security forces has put the issue in the national 
agenda and public opinion looks increasingly polarized about it between those who demand greater 
citizen consultation and protection of ecosystems and those who believe that the mining sector 
must not be blocked to stimulate the economy. The division is an interesting development in a 
country with very weak labor unions and civil society organizations (Dargent 2019).242 However, 
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citizen demands, and policy makers’ responses, have had less to do with international trade policies 
or regulations about investments than with environmental standards and local regulations. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter shows that Peruvian governments have pushed firmly in the direction of more 
open trade policies while public support has been fragile. The unique structure of Peru’s export 
economy, the extreme weakness of parties, and the consensus of the elite (some of whom lead the 
agencies that make trade policy) about the model of integration into the world economy, leaves 
little room for voters and deviations are not punished in elections. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
The world was moving into protectionist terrain even before the Covid-19 pandemic hit 
and governments closed borders, shattering global value and supply chains. The United States 
government has launched trade wars with China as well as with allies such as Canada and Japan, 
in a battlefield of tariffs and non-tariff measures against foreign goods from steel to wine. This 
was more than the doing of a populist president. The two political parties in the United States 
moved toward protectionism. The WTO’s prime function, its dispute settlement mechanism, is 
fully paralyzed. Negotiations for a transatlantic trade agreement are frozen, as well. Argentina and 
its Mercosur partners took 20 years to culminate a trade deal with the European Union, but now a 
different administration in Buenos Aires has its own doubts while lawmakers in Brussels refuse to 
ratify the deal. Colombia, once the spearhead of free trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere, 
has withdrawn from the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
After decades of assuming there was a strong free trade consensus, scholars, journalists, 
and pundits are increasingly pointing fingers at citizens’ discontent with free trade. The “anti-
globalization backlash” has entered our vocabularies. At its root, is the ideas that ordinary voters 
are unhappy with globalization because they think it has pernicious effects on their lives, their 
families, and the country as a whole (Colantone and Stanig 2019; J. Frieden 2019; Hays, Lim, and 
Spoon 2019; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Globalization is not only free trade, of course, but also 
unrestricted capital and massive migration. Still, trade is singled out as causing much harm and 
anxiety about our globalized world (Silver, Schumacher, and Mordecair 2020). 
This came as a surprise because for too long, scholarship on trade politics either assumed 
that public opinion was strongly supportive of free trade or that public opinion had a very limited 
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role in trade policy making. The first view was overly optimistic about the masses embracing free 
trade (Baker 2009; Kono 2008; Milner and Mukherjee 2009) without having solid public opinion 
evidence that that was the case. The second view downplayed voters by focusing exclusively on 
lobbying by special interest groups (Alt and Gilligan 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Rodrik 
1995), both import-competing and exporting firms and business associations (J. A. Frieden 1991; 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; I. S. Kim and Osgood 2019). The result was that studies did 
not examine whether and how public opinion really mattered in trade politics, which was 
analogous to “leaving soldiers out of the study of war” (Verdier 1994, xvii). 
7.1 What I Did and What I Found 
In this study, I brought the electorate at large back into trade politics. I argued that we 
should stop asserting citizens’ preferences on trade and start examining what aggregate trade 
sentiment is. If we measure aggregate sentiment about trade over time, I argued, we could test 
whether and how it shapes trade policy outputs. I recognized that sometimes aggregate opinion 
leans towards free trade and other times, it leans more toward protectionism. Those changes are 
not random, but orderly. I argued that changes in aggregate opinion on trade hinges not on the 
invariant preferences of people with clear economic preferences over trade policy (i.e., those who 
benefit or suffer from unrestricted commerce) but on what ordinary people with no direct stakes 
on trade, whom I called the bystanders, believe about trade. To assess trade, bystanders follow a 
neo-mercantilist shortcut which builds from the fact that trade openness has two components: 
imports and exports. Selling more exports abroad is portrayed by the media and the elite as a good 
thing because it creates jobs and signals national strength. By contrast, the neo-mercantilist 
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shortcut poses that buying many imported goods from abroad is a bad thing because it threatens 
jobs, is unfair and unsafe, and makes the nation look weak. Public support for free trade should be 
higher with more exports and lower when more imports. But not all surges in imports or sustained 
high levels of imports trigger a protectionist backlash. I followed the research on embedded 
liberalism and argued that government-provided social protection can compensate the losers from 
trade integration and dissuade bystanders from joining the anti-free trade coalition. Therefore, 
countries with a more generous welfare net should maintain relatively stable public opinion on 
trade in the face of an import shock. 
In Chapter Two I presented a new time series index of public support for free trade for a 
large pool of countries in Latin America covering more than two decades. Studying these societies 
together is important because they exhibit some cultural and structural similarities but vary 
significantly in their trade policy choices over time. It is too simplistic to classify Latin American 
countries as converging to free trade just based on the fact that in all of them, governments rushed 
to unilaterally liberalize trade and join the WTO. Since 1995, Latin American countries have parted 
ways regarding trade, and this has especially been the case during the China-led cycle in 
commodity prices of the last two decades. In that context, I was able to estimate that public support 
for free trade was more fragile than previously thought (Baker 2009), and differences across 
countries were met with longitudinal variation within countries. Latin American voters, it turns 
out, like the idea of free trade when their countries enjoy strong export performance but become 
pessimistic when imports remain too high for a long time or suddenly grow too much. 
The welfare state inherited from the pre-liberalization era (i.e., before the early 1990s) 
significantly shaped the reaction of the masses to the increase in foreign competition brought about 
with trade liberalization. The postwar welfare state in Latin America was developed by nationalist 
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governments that pursued import-substitution industrialization, the opposite of how the welfare 
state was developed in the open economies of Western Europe. Regardless of its origin, the web 
of social protection policies played a compensatory function. The panel data evidence shows that 
even when globalization pressured national governments in developing countries to cut public 
spending, social protection avoided the rise of anti-globalization backlash. This was especially true 
during the Chinese import shock of the last fifteen years. 
My reassessment of public opinion in trade politics did not stop there. I asked how policy 
makers respond to public opinion to the point of eventually overcoming powerful interest groups 
and putting their own preferences aside. This is how we arrived at the conditional theory of trade 
policy responsiveness. In Chapter Three, I argued that policy makers respond to public (instead of 
elite or group-specific) opinion by choosing policies that ease restrictions on trade when free trade 
is more popular and by choosing policies that increase restrictions when free trade is less popular.  
My theory predicted that there should be trade policy responsiveness when public officials 
are willing and able to follow public opinion. Informed by the literature on political economy, I 
argued that salience and incentives to appeal to the broader electorate shape the willingness to be 
responsive. The economic structure should determine salience, shaping how much trade appears 
as a prominent issue in the lives of many people. Differences in electoral institutions motivate 
politicians to cater to different electorates. In proportional democracies where rules give a 
dominant role to party leaders in campaigns and legislative behavior, lawmakers care more for the 
broader national electorate. In majoritarian democracies, or proportional ones where individual 
candidates cultivate a personal vote, lawmakers care more for the narrower electorate in their 
district.  
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Turning to the administrative dimension of economic policy making, I argued that the 
ability to respond to public opinion is crucial, offering two hyptoheses.Responsiveness should be 
greater when the policy-making process is concentrated because concentration reduces 
coordination issues and shields the process from the recurrent access of special interest groups. 
And responsiveness should be greater when the trade policy instrument involved is more visible 
for society. 
I tested the theory of trade policy responsiveness with quantitative data and econometric 
models in the same 18 Latin American democracies where I first measured public opinion on trade. 
These are countries that, on the one hand, diverge in the distribution of employment across 
economic sectors with varying level of exposure to trade, and on the other hand, all have 
majoritarian presidential systems with proportional (or mixed) systems for the legislature, but with 
a variety of electoral rule combinations. Above all, I found that the visibility of the trade policy 
instrument is a major source of ability to respond to public opinion. There is strong evidence of 
direct responsiveness to voters with preferential trade agreements and moderate evidence for 
average tariff rates. But there is no responsiveness to voters when dealing with non-tariff barriers, 
which are low visibility instruments. On the contrary, when voters are collectively more favorable 
to free trade, governments seem to impose new non-tariff barriers. 
Furthermore, I found strong evidence in support for the idea that having fewer agencies in 
trade policy making enables governments to better respond to changes in aggregate trade 
sentiment. The causal mediation analysis shows that the setup of the trade administration is not a 
mediator but a condition for responsiveness These two findings constitute major contributions to 
the political economy of trade, which had underemphasized the bureaucracy and public 
administration for a bigger focus on electoral incentives. 
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The three country case studies of Argentina (Chapter Four), Colombia (Chapter Five), and 
Peru (Chapter Six) ratified the findings on administrative concentration and offered qualitative 
evidence in support for the hypotheses on salience and party leaders, which had obtained only 
weak support in the statistical analysis with pooled panel data. On the one hand, the econometric 
models estimated that electoral rules that created incentives for a personal vote (in contrast to 
strong party leaders) were significantly associated with less responsiveness, given that in societies 
with those rules, higher public support for free trade les to higher tariff rates and NTBs. The 
evidence for PTAs, however, was the reverse, as higher public support for free trade lead to more 
international trade treaties under candidate-centric rules. On the other hand, the econometric 
models found little support for the idea that willingness to respond to voters was higher when more 
workers were employed in the agriculture, mining, and manufacturing sectors (the evidence was 
stronger for NTBs than for the other two policy instruments). There are no optimal ways to 
measure salience as a pre-treatment condition and more work is needed to get a powerful 
instrument that works in a cross-country setting.  
The case studies revealed that responsiveness works in Argentina precisely because there 
are strong party leaders that care about the national median voter and because trade is a highly 
salient issue, with a large labor force in import-competing industries in metropolitan districts, that 
divides political parties, and that captures the attention of the news media. The case studies also 
show how responsiveness is very low in a country with a diminutive import-competing industry 
and a highly dynamic export sector of raw materials that employs few, low-skilled workers, 
aggravated with a political system that has failed to develop real political parties after its late 
democratization. Finally, we clearly see in Colombia how an electoral system that rewards 
individual candidates over parties in legislative elections together with a very fragmented 
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technocratic trade bureaucracy makes it difficult to respond to public opinion, even though salience 
is not low. 
What does this tell us about democratic representation in contemporary Latin America? 
According to a 2017 regional survey, 75 percent of Latin Americans believe that their elected 
leaders rule on behalf of “a few powerful groups” rather than for “the people as a whole” 
(Latinobarometer 2017). In Brazil and Mexico, the two largest democracies in the region, more 
than 90 percent of voters felt their governments do not care about society. This is higher, but not 
much from, the findings of the same survey question asked thirteen years before (Latinobarometer 
2004). Citizens perceive their governments to be unresponsive and this is more extensive than any 
government’s level of (dis)approval or leader’s negative image. This is not surprising considering 
the growth in corruption scandals and the rise of inequality in a region were politicians had ignored 
campaign pledges and switched course in the past (Stokes 2001). 
Citizens disaffection with democratic representation will not improve unless politicians are 
responsive once in office. The management of trade integration gives public officials a chance to 
follow public opinion. My findings show that, overall, responsiveness in the domain of trade exists 
but that governments do not all have the same incentives to follow public opinion or the ability to 
do so. There are important obstacles that hinder responsiveness in a public policy arena that has 
large effects locally and in the real economy at large. Those obstacles (the configuration of the 
public administration, electoral rules) are very hard for individual presidents or legislative sessions 
to modify. The best opportunity for policy makers to show that they care about voters when they 
regulate cross-border commerce is to choose visible policy instruments. 
 323 
7.2 Public Opinion and Elite Cues 
A remaining important question is whether policy makers manipulate mass opinion to give 
the false impression of responding to it. As Bourdieu said, for politicians “the modern equivalent 
of ‘God is on our side’ is ‘Public opinion is on our side’” (Bourdieu 1993). Some studies provide 
evidence that elites influence public opinion and citizens adopt politicians’ positions on public 
issues as their own (Gabel and Scheve 2007). All observational studies of public opinion and public 
policy will surely contain some degree of endogeneity, but that does not invalidate the whole 
research. The point is how to minimize it. While “economists rarely ask whether supply causes 
demand or whether consumers cause producers” (Baum and Potter 2008, 43), there is substantial 
scholarly disagreement in political science and communication science on whether political elites 
try to influence public opinion (and succeed or fail) and on how opinion leadership affects citizens’ 
preexisting views.  
On the first point, there is observational evidence from the United States in the pre-Trump 
era that politicians try to craft opinion, but they are not very successful. The reason is that political 
competition tends to cancel out the impact of any individual party or politician (Chong and 
Druckman 2007; Canes-Wrone 2015). On the second issue, some authors contend that political 
elites exert persuasion on mass views by highlighting how their policy proposals are consistent 
with citizens’ preexisting values or by arguing they will accomplish shared goals (Chong and 
Druckman 2007; Zaller 1992). This model still allows politicians to be held accountable for 
deviating from responding to public opinion. But a different theory posits that political leadership 
is so strong that citizens are inclined to defer to politicians’ positions on an issue without 
demanding justifications to change their views (Achen and Bartels 2016). There is some field 
experimental evidence from the US subnational level that when voters receive information on issue 
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positions from their districts’ representatives, those voters are more likely to adopt their 
representatives’ positions, even if they previously opposed them (Broockman and Butler 2017).243 
However, the experimenters acknowledge that the evidence “does not suggest politicians can 
always convince their constituents of anything, nor that they can reliably escape electoral 
punishment for everything” (Broockman and Butler 2017, 209).  
This relates to the possibility that economic elites shape public opinion, too. There is 
evidence that business associations and large individual firms invest substantially not only to lobby 
policy makers but to influence voters with the goal of creating indirect pressure on policy makers 
to protect their interests (Jacobs and Page 2005). Economic elites can buy TV advertisements and 
use marketing tools for their causes, such as cutting corporate taxes or blocking regulations that 
harm their assets, but those are their more explicit influence activities. Businesses also recruit non-
partisan experts and fund universities and think tanks that exert influence on citizens when they 
are interviewed by the media, or when the media disseminate their findings, and citizens respect 
them due to their positions of expertise. 
Do elites consciously shape public opinion on trade, and if so, how? Trade is an 
international economic policy issue, which carries its own complications for studying the 
relationship between public opinion and public policy. Researchers generally argue that foreign 
policy affairs are “ripe for cue-giving” by elites exploiting the fact that foreign matters are distant 
from the lives of many citizens (Guisinger and Saunders 2017). Political elites can exploit the 
information gap of citizens and develop partisan cues to try to move citizens’ opinion closer to 
 
243 This well-known study has its own methodological problems: the inferences differ substantially once we control 
for post-treatment manipulation checks. 
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what they want. As Irwin (2017, 25) notes, “economic interests are sometimes passive until 
political entrepreneurs, motivated by ideas or driven by ideological passions, recruit them in 
support of a particular cause.” However, the available observational evidence, which is largely 
from the pre-Trump United States, suggests that trade policy is a domain in which partisanship 
does not significantly determine voter attitudes when controlling for individual income or skills 
(Guisinger 2009; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro 2001). The most recent evidence, by contrast, 
shows that partisanship shapes Americans views on trade (Guisinger 2020). Donald Trump has 
effectively used loss frameworks, in which the aversion to losses outweigh the gains from trade 
(Freund and Özden 2008), to shape protectionist sentiment amid his followers. Business elites may 
also try to shape mass views on trade by financing information campaigns and experts that show 
how policies (they do not like) are effectively harming collective interests (while it may be the 
case it is only those specific business interests).  
Moreover, observational evidence from contexts closer to this study show that politicians 
may have an important role in providing partisan cues to voters on matters of trade (Hicks, Milner, 
and Tingley 2014). Nonetheless, those actions occurred in Costa Rica surrounding the 2007 
popular referendum to ratify the US-CAFTA, an extraordinary event, as voters were asked to cast 
a direct vote for or against a free trade agreement after political elites could not override legislative 
gridlock. In the rest of the region (and in other times in Costa Rica), voters do not intervene directly 
on trade policy decisions, but through their representatives and elected officials. Recent survey 
experiments in Argentina find that partisan voters that receive party cues on many policy issues, 
including trade, adopt the policy preferences attributed to their parties, polarizing opinions over 
issues that did not generate division in the absence of partisan sponsorship (Levy Yeyati, 
Moscovich, and Abuin 2020). 
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In this study I have addressed the relationship between public opinion, elite cues, and 
public policy in two ways. First, I have developed and tested a model of mass public opinion on 
trade. Opinion shifts toward protectionism and toward free trade are not random and not fully 
determined by members of society with clear interests for and against free trade. I argue that those 
changes are the result of people with no direct stakes on trade jumping into the protectionist or the 
free trade coalitions, respectively. The theory allows bystanders to receive messages from political 
and economic elites. Bystanders can receive messages from multiple members of the elite (e.g., 
the president, opposition leaders, business representatives) on factual, probable, or even fake 
effects of imports and of exports on the economy, their districts, and groups of people. The neo-
mercantilist shortcut allows bystanders to make sense of these competing messages in the 
aggregate. Then I tested how two economic components of trade openness, the value of imports 
and the value of exports (with alternative indicators), that are not directly manipulated by public 
officials, explain shifts in aggregate sentiment.  
The second way I addressed the relationship between public opinion and elite influence 
was to think of salience as a result of the national economic structure. If salience is one of the 
factors that should increase responsiveness, it cannot be a direct consequence of elite behavior or 
even of public policy choice. In the quantitative analysis, I measured salience with an indicator of 
the share of employment in the agriculture, mining, and manufacturing sectors of the economy 
using international classifications and data. In the case studies, I found evidence that policy makers 
sometimes assume what public opinion is and other times they monitor public opinion, but there 
was no indication that public officials acted consciously to manipulate public opinion on trade, 
with one exception. The exception was the extraordinary crisis that ensued in Argentina in 2008 
when the government of Cristina Kirchner failed to change the new export taxes on agricultural 
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commodities in the face of public outrage. For many months, the single most important issue in 
the public agenda were the export taxes, and politicians from both sides of the aisle organized 
public acts and mobilized their voters to get others to support their positions for or against the 
policy. Either way, it was a reaction of the political elites to the initial change in the public mood 
that originated those partisan cues that tripled down to bystanders. 
Political methodologists acknowledge the difficulty of estimating inherently endogenous 
causal relationships between public opinion, economic policy outputs, and macroeconomic 
outcomes. For example, Sattler, Freeman, and Brandt (2008) created a Bayesian structural vector 
autoregressive model to study how the British government reacted to changes in public opinion 
and how policy makers’ policy outputs fed back into popular evaluations of government policy 
while controlling for the behavior of the real economy with quarterly data. Such a model involved 
11 simultaneous equations, and just for one country. Unfortunately, there are no tractable empirical 
models for time-series, cross-country data. 
7.3 Extensions 
The first extension that future research should address is to predict policy makers’ policy 
choices and position taking on trade policy by exploiting both variation in trade sentiment between 
subnational districts and individual policy makers’ behavior. It is likely that trade sentiment in a 
given district does not match national trade sentiment. This could be the case for different reasons: 
firms’ concentration, industrial development, import penetration, media presence and coverage, 
and elites’ cueing and framing. District-level opinion could be estimated with Bayesian multilevel 
regression and poststratification. In the first stage, a multilevel model of individual survey 
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responses on trade is estimated, with opinion modeled as a function of demographic and 
geographic predictors. The second step is poststratification: the estimates for each demographic-
geographic respondent type are weighted by the percentages of each type in actual district 
populations, so that we can estimate the percentage of respondents within each district who have 
an issue position (Lax and Phillips 2009; Caughey and Warshaw 2018). 
The behavior of individual policy makers can be assessed by examining roll-call votes on 
trade-related bills and the content of legislators’ speeches in the floor, by counting the frequency 
of positions for and against the removal of restrictions to trade. While nowadays executives take 
most decisions on trade policy, legislators intervene to ratify preferential trade agreements and 
sometimes they vote on omnibus bills that include customs regulations, including import and 
export tariff rates and schedules and quantitative restrictions on certain products and trading 
partners. It is interesting to study legislative behavior on trade because it helps to bridge the micro- 
to macro-level divide that I referred to earlier in this study. Legislators represent districts unevenly 
affected by trade and where free trade enjoys different levels of popularity. Such an empirical 
strategy could allow us to get at honest behavior given that legislators do not need to worry about 
domestic and international constraints on their trade policy choices as government leaders do, such 
as coordination with the exchange rate policy or legal commitments included in multilateral 
agreements. Moreover, this strategy would allow us to include direct measurement of interest 
group contributions and lobbying on trade matters which in multi-country studies are only inferred 
from indicators such as exchange rate movements and the business cycle. 
My conditional theory of trade policy responsiveness and the model of shifting mass 
sentiment on trade are not limited to contemporary Latin America. Responsiveness is a problem 
of dynamic representation inherent to all democracies. And trade integration is an issue 
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everywhere. Moreover, the economic causes that activate the neo-mercantilist shortcut that drives 
the popularity of free trade are universal (all economies have imports and exports), while social 
protection is not. The next step would be to extend this research to other types of democracies. 
The European case would be interesting for several reasons. First, those are parliamentary 
democracies with proportional representation, a combination that creates a different set of political 
incentives for policy makers to follow public opinion (Elkjaer and Iversen 2020). Members of 
parliament may not care much about the national median voter and the types of coalition 
governments that emerge will have to make compromises that may constrain responsiveness. The 
second reason is that, even when voters differ in their economic policy preferences by income 
level, European governments tend to follow not the wealthy as in the United States but the middle 
classes (Elkjaer and Iversen 2020). Third, the development of the welfare state was very different 
in Europe compared to Latin America. In the old continent it was part of a class compromise 
between workers and business leaders in the context of open borders and deep trade integration 
(Ruggie 1982; Hays 2009).  
Most European countries have delegated substantial trade policy authority from the 
national government to the European Union. The EU Trade Commissioner and non-elected 
bureaucrats in the Directorate-General for Trade in Brussels make decisions previously reserved 
to national governments in the domains of administering the common external tariff, import 
control measures, standardization, inter-state trade disputes, and the negotiation of preferential 
trade agreements outside of the Union. This creates a whole set of constrains to respond to national-
level public opinion. There are studies that show that countries representatives in the European 
Union administrative and executive bodies do try to accommodate their national electorates when 
voting on specific public policies (Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2017). But it is also true that 
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many European citizens feel disaffected in a political system which delegates important decisions 
on their jobs, wages, consumption, and production to a supranational body, a disaffection that has 
given rise to right-wing populism in consolidated democracies (Norris and Inglehart 2019). 
The search for trade policy responsiveness in other democracies should not be limited to 
rich economies. I think we could gain a lot of insights from the relationship between public opinion 
and trade policy in a developing democracy. India would be a good candidate. With its important 
ethnic divisions, India’s political system has different citizen-politicians linkages than those found 
in Latin America. The sources of political division and the rules that constitution makers in India 
have envisaged to accommodate such division can create other opportunities and costs for policy 
makers to respond to public opinion. Moreover, India is similar to the largest economies of South 
America, such as Brazil, in respect to the structure of trade policy. India is known for its frequent 
use of protectionist measures to isolate domestic producers from international competition. 
Crucially, India is a low income, low skilled labor abundant country that faces extraordinary 
pressure from the economic rise of China, boosted by high productivity, import repression, and 
state subsidies. 
Extending the study of trade policy responsiveness raises the questions of the possibility 
of adjusting policy to public opinion in authoritarian regimes. In principle, authoritarian regimes 
are not prone to responsiveness because governments are not formed by popular will, the 
selectorate and winning coalitions that keep autocratic rulers in power are small, and there is no 
freedom of expression. The latter point implies that while public opinion does not cease to exist, 
because individuals have their own opinions, the masses cannot express their opinions freely 
without fear of retaliation from the government. Moreover, the aggregation of opinions may be 
channeled through institutional means that coerce and manipulate the results (e.g., pollsters may 
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need to adjust the survey findings to please state officials). The first two points, by contrast, deal 
with the political survival of policy makers. Autocrats fear no electoral punishment, because there 
are no elections, or when there are, they are not free and fair.  
In recent years, however, scholars have shown that autocracies are not all the same, that 
they adopt different political institutions, with some regimes utilizing nominally “democratic” 
institutions, particularly legislatures and elections, to manage societal discontent (Gandhi 2008). 
This line of research argues that legislatures, such as in Brazil during the military dictatorship, help 
autocratic regimes identify popular discontent because they allow legislators to make demands on 
the government on behalf of their constituents, who then use the information to stabilize the 
political situation by making some policy concessions. Actual evidence of that mechanism is 
largely anecdotal, but some new studies with panel data identify that weak electoral results for 
autocratic parties (that allow elections) leads to increases in education and social welfare spending 
and decreases in military spending following elections (Miller 2015). There is no evidence, 
however, that autocratic governments respond to public opinion in between elections rather than 
to electoral results. In addition, I have low expectations that they would do so in the domain of 
trade policy, which is documented to have been used by autocrats to create and distribute rents to 
their winning coalitions in the business sector and the armed forces (Milner and Kubota 2005; 
Milner and Mukherjee 2009; Weyland 2002). In my case study of post-1992 Peru under the 
Fujimori regime, I show that in fact there was little responsiveness to voters on trade, even when 
the president replaced the neoliberal technocrats (who should be more isolated from societal 
pressures) in charge of trade policy with business representatives.  
In sum, policy responsiveness is in the nature of representative democracies. The decisions 
that national public officials make to manage trade integration in the global economy can respond 
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to voters’ aggregate sentiment when there is a real threat of electoral punishment for deviating 
from the popular will. This is the clearest when governments decide to move forward with 
international preferential trade agreements. Ultimately, the willingness to respond is shaped by the 
economic and electoral configurations in place while the ability to effectively respond depends on 
how democracies organize their policy-making processes. 
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Appendix A  Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix A Table 1: Distribution of Survey Questions by Source 
Source/Pollster Questions Countries Years 
Centro de Investigación y Docencia 
Económicas 
3 6 
2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012, 2014, 2015 
Consorcio Iberoamericano de 
Investigaciones de Mercados y 
Asesoramiento 
2 18 2003, 2004, 2009, 2011 
Gallup 1 2 2001, 2006, 2008 
Graciela Romer & Asociados 1 1 1993-1995 
Latinobarometer 4 18 1995-2010, 2015-2017 
Latin American Public Opinion Project 1 14 
2004, 2006-2008, 2010, 
2012 
Office of the President (Mexico) 4 1 1991-1993 
Pew Research Center 1 7 2002, 2007-2011, 2014 









Appendix A Table 2: Full Survey Questions by Source 
US Information Agency 
1. Some countries favor few restrictions to trade. Others favor many restrictions in 
order to protect their own products. What do you think is best? 
2. To what degree do you think that MERCOSUR benefits your country’s economy?  
3. Do you think that NAFTA is beneficial for you country? 
4. Do you think that NAFTA will be beneficial for the country’s economic 
development? 
5. Do you think that NAFTA will be beneficial for the country’s long-term economic 
development? 
6. Do you think that the free trade policy of the US toward Latin America is beneficial 
to the economy of your country? 
7. Do you think that the Free Trade Area of the Americas will benefit the economy of 
your country? 
8. Do you think that a Free Trade Agreement with the US will benefit your country? 
 
Latinobarometer 
9. Do you agree that your country can buy goods and services from any other country 
and that any other country can sell goods and services? 
10. Do you agree that the Free Trade Area of the Americas will be beneficial for the 
economic development of the country? 
11. Do you think that economic integration agreements have a positive impact on job 
opportunities? 
12. Do you think that economic integration agreements have a positive impact on your 
country’s development? 
 
Office of the Technical Advisor to the President of Mexico 
13. Do you agree with your country joining a free trade agreement with the US and 
Canada to reduce tariffs and restrictions to trade? 
14. Overall, do you agree with your country joining NAFTA? 
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15. Do you think that NAFTA will be beneficial for the country's economic 
development? 
16. Do you think that NAFTA will be beneficial for the average citizen? 
 
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas 
17. ¿Cree usted que el mayor contacto de nuestra economía con otras economías en el 
mundo, lo que se conoce como globalización, es generalmente bueno o generalmente 
malo para el país?  
18. El libre comercio trae ventajas (por ejemplo, nuevos mercados para productos 
mexicanos) como desventajas (por ejemplo, mayor competencia de productos 
extranjeros). Tomando esto en cuenta, ¿cree usted que el libre comercio es bueno o 
malo para la economía de su país? 
19. En general, ¿cree usted que el NAFTA es bueno o malo para la economía de su país? 
 
CIMA 
20. En general, ¿cree usted que el comercio internacional es bueno o malo para la 
economía de su país? 
21. La globalización tiene ventajas (ej. mayor oferta de productos a precios más bajos) 
y desventajas (ej. mayor vulnerabilidad frente a crisis internacionales). ¿Cree que 
esto es generalmente bueno o generalmente malo para el país? 
 
Pew Research Center: Global Attitudes 
22. What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between your country 
and other countries? 
 
LAPOP: Americas Barometer 
23. To what extent do you think that free trade agreements with other countries in Latin 






24. Do you agree that a FTA with the United States will create more jobs in your 
country? 
 
Graciela Romer & Asociados 
25. ¿Está usted de acuerdo en que la apertura de las importaciones beneficia a los 
consumidores porque pueden comprar productos mejores y más baratos, o que la 



























10 34 25 1.28 87.71 
Bolivia 1996-
2017 
8 24 22 0.78 71.37 
Brazil 1990-
2017 
13 44 28 1.18 80.08 
Chile 1990-
2017 
11 31 28 0.88 79.66 
Colombia 1990-
2017 
11 32 28 0.92 87.03 
Costa Rica 1992-
2017 





6 16 22 0.58 79.13 
Ecuador 1996-
2017 
10 31 22 1.09 77.61 
El Salvador 1994-
2017 
6 20 24 0.70 84.08 
Guatemala 1996-
2017 
8 25 22 0.80 79.50 
Honduras 1996-
2017 
6 20 22 0.70 72.01 
Mexico 1990-
2017 
18 66 28 1.39 72.48 
Nicaragua 1996-
2017 
6 20 22 0.80 88.53 
Panama 1996-
2017 
8 26 22 0.87 73.58 
Paraguay 1995-
2017 
7 22 23 0.83 86.55 
Peru 1994-
2017 
11 35 24 0.88 70.27 
Uruguay 1990-
2017 
8 25 28 0.76 85.11 
Venezuela 1990-
2017 




Appendix A Figure 1: Observed Opinion Survey Data and Estimated Index of Public 












Appendix A Table 4: Three-Year Average Imports and Exports and Public Support for 
Free Trade 









Imports(3avg) -0.086 -0.094 0.027 -0.012 
 (0.108) (0.138) (0.078) (0.071) 
Exports(3avg) 0.375*** 0.426** 0.189** 0.207*** 
 (0.132) (0.163) (0.075) (0.073) 
Social Protection t-1 14.945** 17.583** 12.702*** 4.139 
 (5.978) (6.625) (3.218) (3.580) 
Imports(avg)*Social Protection t-1    0.612** 
    (0.255) 
Unemployment t-1 0.237 0.376 0.448*** 0.440*** 
 (0.371) (0.396) (0.120) (0.113) 
Inflation t-1 -0.045 -0.050 -0.040 -0.039 
 (0.061) (0.053) (0.046) (0.046) 
GDP growth t-1 -0.037 -0.038 -0.061 -0.057 
 (0.112) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) 
Exchange rate t-1 -0.014 -0.005 -0.015* -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
GDP per capita t-1 0.608 0.626 7.612** 3.898 
 (5.451) (4.535) (3.787) (3.614) 
Labor mobility t-1 -0.093 -0.084 -0.090 -0.112 
 (0.199) (0.200) (0.087) (0.087) 
Time trend   -0.397* -0.258 
   (0.226) (0.218) 
Public Support t-1   0.552*** 0.555*** 
   (0.052) (0.052) 
Constant 19.744    
 (78.602)    
Observations 319 319 319 319 
R2 0.083 0.137 0.879 0.887 
rho .472    
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable is index of public support for free trade (see Chapter 
Two). A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable generates an increase in public 
support. Model 1 is Random Effects regression with robust clustered standard errors. Model 2 is Fixed Effects 
regression with robust clustered standard errors. Models 3 and 4 are AR(1) Prais-Winsten Fixed Effects regressions 





Appendix A Table 5: Imports and Exports (Absolute) and Public support for Free Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Error Correction Error Correction 
Imports (abs) t-1 -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Imports (abs) Δ   0.006*** 0.005** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Exports (abs) t-1 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Exports (abs) Δ   -0.014*** -0.015*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Social Protection t-1 11.338*** 8.802** 10.893** 7.340 
 (3.978) (4.389) (4.300) (4.732) 
Imports (abs)*Social Protection t-1  0.003***  0.004*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Social ProtectionΔ   -0.974 -2.126 
   (5.882) (5.495) 
Imports (abs)*Social ProtectionΔ    0.030 
    (0.065) 
Unemployment t-1 0.232** 0.207** 0.379*** 0.333** 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.129) (0.131) 
UnemploymentΔ   0.327* 0.313* 
   (0.181) (0.183) 
Inflation t-1 -0.008 -0.010 -0.063 -0.070 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.050) (0.049) 
InflationΔ   -0.082* -0.088* 
   (0.050) (0.047) 
GDP growth t-1 0.027 0.025 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.206) (0.202) 
GDP growthΔ   -0.094 -0.093 
   (0.172) (0.168) 
Exchange rate t-1 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.015 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
Exchange rateΔ   0.010 0.010 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
GDP per capita t-1 5.435 6.270* 1.333 2.496 
 (3.571) (3.537) (4.329) (4.332) 
GDP per capitaΔ   -3.128 -2.765 
   (15.052) (14.796) 
Labor mobility t-1 -0.089 -0.102 -0.183 -0.207* 
 (0.086) (0.084) (0.121) (0.118) 
Labor mobilityΔ   -0.112 -0.120 
   (0.107) (0.106) 
Time trend -0.228 -0.233 -0.048 -0.057 
 (0.210) (0.211) (0.246) (0.248) 
Public Support t-1 0.587*** 0.581*** -0.398*** -0.406*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.050) 
Observations 325 325 310 310 
R2 0.868 0.884 0.288 0.293 
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 is index of public support for free 
trade (see Chapter Two). Dependent variable in Models 3 and 4 is change in index of public support for free trade. A 
positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable generates an increase in public support. 
Variables with Δ indicate one-year change. Models 1 and 2 are AR(1) Prais-Winsten Fixed Effects regressions with 
panel corrected standard errors. Models 3 and 4 are Error Correction Models with Fixed Effects and panel corrected 
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standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Appendix A Table 6: Trade Balance and Public Support for Free Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Error Correction 
Trade Balance t-1 0.255 0.133 0.366*** 
 (0.208) (0.086) (0.128) 
Trade BalanceΔ   0.449*** 
   (0.147) 
Social Protection t-1 13.144* 10.174*** 11.850*** 
 (7.184) (3.081) (3.128) 
Social ProtectionΔ   0.631 
   (6.431) 
Unemployment t-1 0.175 0.200** 0.255** 
 (0.373) (0.091) (0.112) 
UnemploymentΔ   0.211 
   (0.179) 
Inflation t-1 -0.025 -0.019 -0.082 
 (0.056) (0.045) (0.056) 
InflationΔ   -0.124** 
   (0.057) 
GDP growth t-1 0.090 0.016 0.111 
 (0.083) (0.106) (0.225) 
GDP growthΔ   0.022 
   (0.194) 
Exchange rate t-1 -0.013 -0.020** 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) 
Exchange rateΔ   0.021*** 
   (0.008) 
GDP per capita t-1 3.301 6.313* 8.000* 
 (4.355) (3.426) (4.652) 
GDP per capitaΔ   -8.892 
   (20.067) 
Labor mobility t-1 -0.019 -0.098 -0.186 
 (0.181) (0.089) (0.134) 
Labor mobilityΔ   -0.122 
   (0.123) 
Time trend  -0.288 -0.465** 
  (0.199) (0.222) 
Public Support t-1  0.574*** -0.377*** 
  (0.046) (0.050) 
Observations 328 325 310 
R2 0.085 0.864 0.312 
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable in Models and 2 is index of public support for free 
trade (see Chapter Two). Dependent variable in Model 3 is change in index of public support for free trade. A positive 
coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable generates an increase in public support. Variables 
with Δ indicate one-year change. Model 1 is Fixed Effects regression with robust clustered standard errors. Model 2 
is AR(1) Prais-Winsten Fixed Effects regression with panel corrected standard errors. Model 3 is Error Correction 






Appendix A Table 7: Temporal Breaks 
 
Note: This table reports partial results from 16 AR(1) autocorrelation fixed effects regressions with panel corrected 
standard errors. Models incrementally incorporate one more year. Dependent variable is index of public support for 
free trade. A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in imports generates an increase in public support for free 
trade at higher levels of spending in social protection. All predictors are lagged one year. All models control for 
exports, unemployment, inflation, GDP growth, exchange rate overvaluation, GDP per capita, labor mobility, and a 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A Table 8: Imports, Exports, and Social Protection with Country Effects 
 (1)  
 Public Support  
Public Support 0.564*** (0.045) 
Imports/GDP -0.119* (0.061) 
Social Protection 4.440 (3.517) 
Imports * Social Protection 0.554** (0.221) 
Exports 0.183*** (0.069) 
Unemployment 0.212** (0.089) 
Inflation -0.047 (0.049) 
GDP growth -0.055 (0.107) 
Exchange rate -0.019* (0.010) 
GDP per capita 4.671 (3.162) 
Labor mobility -0.122 (0.085) 
Time trend -0.271 (0.192) 
Argentina -16.400*** (3.768) 
Bolivia 0.162 (2.474) 
Brasil -7.403** (3.723) 
Chile -9.329*** (3.536) 
Colombia -4.488*** (1.731) 
Costa Rica -4.921* (2.545) 
Ecuador 0.261 (3.364) 
El Salvador 1.875 (2.020) 
Guatemala 2.053 (1.729) 
Honduras 2.204 (4.397) 
Mexico -4.905** (2.153) 
Nicaragua -0.978 (6.032) 
Panama -7.380** (3.159) 
Paraguay  -4.043*** (1.247) 
Peru 1.972 (1.588) 
Venezuela -8.687*** (2.767) 
Uruguay -13.481*** (3.752) 
Observations 325  
R2 0.860  
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable is index of public support for free trade (see Chapter 
Two). A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable generates an increase in public 





Appendix B Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix B Table 1: Public Opinion and Preferential Trade Agreements: Alternative 
Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






 Jackknife Jackknife Lagged DV PR 
Public Support 0.151*** 0.015*** 0.005* 0.037*** 
 (0.028) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012) 
GDP per capita 7.863*** 0.684*** -0.356 0.320 
 (1.338) (0.153) (0.505) (0.456) 
GDP growth -0.041 -0.002 0.014*** 0.011** 
 (0.100) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) 
Financial Openness 0.863 -0.081 0.245 0.262* 
 (1.980) (0.171) (0.150) (0.154) 
Exchange rate -0.005** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Left -0.653 -0.190 0.067 0.085* 
 (0.967) (0.128) (0.056) (0.051) 
PR    1.097*** 
    (0.296) 
Public Support*PR    -0.013** 
    (0.006) 
Tradable Labor Force    0.014 
    (0.024) 
Public Support* Tradable Labor Force    0.000 
    (0.000) 
Trade Agencies    0.152** 
    (0.073) 
Public Support*Trade Agencies    -0.003** 
    (0.002) 
Lagged DV   0.040**  
   (0.016)  
Constant -71.502*** -131.073*** -128.335*** -150.602*** 
 (14.182) (22.516) (36.223) (36.887) 
Observations 367 367 367 362 
AIC 2091.382 1802.058 1466.856 1473.531 
BIC 2118.720 1837.207 1502.004 1543.581 
R2 0.540    
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable is cumulative stock of signed Preferential Trade 
Agreements. Model 1 is linear probability model with robust jackknifed std. errors. Model 2 is negative binomial 
regression with robust jackknifed std. errors. Models 3 and 4 is negative binomial Fixed Effects regressions with 
robust clustered std. errors. AIC: Akaike inf. criterion. BIC: Bayesian inf. criterion.*p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01 
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Appendix B Table 2: Public Opinion and Preferential Trade Agreements: Other Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Public Support 0.021 0.015 0.023 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Personal Vote -0.252*** -0.270*** -0.270*** 
 (0.063) (0.057) (0.057) 
Public Support*Personal Vote 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tradable Labor Force -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Public Support*Tradable Labor Force 0.000 0.001* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade Agencies 0.316*** 0.287*** 0.321*** 
 (0.087) (0.071) (0.077) 
Public Support*Trade Agencies -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP per capita 0.345 0.467 0.437 
 (0.449) (0.459) (0.433) 
GDP growth 0.009** -0.002 0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Financial Openness 0.347** 0.129 0.299** 
 (0.137) (0.103) (0.145) 
Exchange rate 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Left 0.068 0.029 0.074* 
 (0.050) (0.047) (0.045) 
Temporal trend 0.073*** 0.058*** 0.065*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) 
Checks and Balances 0.032**   
 (0.015)   
Regional Trade  0.035***  
  (0.007)  
Customs Union   0.970*** 
   (0.219) 
ln(α) -17.689 -18.269*** -17.686*** 
Observations 347 362 362 
AIC 1384.164 1441.192 1458.294 
BIC 1441.904 1499.567 1512.777 
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable is cumulative stock of signed Preferential Trade 
Agreements. All models are negative binomial Fixed Effects regressions with robust clustered standard errors. AIC is 
Akaike information criterion. BIC is Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix B Table 3: Public Opinion and Import Tariff Rates: Alternative Models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public Supportt-1 -0.011 0.002  0.129  
 (0.036) (0.005) (0.143) 
Public SupportΔ  -0.006  
  (0.007)  
Personal VoteΔ  -0.154  
  (0.142)  
Public Support*Personal VoteΔ  0.034  
  (0.058)  
Personal Vote t-1 -0.333* -0.363**  
 (0.185) (0.182)  
Public Support*Personal Vote t-1 0.014*** 0.007***  
 (0.004) (0.002)  
PR t-1   8.236* 
   (4.205) 
Public Support*PR t-1   -0.161** 
   (0.079) 
Trade Agencies t-1 0.302 0.209 -0.378 
 (0.214) (0.158) (0.431) 
Public Support*Trade Agencies t-1 -0.005 -0.005 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) 
Trade AgenciesΔ  0.248**  
  (0.100)  
Public Support*Trade AgenciesΔ  0.040**  
  (0.017)  
Tradable Labor Force t-1 0.049 0.018 0.077 
 (0.061) (0.039) (0.140) 
Public Support*Tradable Labor Force t-1 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Tradable Labor ForceΔ  0.059*  
  (0.034)  
Public Support*Tradable Labor ForceΔ  -0.001  
  (0.007)  
GDP per capita t-1 -2.031*** -0.107 -3.018 
 (0.723) (0.609) (3.051) 
GDP per capitaΔ  -1.524  
  (2.595)  
GDP growth t-1 -0.039** -0.048 -0.033 
 (0.018) (0.030) (0.030) 
GDP growthΔ  -0.020  
  (0.027)  
Financial Openness t-1 -1.547*** -0.670** -1.410* 
 (0.318) (0.265) (0.789) 
Financial OpennessΔ  -0.175  
  (0.381)  
Exchange rate t-1 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Exchange rateΔ  0.000  
  (0.001)  
Left t-1 0.272 0.081 0.465 
 (0.190) (0.136) (0.507) 
LeftΔ  -0.459***  
  (0.145)  
 348 
Lagged DV  -0.553***  
  (0.057)  
Observations 353 332 353 
R2 0.804 0.360 0.400 
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable in Models 1 and 3 is average level of ad-valorem 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) import tariff rate. Dependent variable in Model 2 is change in average MFN import tariff 
rate. A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the independent variable generates an increase in the average 
level of import tariff rates (i.e., less free trade). Variables with Δ indicate one-year change. Model 1 is Fixed Effects 
linear regression with robust jackknifed standard errors. Model 2 is Error Correction Model with panel corrected 
standard errors. Model 3 is Fixed Effects linear regression with robust clustered standard errors.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 





















Appendix B Table 4: Public Opinion and Import Tariff Rates: Other Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public Support 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Personal Vote -0.181 -0.139 -0.137 
 (0.127) (0.132) (0.131) 
Public Support*Personal Vote 0.006** 0.005** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tradable Labor Force -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) 
Public Support*Tradable Labor Force 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade Agencies 0.080 0.145 0.133 
 (0.162) (0.157) (0.157) 
Public Support*Trade Agencies -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
GDP per capita 0.998* 0.856 0.888 
 (0.538) (0.571) (0.553) 
GDP growth -0.035*** -0.036** -0.039*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
Financial Openness -0.860*** -0.718*** -0.752*** 
 (0.279) (0.277) (0.273) 
Exchange rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left 0.286*** 0.218** 0.213** 
 (0.107) (0.101) (0.102) 
Checks and Balances -0.030   
 (0.054)   
Regional Trade  -0.012  
  (0.020)  
Customs Union   -0.332 
   (0.822) 
Temporal trend -0.097*** -0.071** -0.077** 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) 
Lagged DV 0.456*** 0.470*** 0.471*** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) 
Observations 333 345 345 
R2 0.949 0.951 0.950 
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable is average level of ad-valorem Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) import tariff rate. All models are AR(1) autocorrelation Fixed Effects linear regressions with panel corrected 





Appendix B Table 5: Public Opinion and Non-Tariff Barriers: Alternative Models 












Public Support 0.919** 0.036*** 0.018** -0.039 
 (0.379) (0.012) (0.009) (0.060) 
GDP per capita 22.147*** 1.195*** 0.027 0.097 
 (6.364) (0.365) (0.750) (0.883) 
GDP growth -1.336 -0.040* -0.000 0.004 
 (0.814) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) 
Financial Openness -17.338 -0.271 0.906** 0.821 
 (15.438) (0.524) (0.460) (0.501) 
Exchange rate -0.016 -0.001* 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left 4.508 -0.042 -0.021 0.011 
 (9.483) (0.248) (0.124) (0.146) 
PR    0.991 
    (2.927) 
Public Support*PR    0.005 
    (0.045) 
Tradable Labor Force    -0.019 
    (0.073) 
Public Support*Tradable Labor Force    -0.000 
    (0.001) 
Trade Agencies    -0.525** 
    (0.218) 
Public Support*Trade Agencies    0.010** 
    (0.004) 
Lagged DV   0.006**  
   (0.003)  
Constant -209.553*** 4.906   
 (61.128) (32.483)   
ln(α)  0.395* -0.330 -0.372 
Observations 367 367 367 362 
AIC 3550.442 2922.615 2699.796 2684.164 
BIC 3577.780 2957.763 2734.944 2738.647 
R2 0.254    
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable is count of Non-Tariff Barriers reported by the 
government to the WTO, including price, quantity, and quality import control measures. Model 1 is linear probability 
models with robust jackknifed standard errors. Model 2 is negative binomial regression with robust jackknifed 
standard errors. Models 3 and 4 are negative binomial Fixed Effects regressions with robust clustered standard errors. 





Appendix B Table 6: Public Opinion and Non-Tariff Barriers: Other Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public Support -0.041 -0.040 -0.037 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.047) 
Personal Vote -0.046 -0.022 -0.016 
 (0.172) (0.167) (0.167) 
Public Support*Personal Vote 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tradable Labor Force -0.014 -0.025 -0.019 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.078) 
Public Support* Tradable Labor Force -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade Agencies -0.559* -0.548** -0.526* 
 (0.299) (0.278) (0.290) 
Public Support*Trade Agencies 0.011* 0.011* 0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
GDP per capita -0.064 0.273 0.032 
 (0.882) (0.864) (0.869) 
GDP growth 0.009 -0.007 0.007 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Financial Openness 0.895* 0.626 0.863* 
 (0.526) (0.567) (0.522) 
Exchange rate 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left 0.016 -0.015 0.005 
 (0.126) (0.116) (0.116) 
Checks and Balances 0.005   
 (0.100)   
Regional Trade  0.050*  
  (0.030)  
Customs Union   -2.163*** 
   (0.394) 
Temporal trend 0.015 -0.019 0.011 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
ln(α) -0.328 -0.385 -0.362 
Observations 347 362 362 
AIC 2569.858 2683.595 2687.369 
BIC 2627.598 2741.969 2741.852 
Note: Pooled data, 18 countries, 1995-2017. Dependent variable is count of Non-Tariff Barriers reported by the 
government to the WTO, including price, quantity, and quality import control measures. All models are negative 
binomial regressions with robust clustered standard errors. AIC is Akaike information criterion. BIC is Bayesian 










Appendix B Table 7: Mediation Analysis: Trade Agencies 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 PTA PTA Tariff Rate Tariff Rate NTB NTB 
 First Stage Second 
Stage 
First Stage Second 
Stage 
First Stage Second 
Stage 
Public Support 0.022*  0.087* 0.024* -0.064* 0.022* 0.877** 
 (0.011) (0.046) (0.011) (0.035) (0.011) (0.376) 
Trade Agencies  0.386  -0.313  -0.371 
  (0.406)  (0.242)  (1.316) 
Personal Vote 0.172** -0.238 0.179**  0.270** 0.173**    1.087 
 (0.073) (0.160) (0.073) (0.120) (0.073) (1.035) 
Tradable Labor Force 0.022 0.442*** 0.023  -0.057 0.022    0.410 
 (0.044) (0.093) (0.041) (0.069) (0.044) (0.589) 
GDP per capita 0.186    15.681*** 0.187  0.633 0.186   27.280** 
 (0.824) (1.978) (0.779) (1.242) (0.824) (12.404) 
GDP growth -0.005  -0.128 -0.007  -0.098* -0.005    -1.375 
 (0.024) (0.088) (0.023) (0.052) (0.024) (0.872) 
Exchange rate -0.000  -0.010*** -0.001  0.000 -0.001    -0.024 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015) 
Financial Openness -2.467**  -0.981 -2.523***    -4.718*** -2.467***    -18.476 
 (0.849) (1.563) (0.817) (1.107) (0.849) (14.487) 
Left 0.533     0.093 0.500  -0.683 0.533    7.074 
 (0.341) (0.755) (0.312) (0.567) (0.341) (10.075) 
Constant 3.533  -154.692*** 3.377  13.768 3.533  -270.947* 



















 0.867  
[0.150, 1.583] 
 




 -0.010  
[-0.044, -0.005] 
 
Observations 347 347 341 341 347 347 
Adjusted R2 0.381 0.685 0.410 0.369 0.253 0.381 
Note: ACME (Average Causal Mediation Effect), ADE (Average Direct Effect). The 95% confidence interval is in 
brackets. Confidence intervals are estimated based on a nonparametric bootstrap with 1000 resamples. Mediation and 
outcome equations are estimated with OLS based on Imai et al. (2011). 
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